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Now, a tank of worms crawl out of DRDO’s Arjun

Natteri Adigal

30 April 2008, Wednesday

CLOSE ON the heels of the Indian Air Force (IAF) being slammed by ultra-patriotic scientists and technologists, it is now the turn of the Directorate General of Mechanised Warfare (DGMF) to get the beating from bureaucrats and politicians, batting for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The R&D behemoth, which routinely hogs media limelight for the feel-good factor involved in its ‘breakthroughs’, considers IAF as insensitive to national pride. The airmen have chosen to be ‘disloyal’ to the country and send out a Request for Proposal (RFP) to six global manufacturers for the acquisition of 126 multi-role combat aircrafts. If IAF is unpatriotic for losing faith in the ever-elusive ‘Tejas’ light combat aircraft (LCA), the Army is accused of being extremely reluctant to induct ’Arjun’ battle tanks, “successfully developed indigenously” by it. Citing that the indigenous tank has undergone extensive trials – driven over 75,000 km, fired over10,000 ammunition rounds – they claim the Arjuns have proven themselves.


The Army seems more keen on inducting foreign tanks at great cost rather than indigenous ones,” says a high profile lobbyist engaged by DRDO. The Indian Army has been obliquely accused of ’internal sabotage’ of the nationally important strategic project. Rao Inderjit Singh, the honourable minister of state in charge of defence production in the Manmohan Singh government has implied disloyalty of the combat officers from the mechanised forces of the Army, by stating, “The possibility of sabotage in the recent winter trials of the (Arjun) tanks should be examined.” The dignitary is not – as one might imagine from his authoritative note – a knowledgeable one-time military officer, well versed in tank warfare. Inderjit Singh is supposed to be a ’humble’ farmer cum lawyer and owes his position to former chief minister of Haryana and his illustrious father, Rao Birender Singh, noted as past master in the game of political disloyalty and defection. Far from being a decorated officer, he is unlikely to have attended any National Cadet Corps (NCC) drill as a student!


DRDO was assigned the work of building India’s own Main Battle Tank (MBT) in 1974. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was set on projecting herself as a formidable leader of the Indian Ocean region after her ‘triumph’ in creating Bangladesh and becoming ‘Durga’ in the eyes of gullible Indians. Just like the indigenous development of nuclear reactors and weapons undertaken by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the only achievement of DRDO in the MBT project was to give it a formidable name – Arjun! It missed deadline after deadline on targets set by itself. While the unfulfilled promises of BARC about a breakthrough in nuclear power sector being just around the corner, could be made up by setting up numerous inefficient thermal power plants, similar hollow promises by DRDO about the MBT (as well as about the LCA) did not present any such alternative to the defence services. Eventually, the organisation that has become noted for sky-high levels of nepotism, corruption and non-performance, lost any semblance of trust it had enjoyed with the Army and the IAF.


The army had to buy the T-72 tanks in late 1970s and T-90 tanks in the 1990s from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The ‘trusted friend’ of India was the monopoly supplier, enjoying good clout with top politicians and bureaucrats of New Delhi. So, the Army had to live with numerous technical glitches in these second grade tanks. Moscow sucked up billions of dollars from Indians in the guise of ‘rupee trade’, while worthies from Congress and communist parties were content with the crumbs thrown at them. In 2000, the Army was forced, despite serious deficiencies in the half baked imitations touted by DRDO, to place an order for 124 Arjun tanks. These were supposed to be manufactured by the Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF) at Avadi, near Chennai and handed over by 2008-09. Even as five machines submitted after long delays to the Army for Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AURT) are yet to be cleared, HVF claims to have ‘almost completed’ assembly of several tanks under this order at great expense.


Reporting on the third round of AURT last winter, when the tanks miserably failed to stand up to the stringent requirements, the Army told honourable MPs, comprising of the standing committee on defence, “We (Army) have just carried out the trial in winter. The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far... There has been a problem. The defence minister has been apprised by the (Army) chief... So, a lot of improvements have to be done before the Army will be satisfied with the Arjun tank.


The public relation folk of DRDO and India’s breed of armchair strategic analysts started finding fault with the Army, claiming that the DGMF systematically undermined the project. The super-brilliant scientists of DRDO went to the extent of questioning the intelligence of the Army officers. It was said that whenever they approached a technology solution, the Army would get new ideas from the latest issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly and upgrade the design goalposts! The logic of the soldiers that they could not accept a tank-equivalent of PC-XT in the age of Pentium 4 has been portrayed as their keenness to please foreign arms dealers!


Interestingly, the ‘indigenous’ Arjun is powered by a German engine and the transmission components are designed according to German technology, just like the ‘indigenous’ Tejas LCA has a General Electric power plant.In both cases, suboptimal design of the other components, awry integration of systems and too high a weight have led to the failure of proven engines.

The MPs, in their superior wisdom, have observed, “The committee, however, is startled to hear now from a representative of the Army that the Arjun tanks have performed very poorly and a lot of improvements have to be made before the Army is satisfied with the Arjun tank. It is not clear why things went wrong with the Arjun tank. In any case, the causes for the failure of the Arjun tank should be identified without loss of time...”It requires only a little bit of common sense to make the causes clear!


The netas and babus want the Army and IAF to emulate the Indian Navy and fully participate in indigenous design and development of their needs. The worthies have found fault with the soldiers for seeing “the Arjun not as a national defence project, but as a tank that they must drive into battle!” In effect, the netas are against adopting a ‘judgmental’ approach in approving indigenous items. Army Chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor has rushed to HVF as part of the stocktaking by the government, in the wake of failure of the trials. High pressure lobbying has been mounted to force the Army to somehow give grace marks and pass the Arjuns in the fourth round of AUCRT in May.

No rational person will find fault with combat officers from the mechanised forces for seeing the Arjun as a ’tank’. After all, the Army is supposed to maintain the tanks over extended periods in ‘combat-ready’ condition and can compromise on reliability only at the country’s peril. If the netas need to peddle feel-good euphoria to their illiterate vote banks, there are other areas for that. They can boast of any number of make-believe breakthroughs on other fronts – like Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles’ (ICBM), moon missions, submarine-fired nukes and such other fictitious strengths, which are never intended to be used. Any number of desk-bound, bogus scientists and technologists could be employed for that purpose. Similarly, our Navy is minuscule and has only a ceremonial presence. Even if all the allocated money is siphoned off in junks like Kitty Hawk or Admiral Gorshkov, it is not going to make much difference. But, when it comes to real military might, there can be no compromise on quality. It is heartening that the Army and IAF top brass are standing firm and not betraying their fighters. They simply cannot accept mediocre products that are even worse than Russian ones, just because they are ‘indigenous’ and can generate euphoria. Hopefully, the Army and IAF will succeed in drilling sanity into the heads of the babus and netas that manufacture of mission-critical equipment – and subsequently R&D at a later stage – are better left to be done by entities with core skills and requisite investments. They cannot be achieved just by hollow self-pride. Also, cutting edge R&D can have meaning only after high-tech manufacture is mastered.

In short welcome to the world of high tech manufacturing
 
In short welcome to the world of high tech manufacturing

Indeed very short. I suppose you meant high quality manufacturing, instead.

Technology can be acquired through T.o.T using diplomatic tactics, can be stolen or copied but there is no shortcut in the process of developing quality awareness and workmanship skills.
Good luck.
 
Arjun Tanks Failed To Deliver On Many Fronts: Defence Ministry
Monday 05th of May 2008

The defence ministry Monday admitted in Parliament that the indigenous main battle tank (MBT) Arjun has shown some recurring defects, besides having some faulty parts, in the just-concluded winter trials.

'Failure of power packs, lower accuracy and consistency have been noticed during the ongoing Accelerated User Cum Reliability Trials by the Army,' Minister of State for Defence (production) Rao Inderjit Singh told the Lok Sabha.

'During the trial, the tank also witnessed shearing of top rollers and chipping of gun barrels,' Singh added.

Last year, 14 Arjun tanks had been handed over to the Indian Army for user trials, but were returned to the manufacturer - the Combat Vehicles Development Establishment - with a list of defects.

These included a deficient fire control system, inaccuracy of its guns, low speeds in tactical areas - principally the desert - and the tank's inability to operate in temperatures over 50 degrees Celsius.

Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor had gone to the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Tamil Nadu April 24 to inspect the Arjun tank after it failed the winter trials.

The army had told a key parliamentary panel earlier this month that the Arjun tank, which has been in development for nearly 36 years, had failed to deliver at the just-concluded winter trials in Rajasthan. After the winter trials, conducted at below 40 degrees Celsius, the army said the tank needed a lot of improvement before it could be inducted.

Kapoor and his predecessor J.J. Singh have on separate occasions expressed their unhappiness with the tank.

'What we have today is a mid-level technology. What we need is a tank of international quality,' Kapoor had said in November.

J.J. Singh had spoken in much the same vein during a major Indian Army exercise in the deserts of Rajasthan in April-May 2007.

The army had laid down its qualitative requirement (QR) for the Arjun in 1972. In 1982, it was announced that the prototype was ready for field trials. However, the tank was publicly unveiled for the first time only in 1995.

Arjun was originally meant to be a 40-tonne tank with a 105 mm gun. It has now grown to a 50-tonne tank with a 120 mm gun.

The tank was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBT that was first inducted in the early 1980s.

However, delays in the Arjun project and Pakistan's decision to purchase the T-80 tank from Ukraine prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001.

Of these, 186 were assembled from kits at the HVF at Avadi. An agreement was also signed for the licensed production of another 1,000 T-90s.

With the development of the Arjun delayed further, India last year signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy another 330 T-90s.

The summer trials will be conducted in Rajasthan soon.
NOT AGAIN :hitwall:
All not well with Arjun tanks, admits Govt
 
Five ‘defects’ in Arjun tanks listed
New Delhi, May 5: The government has listed five "defects" noticed in the Arjun tanks during user trials conducted by the Army. These are "failure of power packs, low accuracy and consistency, failure of hydropneumatic suspension units, shearing of top rollers, and chipping of gun barrels".
 
Defects found in Arjun tank during trial: Govt
5 May 2008, 2126 hrs IST,PTI

NEW DELHI: The country's indigenous main battle tank Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials, the Lok Sabha was informed on Monday.

The tanks also had problems with consistency, recorded failure of hydropenumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls, the Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh said in a written reply.

"The rectification of these defects and performance of the tanks was being closely monitored," he said.

The minister's findings to the House came in the wake of his recent comments that Army sabotaging the tanks' final pre-induction trials could not be ruled out.

The Defence Ministry then rushed the Army Chief to Avadi Tank factory near Chennai to inspect the war machines afresh. Later, the Army said it would induct the tanks after defects were rectified.

Singh said there was some delay in the issue of tanks to the Army due to design modifications and removal of defects noticed during various trials.

He said the manufacture of the tank was being monitored by a team headed by director general of mechanised forces and a steering committee under the chairmanship of the secretary defence production and scientific advisor to the Defence Minister.

:: Bharat-Rakshak.com - Indian Military News Headlines ::
 
The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Nation

T-20 tanks need cooling

Now what is this T-20

Army proposes air-conditioners
Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, May 20
India’s main battle tank, the Russian-built T-90, is facing problems with its sophisticated computerised systems as they are not working properly in high temperatures which is a routine during the summer in Rajasthan and parts of Gujarat.

The Army has now requested the ministry of defence to install air-conditioners in the tanks as the electronics have been failing when temperatures rise above the 45° Celsius. Sources said the project to install air-conditioners would be handled in India only. It will be a big task as about 300 T-90 tanks are required to be re-fitted and equipped with a cooling system.

The heat is hampering the working of the sophisticated system on board and also slows down the firing capability. Modern tanks, like modern aircraft, have a very sensitive sensor and computer-based firing and navigation system. The source added that the Defence Research and Development Organisation would be roped in for the project that would require some hardcore engineering work.

However, it will not be an easy job. The tank does not have space within its exterior armour that can take an AC unit. Moreover, an externally mounted AC unit will be a liability in case of a conflict. Also an auxillary power unit will be required to power the AC. Again fitting this power unit will be task in itself, said a top official.

The existing power system drawn from a 1000 horse power engine may not be enough to run the 46-tonne tank and also power the AC. And this is not some normal air conditioning it will require a powerful AC as the temperatures in the desert areas like Barmer, located smack on the border with Pakistan, go up to the 50° C mark. And the inside of the tank can be even more heat generating. The temperature inside the chamber will be required to be brought down to a comfortable 30 degrees as the hood will be required to be closed to make the AC effective.

Even if the auxiliary power system is fitted it will need fuel to run and this will mean drawing fuel from the tank’s existing supplies.

In the past it has been observed that the systems of the tanks gets heated so much that ice packs were needed to cool them.
 
Arjun Mk2 MBT’s pre-production prototype to rollout by mid-2009


By Prasun K. Sengupta

May (2008)
Feature / Report
The Field is Open
Pay Back Time
Smooth Sailing
Eastern Showcase


Unfazed and undeterred by the quality-control problems that have beset the series-production phase of the Arjun Mk1 main battle tank (MBT) at the assembly line of the ministry of defence-owned Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi, the DRDO’s Avadi-based Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment has embarked upon the development of the third-generation Arjun Mk2 MBT, whose first pre-production prototype is due for rollout by mid-2009, as per present estimates. As per the Army HQ’s General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR), this MBT — to be manned by a three-man crew complement will have a redesigned rear hull section and turret, an enhanced powerpack, a turret-mounted autoloader coupled to a redesigned turret bustle, an improved 120mm rifled-bore main gun controlled by a new hunter-killer digital fire-control system (DFCS), and a novel environment control system being co-developed with Israel’s Kinetics Ltd that will provide NBC air filtration/over-pressure generation, as well as cooling for the vectronics (all built by the MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd) and crew compartment. The redesign of the Arjun Mk2’s hull and turret sections, and R&D work on the autoloader is being undertaken with the help of France’s Nexter Systems.

The main gun, which currently has a barrel length of 44 calibres, will be increased to 52 calibres by the DRDO’s Pune-based Armaments R&D Establishment. The gyro-stabilised gun will be insulated with a thermal sleeve and will incorporate a muzzle reference system, as well as an automatic compressed air fume extraction system instead of the Arjun Mk1’s existing fume extraction cylinder. The turret, to have a rotation time of nine seconds through 360 degrees, is being redesigned around the ammunition autoloader, which will hold 22 rounds of up to five types of ready-to-fire rounds and will permit a rate of fire of 12 shots per minute. Another 20 rounds and their modular charges will be housed within a pressurised turret bustle whose temperature will be cryogenically controlled. The main gun, to have a combat range of 5.5km when firing FSAPDS kinetic-energy rounds, will have maximum elevation/depression angles of +20 degrees and -9 degrees. The Arjun Mk2 will share with its predecessor the same imported all-electric power traverse system (supplied by Germany’s ESW Extel Systems Wedel), which comprises the automatic elevating and traversing drives with semi-automatic back-up, direct gun-laying with electrical instruments control and manual control. The DFCS will include an independent commander’s panoramic sight incorporating a medium-range uncooled thermal imager, and the Sagem Défense Sécurité-built IRIS thermal camera of the gunner’s sight that can ‘see’ at around 5.5km, recognise a target at 3.1km and identify targets at 2.5km. The gunner’s sight will incorporate an ‘auto tracker’ — an optronic system based on image processing that will simultaneously track up to six moving targets. As the gunner’s sight is fixed on a target, a picture analysis will take place. When the target moves, the 120mm gun and the gunner’s sight will get aligned with the target and will move automatically while keeping the target in focus. This is particularly good in cross-country terrain when the target is moving and the MBT might go through bumps or twists or turns for manoeuvring, but the ‘auto tracker’ will not lose sight of the target. Presently, the Arjun Mk1 uses a ‘director mode’ for track initiation. On the Arjun Mk2, the top mirror of the gunner’s sight will be independently stabilised, and a digital ballistics computer will evaluate the elevation of both the top mirror and the main gun, as well as the angle of the turret. There will be a continuous feeding of these parameters into the ballistics computer, which in turn will give electronic instructions to the all-electric gun-control system. Hence, the crosshairs of the gunner’s sight will be right in the middle of the target even in a cross-country environment. If, momentarily the gun is misaligned, the firing circuit will remain closed and the gunner will not be able to fire. The DFCS will receive all required meteorological data from IRDAM SA of Switzerland’s Model 2156B sensor that will measure wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and atmospheric pressure. All-terrain navigational accuracy will be provided by a fibre optic gyro-based autonomous land navigation system (ALNS) that can store more than 100 routes and 500 waypoints. The communications element of the Arjun Mk2’s vectronics suite will include a digital universal control harness duplex communications system for ensuring voice and data communications between the MBT commander, gunner and driver, and an AQ-6411 intercom system meant for inter-communications between crews of the host MBT and also with other MBT crews through the STARS V50WFF LVM-271 radio. Also using this radio will be a BEL-built battlespace management system (BMS), which will allow all friendly MBTs to share a common operating picture and give senior armoured corps commanders a comprehensive view of the battle space. It will also free up frontline MBT commanders from routine reporting tasks. The BMS will be capable of displaying relevant digital moving map data (in 2-D) and plotting of own position, will offer zooming, panning, fit-all, overlay and refresh modes, will plot the positions of friend or foe as well as mines, bunkers etc using different symbols, will generate path profiles, will send situation reports and receive operational order updates. The BMS will also be linked to the MBT’s on-board health and usage monitoring system (HUMS), an achievement that will significantly reduce the MBT’s operational logistics demands.

A Complete News Magazine on National Security
 
Arjun Mk2 MBT’s pre-production prototype to rollout by mid-2009

Unfazed and undeterred by the quality-control problems that have beset the series-production phase of the Arjun Mk1 main battle tank (MBT) at the assembly line of the ministry of defence-owned Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi,

A Complete News Magazine on National Security

So this means the army is not cribbing about the TANK as such, also the so called defects are more to do with Avadi. Thats finally a good news after a very long time.
 
The Arjun battle tank acquires a growing fan club


India's own Arjun tank is finally proving its worth. Despite continuing criticism from an army establishment that judges the Arjun far more strictly than foreign purchases like the T-90, the Arjun is successfully completing a gruelling 5,000-kilometre trial in the Rajasthan desert.

During six months of trials, the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), along with tank crews from the army's 43 Armoured Regiment, have proved not just the Arjun's endurance, but also the ability of its computer-controlled gun to consistently blow away suitcase-sized targets placed more than a kilometre away.

The army's Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which must eventually okay the tank, is not impressed but key decision-makers are rallying behind the Arjun.

The head of the Pune-based Southern Command, Lieutenant General N Thamburaj, strongly backs the Arjun. On a visit to the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan to watch his troops exercising, Lt Gen Thamburaj noticed the Arjun firing nearby.

After walking across, he was invited by the DRDO team to drive and fire the tank. Half an hour later, the general was an Arjun backer; two holes in the target he aimed at testified that a soldier without previous experience operating tanks could get into the Arjun and use it effectively.

Business Standard has evidence of many more such incidents. On June 29, 2006, the commander of the elite 31 Armoured Division, Major General BS Grewal, visited the Mahajan Ranges along with a colleague, Major General Shiv Jaswal. Both drove and fired the Arjun for the first time that day; the two rounds that each fired punched holes through targets almost two kilometres away (see picture).

That same month, 43 Armoured Regiment, which is the first army tank unit equipped with the Arjun, pronounced itself delighted with the Arjun's firing performance. After firing trials in summer 2006, 43 Armoured Regiment endorsed: "The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun have been proved beyond doubt."

But the establishment was quick to strike back. Barely three months after that report, the commanding officer of 43 Armoured Regiment, Colonel D Thakur, was confronted by the then Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen DS Shekhawat. Eyewitnesses describe how he was upbraided for "not conducting the trials properly". But in a career-threatening display of professional integrity, Colonel Thakur's brigade commander, Brigadier Chandra Mukesh, intervened to insist that the trials had been conducted correctly.

In a series of interviews with the army, including the present Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, and with the MoD top brass, Business Standard has learned that opposition to the Arjun remains deeply entrenched. This despite the soldiers of 43 Armoured Regiment declaring that if it came to war, they would like to be in an Arjun.

Minister of State for Defence Production, Rao Inderjeet Singh recounts: "I've spoken, off the record, to officers who have gone through the trials. Even the crews (from 43 Armoured Regiment)… who have been testing the tank… I forced them to choose between the Russian tanks and the Arjun.

I said, you've driven this tank and you've driven that tank (the T-90). Now mark them out of ten, which tank is better? And I've found that the Arjun tank was given more numbers than the T-90 tank."

With new confidence, the Arjun's developer, the Central Vehicles R&D Establishment (CVRDE), is arguing strongly for "comparative trials", in which the Arjun would be pitted head-to-head, in identical conditions, with the army's T-90 and T-72 tanks. But the DGMF continues to resist any such face-off.
 
Arjun versus T-90: Army avoiding trials



Defence (MoD) officials, confident that the Arjun is superior to the army's Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks, are demanding "comparative trials", where the Arjun, the T-72 and the T-90 are put through endurance and firing trials in identical conditions.

But the army — particularly the nodal Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF) — is shying away. Earlier, the DGMF declared that the T-72 and T-90 were proven tanks, which needed no further trials.

Now, with the MoD adding its voice to the demand for comparative trials, the DGMF has told Business Standard that they must be put off until the army gets a full squadron of Arjun tanks (14 tanks) and absorbs the expertise to use them.

DRDO sources say the army is stonewalling on accepting the Arjun by demanding levels of performance that neither of its Russian tanks can deliver. Meanwhile, more T-90s are being imported from Russia on the plea that the army is falling short of tanks.

The DRDO's fears are grounded in experience. On July 28, 2005, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee informed Parliament, "The Arjun tank is superior to (the) T-90 tank due to its high power to weight ratio, superior fire on the move capability during day and night and excellent ride comfort. MBT Arjun has gone through all the tests and it is meeting the (requirements) of the Army."

But a year later, in December 2007, India bought 347 more T-90s for Rs 4,900 crores. That despite the MoD's admission in Parliament that the 310 T-90s purchased earlier had problems with their Invar missile systems, and the thermal imagers that are crucial for night fighting.

A comparative trial, says the DRDO, will conclusively establish that the Arjun is a better tank than the T-90. That will at least put a stop to the import of more T-90s.

But the DGMF is putting off such a trial. The DG of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, told Business Standard, "The Arjun is based on a very stringent GSQR and is in a class by itself. User trials are conducted based on this GSQR. Nevertheless, comparative trials will be conducted once a squadron worth of tanks (i.e. 14 Arjun tanks) is inducted in the army."

This new insistence on 14 tanks will delay the trials at least till December 8. In 2005, the army had agreed to comparative trials, with five Arjun tanks pitted against five T-72s and an equal number of T-90s.

The DGMF had even written the trial directive, spelling out how trials would be conducted. Those trials were postponed as the Arjun was not ready to operate in high summer temperatures. Now, the Arjun is ready but the army is not.

Top MoD officials are no longer buying the DGMF's argument that the Arjun is a dud. The MoD wants comparative trials too. Minister of State for Defence Production, Rao Inderjit Singh, told Business Standard, "The proof of the pudding will be in comparing the Arjun tank with the T-90 tank, as imported. The T-90 is supposed to be a frontline tank; let it have it out with the Arjun. Let them slug it out in the desert … and see which comes off best."

Besides demanding more Arjun tanks in the trials, the DGMF is also proposing to conduct the trials differently. Comparative trials are normally a straightforward test of equipment capability, with all the tanks driving through the same course and firing at similar targets to determine which of them does better.

But the DGMF now plans to add a tactical - and therefore subjective - dimension. The Arjun, the T-72 and the T-90 squadrons will be given operational tasks, e.g. capturing a hill some 150 kilometres away.

The DRDO is crying foul. Major General HM Singh, who spearheaded the Arjun's development for the last 28 years until he retired a fortnight ago, points out that inserting tactics into the trials would give the army a way of putting down the Arjun.

In a tactical exercise the tactical skills of the crew - something that is irrelevant in evaluating a tank - can determine the outcome of the trials. Gen HM Singh asks, "What is it that cannot be determined with five tanks, but can be with fourteen?"
 
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Ajai Shukla: Finding the right bullies
BROADSWORD
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi June 17, 2008, 4:47 IST
The unseemly squabbling between the army and the DRDO over the Arjun tank invites a wider debate on how India must shape its mechanised forces. This vital branch of any military launches attacks into an enemy country, its tanks, armoured carriers and airmobile forces sweeping into the opponent's heartland, dislocating his planning and breaking his will to fight. If it came to war with Pakistan, India's three "strike corps", as these mechanised formations are termed, would not dally at the border. Their objective would be the towns and cities along the Indus.


As Lt. Gen. BM Kapur (Retired), one of India's more flamboyant strike corps commanders, loved to declare, "My corps has no tasks on the territory of India."

The key player in these strike operations is the main battle tank — the MBT in military parlance — which, for India, is the Russian T-72 and T-90 tank. The "bully of the battlefield", as the MBT has been called, must be a multi-faceted fellow. It must be highly mobile on roads and cross-country; it must have a capable, computer-enhanced gun to dominate the battlefield; it must be strongly armoured to protect its crew; and it must be self-contained, carrying ammunition and fuel for days of battle deep inside enemy territory.

In the late 20th century India could get by with its Russian fleet. Those tanks were cheap, rugged, effective, and faced simpler threats. Pakistan's tank fleet was outdated, its air force was not getting additional F-16s from the US and JF-17s from China, and the Dragon himself was a relatively benign blip on the threat radar.

But now India's tank fleet must cater for a wider range of threats than the Pakistan border, where 58 out of the army's 59 tank regiments are currently deployed. The entire northeast of the country — an 11,000-kilometre border with China, Bangladesh and Myanmar is allotted just one regiment of 45 tanks.

Though the Russian T-72s and T-90s are too heavy for the riverine and mountainous northeast, the army has dragged its feet for decades in identifying and procuring a lighter tank. China is flexing its muscles over the so-called Finger Area in North Sikkim, an ideal deployment area for a detachment of Indian light tanks. But the long-standing proposal for acquiring a brigade (three regiments) of light tanks for northeast India is still in the seminar rooms of the army; it has not yet been sent on to the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

When asked why, the army's Director General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, responded with a terse written statement: "The current fleet of tanks in Mech(anised) Forces (sic) is well equipped to execute operations efficiently in all types of terrain i.e. deserts, canal and riverine terrain. We are studying the proposal for a lighter weight tank for other terrains, specifically in the NE (northeast). This of course is a futuristic requirement."

Light tanks are needed also for India's amphibious forces, which protect island territories like the Andaman and the Lakshadweep archipelagos and offshore assets like Bombay High. The Hyderabad-based 54 Infantry Division is earmarked for amphibious tasks; the Indian Navy has built landing ships for tanks; it has bought the INS Jalashwa (formerly the USS Trenton) from the United States. But it hasn't bought the light tanks that will be launched from these ships — an essential component of any amphibious force.

Light tanks are required also for airmobile operations. India has one of the world's very few militaries with strategic airlift capability, its giant IL-76 aircraft able to drop a brigade of paratroopers onto objectives far from India. In November 1988, when Tamil mercenaries invaded the Maldives, two Indian battalions were dropped from IL-76 aircraft to restore peace. They did what was asked but if a parachute force were to encounter serious fighting, they would need tank backup that isn't there today. The IL-76 can just about carry one Russian MBT, but it cannot para-drop it. A light tank, which could be air-transported and para-dropped, is a critical need.

A light tank is also needed against the growing threat of urban terrorism. Currently, India's military, police and paramilitary forces use a variety of improvised vehicles, with armour-plates welded on, when they need fire support for operations in towns or cities. Lives would be saved by a light tank, which can drive and manoeuvre in twisty streets and elevate its gun to fire at terrorists holed up in higher floors. A cleft turret fitted onto a light tank would give India this capability.

The military's inertia on the light tank is matched by its foot-dragging over the heavy Arjun MBT. Compared to the 42-ton T-72 and the 46-ton T-90, the muscular 58-ton Arjun is just the right bully for a battlefield where tank killing is an increasingly popular activity. Its Kanchan armour (named after Kanchanbagh, Hyderabad, where it was designed) adds weight; but provides reassuring protection against enemy aircraft, artillery, attack helicopters, tanks, missile carriers and shoulder-fired rocket launchers, all of which are seeking to make their day by destroying a tank.

While the weight of the Arjun would be a liability in the canal-crossed plains of Punjab, it would be transformed into an asset in the open deserts of southern Rajasthan, where one of India's strike corps invariably operates. Equipping that formation with the Arjun would dramatically increase its punch. Such a decision would also provide the tank's designers with a clear idea of what strengths they must build into future variations of the Arjun.
 
Is Arjun still go ahead or is it being avoided by the Indian Army.

The IA is increasingly getting polarized on the Arjun issue.

It does look like as though the pro-Arjun faction is gaining strength day by day.

Arjun won't be ignored by the IA; the implications of such a move would be huge.

Plus, its a significant improvement over the T-90/72s that the IA is used to.
 
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