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All dressed up and no takers
Sandeep Unnithan
September 5, 2008
Space is at a premium at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Avadi on the outskirts of Chennai. But these are no ordinary motor cars which need parking. Rows of battle tanks lie jammed, spilling out of the factory premises. Parking a monster that is the size of a city bus but at 60 tonne weighs heavier than a railway coach, is no easy task.
Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) officials have asked for parking space at the nearby Combat Vehicles R&D Establishment (CVRDE) that designed the tank, even as they worry about sheltering their monsters and its electronics from the elements.
In the past four years, over 90 Arjun main battle tanks have rolled off the production line that made India's first indigenous tank-part of an order for 124 tanks that was placed six years ago.
In late August this year, the army completed nearly a year of what it calls Accelerated User Cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT) and somewhat unprecedented, extended trials in the desert of Rajasthan.
Trials that tested the three characteristics of any battle tank-firepower, mobility and protection. From all accounts the tank finally morphed from a white elephant into an extreme battle machine worthy of its moniker.
So far 15 Pre-Production Series (PPS) tanks have completed a cumulative 80,000 km, or the equivalent of two trips around the world, and fired over 8,000 rounds.
The Arjun tankTwo tanks covering over 6,000 km or nearly twice the distance they are supposed to cover in 10 years. Now, the army is poring over the trial reports to decide whether the crowded tank lot at Avadi will equip at least three of the army's 61 armoured regiments.
There's just a catch. The army has pronounced its verdict. It wants more tanks-armoured fists that are used to punch through enemy lines and an essential component of its Cold Start battle strategy-but it does not want the Arjun.
Speaking at a recent CII seminar on the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT), Lt General Dalip Bharadwaj, director general, Mechanised Forces said the army will not place orders for Arjun beyond the 124 already on order because it is "now looking 20 years ahead and wants a futuristic MBT".
His predecessor, Lt General (retd.) K.D.S. Shekhawat is blunter. "The DRDO does not want to own up, the Arjun is based on the German Army's Leopard-1 design which entered service in the mid-1960s. It outlived its life over a decade ago.
Today, every tank in the world, including the Leopard-2 and T-90, have sloped turrets (to reduce the impact of a hit) but the Arjun still continues with the rectangular turret."
The DRDO is combative and not only because the project is the baby of the current chief M. Natarajan. "The Arjun can handle all present and future threats," says the DRDO.
This war of words between the army and DRDO could well be among the penultimate chapters in the long sad story of a saga that began with the army placing General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) for an indigenous tank in May 1974.
The project was to cost Rs 15.50 crore and to be completed in a decade. The first production model of 'Chetak', as it was then called, which rolled out in 1984, was wisely renamed the Arjun.
Plagued by technical glitches—its European electronics did not work in the searing circuit—melting 50 degree heat of the Thar desert-the final production series tank was not delivered until 1995 or a decade after the original deadline.
Arjun tanks at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in ChennaiPerhaps the DRDO strategically overreached itself on this project as it had on several others. It agreed to deliver everything on the tank when it should have gone in for a no-frills Mark 1. This was clearly not the case when the tank was due for induction into service by an already extended deadline of 1995 and an exasperated army did not get its tanks.
The army, which has around 3,500 tanks in 61 armoured regiments—each with 45 tanks, mostly T-72s imported and licence-produced from Russia in the early '80s serving as first line MBTs-has this complaint. The Arjun did not come on time.
Not even when the acquisition of 300 Ukranian missile-firing T-80s UD MBTs by Pakistan in 1997 dangerously tilted the balance of armoured power on the subcontinent. (Tanks can only be used on the deserts and plains of India's western borders).
Even during Operation Parakram, the near-war with Pakistan in December 2001, the army found its T-72s, obsolete T-55s and Vijayantas staring down the gunsights of the more modern T-80s. There was no sign of the Arjun.
Delays in productionising the design ensured the order for 124 tanks was not placed to the OFB until 2002 and production did not begin until 2004 or nearly three decades after the project had been conceived. "The Arjun was not available when we needed it," says a senior army official.
The army was hence forced to import 310, T-90 tanks from Russia in 2001 to sharpen the tip of its armoured spear. The door had begun to close on the Arjun which was still jumping through the hoops of the army's trials.
Even as the tank struggled to meet GSQRs, the army would add new demands citing delays and changes in the global scenario. "The army's GSQR was always a moving goal post," says a DRDO-armoured vehicle scientist. "You cannot have a tank with the best-of-the-world-systems."
Yet the Arjun managed to do this and more. Some of the state-of-the-art technologies incorporated in the tank include a modern fire control system with Fire Control Computer and multiple rocket system-which gives it the ability to blast targets placed over a km away while on the move, a gas-based suspension, a unique 'Kanchan' composite armour capable of withstanding direct hits from T-72 and T-90 tanks , lethally accurate fin-stabilised armour piercing discarding sabot ammunition and kinetic energy penetrators which can shatter enemy tanks, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical protection not to speak of the ability of the 60-tonne monster to spin full circle on a coin in 12 seconds.
During the desert trials which concluded last week the tanks also rectified two problems raised by Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor during a visit to the CVRDE in May-premature failure of engine transmission and gun accuracy.
However, it finds that the army has shifted the goal posts again. This time, to over the horizon. "Arjun is a contemporary tank and may be used in the next decade or so, but not for next generation warfare some two decades hence," says Bharadwaj.
In the meantime, the army has gone ahead and ordered an additional 330 T-90 tank kits and another 1,000 T-90s from Russia to be assembled at the HVF, Avadi, a deal that actually saved Russia's largest tank manufacturer, Ural Vagon Zavod from shutdown.
By 2020, the army hopes to field a force of over 21 regiments of T-90 tanks and 40 regiments of modified T-72s. The DRDO has been arguing for a slice of the pie-a mix of heavy tanks including the Arjun and medium tanks like the T-72 and T-90.
But the army is not convinced. It has rejected the DRDO's offer of Arjun Mark-2-featuring uprated engines, digital fire control and a battlefield management system with the ability to 'talk' to other assets, which it claims it can field in five years.
The army insists it wants nothing short of a futuristic tank. Yet, despite repeated reminders over the past two years, the army is yet to even furnish the DRDO its requirements.
Has the door been closed on Arjun? Not just yet. Senior Defence Ministry officials have indicated an order for a second batch of modified 124 Arjun tanks as a face-saver for the DRDO and that would be the end of the programme. "After that we want the DRDO to focus on building the FMBT."
The army will buy over 1,600 T-90s in 12 yearsThe DRDO which says it needs an order of at least 376 more tanks to breakeven on the project investments of around Rs 370 crore is now scrambling to integrate Arjun-2 features on the promised second batch.
The DRDO is also pressing for comparative trials of the Arjun with the T-90 known as the 'Bhishma' in the army, in Rajasthan later this year. It is a desperate rearguard action where the agency hopes to repeat mythology, but this is a contest the army is keen to avoid. "It's just a ploy to fool the bureaucrats," snarls a senior army official.
The army concedes that the Arjun programme was a learning experience—on how not to execute a project and the necessity for closer user-interface. "As users we did not get adequately involved in the project as say the navy does," says Shekhawat. "Army officers posted on the project reported to the DRDO and not to army HQ. In the end, the DRDO did not get honest advice," he says.
The battle over the Arjun is not just about a tank. It is about the shaky but obligatory path of building of indigenous defence capability. Why for instance, India's stunning success in the space industry has not translated into defence industry?
These are matters which transcend the bean counters at service headquarters into the realm of higher national strategic planning. India already has the dubious distinction of being the world's second largest importer of defence items, abjectly dependent on foreign suppliers who sit on the UN Security Council, where it aspires to be-to supply basics like tanks and fighter aircraft.
There are some answers under the hood of the Arjun—only the third complete defence system produced indigenously after the Akash medium-range surface-to-air missile and the Pinaka rocket system.
A raft of systems made indigenously talks about the tremendous force-multiplier effect of this programme. Its gearbox is common with the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft and indigenous gas-based suspension compares with the best in the world.
Sure, nearly 60 per cent of the components of the first batch of 124 tanks, including the German-built power pack are imported. The DRDO says these will be reduced to under 30 per cent after it builds 500 tanks.
"We are not ashamed of the delays but ashamed of the fact that we cannot sell it within our own country," says a senior DRDO scientist. An Arjun with no takers in India. That would be a tragedy of epic proportions.
Why the Arjun is grounded
Army’s view
Arjun is horribly late. Should have been inducted a decade ago when Pakistan began inducting T-80s.
Requirements changed because DRDO took time to deliver first batch of tanks.
Tank is good but relevant only for 10-15 years. We want future tanks.
Don’t want Arjun-2. Are importing over 1,600 T-90 tanks from Russia.
DRDO should work on Future MBT design for the army
DRDO view
Development cycle and delays in productionising the tank at OFB. Army kept changing requirements.
Army always wanted ‘best in the world’ systems and we had to satisfy them.
Order 376 more Arjuns, we’ll give you a more sophisticated Arjun-2.
Take the T-90s but also order 500 indigenous Arjuns.
Army yet to give us FMBT design for two years now.
