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A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

I think what @PanzerKiel means is that the forces in Quetta are critically important for defending Pakistan between Nawabshah to Rahimyar Khan. There are few major formations south.
I didnt reply Pk further regarding this matter as it would become an argument.

Marines cannot conduct an offensive on their own, they use resources from Navy. A joint Ops with Army can provide such resources for marines also. Again, 5 Corps has its own AOR and its massive, when compared to other Corps deployed on eastern side.

Correct!

Most 33 Div brigades are based in east-Balochistan and its structure suggests this is a counterattack force available at the command level.
33rd will be deployed in a new terrain in any case, whether 5 Corps AOR or south of it. If 5-Corps assets will be used with PM near creek area and further towards Bhuj, this will further thin it out. Its best to keep 5-Corps assigned where its meant to operate.
 
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I didnt reply Pk further regarding this matter as it would become an argument.

Marines cannot conduct an offensive on their own, they use resources from Navy. A joint Ops with Army can provide such resources for marines also. Again, 5 Corps has its own AOR and its massive, when compared to other Corps deployed on eastern side.


33rd will be deployed in a new terrain in any case, whether 5 Corps AOR or south of it. If 5-Corps assets will be used with PM near creek area and further towards Bhuj, this will further thin it out. Its best to keep 5-Corps assigned where its meant to operate.

I didn't propose that Marines attack the Bhuj salient alone. My war game addresses this and many other similar manpower shortage issues. Allowing second tier forces to play rear guard frees up a lot of the PA forces for offensive operations. Which is the exact point of the battle concepts I've illustrated in this thread. The main key takeaway.
 
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I didn't propose that Marines attack the Bhuj salient alone. My war game addresses this and many other similar manpower shortage issues. Allowing second tier forces to play rear guard frees up a lot of the PA forces for offensive operations. Which is the exact point of the battle concepts I've illustrated in this thread. The main key takeaway.

My simple point is that, at Army level, if the Army commander has employed both his strike forces (ARN and ARS, and elements of defensive Corps) for offensive...... with no uncommitted forces at hand for unforeseen, counter offensive or even offensive options, then he is out of a job. Same principle holds till the lowest level of command.

You can do the maths now.
 
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My simple point is that, at Army level, if the Army commander has employed both his strike forces (ARN and ARS, and elements of defensive Corps) for offensive...... with no uncommitted forces at hand for unforeseen, counter offensive or even offensive options, then he is out of a job. Same principle holds till the lowest level of command.

You can do the maths now.

My great teacher, in my scenario that is the hordes of infantry divisions raised from the 200,000 conscripts and surplus Chinese equipment. If you notice in the older maps its the units marked in red.
 
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My great teacher, in my scenario that is the hordes of infantry divisions raised from the 200,000 conscripts and surplus Chinese equipment. If you notice in the older maps its the units marked in red.

What stops the other sides from raising the same hordes and neutralizing ours?

Actually trained manpower is what is exactly required, hordes would prove to be only cannon fodder. I still remember a Soviet Divisional counter-attack outside Moscow against a German battalion group. The whole Division was massacred without a SINGLE casualty on the German side, thanks to their well sited automatics and infantry guns.

You are following OKW's / OKH's footsteps. A Divisional flag marked on a map doesnt necessarily mean that it is a full fledge, superbly trained formation and well equipped as well.
 
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33rd will be deployed in a new terrain in any case, whether 5 Corps AOR or south of it. If 5-Corps assets will be used with PM near creek area and further towards Bhuj, this will further thin it out. Its best to keep 5-Corps assigned where its meant to operate.

The length of border covered by PA 5 Corps is same as IA 12 Corps. I am suggesting usage of neither 5 Corps nor 33 Div for what is being imagined as an offensive in the marshes.

In this regard, lets start by looking at the size & assets of Pak Marines. And the formations that are expected to secure Pak coastal areas from IA/IN amphibious attacks.
 
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What stops the other sides from raising the same hordes and neutralizing ours?

Actually trained manpower is what is exactly required, hordes would prove to be only cannon fodder. I still remember a Soviet Divisional counter-attack outside Moscow against a German battalion group. The whole Division was massacred without a SINGLE casualty on the German side, thanks to their well sited automatics and infantry guns.

You are following OKW's / OKH's footsteps. A Divisional flag marked on a map doesnt necessarily mean that it is a full fledge, superbly trained formation and well equipped as well.

Here is how Soviets in the era you mentioned approached conscription - get a uniform, boots, give one guy a gun with ammo, give the next guy some ammo. Tell the to fight in a general direction with the second taking the rifle from the dead hands of the first.

This is a far cry from how the Swiss used it. Or how Israel (who took the Swiss template and reworked it) used it. Nor how countries like Taiwan and Singapore use conscript soldiers. There are over a dozen other highly successful examples of using conscription.

Why India can't do the same:

1. India can. But India doesn't have a numbers problem, Pakistan does.
2. India is less suited to doing so due to massive political differences in a very diverse federation that hates each other. Imagine Muslim conscripts turning their guns on their own. Remember how the Italian conscripts that didn't care about the war or Moussolini performed against Rommel in WWI ("Aviva German", surrendering in droves). Remember that South Indians would be least enthused to fight a north Indian war, or East Indians would find it alien to be fighting in Punjab or Rajasthan.
3. Just because India can doesn't mean we won't. Our defense policy should not be based on a "me too" strategy, rather it should be based on our needs. Our economy cannot afford a larger army, we have to improvise. We can't say "what if India does it too" and sit on our hands.
4. If we look at game theory and we assume the Indians are dumb enough to follow us into conscription, the ultimate outcome is in Pakistani favour -
a) because Indian governments will face a massive political backlash from conscription
b) India doesn't need conscription to begin with they have hordes of BSF, etc.
c) In the greater scheme of things, following conscription on both sides, the logical outcome is a reduction in force disparity in terms of ratios.

I hope I have addressed your concerns, if I haven't I can expand on this.
 
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The length of border covered by PA 5 Corps is same as IA 12 Corps. I am suggesting usage of neither 5 Corps nor 33 Div for what is being imagined as an offensive in the marshes.

In this regard, lets start by looking at the size & assets of Pak Marines. And the formations that are expected to secure Pak coastal areas from IA/IN amphibious attacks.

Our 5 Corps is faced by Indian 12 Corps (def) having one infantry division (reinforced), one RAPID (D) with Corps assets of Armored, Mechanised, Artillery and AD Brigades.
Moreover, 5 Corps also faces the 21 Indian Strike Corps of an Armored Division, RAPID (S) and a RAMFOR (54 Division). 21 Corps assets have additional AD, Engineers and Artillery Brigades.

Indian Southern Command, apart from 12 and 21 Corps, has part of Command assets an Artillery Division.

My point is that AOR of our 5 Corps and Indian SC may be equal, but their force potential is more than us.

Here is how Soviets in the era you mentioned approached conscription - get a uniform, boots, give one guy a gun with ammo, give the next guy some ammo. Tell the to fight in a general direction with the second taking the rifle from the dead hands of the first.

This is a far cry from how the Swiss used it. Or how Israel (who took the Swiss template and reworked it) used it. Nor how countries like Taiwan and Singapore use conscript soldiers. There are over a dozen other highly successful examples of using conscription.

Yes there are several successful examples, of course, but then, can conscription be implemented in a country like Pakistan. There lies in the problem. You cant just order Pakistanis to follow into conscription. Countries which follow it have several factors to aid them, such as, their previous military history and engagements, the prevailing threats they face, ideology, economy, type of government, military machine to rapidly expand the army etc.
 
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Yes there are several successful examples, of course, but then, can conscription be implemented in a country like Pakistan. There lies in the problem. You cant just order Pakistanis to follow into conscription. Countries which follow it have several factors to aid them, such as, their previous military history and engagements, the prevailing threats they face, ideology, economy, type of government, military machine to rapidly expand the army etc.

I am not sure how Pakistan's history, ideology, type of government plays into conscription, perhaps you know more than me about it and what is lacking in Pak's history, ideology, etc. I defer to your judgment here.

However, conscription as a technical tool has been used by a wide assortment of countries, in a wide assortment of ways. It was never used by the colonial British Indian Army because the local population was hostile to British occupation. I am assuming that this phase has ended.

There are certain common misconceptions about conscription. Conscription doesn't necessarily mean every able bodied man has to join the front. It can even start with small numbers - like 10-50 thousand. Pakistan Army has not engaged in conscription, that is true. I believe it is more to do with still having the psyche of the British Indian Army and deep down somewhere, imagining that the goras knew best.

This is why, despite every indicator pointing to conditions being most opportune for conscription, and in fact a need of the hour, Pakistan Army refuses to even give it a try. People like you and me are supposed to be thinkers, people who make decisions based on the merit of something, not based on obtuse neo-colonial pseudo-ideologies.

I for the life of me, being a Bangladeshi, can't understand why we have servile looking bronze statues of our colonial era as glorified pieces. As if we are little House Elves in Harry Potter, glorifying how well we served our masters. I personally cannot understand why these bronze statues litter all over Dhaka. With little brown guy statues standing like house elves, and great white masters posing picturesquely in grand horses. I hate going past them. I hate it to the core of my soul.

Mental slavery, as Ibn Khaldun writes in Al Muqaddimah, takes 40 years past independence to get rid of. Unfortunately something seems wrong - we are well past that 40 years. It seems our institutions, like our armed forces, are replicating the disease and inculcating it to the next, thus it is not decaying but growing...
 
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What stops the other sides from raising the same hordes and neutralizing ours?

Actually trained manpower is what is exactly required, hordes would prove to be only cannon fodder. I still remember a Soviet Divisional counter-attack outside Moscow against a German battalion group. The whole Division was massacred without a SINGLE casualty on the German side, thanks to their well sited automatics and infantry guns.

You are following OKW's / OKH's footsteps. A Divisional flag marked on a map doesnt necessarily mean that it is a full fledge, superbly trained formation and well equipped as well.

Some unasked-for input: The CRPF is today 300,000 strong, 1.5 times as many as the 'conscripts' being conjured up like Cadmus soldiers. They are already engaged in counter-insurgency against insurgents, badly armed ones, but ones who have resisted being overcome.

The Border Security Forces are 260,000 strong. They are the equivalent of Pakistan's rangers, but AFAIK, far outnumber them.

The Assam Rifles number more than 60,000 riflemen, with many decades of campaigning under their belts.

We are informed that the 'South Indians' will not fight in the North; it has nothing to do with them. As you probably already know this, please point out the ethnic composition of the Thambis, the Madras Regiment, and please point to the leadership of a host of 'South Indian' officers, including several Chiefs of Army Staff, and Chiefs of Staff of the other two services. Finally, please do use the example of 404, 405 and 405 field companies of the 9th Engineer Regiment, who opened up the minefields in Basantar, after the failure of the tank flail, manually, and guided tanks through standing right there in the middle of the minefields. Their CO and two other officers got Vir Chakras (Major Choudhary and Captain Gupta posthumously), and got battle honours as well as theatre honours. I could go on, but it seems a bit pointless. For dashing young Internet heroes, it might be brought to mind that this was where Arun Khetrapal with his squadron stopped the Pakistani attack, losing his life in the process, and where the Hamoodur Commission wanted the GOC Pakistani I Corps to be cashiered.

Regarding conscription in India, we will not need it, although you have pointed out what might happen if we did. The Indian Army in that case would be able to open fronts and move into offensives at will, or, more likely, firm up defensive positions with plentiful secondment of conscripts, after exhausting their para-military troops, the CRPF, the BSF, the Assam Rifles (that's 620,000 in all), all without even touching the Eastern Frontier Rifles, the parent body of the Bangladesh Border Guards when they were first constituted as the Bangladesh Rifles. You will of course remind advocates of this Aladdin's Lamp solution that 200,000 out of 220 million is 0.001; that figure applied to the Indian side would yield 1,300,000 able-bodied equally trainable people. If we were to play the numbers game, that would be 1.92 million men over and above the existing strength of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force, counting the BSF, not counting the SSB and other border units and also not counting the Coast Guard.

Trying to overwhelm Indian defences with a sea of under-trained, under-armed people will not end well for the attacking force; contrariwise, if it pushes India into steps not taken nor contemplated so far, there will be the devil to pay. If you get an opportunity to slide in a word edgewise, do please point out that the military machinery already exists in embryo on the Indian side, in the form of the NCC, the Territorial Army and the not insignificant numbers of reservists.

Since you have already demonstrated that you know far more than you should, you might very kindly, as an aid to memory to the old and failing in their faculties, recall the existing amphibious capacity in the Indian armed forces (not projected, not planned, not brought into existence through the gigantic deus ex machina that is your higher than the mountains ally), and you might know which Indian Army formations have been earmarked for these. If I remind you of more, that might lead to trouble (for me); you may or may not know those additional facts, but these are not properly gifted to opposing intelligence. Suffice it to say that we are not alone in possessing a very long coastline, and desperate efforts at creating resources - a military area, no doubt to be developed into a cantonment, an air base, additional harbour facilities, additional submarines, additional air force resources committed to maritime surveillance.....the whole nine yards - are not likely to be useful in one day or two. Meanwhile there is a force in existence, and practised and rehearsed.

It is difficult to believe that this thread exists.
 
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Couldn't sleep as an idea was working in my head so I got up and built an Excel model of conscription.

Basically the model has the following assumptions:
1. 10,000 conscripts per month.
2. Each conscript gets 1.5 month training and serves an additional 6 months
3. At the end of conscription, PA picks the best and offers them positions in the regular army
4. Of the rest, a second tour is offered on a voluntary basis with better remuneration. The model assumes 10% of conscripts choose such an option. A third tour is 10% of the second tour
5. Another option is to volunteer for the Weekend Warrior program - part time reserve, with training one weekend every month and a 2 week tour every year. The model assumes 20% of the conscripts choose this option. Every six months, attrition is 10%.

The net result is that, within the first year, Pakistan has 78,000 soldiers. By the second year, Pak has 91,500 soldiers. And by Year 3, there are 95,000 soldiers.

The Israelis use an 80-20 split. For every 8 conscripts, they have 2 professional soldiers / technicians / engineers to back them up. If we add about 18000 such soldiers for our force, we end up with approximately 113,000 soldiers of professionals / nonprofessionals mixed.

Next we can look into how to equip them and where to base them.

@PanzerKiel thought you may find it interesting.
 
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@MastanKhan what are your thoughts on the commercial viability of exporting a modern cousin of the WWII Jeep?

Just different enough so that it doesn't violate the intellectual property law. A simple jeep that size does not have a competitor.

Here is the idea: build the original 1940s / 1950s jeep for the PA in large numbers. Export the same. Could be a first mass produced vehicle for Pakistan. Target - 100,000 jeeps a year for commercial and military use.
 
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@MastanKhan what are your thoughts on the commercial viability of exporting a modern cousin of the WWII Jeep?

Just different enough so that it doesn't violate the intellectual property law. A simple jeep that size does not have a competitor.

Here is the idea: build the original 1940s / 1950s jeep for the PA in large numbers. Export the same. Could be a first mass produced vehicle for Pakistan. Target - 100,000 jeeps a year for commercial and military use.

Hi,

The Toyota Tacoma 4 dr has control of that market now---. That is a vehicle of choice---.
 
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Hi,

The Toyota Tacoma 4 dr has control of that market now---. That is a vehicle of choice---.

I don't think a Pak mass produced vehicle can compete directly with Toyota or Ford. What we need to do is find a niche in the market to get our toe in. Just trying to get the idea by you of the basic features and dimensions of the WWII era Jeep.

The benefit of this is that it can be both a civilian and a military product. Something that could be sold to PA and third world militaries, while still serving a niche market in the civilian sphere.

Few other ideas (but doesn't serve a dual role) - 67 Mustang and MX-5 Miata. Relatively simple but classic - and timeless - designs.
 
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