A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[PanzerKiel]

Whats interesting in all this is that Pakistan can use two types of forces for launching similar strikes - the Independent Brigade Groups and an Ad-Hoc force similar to Indian IBG (between brigade and Division strength). I find the area of Rahim Yar Khan of utmost importance and vulnerable - cut off region.

We are already using a HEAVILY customized, purposed and tailored doctrine of doing what your are suggesting.

I heard that officers study all night in group study (if possible) before/during exams and attend classes during regular days on a specific course which makes their career. What are you doing here so early in morning

You answered yourself i believe. Judging from the timings of my posts, you can well judge whats happening around.

Yes, I was pulling your leg and i knew you will come after me But the realization of IA IBGs did come a bit late

Whats interesting in all this is that Pakistan can use two types of forces for launching similar strikes - the Independent Brigade Groups and an Ad-Hoc force similar to Indian IBG (between brigade and Division strength). I find the area of Rahim Yar Khan of utmost importance and vulnerable - cut off region.


I heard that officers study all night in group study (if possible) before/during exams and attend classes during regular days on a specific course which makes their career. What are you doing here so early in morning

From Pakistan perspective, offensive from the direction of RYK is the worst direction one can take. The terrain simply doesnt allow.

 

[PakFactor]

It was part of the package of 50s, in which we received tanks, aircraft, arms and ammunition. They made it for us, part of overall re-organization and improvement of our armed forces. Cherat Cantonment was another such project built by them.



Yes. And it was further improved once we wargamed everything from sub-tactical to strategic level under the supervision some of the ablest instructors of ours at the operational and strategic level. I can, myself, see a big improvement once i compare my replies on PDF of today compared with those of 15 years ago. Learning process should continue till death.

@PanzerKiel have a question has Pakistan ground forces started embedding drones (equipped with nigh vision and infrared) in platoon to company level to boost recon capabilites?

Armed Drones will they be operating with regular forces to the level US Army/Marines have them integrated to help advances and take out enemy positions?

 

[PanzerKiel]

I heard that officers study all night in group study (if possible) before/during exams and attend classes during regular days on a specific course which makes their career. What are you doing here so early in morning

Or maybe i am not doing well in my course.

@PanzerKiel have a question has Pakistan ground forces started embedding drones (equipped with nigh vision and infrared) in platoon to company level to boost recon capabilites?

Armed Drones will they be operating with regular forces to the level US Army/Marines have them integrated to help advances and take out enemy positions?

At platoon and company level, drones are not there yet, only at Battalion level and above. However at platoon and company level, GSRs are there.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Or maybe i am not doing well in my course.

LOL. He led with his chin on that one. However, I am willing to bet a month's fixed income that is nowhere near reality.

At platoon and company level, drones are not there yet, only at Battalion level and above. However at platoon and company level, GSRs are there.

 

[PakFactor]

Or maybe i am not doing well in my course.



At platoon and company level, drones are not there yet, only at Battalion level and above. However at platoon and company level, GSRs are there.

While that is alright, I feel in order to compensate for the number disparity between India/Pakistan; we should at the least develop a drone in house similar to the Switchblade operated by the U.S., whereas it acts as a kamikaze drone. We need to either acquire from outside or build inside using local industry we have available technologies to blunt the numerical advantage using tech.

Drones operated by PA can be sent ahead to eliminate IA Armour before PA Armour thrust is made.

After reading this whole thread their were many good points raised; but I feel the lack of Air Defense coverage for our ground forces could play against any advance Pak Forces can make. While having CAPs and PAF support they can be pulled away due to again the numbers game with IAF. If we follow what the Egyptians did in 1971 in the early stages of Operation Badr, the Israeli Air Force wasn't able to be effective in blunting the advance due to Air Defense coverage provided to the ground forces, only once they decided to advance without it they were immediately put at a disadvantage.

 

[PanzerKiel]

LOL. He led with his chin on that one. However, I am willing to bet a month's fixed income that is nowhere near reality.

my colleagues here are willing to do the same, however i see my "open terrain of Sedan" somewhere else.

 

[Joe Shearer]

We are already using a HEAVILY customized, purposed and tailored doctrine of doing what your are suggesting.

Sir, what has been suggested (in India) is that every single Independent Battle Group needs to be customised for its precise purpose; no two may look the same. There is also talk of using different labels, as using the same name whether a formation is around 5,000 heads or 50,000 heads is a little too elastic.

You answered yourself i believe. Judging from the timings of my posts, you can well judge whats happening around.



From Pakistan perspective, offensive from the direction of RYK is the worst direction one can take. The terrain simply doesnt allow.

 

[PanzerKiel]

While that is alright, I feel in order to compensate for the number disparity between India/Pakistan; we should at the least develop a drone in house similar to the Switchblade operated by the U.S., whereas it acts as a kamikaze drone. We need to either acquire from outside or build inside using local industry we have available technologies to blunt the numerical advantage using tech.

Drones operated by PA can be sent ahead to eliminate IA Armour before PA Armour thrust is made.

After reading this whole thread their were many good points raised; but I feel the lack of Air Defense coverage for our ground forces could play against any advance Pak Forces can make. While having CAPs and PAF support they can be pulled away due to again the numbers game with IAF. If we follow what the Egyptians did in 1971 in the early stages of Operation Badr, the Israeli Air Force wasn't able to be effective in blunting the advance due to Air Defense coverage provided to the ground forces, only once they decided to advance without it they were immediately put at a disadvantage.

Burraq UCAV is pretty well developed.

Your points about AD are valid.

 

[Joe Shearer]

my colleagues here are willing to do the same, however i see my "open terrain of Sedan" somewhere else.

May the wind be in your sails.

While that is alright, I feel in order to compensate for the number disparity between India/Pakistan; we should at the least develop a drone in house similar to the Switchblade operated by the U.S., whereas it acts as a kamikaze drone. We need to either acquire from outside or build inside using local industry we have available technologies to blunt the numerical advantage using tech.

Drones operated by PA can be sent ahead to eliminate IA Armour before PA Armour thrust is made.

After reading this whole thread their were many good points raised; but I feel the lack of Air Defense coverage for our ground forces could play against any advance Pak Forces can make. While having CAPs and PAF support they can be pulled away due to again the numbers game with IAF. If we follow what the Egyptians did in 1971 in the early stages of Operation Badr, the Israeli Air Force wasn't able to be effective in blunting the advance due to Air Defense coverage provided to the ground forces, only once they decided to advance without it they were immediately put at a disadvantage.

May I comment on this?

 

[PakFactor]

May the wind be in your sails.



May I comment on this?

Sure bro, we all here to learn.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Sir, what has been suggested (in India) is that every single Independent Battle Group needs to be customised for its precise purpose; no two may look the same. There is also talk of using different labels, as using the same name whether a formation is around 5,000 heads or 50,000 heads is a little too elastic.

Your first point is valid. IA is already doing it that way.

Regarding labels, One does everything to confuse the enemy. Stratagem. A Division label with 5000 men or Brigade label with 8000 can confuse.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sure bro, we all here to learn.

Sir, just to say that your point is valid with regard to Air Defence; if it is a fixed element, then operating outside its cover is fatal. However, with the increasing mobility of both radar and sensor systems, and missiles slaved to these, and with the increasing willingness of field commanders to accept that formations will be complex organisations and no longer pure infantry, or armour, or even artillery, we may see mobile Air Defence organically included in combat formations. The technology is already present.

The second point I want to make is somewhat querulous, and your forgiveness is sought in advance.

The Indian Army also has increasing access to drones. It is not inconceivable that what you have in mind for the PA might be equally workable for the IA; what is sauce for the goose, after all, is sauce for the gander.

On a lighter note, if technology, especially airborne technology, delivered all that it promises to deliver all the time, we might have a scenario where the two opposing formations sit and stare at each other, having comfortably destroyed each other's armour and supporting vehicles, perhaps even a significant portion of tubed artillery and MBRLs. (This is a joke against my own background in aerospace).

Your first point is valid. IA is already doing it that way.

Regarding labels, One does everything to confuse the enemy. Stratagem. A Division label with 5000 men or Brigade label with 8000 can confuse.

I am getting the uncomfortable feeling that a great deal more is known on your side than has been imagined.

 

[PakFactor]

Burraq UCAV is pretty well developed.

Your points about AD are valid.

While we do have the Burraq UCAV; my thought is on something like the link shows if you can check it out.

Light weight, small warhead able to be carried in a back pack. Able to allow smaller units to effectively hit a hardened position like a bunker or something. This way you don't have to wait for orders from top and deployment of the asset to reach its intended destination; and decision can be made from a Lt. to Cap rank.

If we look at the Libyan Conflict the drones have been used to a deadly effective within the scope of an active theater. And the Libyan Milita's have been using small drones with hand grenades to deadly effect.


The U.S. is working on a Drone Swarm Strategy to employ them in the future in mass numbers to target positions, which will soften targets before the actual engagement. Following the principle of using readily available technology at a lower cost, allowing ground officers to make quicker decisions.

Sir, just to say that your point is valid with regard to Air Defence; if it is a fixed element, then operating outside its cover is fatal. However, with the increasing mobility of both radar and sensor systems, and missiles slaved to these, and with the increasing willingness of field commanders to accept that formations will be complex organisations and no longer pure infantry, or armour, or even artillery, we may see mobile Air Defence organically included in combat formations. The technology is already present.

The second point I want to make is somewhat querulous, and your forgiveness is sought in advance.

The Indian Army also has increasing access to drones. It is not inconceivable that what you have in mind for the PA might be equally workable for the IA; what is sauce for the goose, after all, is sauce for the gander.

On a lighter note, if technology, especially airborne technology, delivered all that it promises to deliver all the time, we might have a scenario where the two opposing formations sit and stare at each other, having comfortably destroyed each other's armour and supporting vehicles, perhaps even a significant portion of tubed artillery and MBRLs. (This is a joke against my own background in aerospace).



I am getting the uncomfortable feeling that a great deal more is known on your side than has been imagined.

What you say is true as well, and I was thinking more along with Mobile Air Defense line. But even that I would think be limited to targeting drones or heli's. Doubt long range Mobile Air Defence would move along, that might be stationary.

 

[Armchair]

You again went lightening fast......anyways, you can sleep, we'll continue from here, but you arent going in to the other side easily.

@Armchair
Some topics on which you can work upon while you sleep, will help you prepare better.
- Once move ends, where is the Strike Corps detraining or move stops where? Which are the areas where they are assembling? Threat envisaged and your responses.
-Routes taken for the approach march from assembly areas to the border. Threat envisaged and your responses.
- Indian Fence at the border, how will you negotiate it?
- Help required from Engineers, AD, S&T, Signals, artillery, AHs etc in the above mentioned phases.

1. I've no idea, one would need detailed information of the local area (and experience managing brigades) to figure out assembly areas. Detraining at Hyderabad for now (and Pano Aqil).
2. A thorough intelligence and recon is needed to envisage real threats at the border at this stage. Is it only BSF? Are regulars present? In what numbers and where? How far away are reinforcements and larger Indian formations?

Okay I will slow down a bit more but it becomes a bit more boring (I understand real military planning requires every nitty gritty dealt with, we do the same in business school in something we call business plans). But such requires access to a wide sort and experience, and ability to to be on the ground in these places... so it becomes a fruitless exercise to get into the nitty gritty of it...

Now, the next stop would be to indicate where all forces are on a map, where the Rangers are and other units. And what preparations are needed to launch them across the border, who to share this information with (like PAF, air defense, civilian administration (?)).

Where are the CAS formations and how will they act. How is their deployment. How where the deployed. What about the logistics of keeping the forces supplied. How will air defense be provided for the theatre? How will air defense coordinate between PAF and PA AAA

For choosing what vectors will be attacked, again we would need knowledge of the terrain, knowledge of what is going on in the border areas (intelligence) while being mindful not to alert the enemy, recon. How units placed on pak side will traverse and launch their attack. What time will the attack take place. How would you negotiate the fence? (Blowing it up will make a lot of noise. Can wire cutters be used or not? ) All these questions would require expertise from a wide assortment of people. And tons of real life experience...

However, all these questions, answering them with any real meaning is impossible without having access to information I as a foreign civilian shouldn't have. Which makes them moot...

And I wrote Bhuj, not Ahmedabad.

Your mistake Joe. There are no divisions in Bhuj. Prove us wrong.

There are of course ruthless people out there who don't give a damn about the welfare of the troops under pseudo pretext such as fake patriotism while staying themselves in comfort.

Well, this is just a war game in internet space not real. If it were real I'd be glad to be a part of it (and serve in the front lines).

Some totally random remarks.

1. The difficulty is in adaptation of equipment to different operating environments. One of the worst features of any Russian design is their complete neglect of dust filtration. It is bad enough coping with this in the upper India plains, it is absolute hell in Rajasthan (or in the Thar region, to keep the comment neutral). It is understood that Pakistan, in its later adaptations of armoured equipment (I believe this is the later of the two tank types re-designed from Chinese and Russian originals), has carefully ensured that air filtration is of a high enough quality to permit sustained operation in the desert; the Thar is much more lethal for equipment management than Libya. Obviously, similar steps have been taken elsewhere. It is inappropriate to go into further detail but there is sufficient open information on this.
2. Further, there is another dilemma; ideally, armour would be delivered to the battlefield with minimal wear and tear. Tanks are not Ferraris, and do not deal happily with roads. One is reminded of Tipu Sultan, who once said that he would have liked to have had British gora soldiers fighting for him; he would have transported them, like hunting cheetahs, in palanquins to the battle field. So, too, with tanks; eliminating road movement as much as possible is desirable. No matter what work-arounds we use, moving them by road just shortens their life and shortens their maintenance cycle. The result is likely to be multiple mechanical breakdowns in the middle of battle. At the same time, rail-heads are what they sound like, the terminal points for rail transportation. They don't run conveniently right to the edge of the forming up zone.
3. This is one reason why the Indian Army managed to resist the Arjuna for so long, pleading - a devious, motivated plea - that there would be huge complications in rail transportation due to their outsize dimensions. This was, in some circles, pushed harder than the problem of bridge capacity, and the problem of weight on the ground, both so shallow that they were shot out of the water in very quick time.

@PanzerKiel, collating your hints and guidelines is like being presented with a tutorial in written form from one of the institutions of higher learning in specialised, professional studies. Both your patience and your attention to detail are remarkable. Have you been an instructor already, Sir?

@Nilgiri, you might feel ill done by, in not having been given details below the division level. First, there was the question of appropriate disclosure; second, there was the sheer volume of the task. Now that the orbat is put to the test by zestful young enthusiasts like @Armchair, these lacunae are becoming prominent. So, tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner, mon ami. Or, to bow to @PanzerKiel, Verstaendnis ist Vergebung.

@Blacklight If you had not been so rude and uncivil, I would gladly have complimented @Armchair with a positive rating as you wished. As it is, you have to apply to somebody who also appreciates remarks about 'gangus' and the baggage of adjectives that go with it. Good luck.

Thanks for an excellent post Joe. About tanks on roads - isn't that why Rooikat types make a lot of sense for the PA? Cheap, easy to mass produce. And works in this case better than MBTs.

 

[Joe Shearer]

1. I've no idea, one would need detailed information of the local area (and experience managing brigades) to figure out assembly areas. Detraining at Hyderabad for now (and Pano Aqil).
2. A thorough intelligence and recon is needed to envisage real threats at the border at this stage. Is it only BSF? Are regulars present? In what numbers and where? How far away are reinforcements and larger Indian formations?

Okay I will slow down a bit more but it becomes a bit more boring (I understand real military planning requires every nitty gritty dealt with, we do the same in business school in something we call business plans). But such requires access to a wide sort and experience, and ability to to be on the ground in these places... so it becomes a fruitless exercise to get into the nitty gritty of it...

Now, the next stop would be to indicate where all forces are on a map, where the Rangers are and other units. And what preparations are needed to launch them across the border, who to share this information with (like PAF, air defense, civilian administration (?)).

Where are the CAS formations and how will they act. How is their deployment. How where the deployed. What about the logistics of keeping the forces supplied. How will air defense be provided for the theatre? How will air defense coordinate between PAF and PA AAA

For choosing what vectors will be attacked, again we would need knowledge of the terrain, knowledge of what is going on in the border areas (intelligence) while being mindful not to alert the enemy, recon. How units placed on pak side will traverse and launch their attack. What time will the attack take place. How would you negotiate the fence? (Blowing it up will make a lot of noise. Can wire cutters be used or not? ) All these questions would require expertise from a wide assortment of people. And tons of real life experience...

However, all these questions, answering them with any real meaning is impossible without having access to information I as a foreign civilian shouldn't have. Which makes them moot...

Your mistake Joe. There are no divisions in Bhuj. Prove us wrong.

LOL.

My dear fellow, read what I wrote.

Well, this is just a war game in internet space not real. If it were real I'd be glad to be a part of it (and serve in the front lines).

How would you serve in the Pakistan Army as a Bangladeshi? Will your conscript force include the Pakistan Foreign Legion?