ASF saved the day; it could have been worse...
Wajahat S. KhanTuesday, June 10, 2014
ISLAMABAD: For those addicted to action, the flight from Tarbela was probably not worth it. By the time the Zarrar Company of the Special Operations Task Force got in the game, it was almost over.
Pakistan’s toughest crack team of commandos — the same unit that saw action and sacrifice in the Lal Masjid operation in 2007 — didn’t get to do much at the Jinnah International Airport on Monday morning except secure some aircraft that were idling on the tarmac. Ghosts, entering shells, at around 0430 hours, as the call to Fajr prayers soared across the Jinnah Terminal’s tarmac.
A directive from an infantryman who was watching from afar had decreased their workload. The country’s most powerful soldier – some still maintain that he’s also the country’s most powerful man – General Raheel Sharif, was up all night: demanding ‘SitReps’, getting updates from the V Corps Commander and in direct contact with the operational brains on the ground behind the counter-assault, the Director General of the Pakistan Rangers.
“Spare no quarter. Show no mercy,” is what the Chief of Army Staff had told Lt. Gen. Sajjad Ghani and Major General Rizwan Akhtar, according to the military spokesperson, Major General Asim S. Bajwa. “Do not wait for the battle to evolve. Win the fight, now.”
If the television media’s hyper narratives were to be believed, no was really in charge in those first few hours. If social media were to be believed, PAF’s drones and the Navy’s frogmen were in the mix, too. But detailed conversations with senior and mid-level officers on the ground indicate that despite intelligence and security lapse - or is it failure, for how else would ten terrorists infiltrate Pakistan’s busiest airport but without proper reconnaissance and surveillance that “probably took several days, even weeks”, according to an insider - the heavy lifting was done by those who were responsible for it: The Airport Security Force. And quick, aggressive operational decision-making and joint coordination between multiple intelligence, security and even information machines took care of the rest.
Led by Brigadier Azam Tawana, JIA’s ASF contingent is slightly larger than a proper army-sized brigade, around 3,000 officers and men. Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world that maintains a purpose-built force – around 10,000 across all of Pakistan’s airports. Not fully military, not fully civilian, the ASF usually gets its fair share of criticism for being in on airport-related scandals, usually smuggling. Detractors also recall how the same ASF had caused a serious lapse in letting Palestinian hijackers play havoc with the same target, Karachi’s old terminal, in 1986 when Abu Nidal terrorists were actually saluted on their way to the tarmac as they took over Pan-Am flight 73. Just like this contingent, the Arabs of ‘86 were sporting ASF uniforms.
But those were different times. The ASF went through a beefing up in the ‘90s, as it saw its now redundant elite Air Guards occupy a First Class seat in every PIA flight between Pakistan and everywhere.
By the early 2000s, budget cuts and decreased threat indices caused the ASF to scale back and limit its Air Guard program, forcing it to morph the commandos into a dedicated company-sized Quick Reaction Force, that came into play when terrorists broke cover at the second barrier of the old terminal on Sunday night and caused the initial casualties to regular ASF personnel. It would be that same QRF contingent’s role in the fighting that would ensue from around 2330 hours to 0130 hours, which would be decisive.
By the time regular contingents of the paramilitary Rangers, led by the Bhittai Sector that watches over this area, had set up the outer cordon, the ASF had “borne the initial brunt and stood their ground”, according to Major General Bajwa.
“It’s their home. It’s their area of responsibility. They are not as well trained as our boys, nor do they see as much as action as we do, but they were very brave,” said a senior commander from the Rangers who took part in the action. “Even when some of them ran out of ammo, they threw aside their weapons and acted as our guides”
As the Rangers own Special Operations force – the RATS (Rangers Anti-Terror Squad), and the crack troops of the 4th Frontier Force Regiment, which is an armoured infantry battalion based nearby and connected to the 25th Mechanized Division had joined the action, the ASF had taken hits but also managed to isolate the terrorists into two groups. It’s dedicated, terminal-centric training – apron cordoning, parameter fencing - had paid off. The militants were holed up, and even though it would take 450 men to clear one hangar, and more good guys than bad guys would be lost – 11 ASF personnel and one Ranger, versus 10 militants - “it had to be done that way”, according to a senior commander.
“At the height of it, it was room to room combat, and we moved in two groups, left and right, and kept on forming inner and outer cordons and forcing tighter concentric circles around the terrorists” said a senior officer who participated in the fighting. “And the fact that the DG Rangers and the IG Police and everyone else got there fast, only helped in aggressive decision-making. Frankly, we were done in the first one and half hours because nobody was in the mood for a debate.”
Security experts would have a field day in dissecting all that went wrong with the way the operation was handled: The media’s coverage of weapons, platforms and contingents of troops that were deployed was a straight giveaway, a serious compromise, of the security footprint that was being committed to the cause of saving the airport; the Sindh Chief Minister’s token arrival and photo-op at the scene, which only created more chaos than security; the confusing contradictions between Sharjeel Memon, the Sindh Rangers public relations officials and the Inter-Service Public Relations Directorate (especially regarding the “Indian connection”); and the hyper-activity on social media, even by responsible politicians, ‘journalists’ and ‘religious leaders’, which only compounded the insurgent confusion.
But these are the facts: The attack was unequivocally a failure on the part of the state; as an international news editor in London I was updating through the night eventually pointed out, “it’s pretty humiliating to have the largest airport of the largest city of the world’s fifth largest country taken on by a bunch of thugs, especially given the size the military and intel apparatus you guys have.”
But, remembering the attack on PNS Mehran, I will go on a limb and claim, as my sources do, that it could have been worse. Given what the attackers had on them besides their weapons - dry rations to keep them going, blood thickeners like Oncodox 50 to keep them fighting – anything was possible: a long-haul hostage drama; a blown up international airliner; a live suicide-bombing caught on tape. As a worn-out operational commander who had spent the night in combat brusquely pointed out: “They got inside our house, but they couldn’t touch our mothers and sisters: our vital assets remained.”
ASF saved the day; it could have been worse... - thenews.com.pk