1965 War - The complete story

[fatman17]

Take A Moment Out To Observe An Indian Defeat 1965 War

Monday, 08 September 2008 02:15

An American Radio Service Journalist Rai Milan writes in his war diary: “I want to bring it on record that India is claiming victory but on ground there is no evidence to support Indian claims. What I see is only destroyed Indian tanks and huge logistic support units rolling towards their forward area. During my long journalistic career spanning over two decades, I have never seen a group of such confident individuals as the victorious Pakistani soldiers fighting against Indians.”

“In the Jammu-Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might, i.e. 1 Corps consisting of one Armoured Division (one Armoured Brigade and one Lorried Brigade), two Infantry Divisions and one Mountain Division. However, 1 Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Here again, bad generalship at the Corps and the Divisional levels, and lack of cooperation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing.”

The above quotes are from chapter 12 of the Indian Official History of 1965 war.

The Indian official History is full of such observations about the inefficiency of their military leadership during 1965 which ultimately led them to defeat.

On the morning of 6th September when the Indians crossed into Pakistani territory in the Burki Sector, the higher ups had assured their under-command that they would have their lunch in Lahore. But in the next few days the Indian Army was to learn that a nation’s spirit could never be taken lightly.

An American Radio Service Journalist Rai Milan writes in his war diary:

“I want to bring it on record that India is claiming victory but on ground there is no evidence to support Indian claims. What I see is only destroyed Indian tanks and huge logistic support units rolling towards their forward area. During my long journalistic career spanning over two decades, I have never seen a group of such confident individuals as the victorious Pakistani soldiers fighting against Indians.”

In the Wikipedia (the online encyclopedia), while analyzing the war of 1965 it is written that invasion the Indian army’s invasion of Pakistan was a strategic blunder. Indian Army failed to analyze the real potential of Pakistan Army. This resulted in the invasion’s defeat. The official History of the 1965 War drafted by the Indian Ministry in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22, when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked his army chief General Chaudhri if India could possibly win the war were he to delay accepting the ceasefire for a little while longer. The General replied that most of India’s frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered tank losses.

It was revealed later that only 14% of India’s frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan. By this time the Pakistan Army had used up to 80% of its ammunition. India’s Air Chief Marshal (Retired) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the Indian air force, the IAF, and the Indian Army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by India’s Ministry of Defense and General Chaudhri did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle.

There are hundreds of other blunders by the Indian Intelligence and their field commanders.

Pakistan Army, with the backing of the entire nation, stood like a wall against Indian onslaught on all fronts. On the Sialkot front, one Indian Infantry, one Armoured Division and an Armoured Brigade were repulsed by an Infantry Division. At just one sector, the Chawida-Philora sector, fifteen consecutive Indian attacks were repulsed.

The Indians had to face the biggest of humiliations on the Lahore front, where their thirteen consecutive attacks were repulsed. At Kasur, Pakistani forces not only repulsed many Indian attacks but went deep into India and captured a substantial chunk of their territory.

The spirited Pakistanis faced boldly the Indian might and defeated them on all fronts. The examples of extreme valor and courage shown during the 1965 war by the Pakistani nation and soldiers can be listed among the best in the military history of modern warfare.

Despite numerical superiority, the Indians were humiliated on all fronts in sea, air and ground. The war that India foisted on Pakistan on September 6, 1965, was the product of several years of constant and deliberate planning in New Delhi.

The underlying Indian philosophy behind this aggressive attack on a smaller neighbor Pakistan was to take revenge for the division of India in 1947 and the endeavor to reverse the freedom and independence of the Muslims of Pakistan.

The war that continued with full resolve and determination in the ranks and file of Pakistani armed forces proved once and for ever, that the valiant Pakistani soldiers backed by a resolute nation were not to be cowed by Indian threats and intimidations.

Pakistanis need to take a moment out today and think about their ability to achieve the impossible if they put their minds to it. The changing global environment and challenges faced by us today demand the same unity, faith, discipline and determination that the nation displayed forty-one year ago during the 1965 war. After the October 8t, 2005, earthquake, the nation once again proved that whether it is a natural calamity or a foreign aggression, the Pakistani nation is ready to face all challenges with fortitude and courage. It was heartening to see when every individual of this nation came out to help their brethren in distress and pain in Azad Kashmir and NWFP who were affected due to earthquake. Long live Pakistan

my friend there was plently of that (mentioned above) on our side - our soldiers and young officers saved the day for us, whilst our generals had "cold feet"!

 

[abdulrafi]

not all generals, only ayub khan/ musa khan/ yayha khan had cold feet

 

[Zob]

ok third eye accepting your claims that no one was holding onto the fort....well then why was there no counter attack once pakistanis occupied it.....given the claim that we just walked into it and sat down!!!

no counter attack means two things

1) the indians had no clue as to the where abouts of where pakistani army & militia were.....this is bad INTEL on the indian part

2) the indian army was soundly beaten in the area and couldnot muster a counter attack.....


@ratus

my friend i was interested in reading what you had to say but BHARAT RAKSHAK...well i dunno don't think it will be unbias....!!!

 

[Kasrkin]

Whether it was because of ever increasing Chinese pressure or because of their failed assessment of our rapidly depleting ammunition and oil reserve.

Or because of the thrashing we had handed them. Probably a mixture of the above...

 

[Ratus Ratus]

ok third eye accepting your claims that no one was holding onto the fort....well then why was there no counter attack once pakistanis occupied it.....given the claim that we just walked into it and sat down!!!

no counter attack means two things

1) the indians had no clue as to the where abouts of where pakistani army & militia were.....this is bad INTEL on the indian part

2) the indian army was soundly beaten in the area and couldnot muster a counter attack.....

No he said only the RAC were in that location. This is a somewhat para military unit and the implication is that this sector was of small importance to the Indian military.

If you read the BR reference I mentioned you will notice rather quickly the Indians were having problems with communications as well as logistics in the complete region.
This may mean they would have problems doing anything at all.

@ratus

my friend i was interested in reading what you had to say but BHARAT RAKSHAK...well i dunno don't think it will be unbias....!!!

Well it is just housed on that site. It is in fact the "Official War History - 1965", by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
Now like all such histories they may have a level of leaning in a particular direction, but so would one from Pakistan.
Though the chapter I listed is not that bad.

As far as the location is concerned tactically K' Garh held no significance in '65. The fact that the RAC held it indicates the importance given to that axis.

I do recall reading of this fort shall try & locate some information & post.

Meanwhile , all the troops mentioned as deployed at K Garh in previous posts were in fact deployed way to its south in Barmer.

I noted the disposition of the forces, well as much as could be determined from that History reference.

I have a few problems understanding why the main force was pushed into the south as that reference indicates. The only reason I see was the road and rail links into India. The only thing of interest is there are a few more Indian settlements in this region vs the north. But as far as anything else goes the desert was a wider barrier in this region, ie between the border and the closest Pakistan settlement areas. It would be a problem for both sides. What raiding that occurred on the Indian side of the border appears not to have been significantly halted by the Indian force anyway.
Leaving a smaller force in the south and hopefully more mobile wold have resulted in the same. Also if the main Indian force have been in the north of this bulge it could have made a reasonable input to the Lahore battles by moving against places as Rahimyar Khan. Though this assessment is made with no knowledge of the pakistan disposition at that time.
Even if a move by these Indian forces resulted in no ground gain it would have made a more significant impact with the Lahore battles due to its close proximity.

 

[Zob]

No he said only the RAC were in that location. This is a somewhat para military unit and the implication is that this sector was of small importance to the Indian military.

If you read the BR reference I mentioned you will notice rather quickly the Indians were having problems with communications as well as logistics in the complete region.
This may mean they would have problems doing anything at all.

fair enough RAC were in place...how many and what kind of patrolling were they doing....did anyone get the word out at all that they were under attack or not??

this sector was of less importance maybe....but then again why let the enemy have a ball of a time attack it sit there without being disturbed without being counter attacked.... any area that is seen as "less" important is still defended once the enemy occupies it...!!

now as for communications being down....didn't anyone spot the PAKISTANIS in the area and report...to the GHQ....what was the role of the locals of the area??

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

You are right but the option of trying ‘alternate means’ was not on the tables in the fall of 1948. The real problem was the lack of confidence on both the sides. Pakistan was required to remove its regular troops and lashkaris from the Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (at the time of the resolution, now it is Pakistani-administered) in 1948 as per the resolution but it failed to comply. The point I am trying to make here is, we had the choice, to take Kashmir by force or by peaceful means through UN intervention. However, we did not follow either path properly and lost international support in the process. Political leadership is often blamed for not showing full commitment to a military solution of Kashmir in 1948 which in turn also lead to a failed but first ever attempted coup in Pakistan in 1951. However, it was probably a combination of economical situation of Pakistan that could not sustain a prolonged war in Kashmir and the dubious role of the top Pakistani commanders who were all British. Several authors have written on the shady role of Douglas Gracey, the first C-in-C of PA, who was working in the interest of British more than in the interest of Pakistan. It is not a secret that General Bucher (than C-in-C Indian Army) was a close friend of General Gracey and General McKay (Chief of Staff of PA). It is interesting that even the Indians did not trust their British C-in-C and kept him out of the loop during several occasions.

While the intial UN resolutions did indeed call for a Pakistani withdrawal, the subsequent ones (which override the previous ones) indicated that the withdrawal would be almost simultaneous, with mutually agreed upon numbers of Indian troops remaining behind (3000). LAK agreed to this, and it was at this point that the Indians held up movement towards demilitarization by insisting on more troops (as the UN thread explains).

So I fail to see how Pakistan was not 'properly following the peaceful path'. If you are suggesting that Pakistan should have just withdrawn all its forces per the first few resolutions, then let me remind you of Indian actions in the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad, both of whose rulers acceded/considered accession to Pakistan:

Junagadh:
"Pakistan agreed to discuss a plebiscite, subject to the withdrawal of Indian troops, a condition India rejected. On 26 October, the Nawab and his family fled to Pakistan following clashes with Indian troops. Before leaving, the Nawab had emptied the state treasury of its cash and securities."

Hyderabad:
"The Muslim ruler of Hyderbad Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, the last Nizam, and his followers, Razakars, wished to remain independent or considering joining Pakistan. The Indian Government carried out the so called “Hyderabad Police Action” against the Nizam. Code-named “Operation Polo” by the Indian military, this action by the Indian armed forces' ended the rule of the Nizams of Hyderabad by the forcefull incorporation of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union."

After these actions by India, the Pakistani leaders would have been fools to withdraw all military forces from Kashmir and leave it up to the 'good intentions' of the Indians to actually conduct a free and fair plebiscite - let me remind you of the argument that Indians raise most often - the UNSC resolutions were chapter VI, and therefore not enforceable by the UN, and given Nehru's views on the issue, India would have violated its commitments and annexed all of kashmir, and we would still be moaning about the 'lack of implementation pf the UN resolutions' (except without 45% of Kashmir) just as the Arabs are with Israel.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

fair enough RAC were in place...how many and what kind of patrolling were they doing....did anyone get the word out at all that they were under attack or not??

THis is an interesting issue. patrols would have at least provided some prior notice. As fro getting the intel out I am not sure if that was actually possible. So far I am not sure if they were stuck with landline or radio. Which ever it was it does appear there were significant problems.

this sector was of less importance maybe....but then again why let the enemy have a ball of a time attack it sit there without being disturbed without being counter attacked.... any area that is seen as "less" important is still defended once the enemy occupies it...!!

I feel the importance was misguided but it would depend on the assumptions of the indian military as to how they saw any attacks or how they intended to provide/deliver their own style of raiding parties.
I do suspect that they considered it far enough away from Lahore so if they attacked pakistan then it would require some time for Pakistan to move troops and equipment to the region.

now as for communications being down....didn't anyone spot the PAKISTANIS in the area and report...to the GHQ....what was the role of the locals of the area??
I suspect the Indians were suffering logistics sufficiently enough so they could not do a thing about it. Also if you read that History PDF, they had other problems. Have of which was caused by their own poor communications.

 

[qsaark]

While the intial UN resolutions did indeed call for a Pakistani withdrawal, the subsequent ones (which override the previous ones) indicated that the withdrawal would be almost simultaneous, with mutually agreed upon numbers of Indian troops remaining behind (3000). LAK agreed to this, and it was at this point that the Indians held up movement towards demilitarization by insisting on more troops (as the UN thread explains).

So I fail to see how Pakistan was not 'properly following the peaceful path'. If you are suggesting that Pakistan should have just withdrawn all its forces per the first few resolutions, then let me remind you of Indian actions in the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad, both of whose rulers acceded/considered accession to Pakistan:

I one hundred percent agree with you. But it was the GoP that accepted the August 1948 resolution that I myself find absurd for the reasons you have given. But once Pakistan accepted the resolution, they had to comply with it, and they did not. Hence in the process we lost the moral high ground. It would have been better if Pakistan had not agreed on that first resolution that it would withdraw all its forces. Jinnah was right, experience he gained from dealing with the Congress party and the British; he knew all too well that the only way of getting Kashmir was through a military action hence he ordered Gracey to send Pakistani troops in the valley. It was a bad luck or what that we had Gracey as our C-in-C who refused to listen to his supreme commander. Finally when the troops were sent, it was already late and rest is history.

 

[Zob]

I totally agree with u in this regard, standing upto a 6times army is a success, but i dont think u really deserve the cup, lol we gave it to you. If we had advanced further on 1971WAR, there would have been no pakistan at all. An Army only surrenders when it knows it will definitely lose, and know there is no point in fighting and losing the land rather surrender decently and start to live a life. I can't imagine u guys call 1971 WAR a Victory..shame on U guys. We accept we lost the bloody war with China in 1962, we had our reasons too,but we never denied it at any cost.How could u even say that u would have come to a stalemate if we had advanced to the WEST?Please take the IF's out as your army was in no position to defend your land. Will u Surrender when u know u may WIN or whatever bring a stalemate? NO dumb person will,Americans helped you in it,they warned, opened your generals eyes, told them looking at the speed the Indian Army is advancing looks like you are bound to lose everything,its better you surrender and accept the defeat,atleast u will have the WEST. I am sure everyone knows this

OK NEWBIE!!! listen cuz i am going to say this once....no one said 71 was a pakistani victory....the whole issue is did india back stab pakistan and get involved in our INTERNAL matter in 71 or not!!!


i recommend you read comments before you post!!!! or u might not last here for a long time.....

 

[Zob]

fair enough RAC were in place...how many and what kind of patrolling were they doing....did anyone get the word out at all that they were under attack or not??

THis is an interesting issue. patrols would have at least provided some prior notice. As fro getting the intel out I am not sure if that was actually possible. So far I am not sure if they were stuck with landline or radio. Which ever it was it does appear there were significant problems.

this sector was of less importance maybe....but then again why let the enemy have a ball of a time attack it sit there without being disturbed without being counter attacked.... any area that is seen as "less" important is still defended once the enemy occupies it...!!

I feel the importance was misguided but it would depend on the assumptions of the indian military as to how they saw any attacks or how they intended to provide/deliver their own style of raiding parties.
I do suspect that they considered it far enough away from Lahore so if they attacked pakistan then it would require some time for Pakistan to move troops and equipment to the region.

now as for communications being down....didn't anyone spot the PAKISTANIS in the area and report...to the GHQ....what was the role of the locals of the area??
I suspect the Indians were suffering logistics sufficiently enough so they could not do a thing about it. Also if you read that History PDF, they had other problems. Have of which was caused by their own poor communications.

ok now i am curious as to how long did the PAKISTANIS actually hold the fort for.....secondly what did the locals in the area do....did they welcome the pak army or did they try to resist like the french....


its important to know if the INDIAN army had enough time for it to find out about pakistan controlling to fort....as in if pakistan kept the fort occupied for 14 days then that is ample time to get the word across even with COMMUNICATION being a bottle neck!!!


as for intel well it might not have been possible to check up what was going on in the area like you pointed out...but the question is couldn't the locals contact the indian army in this regard

this is what happened in KARGIL some sheephearders spotted the "freedom fighter"




there is so less on this issue that we can litreally conclude anything....but i guess if we clear out how long the pak army held it for and the role of the locals we can have a clearer picture as to what went wrong on the indian side.....

 

[Kasrkin]

can I have a link that states that it was YOU who handed over the territory to us?because I have been made to believe otherwise.

I'll quote Cloughley's work:

"The Rann of Kutch conflict was ended by British intercession and the dispute was solved when both countries agreed to appointment of the Indio-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal by the UN Secretary General. The Tribunal presented its report on 19th February 1968. It awarded Pakistan a mere 300 square miles out of a claim of 3,500 and upheld almost all the Indian claim. This was an excellent example of how international 'Good Offices' and mediation, followed by independent analysis and arbitration, can result in lasting solutions to territorial disputes."

The rest of your argument has been addressed by AM and myself. Now I think its time you try and digest what we've told you before raising more non-issues.

 

[fatman17]

not all generals, only ayub khan/ musa khan/ yayha khan had cold feet

as you wish!

 

[qsaark]

I'll quote Cloughley's work:

I believe Kasrkin is quoting from A HISTORY OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY by Col. Brian Cloughley. Boy there are some really nasty comments about PA in the book especially when he talked about two divisions of troops working as servants in officers’ messes and homes.

 

[qsaark]

as you wish!

Nice way of putting your disagreement. I wish I could have the similar cold temperament.