Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at Chawinda
The major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership ?marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily combined ?but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great ?it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke?.
The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre!
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