Tom M
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 8, 2016
- Messages
- 4,883
- Reaction score
- -15
- Country
- Location
India, Russia ink S-400 missile system deal
- Thread starter Theparadox
- Start date
Papa Dragon
BANNED
- Joined
- Nov 18, 2015
- Messages
- 1,540
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
Probably the Chinese could answer your question sometime down the lane because they received their first batch of S-400 in July 18'
And you think India would only defend itself and not go on the offensive? We would probably empty our silos on you guys if that were to happen
MultaniGuy
BANNED
- Joined
- Feb 6, 2017
- Messages
- 12,243
- Reaction score
- -6
- Country
- Location
The Roots of India’s Shadow-Bank Crisis
The country still hasn’t figured out how to pay for the billions in infrastructure it needs.
By
Mihir Sharma
October 3, 2018, 12:12 AM EDT Updated on October 5, 2018, 6:13 AM EDT
Government money alone can’t solve the problem. Photographer: Pratik Chorge/Hindustan Times/Getty Images
Read more opinionFollow @mihirssharma on Twitter
COMMENTS
5
LISTEN TO ARTICLE
4:48
SHARE THIS ARTICLE
Share
Tweet
Post
Email
When one of India’s largest shadow bankers — an institution with 169 subsidiaries that calls itself Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services — admitted to a series of defaults last week, Indian markets came close to a crisis. Fearing that a prolonged investment slowdown would intensify, the government invoked a little-known clause in India’s Companies Act and appointed a new board. The rot the defaults revealed is about more than one organization, however, or even this particular moment in the Indian economy’s fragile recovery. Behind the messy descent of IL&FS from a gilt-edged, quasi-sovereign debt issuer to the object of a bureaucratic bailout lies one unpalatable truth: India hasn’t a clue how to pay for infrastructure.
It’s not as if the government hasn’t tried. Soon after taking power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration doubled down on public spending on roads and Indian Railways, hoping the investment would pay for itself in a revival of private-sector activity. It hasn’t, and now the government is running out of fiscal space while bond yieldsare soaring.
Modi and his officials felt they had little choice. The previous government, under then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, had tried to build infrastructure in partnership with the private sector. That model, in which a company would agree to use subsidized resources to build a road or a power plant for the state in return for a cut of the revenue, had collapsed well before Singh was voted out and in fact contributed greatly to his defeat. Contracts were poorly drafted and implemented; accusations of corruption multiplied; the government failed to fulfill its part of the bargain with its private-sector partners; and huge chunks of capital got locked up in half-built projects, sharply slowing growth.
Singh had chosen the PPP model in the first place because he felt that India couldn’t afford to build all the infrastructure it needed — trillions of dollars’ worth — out of taxes that could be better spent on, for example, rural welfare. Modi’s choice of the alternative model is now coming back to haunt him, as distress spreads across India’s vast rural hinterland. On Tuesday, Delhi’s police used water cannons and tear gas on tens of thousands of protesting farmers who were denied permission to enter the capital.
So, if the public sector can’t afford to build infrastructure, and it can’t sign contracts with the private sector to do the job, then what’s left? Couldn’t a private-sector funder aggregate such projects and raise funds for them from debt-market players that would otherwise avoid project finance like the plague? That’s what IL&FS attempted to do. Unfortunately, it ran into the old maturity mismatch problem. Using its quasi-public sector status — it’s a private company, but everyone pretended it wasn’t — it splurged on unsecured debt with a one-year tenure. When its long-gestation projects got held up thanks to land disputes, it suffered a liquidity crisis.
It’s hard to see how this problem can be avoided. Just as when one mortgage fails many others are likely to do so — a root cause behind the subprime blowup in 2008 — when one Indian infrastructure project is delayed, it’s likely others will be, too.
What about creating a fund that raises capital only from long-term investors? That’s the six-year old idea behind India’s National Investment & Infrastructure Fund, in which the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore and Abu Dhabi are major investors. The concept isn’t a bad one.
But it only reduces the problem; it doesn’t eliminate it. In order to reassure foreign investors, the government had to put in almost half the money: It owns 49 percent of the NIIF. That means the size of the fund is limited by the state’s straitened resources. While the government hopes the NIIF will grow to have $6 billion to invest, that’s a drop in the bucket. India’s finance minister estimated in 2016 that the country’s infrastructure build-out would require more than $1.5 trillion over 10 years. It’s tough to see half of that coming out of the Indian government’s budget.
This looks like an insoluble problem. It isn’t, if you believe one simple thing is true: The infrastructure projects worth building are those that pay for themselves in the long run. If that’s the case, there’s got to be a way to structure investment so that they get built. Governments shouldn’t have to put their own money in: They should instead commit to getting out of the way and ensuring that they aren’t doing anything that halts projects before they’re finished.
It’s the private sector that needs to put more resources into figuring out what’s worth building and what isn’t — and how to make money off it. Countries like India are where the potential profits are. Yet, too often, Western finance looks for intermediaries like IL&FS instead of doing its job and evaluating risks itself.
After all, there’s one more model on offer: China’s. The People’s Republic has proved that the government can build infrastructure — too much of it! — if private-sector finance isn’t allowed to operate freely. Unless the capital markets start working to solve the problem of long-term debt, they’re going to find that governments decide they aren’t worth keeping around.
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti...needs-better-model-for-funding-infrastructure
@soundHound
The country still hasn’t figured out how to pay for the billions in infrastructure it needs.
By
Mihir Sharma
October 3, 2018, 12:12 AM EDT Updated on October 5, 2018, 6:13 AM EDT
Government money alone can’t solve the problem. Photographer: Pratik Chorge/Hindustan Times/Getty Images
Read more opinionFollow @mihirssharma on Twitter
COMMENTS
5
LISTEN TO ARTICLE
4:48
SHARE THIS ARTICLE
Share
Tweet
Post
When one of India’s largest shadow bankers — an institution with 169 subsidiaries that calls itself Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services — admitted to a series of defaults last week, Indian markets came close to a crisis. Fearing that a prolonged investment slowdown would intensify, the government invoked a little-known clause in India’s Companies Act and appointed a new board. The rot the defaults revealed is about more than one organization, however, or even this particular moment in the Indian economy’s fragile recovery. Behind the messy descent of IL&FS from a gilt-edged, quasi-sovereign debt issuer to the object of a bureaucratic bailout lies one unpalatable truth: India hasn’t a clue how to pay for infrastructure.
It’s not as if the government hasn’t tried. Soon after taking power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration doubled down on public spending on roads and Indian Railways, hoping the investment would pay for itself in a revival of private-sector activity. It hasn’t, and now the government is running out of fiscal space while bond yieldsare soaring.
Modi and his officials felt they had little choice. The previous government, under then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, had tried to build infrastructure in partnership with the private sector. That model, in which a company would agree to use subsidized resources to build a road or a power plant for the state in return for a cut of the revenue, had collapsed well before Singh was voted out and in fact contributed greatly to his defeat. Contracts were poorly drafted and implemented; accusations of corruption multiplied; the government failed to fulfill its part of the bargain with its private-sector partners; and huge chunks of capital got locked up in half-built projects, sharply slowing growth.
Singh had chosen the PPP model in the first place because he felt that India couldn’t afford to build all the infrastructure it needed — trillions of dollars’ worth — out of taxes that could be better spent on, for example, rural welfare. Modi’s choice of the alternative model is now coming back to haunt him, as distress spreads across India’s vast rural hinterland. On Tuesday, Delhi’s police used water cannons and tear gas on tens of thousands of protesting farmers who were denied permission to enter the capital.
So, if the public sector can’t afford to build infrastructure, and it can’t sign contracts with the private sector to do the job, then what’s left? Couldn’t a private-sector funder aggregate such projects and raise funds for them from debt-market players that would otherwise avoid project finance like the plague? That’s what IL&FS attempted to do. Unfortunately, it ran into the old maturity mismatch problem. Using its quasi-public sector status — it’s a private company, but everyone pretended it wasn’t — it splurged on unsecured debt with a one-year tenure. When its long-gestation projects got held up thanks to land disputes, it suffered a liquidity crisis.
It’s hard to see how this problem can be avoided. Just as when one mortgage fails many others are likely to do so — a root cause behind the subprime blowup in 2008 — when one Indian infrastructure project is delayed, it’s likely others will be, too.
What about creating a fund that raises capital only from long-term investors? That’s the six-year old idea behind India’s National Investment & Infrastructure Fund, in which the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore and Abu Dhabi are major investors. The concept isn’t a bad one.
But it only reduces the problem; it doesn’t eliminate it. In order to reassure foreign investors, the government had to put in almost half the money: It owns 49 percent of the NIIF. That means the size of the fund is limited by the state’s straitened resources. While the government hopes the NIIF will grow to have $6 billion to invest, that’s a drop in the bucket. India’s finance minister estimated in 2016 that the country’s infrastructure build-out would require more than $1.5 trillion over 10 years. It’s tough to see half of that coming out of the Indian government’s budget.
This looks like an insoluble problem. It isn’t, if you believe one simple thing is true: The infrastructure projects worth building are those that pay for themselves in the long run. If that’s the case, there’s got to be a way to structure investment so that they get built. Governments shouldn’t have to put their own money in: They should instead commit to getting out of the way and ensuring that they aren’t doing anything that halts projects before they’re finished.
It’s the private sector that needs to put more resources into figuring out what’s worth building and what isn’t — and how to make money off it. Countries like India are where the potential profits are. Yet, too often, Western finance looks for intermediaries like IL&FS instead of doing its job and evaluating risks itself.
After all, there’s one more model on offer: China’s. The People’s Republic has proved that the government can build infrastructure — too much of it! — if private-sector finance isn’t allowed to operate freely. Unless the capital markets start working to solve the problem of long-term debt, they’re going to find that governments decide they aren’t worth keeping around.
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti...needs-better-model-for-funding-infrastructure
@soundHound
Tom M
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 8, 2016
- Messages
- 4,883
- Reaction score
- -15
- Country
- Location
Good luck with American sanctions buddy.
And you seriously think the Americans are really stupid to let go the only other country who could challenge
, huh??At present the Yankees need us more than we need them. You ain't know the reality I guess.
Papa Dragon
BANNED
- Joined
- Nov 18, 2015
- Messages
- 1,540
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
Don't believe everything that you hear from your mullah
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosm...-economy-on-track-to-beat-china/#103bca705136
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263617/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-india/
soundHound
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 17, 2012
- Messages
- 594
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
Naah, whole world financial system is in frenzy this days, look at Turkey for example, I thinks this was an overdue correction, irrespective of sensex FDI still looks solid.
soundHound
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 17, 2012
- Messages
- 594
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
The Roots of India’s Shadow-Bank Crisis
The country still hasn’t figured out how to pay for the billions in infrastructure it needs.
By
Mihir Sharma
October 3, 2018, 12:12 AM EDT Updated on October 5, 2018, 6:13 AM EDT
Government money alone can’t solve the problem. Photographer: Pratik Chorge/Hindustan Times/Getty Images
Read more opinionFollow @mihirssharma on Twitter
COMMENTS
5
LISTEN TO ARTICLE
4:48
SHARE THIS ARTICLE
Share
Tweet
Post
When one of India’s largest shadow bankers — an institution with 169 subsidiaries that calls itself Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services — admitted to a series of defaults last week, Indian markets came close to a crisis. Fearing that a prolonged investment slowdown would intensify, the government invoked a little-known clause in India’s Companies Act and appointed a new board. The rot the defaults revealed is about more than one organization, however, or even this particular moment in the Indian economy’s fragile recovery. Behind the messy descent of IL&FS from a gilt-edged, quasi-sovereign debt issuer to the object of a bureaucratic bailout lies one unpalatable truth: India hasn’t a clue how to pay for infrastructure.
It’s not as if the government hasn’t tried. Soon after taking power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration doubled down on public spending on roads and Indian Railways, hoping the investment would pay for itself in a revival of private-sector activity. It hasn’t, and now the government is running out of fiscal space while bond yieldsare soaring.
Modi and his officials felt they had little choice. The previous government, under then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, had tried to build infrastructure in partnership with the private sector. That model, in which a company would agree to use subsidized resources to build a road or a power plant for the state in return for a cut of the revenue, had collapsed well before Singh was voted out and in fact contributed greatly to his defeat. Contracts were poorly drafted and implemented; accusations of corruption multiplied; the government failed to fulfill its part of the bargain with its private-sector partners; and huge chunks of capital got locked up in half-built projects, sharply slowing growth.
Singh had chosen the PPP model in the first place because he felt that India couldn’t afford to build all the infrastructure it needed — trillions of dollars’ worth — out of taxes that could be better spent on, for example, rural welfare. Modi’s choice of the alternative model is now coming back to haunt him, as distress spreads across India’s vast rural hinterland. On Tuesday, Delhi’s police used water cannons and tear gas on tens of thousands of protesting farmers who were denied permission to enter the capital.
So, if the public sector can’t afford to build infrastructure, and it can’t sign contracts with the private sector to do the job, then what’s left? Couldn’t a private-sector funder aggregate such projects and raise funds for them from debt-market players that would otherwise avoid project finance like the plague? That’s what IL&FS attempted to do. Unfortunately, it ran into the old maturity mismatch problem. Using its quasi-public sector status — it’s a private company, but everyone pretended it wasn’t — it splurged on unsecured debt with a one-year tenure. When its long-gestation projects got held up thanks to land disputes, it suffered a liquidity crisis.
It’s hard to see how this problem can be avoided. Just as when one mortgage fails many others are likely to do so — a root cause behind the subprime blowup in 2008 — when one Indian infrastructure project is delayed, it’s likely others will be, too.
What about creating a fund that raises capital only from long-term investors? That’s the six-year old idea behind India’s National Investment & Infrastructure Fund, in which the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore and Abu Dhabi are major investors. The concept isn’t a bad one.
But it only reduces the problem; it doesn’t eliminate it. In order to reassure foreign investors, the government had to put in almost half the money: It owns 49 percent of the NIIF. That means the size of the fund is limited by the state’s straitened resources. While the government hopes the NIIF will grow to have $6 billion to invest, that’s a drop in the bucket. India’s finance minister estimated in 2016 that the country’s infrastructure build-out would require more than $1.5 trillion over 10 years. It’s tough to see half of that coming out of the Indian government’s budget.
This looks like an insoluble problem. It isn’t, if you believe one simple thing is true: The infrastructure projects worth building are those that pay for themselves in the long run. If that’s the case, there’s got to be a way to structure investment so that they get built. Governments shouldn’t have to put their own money in: They should instead commit to getting out of the way and ensuring that they aren’t doing anything that halts projects before they’re finished.
It’s the private sector that needs to put more resources into figuring out what’s worth building and what isn’t — and how to make money off it. Countries like India are where the potential profits are. Yet, too often, Western finance looks for intermediaries like IL&FS instead of doing its job and evaluating risks itself.
After all, there’s one more model on offer: China’s. The People’s Republic has proved that the government can build infrastructure — too much of it! — if private-sector finance isn’t allowed to operate freely. Unless the capital markets start working to solve the problem of long-term debt, they’re going to find that governments decide they aren’t worth keeping around.
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti...needs-better-model-for-funding-infrastructure
@soundHound
This are just opinions buddy, and article mostly speaks about budget required and availability, am telling you again our fundamentals are strong.
Mujahid Memon
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2012
- Messages
- 2,820
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
Next time Putin should be careful when taking topless photos on horse back
Trango Towers
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Oct 29, 2016
- Messages
- 21,951
- Reaction score
- -18
- Country
- Location
I think you will find...
1. Like the rafale deal ... this will take a long time and may ultimatly be cancelled.
2. Pakistan isnt asleep as your air chef keeps saying. Drones galore to keep your air defences busy.
3. Our stand off weapons will give you a good wakeup call to.
4. Best not to indulge in war just to win an election. As pakistan may start to target the homes of the bjp goons who will be leading the average indian soldier tk his death after hunger in the mountains
Peshwa
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 26, 2009
- Messages
- 4,918
- Reaction score
- -10
- Country
- Location
I wouldn't get too comfortable, for India is at risk of sanctions by USA!
A Risk we are willing to take clearly, since we have been “warned”. Lol
What really isn’t a risk is the guaranteed meeting with said non gender specific virgins for PAF pilots lol
You can count on that! Win win for both parties!
Panzerfaust 3
BANNED
- Joined
- Apr 3, 2018
- Messages
- 606
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
You have suicidal tendencies mate!
alee92nawaz
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 14, 2015
- Messages
- 2,067
- Reaction score
- -3
- Country
- Location
If i were an indian my comment would have been
" Hmka ik system ik war me pakistan ka 70 ka 70 ghatak larako vimaan eef solah gira skta ha "
Seriously with 72 missiles they can hit our 70+ F-16s . Given that if they were simultaneously in the air ever.
Papa Dragon
BANNED
- Joined
- Nov 18, 2015
- Messages
- 1,540
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
India is also going ahead with Iranian oil
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...ofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
US on India's S-400 Deal: CAATSA Not Intended to Damage Allies' Capabilities. The source is sputniknews with an official release statement from US Embassy
https://sputniknews.com/asia/201810051068633309-india-s400-deal-us-sanctions/
Embassies aren't your typical corrupt media outlets to blabber whatever crap they want to especially when they're dealing with adversaries. They don't send out an official statement without prior approval from their home state
Last edited:
soundHound
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 17, 2012
- Messages
- 594
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
Going by posts in this thread, am pretty sure burnol will stand ineffective if India tries and gets Patriot system as well..
Mujahid Memon
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2012
- Messages
- 2,820
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
A single nuke detonated in upper atmosphere will cripple the entire s400 system due to emf, without inflicting any direct human casualties.
Similar threads
