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Yadav is an Indian Spy - indian express

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Tussle between Army, govt will shape how The Hague verdict plays out in Pakistan
Kulbhushan Jadhav was sized up by the hardened intelligence professionals sitting across the table — and dismissed as a high-risk fantasist, officials present at the meeting recall.


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Presiding Judge Ronny Abraham of France (far right) and other judges enter the courtroom at The Hague on Thursday. AP photo
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IN the summer of 2010, his hopes of setting up a marine engineering and gypsum-shipping business floundering in the sanctions-hit Iranian port of Chabahar, a former Naval officer walked into the offices of the Research and Analysis Wing off New Delhi’s Lodhi Road, with a startling business proposition. His dhow, the Kaminda, could spy on Pakistan’s naval works around Gwadar, the lean, balding man told officers at RAW’s Pakistan desk; he even suggested it could be used as a platform to ship in covert assault teams, to stage 26/11-type maritime retaliation against jihadists in Karachi.

Kulbhushan Jadhav was sized up by the hardened intelligence professionals sitting across the table — and dismissed as a high-risk fantasist, officials present at the meeting recall. He made repeated attempts to secure a place on RAW’s payroll until 2012, with no success.

Read | Kulbhushan Jadhav’s hanging stayed: Pakistan attacks India, Modi govt says ‘will do everything to save him’

“The fatal conceit of most spies is to believe they are loved,” wrote Ben Macintyre, historian of the great Soviet spy Kim Philby, who betrayed his nation, and his class, for his beliefs. Jadhav, we can be reasonably certain, would have had no such delusions: no Indian spy had ever been acknowledged, let alone bartered, by the country for which he engaged in secret service.

Yet, a man who was, at most, a bit-actor in the India-Pakistan espionage game has become a central figure in one of the most high-stakes battles between the two countries. India has never taken the case of a citizen denied legal rights by Pakistan’s judicial system to the International Court of Justice. Nor has Pakistan ever invested so much capital in the case of one of the many Indian spies it has held.

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Behind the measured legal arguments over Jadhav’s fate made in The Hague’s grand halls lies a savage struggle for power — a struggle that will ultimately decide his fate.

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New Delhi’s exultation about Thursday’s provisional order at The Hague asking Pakistan not to proceed with Jadhav’s execution, and Islamabad’s flat-out rejection of the world court’s jurisdiction in national security matters, tell us what we need to know: this case is about politics, not law. In fact, The Hague has said little that was unexpected. Noting that both India and Pakistan are signatories to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which gives foreign nationals the right to access their diplomatic missions after arrest, and to a protocol giving the world court the right to adjudicate differences in its interpretation, the judgment simply puts the execution on hold until the dispute is resolved.

This is precisely what The Hague did back in 2003, when Mexico approached it on behalf of 54 of its citizens awaiting execution in the United States, all of whom had been denied consular access after their arrest. In February that year, the Court issued provisional measures on behalf of the three prisoners at immediate risk, ordering the United States “to take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr Caesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment”.

For Pakistan’s Generals, though, this unexceptionable delay poses a problem. Ever since 2008, the Pakistan Army has steadily ratcheted up tensions with India, in an effort to strengthen its own legitimacy, under siege from jihadists in the country’s north-west and Punjab. The notion of a predatory India stoking terrorism in Pakistan was a core part of the military’s propaganda — which has continued apace after the Jadhav case too, with former Tehreek-e-Taliban spokesperson Liaqat Ali claiming the jihadi organisation was in RAW’s pay.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s outreach to India, starting early in his term, posed a significant challenge to this narrative. His public naming of the Jaish-e-Muhammad for the 2016 Pathankot attack, and his push for the Army to act against jihadists in Punjab, saw the tensions reach breaking point. Notably, Sharif has not spoken publicly on the Jadhav case. His de facto Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, told Pakistan’s Senate that there was insufficient evidence to prepare a dossier on the case for international release — even as a military court was, it is now known, preparing to try the former officer.

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There’s little doubt Jadhav lived in the world inhabited by traffickers and spies alike. He was linked, in Chabahar, to the Karachi gangster Uzair Baloch — an Iranian intelligence asset whose eventual arrest seems to have facilitated Jadhav’s downfall.

But while the former Naval officer had long possessed the accoutrements of a spy, his tradecraft was sadly wanting if he was indeed one. His illegally obtained passport, L9630722, identifying him by the pseudonym Hussein Mubarak Patel, bore the address of an apartment owned by his mother, an error not even a semi-competent espionage agency would make.

It seems probable Islamabad would have put what evidence it had in the public domain, were it credible — something it has been quick to do in other cases. The decision to try Jadhav in a military court was likely taken precisely because the evidence was, at best, thin; at worst, imaginary.

New Delhi thinks the The Hague judgment will put the Generals in a spot: they could push forward with the execution, and risk international opprobrium — or back down, angering their carefully-grown constituency of hardline nationalists and Islamists at home. But it isn’t clear the script has to play out that way.

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Read | Moral victory for India, but his fate remains in the hands of Pakistan’s generals

From the Avena judgment, we have a good idea what to expect from The Hague’s final judgment. In 2004, The Hague ordered the United States to provide “by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weight to be given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention”. Put simply, this meant the United States had to grant consular access — but its own judicial system would decide whether or not the denial of access had a material bearing on the sentencing or not.
Islamabad could live with a judgment of this kind, should it choose to — after all, it could grant Jadhav consular access, and then have another military court give him the same sentence again.

Then, the Pakistani appellate judiciary could simply ignore The Hague — something Pakistan’s Foreign Office has already indicated the country will do. The United States Supreme Court, in 2008, held that The Hague’s orders could not prevail over domestic law, clearing the way for the execution of some of the prisoners on whose behalf the Avena case had been fought.

Read | PM Modi lauds Harish Salve’s efforts as ICJ stays Kulbhushan Jadhav’s execution until final verdict

In the final analysis, Kulbhushan Jadhav’s life remains in the hands of the Generals who seized him from Iran. He was, and remains, a pawn in the Army’s battle for supremacy against the political leadership.

New Delhi has won a moral victory — but in geopolitics, moral victories carry no prizes, and moral shame, no sanction.



What the court said?
Pakistan shall take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Jadhav is not executed pending the final decision in the proceedings.

On whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case

The Court recalled that India had argued that Article I of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention provides that the Court has jurisdiction over “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention”. It noted that India and Pakistan differed on the question of India’s consular assistance to Kulbhushan Jadhav under the Vienna Convention. It noted that the acts alleged by India, i.e., the alleged failure by Pakistan to provide the requisite consular notifications with regard to Jadhav’s arrest and detention, as well as the alleged failure to allow communication and provide access to him, appeared to be capable of falling within the scope of the Convention. This, the court found, was sufficient to establish that it had prima facie jurisdiction under Article I of the Optional Protocol, and that the existence of a 2008 bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan on consular relations did not change this conclusion.

On whether rights alleged by India are plausible

The Court observed that rights to consular notification and access between a state and its nationals, as well as the obligations of the detaining state to inform the person concerned without delay of his rights with regard to consular assistance and to allow their exercise, are recognised in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, and that India has alleged violations of this provision. Therefore, it appears that the rights alleged by India are plausible.
On whether there is a link between the rights claimed and provisional measures requested.

The Court said it felt the measures requested were aimed at ensuring that the rights contained in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, were preserved. Therefore, a link existed between the rights claimed by India and the provisional measures being sought.

On whether there was a risk of irreparable prejudice, and urgency

The Court said that the mere fact that Jadhav was under a death sentence and might, therefore, be executed, was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by India. The Court also observed that Pakistan had indicated that Jadhav would probably not be executed before August 2017, which meant that there was a risk that he could be executed at any moment thereafter, before the Court had given its final decision in the case. The Court also noted that Pakistan had given no assurance that Jadhav would not be executed before the final decision. In the circumstances, the Court was satisfied that there was urgency in the case.
The Court concluded by indicating the following measures:

# Pakistan shall take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Jadhav is not executed pending the final decision in the proceedings, and shall inform the Court of all the measures taken in implementation of the present Order.

# That, until the Court has given its final decision, it shall remain seized of the matters which form the subject matter of this Order.

Edited excerpts from ICJ press release

praveen.swami@expressindia.com
First Published on: May 19, 2017 12:22 am
 
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Two Ex-RAW Chiefs Did Not Want Kulbhushan Jadhav Recruited As Spy
By Chandan Nandy
January 05, 2018 at 3:20 PM
Even as the controversy – tamasha, as it’s called in certain intelligence quarters – over Indian ‘spy’ Kulbhushan Jadhav refuses to die down, it has come to light that two former chiefs of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), who headed the organisation sometime over the past 15 years, had put their foot down against recruiting him for operations in Pakistan.


Senior RAW Officers Were Not in Favour of Jadhav
Speaking to The Quint, two former RAW senior officers, including one secretary who headed India’s external intelligence agency after 2008, said that the “proposal to recruit Jadhav for operations, whatever it’s worth, was ridiculous.”

In any case, a number of RAW sources, some serving and a few who retired over the past seven to eight years, revealed that Jadhav was “not a high-grade” operative with skills that other operatives recruited by the agency in other theatres had and used effectively to obtain intelligence.

Even as two RAW secretaries refused to hire his services, the proposal to recruit Jadhav for specific assignments was finally acceded to by a chief who headed the intelligence agency a few years ago and was subsequently re-employed (after retirement) in an organisation also involved in collecting intelligence.

This was among a few different attempts to launch renewed efforts to use human sources as “deep penetration” agents in Pakistan, where most intelligence assets, both HUMINT and SIGINT, were wound up during the prime ministership of IK Gujral in the late 1990s.


Evidence That Links Jadhav With RAW
Sources were – understandably – wary about disclosing full details about Jadhav’s recruitment. The proposal to hire him on a temporary basis was prepared by his case officer (of the rank of deputy secretary, who is way below in the hierarchy) on the Pakistan desk. One former RAW officer, however, said that “it could be that the desk handling Iran and Afghanistan” was instrumental in recruiting Jadhav.

In any case, the recruitment was approved by a joint secretary as the supervisory officer. The RAW has a special unit which also undertakes parallel operations in certain crucial target countries for which it seeks out its own recruits.

The clearest evidence that Jadhav operated for the RAW came to the fore only after his cover – as a businessman who would frequent Iran, especially Chabahar – was blown and he was captured by the Pakistan, following which a former RAW chief, besides at least two other senior officers, called his Mumbai-based parents to “advise” them to not speak about their son’s case to anyone.


The other evidence was the second passport, with the name Hussein Mubarak Patel, that he carried, which shows that it was originally issued in 2003 and was renewed in 2014. The second passport (no L9630722) was issued in Thane on 12 May 2014 and was due to expire on 11 May 2024.

While one passport (no E6934766) is in his name, the second one raises more questions, especially the date of its issue and why he signed as Hussein Mubarak Patel to enter into a property deal (with his mother) in Mumbai where he lived with his parents, wife, and children before he was nabbed by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Born in August 1968, Jadhav did work for the navy but prematurely retired and took to business, which would often take him to Iran. He was spotted as a potential recruit by an undercover RAW officer posted in Iran, who then subsequently shared this with a colleague at the agency’s headquarters. This second officer subsequently moved to send overtures to Jadhav, who accepted the terms and conditions.


How Was Jadhav Caught?
The nabbing of Jadhav, on 3 March 2016, itself throws up several questions, especially because Pakistan has maintained a degree of secrecy, if not ambiguity, about it. While the Pakistani intelligence had initially claimed that he was trapped in Saravan on the Iran-Pakistan border, a Baloch leader by the name Sarfaraz Bugti had disclosed at the time that Jadhav was held near Chaman in Balochistan.

The RAW sources, both former and serving, said that Jadhav would “go on assignments off and on” and he would undergo the mandatory “debriefing” each time he returned to India from his “visits to Balochistan” or when he volunteered to share information. He also went through a three-month training programme when he learned methods and means to transmit and/or send information.

However, sources said, Jadhav’s undoing was based partly on his unprofessionalism and partly because he was not a “career spy.” He did the unthinkable – instead of waiting to communicate with his case officer face-to-face, Jadhav would sometimes use “means over the air waves.” The ISI intercepted some of the communications and were also able to pinpoint his location, making it relatively easy for them to track and then nab him, sources said.


Standard Operating Procedure Skipped
“The botch-up was the result of unprofessionalism not only on the part of Jadhav but also his case officer,” one former special secretary, who conducted operations in some parts of West Asia, said. In this context, a former special secretary who handled the Pakistan desk till a few years ago, besides special operations in India’s neighbourhood, said that “Jadhav was no good” as he was “never in the thick of things, although he would claim he knew a lot of things and had sources in Pakistan.”

However, the former special secretary said that while RAW has many flaws, as a “matter of rule and unstated policy” no case officer should attempt to hire the services of an agent whose background in “tradecraft is not sound enough” and who is given to “bragging.”

In Jadhav’s case, while standard operating procedures may have been relaxed while recruiting him, sources said that his incarceration and the ambiguity surrounding his “work” does “have a lot of benefits.”


Several seasoned RAW hands said that while Jadhav’s case officer (deputy secretary) and the latter’s supervisory officer (joint secretary) recruited him for “reasons best known to them,” the standard practice in spycraft would have been to “have a Baloch or a Pakistani national” do the “intelligence gathering job for us.” He added that it was “foolish for to set an Indian the task to obtain intelligence from a country as hostile as Pakistan.”

Sources said that soon after Jadhav was trapped and caught in March 2016, a few records relating to payments made to him were destroyed, leaving “no trace” of his existence as far the RAW is concerned. But a former agency chief, who retired in the closing years of the previous decade, said, “No professional agency should have recruited him. I cannot even imagine that Jadhav was because it has been a disaster.”

He asked pointedly: “Every operation should have an objective. What huge intelligence or foreign policy objective was to be achieved by tasking Jadhav to operate in Balochitan?”
 
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ICJ has no jurisdiction over Pakistan sovereignty and sovereign judiciary. ICJ case is for farcical indian show and dead end. Anyone falling for this bluster will be dumbfounded.
 
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The decision to try Jadhav in a military court was likely taken precisely because the evidence was, at best, thin; at worst, imaginary.
His illegally obtained passport, L9630722, identifying him by the pseudonym Hussein Mubarak Patel, bore the address of an apartment owned by his mother, an error not even a semi-competent espionage agency would make.
pakistans imaginary spy.
He was, and remains, a pawn in the Army’s battle for supremacy against the political leadership.
to be used for brownie points in tussle between politicians & establishment.
 
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