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Way too simplistic and logically incorrect reply.
Whether someone is an academic or not is irrelevant when it comes to these issues.
Secondly, just because a lot of noise is being made - which can be done if a state as powerful as the US wants to -, it doesn't make it necessarily.
The denial argument is a cheap and convenient argument. Very simplistic too, might I add. It's as good as me saying that you're in denial of Indian involvement. It doesn't mean much without clear evidence.
The point is not that the information is not authentic because 'junior officers' collected it, but because in the words of the Western media itself and US military officials quoted in the Guardian reports, the sources and claims in many of the reports could not be verified.Now in this matter the US govt has admitted the leakage however USA is a zionist, selfish govt all it wants to do is malign Pakistan and get its work done, i will agree to this argument also. However in parts there are bits and pieces of other intelligence services too like polish, now u say this is also Bull......
So can u please tell me what is an authentic source for everybody here?? Mr.Sparklingway is painstakingly along with posting the leaks has been advocating in various posts to people not to see this as an effort directed only against Pakistan. He is speaking about the larger picture. The reason why i am questioning only about Pakistani part is that all those allegations have been called accusations by each and every member here.
The most funniest thing is that some are saying that because Junior Officers collected, this information is not authentic. I am an Accountant without even basic knowledge other than reading material public and Movie experience. Even in my filed when entries are to be accounted for only the Junior guys do this work not the Finance Manager or the CFO. Well if this doesn't apply in the spying world i am sorry.
Afghans React to Leaks With Jubilation
By Maria Abi-Habib
The mood among Afghans over leaked U.S. documents outlining Pakistan’s collaboration with the Taliban wasn’t one of surprise Monday but jubilation.
For many Afghans, it was an “I told you so” moment after lawmakers have to Pakistan for nearly a decade as a main source of support for the Taliban.
But what Afghan President Hamid Karzai does with this moment is what matters most, say parliamentarian Shukria Barakzai and Gen. Zahir Azimi, the spokesman for the defense ministry. “This is a golden opportunity for Karzai. He can now say ‘we told you all along’ to NATO and demand more support and funding,” Mrs. Barakzai says.
Mr. Karzai’s faith in the U.S.-led war here is wavering and his confrontational approach to Pakistan has been ditched for softer words of late. Afghan officials say Mr. Karzai is trying to forge a better relationship with Pakistan, worried about coalition forces withdrawing from Afghanistan while the Taliban insurgency strengthens.
But the leaked documents, which show the U.S. is aware of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, may see Mr. Karzai return to his hard-line approach by bolstering his past claims of Pakistani interference, lawmakers say.
The documents, lawmakers and cabinet ministers hope, will also publicly embarrass the U.S. and force them to take a tougher approach with Pakistan after donating billions of dollars in exchange for Pakistan’s help in the war on terror.
“Everyone here knows that a lot of U.S. aid money for Pakistan to build schools or hospitals never gets delivered, but goes to work against the U.S. in Afghanistan,” Mrs. Barakzai said.
Afghans React to U.S. Document Leaks With Jubilation - Dispatch - WSJ
The point is not that the information is not authentic because 'junior officers' collected it, but because in the words of the Western media itself and US military officials quoted in the Guardian reports, the sources and claims in many of the reports could not be verified.
The following quotes are all from the Western media, primarily the NYT and Guardian the collaborated with wikileaks to expose these documents:
Much of the information — raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan— cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.
Experts cautioned that although Pakistan’s militant groups and Al Qaeda work together, directly linking the Pakistani spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, with Al Qaeda is difficult.
American officials have rarely uncovered definitive evidence of direct ISI involvement in a major attack.
But for all their eye-popping details, the intelligence files, which are mostly collated by junior officers relying on informants and Afghan officials, fail to provide a convincing smoking gun for ISI complicity. Most of the reports are vague, filled with incongruent detail, or crudely fabricated. The same characters – famous Taliban commanders, well-known ISI officials – and scenarios repeatedly pop up. And few of the events predicted in the reports subsequently occurred.
A retired senior American officer said ground-level reports were considered to be a mixture of "rumours, bullshit and second-hand information" and were weeded out as they passed up the chain of command. "As someone who had to sift through thousands of these reports, I can say that the chances of finding any real information are pretty slim," said the officer, who has years of experience in the region.
If anything, the jumble of allegations highlights the perils of collecting accurate intelligence in a complex arena where all sides have an interest in distorting the truth.
"The fog of war is particularly dense in Afghanistan," said Michael Semple, a former deputy head of the EU mission there. "A barrage of false information is being passed off as intelligence and anyone who wants to operate there needs to be able to sift through it. The opportunities to be misled are innumerable."
But many of the 180 reports appear to betray as much about the motivation of the sources than those of the alleged foreign puppet-masters. Some US officers were aware of this. One report from 2006 notes that an informant "divulges information for monetary remuneration and likely fabricated or exaggerated the above report for just that reason".
Some of the most striking claims come from the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's foremost spy agency and a bitter rival to the ISI.
But many such reports appear highly implausible. In February 2007 the ISI and insurgents planned "to buy alcoholic drinks from markets in Miranshah [in Pakistan's tribal belt] and Peshawar [in order to] mix them with poison and use them for poisoning ANSF and ISAF troops" according to a C3 report. The Karzai plot is assessed to be "probably true".
Apparently more credible reports of ISI skulduggery are marked SEWOC, or Signals Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations Centre, signifying they come from intercepted communications. One SEWOC report, in December 2007, accused the ISI of deploying children as suicide bombers. But the military source said that such intelligence was also prone to distortion, and that its value depended on whose conversation was being eavesdropped. "If we ever found out anything that the ISI or Pakistani military were somehow complicit in the insurgency, it never came from these sources. Never," he said.
But while Gul, 73, is a well-known fundamentalist ideologue in Pakistan, experts say he is unlikely to play a frontline role in the fighting. Afghan informers may have used his name – he is notorious in Afghanistan – to spice up their stories, said Semple.
"There's a pattern of using a dramatis personae of famous ISI officers and Afghan commanders, and recurring reports of dramatic developments such as the delivery of surface-to-air missiles, to give these reports credibility," he said. "But most of them are simply fabricated."
The retired US officer said some NDS officials "wanted to create the impression that Pakistani complicity was a threat to the US". And more broadly speaking, "there's an Afghan prejudice that wants to see an ISI agent under every rock".
The point is not that the information is not authentic because 'junior officers' collected it, but because in the words of the Western media itself and US military officials quoted in the Guardian reports, the sources and claims in many of the reports could not be verified.
The following quotes are all from the Western media, primarily the NYT and Guardian the collaborated with wikileaks to expose these documents:
Much of the information raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.
Experts cautioned that although Pakistans militant groups and Al Qaeda work together, directly linking the Pakistani spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, with Al Qaeda is difficult.
American officials have rarely uncovered definitive evidence of direct ISI involvement in a major attack.
But for all their eye-popping details, the intelligence files, which are mostly collated by junior officers relying on informants and Afghan officials, fail to provide a convincing smoking gun for ISI complicity. Most of the reports are vague, filled with incongruent detail, or crudely fabricated. The same characters famous Taliban commanders, well-known ISI officials and scenarios repeatedly pop up. And few of the events predicted in the reports subsequently occurred.
A retired senior American officer said ground-level reports were considered to be a mixture of "rumours, bullshit and second-hand information" and were weeded out as they passed up the chain of command. "As someone who had to sift through thousands of these reports, I can say that the chances of finding any real information are pretty slim," said the officer, who has years of experience in the region.
If anything, the jumble of allegations highlights the perils of collecting accurate intelligence in a complex arena where all sides have an interest in distorting the truth.
"The fog of war is particularly dense in Afghanistan," said Michael Semple, a former deputy head of the EU mission there. "A barrage of false information is being passed off as intelligence and anyone who wants to operate there needs to be able to sift through it. The opportunities to be misled are innumerable."
But many of the 180 reports appear to betray as much about the motivation of the sources than those of the alleged foreign puppet-masters. Some US officers were aware of this. One report from 2006 notes that an informant "divulges information for monetary remuneration and likely fabricated or exaggerated the above report for just that reason".
Some of the most striking claims come from the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's foremost spy agency and a bitter rival to the ISI.
But many such reports appear highly implausible. In February 2007 the ISI and insurgents planned "to buy alcoholic drinks from markets in Miranshah [in Pakistan's tribal belt] and Peshawar [in order to] mix them with poison and use them for poisoning ANSF and ISAF troops" according to a C3 report. The Karzai plot is assessed to be "probably true".
Apparently more credible reports of ISI skulduggery are marked SEWOC, or Signals Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations Centre, signifying they come from intercepted communications. One SEWOC report, in December 2007, accused the ISI of deploying children as suicide bombers. But the military source said that such intelligence was also prone to distortion, and that its value depended on whose conversation was being eavesdropped. "If we ever found out anything that the ISI or Pakistani military were somehow complicit in the insurgency, it never came from these sources. Never," he said.
But while Gul, 73, is a well-known fundamentalist ideologue in Pakistan, experts say he is unlikely to play a frontline role in the fighting. Afghan informers may have used his name he is notorious in Afghanistan to spice up their stories, said Semple.
"There's a pattern of using a dramatis personae of famous ISI officers and Afghan commanders, and recurring reports of dramatic developments such as the delivery of surface-to-air missiles, to give these reports credibility," he said. "But most of them are simply fabricated."
The retired US officer said some NDS officials "wanted to create the impression that Pakistani complicity was a threat to the US". And more broadly speaking, "there's an Afghan prejudice that wants to see an ISI agent under every rock".
An administration official went further in an e-mail to reporters: “I don’t think anyone who follows this issue will find it surprising that there are concerns about ISI and safe havens in Pakistan. In fact, we’ve said as much repeatedly and on the record. …
“The period of time covered in these documents (January 2004-December 2009) is before the President announced his new strategy. Some of the disconcerting things reported are exactly why the President ordered a three month policy review and a change in strategy.”
The official added: “t’s worth noting that WikiLeaks is not an objective news outlet but rather an organization that opposes U.S. policy in Afghanistan."
The official highlighted this passage in The Guardian’s coverage: “[F]or all their eye-popping details, the intelligence files, which are mostly collated by junior officers relying on informants and Afghan officials, fail to provide a convincing smoking gun for ISI complicity. Most of the reports are vague, filled with incongruent detail, or crudely fabricated. The same characters – famous Taliban commanders, well-known ISI officials – and scenarios repeatedly pop up. And few of the events predicted in the reports subsequently occurred.
“A retired senior American officer said ground-level reports were considered to be a mixture of ‘rumours, [baloney] and second-hand information’ and were weeded out as they passed up the chain of command. ‘As someone who had to sift through thousands of these reports, I can say that the chances of finding any real information are pretty slim,’ said the officer, who has years of experience in the region.
“If anything, the jumble of allegations highlights the perils of collecting accurate intelligence in a complex arena where all sides have an interest in distorting the truth.”
W.H. condemns 'irresponsible' leaks, dismisses stories - Mike Allen - POLITICO.com
The point is not that the information is not authentic because 'junior officers' collected it, but because in the words of the Western media itself and US military officials quoted in the Guardian reports, the sources and claims in many of the reports could not be verified.
The following quotes are all from the Western media, primarily the NYT and Guardian the collaborated with wikileaks to expose these documents:
Much of the information raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.
Experts cautioned that although Pakistans militant groups and Al Qaeda work together, directly linking the Pakistani spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, with Al Qaeda is difficult.
American officials have rarely uncovered definitive evidence of direct ISI involvement in a major attack.
But for all their eye-popping details, the intelligence files, which are mostly collated by junior officers relying on informants and Afghan officials, fail to provide a convincing smoking gun for ISI complicity. Most of the reports are vague, filled with incongruent detail, or crudely fabricated. The same characters famous Taliban commanders, well-known ISI officials and scenarios repeatedly pop up. And few of the events predicted in the reports subsequently occurred.
A retired senior American officer said ground-level reports were considered to be a mixture of "rumours, bullshit and second-hand information" and were weeded out as they passed up the chain of command. "As someone who had to sift through thousands of these reports, I can say that the chances of finding any real information are pretty slim," said the officer, who has years of experience in the region.
If anything, the jumble of allegations highlights the perils of collecting accurate intelligence in a complex arena where all sides have an interest in distorting the truth.
"The fog of war is particularly dense in Afghanistan," said Michael Semple, a former deputy head of the EU mission there. "A barrage of false information is being passed off as intelligence and anyone who wants to operate there needs to be able to sift through it. The opportunities to be misled are innumerable."
But many of the 180 reports appear to betray as much about the motivation of the sources than those of the alleged foreign puppet-masters. Some US officers were aware of this. One report from 2006 notes that an informant "divulges information for monetary remuneration and likely fabricated or exaggerated the above report for just that reason".
Some of the most striking claims come from the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's foremost spy agency and a bitter rival to the ISI.
But many such reports appear highly implausible. In February 2007 the ISI and insurgents planned "to buy alcoholic drinks from markets in Miranshah [in Pakistan's tribal belt] and Peshawar [in order to] mix them with poison and use them for poisoning ANSF and ISAF troops" according to a C3 report. The Karzai plot is assessed to be "probably true".
Apparently more credible reports of ISI skulduggery are marked SEWOC, or Signals Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations Centre, signifying they come from intercepted communications. One SEWOC report, in December 2007, accused the ISI of deploying children as suicide bombers. But the military source said that such intelligence was also prone to distortion, and that its value depended on whose conversation was being eavesdropped. "If we ever found out anything that the ISI or Pakistani military were somehow complicit in the insurgency, it never came from these sources. Never," he said.
But while Gul, 73, is a well-known fundamentalist ideologue in Pakistan, experts say he is unlikely to play a frontline role in the fighting. Afghan informers may have used his name he is notorious in Afghanistan to spice up their stories, said Semple.
"There's a pattern of using a dramatis personae of famous ISI officers and Afghan commanders, and recurring reports of dramatic developments such as the delivery of surface-to-air missiles, to give these reports credibility," he said. "But most of them are simply fabricated."
The retired US officer said some NDS officials "wanted to create the impression that Pakistani complicity was a threat to the US". And more broadly speaking, "there's an Afghan prejudice that wants to see an ISI agent under every rock".