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Why India's response to Pathankot attack was 'a debacle'

Six alarming questions about the attack on Indian air base
Manoj Joshi
Filed on January 6, 2016 | Last updated on January 6, 2016 at 07.41 am

The handling of the incident has been flawed, if not downright shoddy.

Some things about the attack on the Pathankot IAF base are obvious. First, something is seriously wrong with our border management in the area. Despite the fencing and presumably heavy patrolling, Pakistani militants seem to get through with surprising ease. This is the fifth attack in the area since September 2013, which follows a near identical pattern. A small group of militants, dressed in army fatigues, crosses the international border in Jammu & Kashmir which runs roughly parallel to National Highway 1A in a south-easterly direction from Jammu to Kathua and then loops south at the Ravi river to Pathankot and Gurdaspur. After crossing the border they hike - and in this case, they apparently summoned a taxi and later hijacked an official vehicle - to get to the highway which is some 10-15 kms away and head for a target, usually a police station, an army camp and in Pathankot, the airbase.

This is heavily serrated riverine terrain which is not easy to police, but surely by now India should have gotten its act together. It is not clear whether the Border Security Force has thermal imagers in the area; they do have low light TV surveillance equipment, but it is often unserviceable.

Second, the attack is almost certainly instigated by non state actors. Five or six armed men cannot simply walk through the heavy defences in an area which formed part of a major military thrust by India in the 1971 war.

The third issue is the poor quality of the policing in Punjab. Despite the July 2015 attack on the Dinanagar police station, very near to the point where Punjab Police SP Salwinder Singh was abducted, the police response was worse than flat-footed. They took anywhere between 12-14 hours to come to the conclusion that their SP's account of his abduction meant that a serious national security emergency was on hand.

Whatever scattered accounts of the incident we have been getting indicates that its handling, too, has been flawed, if not downright shoddy.

Government officials themselves admit that they had enough advance information of a possible attack. Punjab police chief Suresh Arora acknowledged that the presence of the militants had been confirmed by Friday And thereafter 168 NSG commandos led by Maj-Gen Dushyant Singh had been flown in from New Delhi.

There were also reports that two columns of the Army, roughly 260 men, had also been sent in along with the Punjab Police SWAT team. Yet, even after 35 hours, at the time of writing, the militants have not been eliminated. It is not enough to say that they have been isolated or contained or whatever, because according to the report, they also had mortars which can easily cause mayhem in a half-kilometre range.

There are many unanswered questions here.

First, why did the terrorists let the SP off, considering he was a senior police officer?

Second, why were the security forces unable to locate the militants in the 20 hours or so they became aware of their presence?

Third, despite prior intelligence and the presence of the NSG, Air Force commandos, aerial surveillance using thermal imaging, how were the militants able to actually breach the base perimeter defences? Had they already breached the perimeter and were hiding out till they launched their attack on Saturday morning ? Is the perimeter fencing and surveillance upto the mark in the first place.

Fourth, why were lower end forces like the Defence Security Corps (DSC), who are mostly retired service personnel, allowed to come in the way of danger when it was clear by Friday evening that highly trained militants were targeting the base which had already received high quality forces like the NSG? According to reports, five of the seven security personnel killed were from the DSC.

Fifth, despite a series of attacks across the international border in this area, why are the security forces unable to effectively seal the border? True, the terrain is a problem, but surely by now, enough technological solutions like motion sensors, thermal imagers and low light TV are available to deal with the problem.

Sixth, did the NSG follow the standard protocol in recovering the body of the militants? I ask this because booby-trapping bodies is standard terrorist tradecraft in such cases and special equipment is supposed to be used to ensure that the body is not wired. Was the NSG sent minus their sophisticated bomb defusing robot ? This may have led to the tragic loss of Lt Col Niranjan.

There are several other issues that will need to be worked out in the coming days. For example, the issue of the number of the militants. If Salwinder Singh's account is accurate, there were four. Then from where did the two additional militants who were discovered on Sunday come from? Is there another group hanging around somewhere, or was their local connivance?

In sum and substance, the Pathankot incident means that some extremist elements are keeping options open when it comes to the efforts being made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi to normalise relations between the two countries. This too ought to have been expected. Every time efforts are made for normalisation, there is a push-back by forces opposed to it. In that sense, this is an old story in the India-Pakistan relationship.

There is a carefully thought through strategy in the attacks on military or police camps in the border areas of J&K and Punjab. After all, the militants could easily hit civilian targets like bazaars, schools, railway and bus stations, but they don't. The goal of the attacks is to keep the Jammu & Kashmir pot simmering, without letting it boil over.

The attack suggests that some elements are out to sabotage the latest Modi-Sharif initiative to de-freeze relations. It would be foolish to play into their hands and stop the process of normalisation. On the other hand, sustained engagement is the only way to neutralise them. That said, there is need on the Indian side for the country to get its defensive act in order. The manner in which the Pathankot attack was handled leaves a lot of unanswered questions about the ability of the security forces - the police, the BSF and the military - to anticipate challenges and react to them swiftly and decisively.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Thewire.in
Six alarming questions about the attack on Indian air base - Khaleej Times
 
When the attack began, Mr Doval chose to airlift some 150 National Security Guard (NSG) personnel from their base at Manesar, on Delhi's outskirts, to fight in an unfamiliar terrain.

Presstitutes Trying too Hard ?

#1. NSG is actually ex Army !
NSG has a special forces mandate, and its core operational capability is provided by the Special Action Group (SAG) which is drawn from the Indian Army.

#2. NSG is Actually Specificcaly Trained for such Ops.

The NSG's is trained to conduct counter terrorist task to including counter hijacking tasks on land, sea, and air; Bomb disposal (search, detection and neutralization of IEDs); PBI (Post Blast Investigation) and Hostage Rescue missions.

Army is NOT trained for the Underlined.


#3, NO/ZERO Details are out , Then what is the basis of this analysis ?
Sir
Army is trained for every thing
Who do you think NSG get training from retired military officers

NSG bomb squad get training from Indian engineer Corps of the Army

Let me tell you that para(commando) of parachute regiment are basically most elite forces in Armed forces were stationed in Pathankot and were protecting Strategic assets of Airforce station at the time of attack and were the last line of defense

Basically Para SF Army were never used in op against terrorist while they were the most elite forces in our inventory
 
I dont think they had intentions of killing civilians otherwise they chose some busy hotels or any other easy target as happened in Taj hotel
They were spotted after They came in contact with DSC personal which are basically retired army soilders

Although you will shocked now one terrorist was killed by one DSC personal
 
They were spotted after They came in contact with DSC personal which are basically retired army soilders

Although you will shocked now one terrorist was killed by one DSC personal

So retired (reserve troops) were also involved apart from airforce troops,army,bsf,police and Special forces in the operation ??? That's pathetic.
 
So retired (reserve troops) were also involved apart from airforce troops,army,bsf,police and Special forces in the operation ??? That's pathetic.
Have a feeling, you would have been able to handle them all on your own.
 
NSG bomb squad officer is killed in IED blast which was boody traped on terrorist body

Second combat op lasted only for 27 hours

Combing operation took three days
Combing op include neutralize IEDs ,search op etc scanning every inch of 27 KM base
On the contrary the siege lasted at least three days according to the news and by lasted I mean sporadic gunfire and lone terrorists running around,

Heavy gunfire as Indian airbase siege enters third day - Al Jazeera English
And I know exactly what a combing op is, it shouldn't take as long as it has despite the size of the base.
 
Sorry to say, but India being a nuclear power, such kind of response is very unsettling.
 
On the contrary the siege lasted at least three days according to the news and by lasted I mean sporadic gunfire and lone terrorists running around,

Heavy gunfire as Indian airbase siege enters third day - Al Jazeera English
And I know exactly what a combing op is, it shouldn't take as long as it has despite the size of the base.
Siege with what there were no hostage situation 4 terrorist killed within first day of the encounter

Other two hiding in under construction building
Killed later

Quoting media won't help it.Aljazeera sources are mainly Indian journos who were cuttoff due to security reason briefed by Op later by our DM himself.
 
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When the attack began, Mr Doval chose to airlift some 150 National Security Guard (NSG) personnel from their base at Manesar, on Delhi's outskirts, to fight in an unfamiliar terrain.
"Unfamilliar with the terrian"? What an entirely stupid thing that keeps getting parroted on blindly. This was not Mars, this was terrain all would have been trained to operate in-the NSG's by nature will be operating in locations that they may not have specifically conducted drills in before but so what? Has the Army's SF been throgh every inch of that base before hand?

The operational command for the mission was handed over to the NSG, the Defence Service Corps (DSC) and the air force's Garud Special Forces.
No, operational control remained with the NSG at all points- does this idiot really expect us to beleive that the DSC had operational charge of this mission at any point? This is intellectual dishonesty and this clown is purposely trying to disparage this operation.


The DSC comprises retired and unmotivated military personnel, whilst the Garuds continue to struggle for operational relevance amongst the plethora of India's burgeoning Special Forces.
Makes an entirely unquantafied "Garuds continue to struggle for operational relevance"- doesn't expand on how this affected the operational element of this operation.

So the Garuds were just flapping about, running around asking their leadership "what am I? what do I do? Please, what is my operational relevance??" whilst this fight was on? This seems to be the scenerio this scumbag is trying to imply. Just because he doesn't know what the role of the Garuds is doesn't mean they don't and it doesn't mean his ignorance should translate into belittling the capabilities of men who spend 3 years training just to become part of this unit.


The NSG, for its part, was unacquainted with the terrain and took avoidable losses that included Lieutenant-Colonel Niranjan Kumar being killed in a grenade explosion from a booby trapped militant's body.
How does being unacquainted with the terrain lead to the loss of life in that incident? Again, an attempt to present half truths to back up a flawed hypothesis.

And not losses plural- a loss, singular (still one too many).
Four other NSG personnel were injured in this blast that - in all probability - would not have fooled the army, familiar with such militant ploys of activating a grenade and lying on it as a last offensive act.
How can he know what would and hwat would not have "fooled the army", is he aware of the exact nature of the incident? Is he claiming that the head of the NSG's bomb disposal unit didn't know what he was doing? Is he ignoring the fact that this officer came from THE EXACT SAME ARMY that he claims would have known better- just because?

The NSG is also strapped for equipment - it has no competent night vision devices and other materiel necessary for an operation of the kind in Pathankot - military sources said.
Simply a lie. Actually look at the NSG today and tell me they are "strapped for equipment".

Army commandos then swapped roles with the MARCOS at the three attack venues in Mumbai - two hotels and a Jewish cultural centre.
Another blatent lie.


"Four days to neutralise no more than five or six militants is unacceptable in a confined open space where there is little or no scope of any civilian collateral damage," he added.
A base measuring half the landmass of Mumbai is hardly a confined space. And this analysis entirely ignores the Indian military's established CT doctrine that is to attempt to catch such guys alive and to refrain from declaring an operation over until an offical "render safe" procedure has taken place.


It appears the one upside of the entire operation was that the security forces were able to prevent the militants from sabotaging any air force "assets" - like Mig-21 fighters and attack helicopters.

On the very last line the entire basis for this being a success is presented, "one of the upsides"- presenting the success of the sole objective of this mission (and primary target of the terrorists) being acheived in such a diminshed manner so as to make this detail seem almost trival is almost unfathomable.


This is typical mentality of the Indian media/intellectuals who seem to look for faults in every single incident of this nature, even when operations were going on you had scoundrels like Burkha Dutt asking why the NSG had not replaced the DSC for perimiter security duties. However this analysis is a step further, it doesn't seem to be the result of pure ignorance (as is the general trait in the Indian media) but a clear agenda to see failure. This peice isn't just asking questions but presenting blatent lies and misrepresenting the truth, it is unacceptable.


Oh and presenting the death of the NSG's BDS head as incompetence on his part was a particuarly classy argument.


Only in India do you get the space for this kind of questioning not only as the operation is still going on but before it is even clear what exactly has happened, before a full account is even made public and without any facts whatsoever to base criticsm on. In a natio of a billion you'll always find enough idiots to argue what you like but that doesn't mean you give them the platform to do it. Contrast this to the coverage of the Paris attacks.


@PARIKRAMA @Vauban @Levina @Echo_419 @MilSpec @ranjeet @hinduguy @Star Wars @Koovie
 
The problem is you can't fight these battles with your hands tied behind your back......time to let them reign in hard. Any border areas should expect an attack. That's the way its got to be played. There should be practice operations considering such attacks all the time to keep the security forces on its toes. You got to have a war zone attitude 24-7 when you are near the borders. The problem is we let boredom, peace and other BS factors set in, which lull us into a false sense of security. Wake up.....
 
Sorry to say, but India being a nuclear power, such kind of response is very unsettling.

True. This could be a prep to steal nukes. Are there any nukes stored in that base? If there is, than I would characterize Indian nukes as unsecured. If India cannot keep its nukes out of militants hands, it should not have nukes.

The problem is you can't fight these battles with your hands tied behind your back......time to let them reign in hard. Any border areas should expect an attack. That's the way its got to be played. There should be practice operations considering such attacks all the time to keep the security forces on its toes. You got to have a war zone attitude 24-7 when you are near the borders. The problem is we let boredom, peace and other BS factors set in, which lull us into a false sense of security. Wake up.....

A soldier should anticipate war at all times. Peace is just a break from combat.
 
Six alarming questions about the attack on Indian air base
Manoj Joshi
Filed on January 6, 2016 | Last updated on January 6, 2016 at 07.41 am

Second, the attack is almost certainly instigated by non state actors. Five or six armed men cannot simply walk through the heavy defences in an area which formed part of a major military thrust by India in the 1971 war.

The third issue is the poor quality of the policing in Punjab. Despite the July 2015 attack on the Dinanagar police station, very near to the point where Punjab Police SP Salwinder Singh was abducted, the police response was worse than flat-footed. They took anywhere between 12-14 hours to come to the conclusion that their SP's account of his abduction meant that a serious national security emergency was on hand.

First, why did the terrorists let the SP off, considering he was a senior police officer?

Second, why were the security forces unable to locate the militants in the 20 hours or so they became aware of their presence?

Third, despite prior intelligence and the presence of the NSG, Air Force commandos, aerial surveillance using thermal imaging, how were the militants able to actually breach the base perimeter defences? Had they already breached the perimeter and were hiding out till they launched their attack on Saturday morning ? Is the perimeter fencing and surveillance upto the mark in the first place.

Fourth, why were lower end forces like the Defence Security Corps (DSC), who are mostly retired service personnel, allowed to come in the way of danger when it was clear by Friday evening that highly trained militants were targeting the base which had already received high quality forces like the NSG? According to reports, five of the seven security personnel killed were from the DSC.

Fifth, despite a series of attacks across the international border in this area, why are the security forces unable to effectively seal the border? True, the terrain is a problem, but surely by now, enough technological solutions like motion sensors, thermal imagers and low light TV are available to deal with the problem.

Sixth, did the NSG follow the standard protocol in recovering the body of the militants? I ask this because booby-trapping bodies is standard terrorist tradecraft in such cases and special equipment is supposed to be used to ensure that the body is not wired. Was the NSG sent minus their sophisticated bomb defusing robot ? This may have led to the tragic loss of Lt Col Niranjan.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Thewire.in
Six alarming questions about the attack on Indian air base - Khaleej Times

If a high ranking police officer claims to be kidnapped and escapes on his own I would be skeptical. It can happen. But one has to be skeptical. Even if he was to be believed did he ever mention that his abductors were Pakistani ?
 
They were all cooks, and were shot in the canteen. One of them killed a terrorist with bare hands (yes, none of them were armed), before being shot by another terrorist.



Says a person whose country had a nuclear Walmart running, and where attacking military installations is sort of national sport.



Probably was aiding the terrorists thinking they were drug traffickers, but when he was thrown out of the car, he informed his superiors.(with a cookedup story of course)

As I said, if India can't secure its own nukes, then it has no business owning them.
 

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