Really ? have been in the army?
they had objectives assigned to them...In fact from some observers, it was the only force who managed to bomb targets in Israel proper and shot a US C5 that was resupplying the IDF, and maintained Cairo sky unmolested by IAF afterwards.
I know that you will come back at me with that , Algeria contributed as a branch of the Egyptian army and wether is a political choice to show arab unity by the Algerian side, by not acting a separate and distinct force, or for some other reasons. You can search for tom cooper blog, a contributor to airforce montly or for the books that was written by Algerian ex minister of defence.
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Literature /
Algeria /
"On the Egyptian front" of General Khaled Nezzar
"On the Egyptian front" of General Khaled Nezzar 
General Khaled Nezzar
An Algerian testimony on the war of attrition
Nearly ten years after the publication of his "fighting Stories" (2002, Shihab Editions, Algiers) which deals with participation in the War of Independence, General Khaled Nezzar published Algiers recently new military memoir "on the Egyptian Front: the 2nd Brigade Algerian reach, 1968-1969" (1). The book recounts his memories of commander of that unit incorporated in the Egyptian army during the "war of attrition" which, after the Arab defeat of June 1967, pitted Egypt to Israeli forces occupying the Sinai and has ended in August 1970. the author is an Algerian military leaders who, in the late 80s, played a political role of the first order.
The heavy shadow Algerian-Egyptian crisis "on the Egyptian front" is divided into two parts. The first is devoted to the two years during which General Nezzar led the 2nd Brigade scope, integrated Arab forces on the eastern shores of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. The second part is a brief evocation of "successive wars in the Middle East" (1948, 1967, 1973, etc.). The book includes several annexes, military maps and charts listing the material and human resources mobilized by the Algerian units deployed in Egypt between 1967 and 1975. The first part alternates anecdotes and quick tactical observations, which makes it look like so little of real "war of memories". Its many imperfections could be explained by the eagerness of the publisher to publish the work, almost without revision, to take advantage of the interest of the audience for everything related to the Algerian-Egyptian relations after the incidents that . marked football matches between teams from Egypt and Algeria (November 2009) edition of the deficiencies are observed in the non-classification of certain content (eg the publication of an annex on "losses Arabic aviation June 5, 1967 "at the end of a chapter on the war of October 1973, page 110). They are also visible in the non-dating of certain events as their dating was possible by the use of other sources - two of which are, moreover, mentioned: a written Egyptian General Saad El Dine Chazli (3) "Victims, history revisited the Arab-Zionist conflict," Israeli historian Benny Morris (4). A more serious editorial work would have avoided the author, on the same page 28, do not start the war of attrition on two dates: March 11 and mid-July 1969 (5). It would, above all, relieved the sentences of narrative are all racist abuse, like that of describing "the true nature of the Egyptians, full of resentment and betrayal" (sic, page 49).
Important Algerian military aid Egypt between 1967 and 1973.While we can not say, after Khellas Djilali (the daily "El Watan", April 7, 2010), it is a "historical investigation" and an "impartial account of all Algerians sent to the Middle East for an 'other war'", the Egyptian Khaled Nezzar memories are not deprived of documentary interest. They provide detailed information, drawn from the archives of the Ministry of Defence on the Algerian aid to Egypt between 1967 and 1975. They give a vivid picture of the state of collapse of the Egyptian army after the defeat June 1967 and the difficult conditions in which she overcame her demoralization prepare for the war of 1973. the author emphasizes the benefits of the war of attrition for the Arab armies that participated. She transformed the Suez Canal, he writes, in a real field maneuvers and thus contributed to the success of the October 1973 offensive, reaching two goals, crossing and the destruction of the Bar-Lev line, "has undermined the legend of invincible Israeli army" (page 29). the general Nezzar review some "legends" on the Algerian participation in the Arab-Israeli wars (eg combat aircraft shot down over Tel Aviv, in June 1967, was painted in the colors but his Algerian driver was an officer in the Egyptian Air Force, page 37). He paid tribute to fellow Egyptian weapons, the chief of Staff Abdel Monêem Riad, which he testifies, spared no effort to fulfill its mission (page 63) or the "great gunner" Colonel Abu Ghazala (page 49). Other officers, he speaks with contempt barely contained: Galal the lieutenant colonel who worked to marginalize Algerian brigade (pages 52 and 53) or the other commander, "as the comfort that its troops were abandoned "(page 54).
Algerian-Egyptian tensions on the frontline contrary agreed stories," on the Egyptian front "reveals that Algerian officials did not hesitate to disobey when Egyptian officials doubted the well- validity of their orders and they complained that the Egyptian policy towards the "disrespectful" which was made for the repatriation of bodies of soldiers from their brigade combat deaths (page 58). Many Egyptian officers, reads, looked with astonishment and suspicion these "defenders of the Arab land" who were taking notes in French, that Khaled Nezzar comment, saying during a staff meeting: "We have not had the honor to learn Arabic, but we managed to drive the French out of our country" (page 52) the author describes with great severity the operational capabilities of the Egyptian army ( none, according to him, those of the unit he commanded) and the indifference of its executives deprivation of the troops and the enormous losses it suffered (page 56). He criticized the tendency of some of its leaders to hide from their superiors poor performance of their soldiers. In May 1967 he wrote, in a maneuver tanks in the presence of the high command, all targets have been met, letting out thick columns of smoke, which raised the enthusiasm of those present; Later we discover that they had put behind each target a barrel of oil and that all the shots were adjusted in advance (page 32). Despite the general tone of the book, this story does not seem to be an Egyptian anti-settlement account; it is immediately followed by another, describing a layout similar scene during a maneuver of the Algerian army.
A chauvinist upmanship If the documentary interest of the first part of "On the Egyptian front" is not doubt the usefulness of its second part is questionable; it does not give to "the successive wars in the Middle East" of information that one can find in a serious historical encyclopedia. However, the annexes are of great benefit to the reader. They detail the Algerian aid to Egypt between 1967 and 1975: $ 300 million, a check to fund the purchase of weapons and Russian equipment, 20,000 soldiers, hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles of all- ground and artillery pieces, dozens of combat aircraft ... a considerable part of this arsenal, says General Nezzar, was sold to the Egyptian army. During the release of his book, the author tried to register in the context of diplomatic tension between Algeria and Egypt. In the name of defense of the symbols of the revolution "attacked by the Egyptians" (the daily "Liberté", 25 January 2010), it comes to a real chauvinist upmanship. He spoke about Egypt "a country in decline," where "there is a minority that takes advantage of wealth and a majority that has nothing" (the weekly "Debates, January 27, 2010) as if the fair distribution of national wealth could distinguish the Algeria of the world. He revealed a surprising ignorance of history teaching us that "the Egyptians have never fought a war" (sic) and that "even against England, they showed no resistance" (re-sic, "Freedom", 25 January 2010).
Algerian-Arab Relations in question a postscript Bashir Medjahed attempts to give an intellectual depth to this attempt to write "on the Egyptian front" in the current context, marked by the deterioration of relations Egyptian-Algerian diplomatic. The researcher compares "Algeria's engagement with Egypt" to "unfortunate Egyptian scenario" to cause the rupture of relations between the two countries (the unfortunate anti-Algerian campaign of many Egyptian media, end of last year). He concludes: "The publication of this book is beneficial for the redefinition of ties between Arab countries and eventually to open a debate on the choice between geopolitical areas that will need to dock." the proposal to open such a debate expresses the viewpoint of a real power within the regime and its elites advocating voluntary loosening of ties between Algeria and the Arab world and its integration in other areas ( Euro-Mediterranean, for example). This view seems based on a fantasized reality completely. Favored by the failure of Arab nationalism and international isolation that Algeria has been during the bloody 90s has gradually detached from political blocs in which she was heavily involved (Arab, African ...). Advocate redefining "geopolitical areas that will need to dock" amounts in reality to theorize
post a fait accompli, that of the growing rift between the country and its various strategic depths. "
[google translation]
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General Hocine Benhadid, commander of the 8th BB faced Ariel Sharon Brigade
