the sia/sunni conflict is mostly rubbish, its never been an issue for arabs.
they inter marry lots, most common iraqis are baffled about the rivalry.
and suicide bombers can easily be coaxed into their actions, just as anyone who is vulnerable.
Who may be behind Rawalpindi 10/10?
- Thread starter Bill Longley
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the sia/sunni conflict is mostly rubbish, its never been an issue for arabs.
they inter marry lots, most common iraqis are baffled about the rivalry.
and suicide bombers can easily be coaxed into their actions, just as anyone who is vulnerable.
PakShaheen79
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Attack was an attempt to make Pakistan Army to show a knee jerk reaction and start advancing into SWA without proper intel. I think it has backfired and now to press this tactic more fresh attacks are mounted in Lahore today.
TalibanSwatter
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Taking on the Real Enemy (Excerpts)
Shafqat Mahmood
Does the brazen attack on the army's General Headquarters (GHQ) show the terrorists' strength or weakness? However contradictory as it may sound, it demonstrates both.
The strength is in the fact that disparate militant elements coming from different parts of the country have coalesced into a coordinated terror network. The weakness is that to make their presence felt, desperate acts with loss of precious assets, have to be undertaken.
Let us look at the strength first. Radical religious groups originating from the Punjab either had an anti-India/pro-Kashmir jihad agenda, in which they had some collaboration from the state. Or they were sectarian outfits targeting Shias, in particular, but also other Sunni groups.
Tribal area based militants were a product of the long Afghan conflict starting in the 80s. After the American invasion of Afghanistan, they became aligned with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. To find out in detail how this happened please read Imtiaz Gul's book, The Al Qaeda Connection.
Their objective initially was to provide support and safe haven to fleeing Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. As Gul points out, money played an important part in this. When the Pakistani state began to make life difficult for them, they took it on. Later, their objective morphed into controlling Pakistani territory and establishing a state within a state. This was visible in their Malakand outreach and deliberate infiltration into other parts of NWFP.
These dissimilar groups have now come together with the common agenda of fighting the Pakistani state and this has become the militancy's strength. This merger has been facilitated by their shared hatred of the United States and a warped perception of an ideal Islamic state. They seek to establish it in Pakistan.
The weakness of the terrorist network is reflected in the reckless nature of the GHQ attack. It was indeed audacious and achieved some early results until the Pakistan Army commandos ended it in an operation. Many brave soldiers gave the ultimate sacrifice and no words can express the nation's gratitude to them.
But, from the militants' perspective, this attack cost them heavily. They sacrificed an important asset in the shape of the terrorist Aqeel, who has been captured. This raises the possibility of at least parts of their network being exposed.
They could not have been unaware of these pitfalls while planning the operation. It must have been obvious that attacking the GHQ is nothing short of a suicide mission with a low chance of success. The only explanation for this is desperation.
This stems from victory of the armed forces in Malakand that has dealt a deadly blow to the militants, both physically and to their aura of invincibility. The elimination of some top leaders like Baituallah Mehsud and other prominent Al Qaeda allies has further weakened them. The current wave of terror attacks and, particularly, the GHQ operation was a desperate attempt to project strength at a time when the noose is tightening around them.
This is where the forthcoming Waziristan operation becomes so critical. It will be tough given the terrain and the strength of the militants and, sadly, many brave soldiers will die for their country. But, it is the ultimate safe haven crammed with Al Qaeda, Afghan/local Taliban, Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens and many wanted terrorists from Punjab. This scorpions den has to be wiped clean.
Shafqat Mahmood
Does the brazen attack on the army's General Headquarters (GHQ) show the terrorists' strength or weakness? However contradictory as it may sound, it demonstrates both.
The strength is in the fact that disparate militant elements coming from different parts of the country have coalesced into a coordinated terror network. The weakness is that to make their presence felt, desperate acts with loss of precious assets, have to be undertaken.
Let us look at the strength first. Radical religious groups originating from the Punjab either had an anti-India/pro-Kashmir jihad agenda, in which they had some collaboration from the state. Or they were sectarian outfits targeting Shias, in particular, but also other Sunni groups.
Tribal area based militants were a product of the long Afghan conflict starting in the 80s. After the American invasion of Afghanistan, they became aligned with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. To find out in detail how this happened please read Imtiaz Gul's book, The Al Qaeda Connection.
Their objective initially was to provide support and safe haven to fleeing Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. As Gul points out, money played an important part in this. When the Pakistani state began to make life difficult for them, they took it on. Later, their objective morphed into controlling Pakistani territory and establishing a state within a state. This was visible in their Malakand outreach and deliberate infiltration into other parts of NWFP.
These dissimilar groups have now come together with the common agenda of fighting the Pakistani state and this has become the militancy's strength. This merger has been facilitated by their shared hatred of the United States and a warped perception of an ideal Islamic state. They seek to establish it in Pakistan.
The weakness of the terrorist network is reflected in the reckless nature of the GHQ attack. It was indeed audacious and achieved some early results until the Pakistan Army commandos ended it in an operation. Many brave soldiers gave the ultimate sacrifice and no words can express the nation's gratitude to them.
But, from the militants' perspective, this attack cost them heavily. They sacrificed an important asset in the shape of the terrorist Aqeel, who has been captured. This raises the possibility of at least parts of their network being exposed.
They could not have been unaware of these pitfalls while planning the operation. It must have been obvious that attacking the GHQ is nothing short of a suicide mission with a low chance of success. The only explanation for this is desperation.
This stems from victory of the armed forces in Malakand that has dealt a deadly blow to the militants, both physically and to their aura of invincibility. The elimination of some top leaders like Baituallah Mehsud and other prominent Al Qaeda allies has further weakened them. The current wave of terror attacks and, particularly, the GHQ operation was a desperate attempt to project strength at a time when the noose is tightening around them.
This is where the forthcoming Waziristan operation becomes so critical. It will be tough given the terrain and the strength of the militants and, sadly, many brave soldiers will die for their country. But, it is the ultimate safe haven crammed with Al Qaeda, Afghan/local Taliban, Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens and many wanted terrorists from Punjab. This scorpions den has to be wiped clean.
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both taliban 're as barbaric, as pathetic, as fcuked up 'nd as unwanted by pakistani/afghan civilians as eachother. those in pakistan 're killing pakistanis 'nd those in afghanistan 're killing afghans, in short words: both 're murderers 'nd should be destroyed ASAP!!!!
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