AgNoStiC MuSliM
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The terrain and threat in Tirah is largely similar to that faced by US troops in the Korengal Valley in Kunar province bordering this region - The Korengal Valley came to be known as 'The Valley of Death' and from where the US withdrew after suffering significant casualties with no tangible progress to show against the Taliban - the US lost the war for Korengal despite winning almost every battle.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/world/asia/15outpost.html?_r=0
In comparison the Pakistan Army has, by all indications so far, won more territory and has significantly greater control over Tirah Valley. The PA's victory in Tirah, where the US Army failed in Korengal, is not because the PA is tactically or qualitatively superior to the US Military (a little more on that later), but because the PA went into Tirah with a clearer strategic understanding of what needed to be done and how to do it and the fact that this was OUR land - the PA isn't going back to a home thousands of miles away. If anything, the average PA soldier still lags behind the average US soldier in overall fitness, quality and equipment (and before the outrage begins, please note emphasis on the term 'average' - I am not comparing the elite units where soldiers are pretty equally matched in terms of fitness, quality and equipment). That gap grows significantly wider when we factor in transport and air-support. The Pakistan Army's higher casualty counts, not just in Tirah but in our operations across FATA, are a reflection of the above.
The discussion on this thread over the high troop casualties in the Tiran Operation is watering down (in a very human need to look for simple answers to complex questions) a very complex military operation in very challenging terrain against a well trained, well equipped enemy that had lived and prepared for battle in said terrain for over a decade, with proper logistical lines stretching into safe havens across the border in Afghanistan. This was essentially a battle against a regular military force (that did not follow any rules of engagement - IED's planted in dead bodies) entrenched in extremely inhospitable terrain, with the opponent only lacking heavy artillery and air support, and the PA's advantage in air and heavy artillery support significantly negated by the terrain.
The impact of air and artillery support (to preempt terrorist attacks on PA positions) would be limited given the heavily forested & mountainous terrain and the difficulty in spotting and identifying targets before engagements started. Air and artillery strikes would, largely, be called in when troops came under attack, and given the terrain and lack of quality air-assets in the PA and PAF (compared to the air-support available to US troops in Korengal for example) to provide 24/7 support, the support was nowhere as effective as some people think. Since we didn't (couldn't) NAPALM vast parts of Tirah, this was always going to be a very bloody and difficult infantry battle, with the TTP having the significant advantage of being the entrenched defending force occupying almost all heights and critical locations and established lines of support, and the PA still ripped them out of their rat-holes in a matter of a couple of weeks.
None of us are privy to the AAR's of each engagement, none of us know what kinds of pressure the unit leaders faced when deployed to move through the forested valleys and mountains of Tirah. What we do know is that casualties were guaranteed, and quite frankly I don't see how the PA could have reduced them by any significant amount, given the decision (and need) to take control of the valley in weeks rather and months and years.
That said, my assessment above is limited to the engagements in Tirah Valley. I agree with some of the other posters that the PA has suffered significant casualties, that were preventable, from engagements such as the ambush of a convoy in Khyber in a semi-urban area. After years of experience with the tactics of the TTP, how and why the convoy moved through an obvious ambush zone without taking the necessary precautions and/or clearing it first is infuriating.