HongWu
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Water War 1?
The first deep incursion happened at Phukchey, some 240km from Leh, last July. People's Liberation Army troops suddenly appeared from behind the mountains and threatened Indians working on an irrigation canal. Work on the 3km-long canal had started in 2005, but could not be completed because of Chinese protests.
According to the defence ministry, in the last three years, there have been over 600 transgressions by the PLA along the disputed 4,057km-long Line of Actual Control. But the deepest incursion came on April 15, with the PLA reportedly entering 10km into Daulat Beg Oldi sector in Ladakh. The military establishment is also worried about China's aggressive patrolling on the LAC and its military drills, using live ammunition.
Gautam Bambawale, joint secretary in charge of China at the ministry of external affairs, was working on upcoming bilateral visits when the storm broke. There is the high-profile visit by Premier Li Keqiang, his first upon becoming premier, and the preparatory visit by Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to China on May 9.
Post-incursion, Bambawale started the diplomatic offensive by contacting his Chinese counterpart, following which, Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai conveyed India's discomfort to Chinese Ambassador Wei Wei.
Defence Minister A.K. Antony had warned at a recent Army commanders' conference that the hardening Chinese stand on the boundary was "not likely" to change, despite the change of guard in Beijing. Antony stressed on the need “to achieve minimum credible deterrence, even while we seek a peaceful resolution of the issue.” He asserted that all necessary steps would be taken to protect the country's interests in the continuing face-off in Ladakh.
“Chinese troops usually go back after making an incursion and showing their presence. But now they are increasingly coming deeper and deeper... to stake claim [over] disputed areas,” a military officer said. He described the situation in Ladakh as tense.
As the Indian Army was mulling its strategy, Chinese helicopters penetrated Indian airspace, suggesting that Beijing may be intent on establishing a long-term presence. China then asked India to destroy certain fortified positions in eastern Ladakh in return for the PLA removing its temporary camp. An Indian Army commander told THE WEEK that a flag meeting on April 23, the second since the incursion, failed after China made this demand. A third flag meeting was scheduled for April 26.
Dr P. Stobdan, ethnic Ladakhi and former Indian ambassador to Kyrghisztan, thinks China is trying to do a 'Kargil'. “Daulat Beg Oldi area remains inaccessible during winter, which lasts almost till the end of March,” he said. The Chinese moved in knowing full well that occupying this section will cut the LAC into two, making it impossible for India to maintain continuity in border security, he said.
Former ambassador Kanwal Sibal said the border issue might be central to this incursion. “It is apparent that China does not want to clearly state their LAC in Ladakh and has actually been suggesting that their dispute with India is on the eastern sector—in Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand—and not in the western sector. This position is in line with a more orthodox view within the Chinese establishment which suggests that India has weaker claims on Ladakh.”
Sources say that the boundaries cell of the external affairs ministry is lacking a chief now. Major General Girish Kumar, formerly in charge, has rejoined the Army and refused to speak to THE WEEK. Currently, the crucial cell is being handled by a “consultant”.
China expert Ravni Thakur of the University of Delhi said the incursion was driven by the desire “to establish Chinese hegemony on the entire water resource bed of the Himalayas” and to protect Chinese investments in the Karakoram range.
“It appears that the Chinese are pushing for more access in the Nubra valley, finally coming to the west of the Shyok river which will then bring them threateningly close to the Siachen glacier,” said Stobdan.
The Tibetan government in exile, too, feels that China wants to control watersheds. Tibetans also feel that China cannot indulge in long-term adventurism against India, as the two countries work together on multiple platforms. That apart, China's string of border disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, and the issue of Tibet, will not let Beijing wage a high-stakes tussle with India.
Perhaps, what has irked Beijing is India's military modernisation programme that includes the construction of strategic roads, expansion of rail networks, helipads and airfields, deploying of Sukhoi aircraft and ballistic and cruise missile squadrons to defend its northeastern borders against China.
Then there is the plan to raise the new mountain strike corps, two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades. The corps, recommended by the China Study Group, will have about 40,000 troops and its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It will provide India with strategic capabilities that were missed badly in the 1962 war.
After 1962, India's policy was not to build any offensive formations in the eastern sector, to desist from provoking Beijing. The sanctioning of a strike corps, a part of India's strategy to deal with a two-front-war against Pakistan and China, indicates a new assertiveness in New Delhi.
Two new infantry divisions (over 35,000 soldiers) have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational task is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
Brigadier (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, former director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, said, “There is no unity of command in the Daulat Beg Oldi section. Indo-Tibetan Border Police is in charge of the sector and the Army, reportedly, is often not aware of the patrolling in that area. As of now, this [incursion] appears like a tactical matter and should be settled at a tactical level without involving political leadership.... India should also take a look at the work it might have undertaken on the border that might have provoked China.”
What worries the Army's tacticians is the very small operational window. Daulat Beg Oldi sector will become inaccessible to India after May 15, as the summer glacial melt will turn the sector unfit for movement of troops and armour.
Enough is enough. India must stop using Chinese water.
The first deep incursion happened at Phukchey, some 240km from Leh, last July. People's Liberation Army troops suddenly appeared from behind the mountains and threatened Indians working on an irrigation canal. Work on the 3km-long canal had started in 2005, but could not be completed because of Chinese protests.
According to the defence ministry, in the last three years, there have been over 600 transgressions by the PLA along the disputed 4,057km-long Line of Actual Control. But the deepest incursion came on April 15, with the PLA reportedly entering 10km into Daulat Beg Oldi sector in Ladakh. The military establishment is also worried about China's aggressive patrolling on the LAC and its military drills, using live ammunition.
Gautam Bambawale, joint secretary in charge of China at the ministry of external affairs, was working on upcoming bilateral visits when the storm broke. There is the high-profile visit by Premier Li Keqiang, his first upon becoming premier, and the preparatory visit by Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to China on May 9.
Post-incursion, Bambawale started the diplomatic offensive by contacting his Chinese counterpart, following which, Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai conveyed India's discomfort to Chinese Ambassador Wei Wei.
Defence Minister A.K. Antony had warned at a recent Army commanders' conference that the hardening Chinese stand on the boundary was "not likely" to change, despite the change of guard in Beijing. Antony stressed on the need “to achieve minimum credible deterrence, even while we seek a peaceful resolution of the issue.” He asserted that all necessary steps would be taken to protect the country's interests in the continuing face-off in Ladakh.
“Chinese troops usually go back after making an incursion and showing their presence. But now they are increasingly coming deeper and deeper... to stake claim [over] disputed areas,” a military officer said. He described the situation in Ladakh as tense.
As the Indian Army was mulling its strategy, Chinese helicopters penetrated Indian airspace, suggesting that Beijing may be intent on establishing a long-term presence. China then asked India to destroy certain fortified positions in eastern Ladakh in return for the PLA removing its temporary camp. An Indian Army commander told THE WEEK that a flag meeting on April 23, the second since the incursion, failed after China made this demand. A third flag meeting was scheduled for April 26.
Dr P. Stobdan, ethnic Ladakhi and former Indian ambassador to Kyrghisztan, thinks China is trying to do a 'Kargil'. “Daulat Beg Oldi area remains inaccessible during winter, which lasts almost till the end of March,” he said. The Chinese moved in knowing full well that occupying this section will cut the LAC into two, making it impossible for India to maintain continuity in border security, he said.
Former ambassador Kanwal Sibal said the border issue might be central to this incursion. “It is apparent that China does not want to clearly state their LAC in Ladakh and has actually been suggesting that their dispute with India is on the eastern sector—in Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand—and not in the western sector. This position is in line with a more orthodox view within the Chinese establishment which suggests that India has weaker claims on Ladakh.”
Sources say that the boundaries cell of the external affairs ministry is lacking a chief now. Major General Girish Kumar, formerly in charge, has rejoined the Army and refused to speak to THE WEEK. Currently, the crucial cell is being handled by a “consultant”.
China expert Ravni Thakur of the University of Delhi said the incursion was driven by the desire “to establish Chinese hegemony on the entire water resource bed of the Himalayas” and to protect Chinese investments in the Karakoram range.
“It appears that the Chinese are pushing for more access in the Nubra valley, finally coming to the west of the Shyok river which will then bring them threateningly close to the Siachen glacier,” said Stobdan.
The Tibetan government in exile, too, feels that China wants to control watersheds. Tibetans also feel that China cannot indulge in long-term adventurism against India, as the two countries work together on multiple platforms. That apart, China's string of border disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, and the issue of Tibet, will not let Beijing wage a high-stakes tussle with India.
Perhaps, what has irked Beijing is India's military modernisation programme that includes the construction of strategic roads, expansion of rail networks, helipads and airfields, deploying of Sukhoi aircraft and ballistic and cruise missile squadrons to defend its northeastern borders against China.
Then there is the plan to raise the new mountain strike corps, two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades. The corps, recommended by the China Study Group, will have about 40,000 troops and its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It will provide India with strategic capabilities that were missed badly in the 1962 war.
After 1962, India's policy was not to build any offensive formations in the eastern sector, to desist from provoking Beijing. The sanctioning of a strike corps, a part of India's strategy to deal with a two-front-war against Pakistan and China, indicates a new assertiveness in New Delhi.
Two new infantry divisions (over 35,000 soldiers) have already been raised at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam in 2009-10. Their operational task is the defence of Arunachal Pradesh, which China often claims as its territory.
Brigadier (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, former director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, said, “There is no unity of command in the Daulat Beg Oldi section. Indo-Tibetan Border Police is in charge of the sector and the Army, reportedly, is often not aware of the patrolling in that area. As of now, this [incursion] appears like a tactical matter and should be settled at a tactical level without involving political leadership.... India should also take a look at the work it might have undertaken on the border that might have provoked China.”
What worries the Army's tacticians is the very small operational window. Daulat Beg Oldi sector will become inaccessible to India after May 15, as the summer glacial melt will turn the sector unfit for movement of troops and armour.
Enough is enough. India must stop using Chinese water.
Here comes the resident comedian with his Mega F@rts.....
Carry on mate and provide timely entertainment on pdf 
