Below is blog from 2010, whereas Vietnam was classified as Middle Power (along with Indonesia, Australia and Canada). Interesting, the blog was written by a Chinese. It tells much how the Chinese want to counter the emerging competition of other medium powers.
Chinese seem to hate competition as they want hegemony instead.
http://www.bearcanada.com/china/archive/middlepowerse.html
How to Weaken Challenges Posed by Middle Powers
Huanqiu, China; 20 October 2010; By Liu Jianhua
In the past few years, China’s relations with middle powers in the Asia Pacific — including Australia, Canada,
Vietnam and Indonesia — have been rather sticky. These countries have challenged China’s national interests in the areas of security, economics and human rights. As a result, they have made China’s peaceful development more complicated, disturbing the regional security and annoying China’s diplomats. These annoyances are different from the ones caused by great powers and problematic small countries.
Some countries annoy China in the realm of security.
Vietnam decided to deal with China in terms of security by holding unprecedented joint military exercises with America. Both Indonesia and
Vietnam are actively buying modern weapons to deter China. Furthermore, other countries annoy China in the area of human rights.
Every year at the United Nations’ Human Rights Conference, Canada and Australia follow America and Europe’s example in blaming China for not protecting human rights. It’s even more obvious in the economic area. Last year, Australia prevented Aluminum Corp of China from buying more shares in Rio Tinto, causing China’s efforts to establish a supply of iron ore to fail. This year, Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty announced that the yuan’s currency depreciation had caused “global trade imbalances.”
As a whole, the challenges made by these middle powers have not affected China as much as America, Europe, Russia, Japan, India or international groups. However, these challenges are not easily ignored, either. These countries might be ones who monopolize important resources, like Australia. They might be hosts of important international summits, like Canada, or strategically important countries, like Indonesia. In particular, most of the countries are strategic allies with America who challenge China on territorial and resource issues.
Objectively speaking, they have helped America to form an encircling chain around China. What’s more, they join with other great powers besides America to contend against China. For example, India and
Vietnam have recently started cooperating militarily, and relations between South Korea and India are warming.
In conclusion, behind nearly every challenge to China made by an Asian Pacific middle power, there is evidence of a great power coaxing or even forcing the middle power to act. America, Japan and India are all purposefully using these middle powers to boycott China. In response to this, China must quickly develop effective military deterrents to keep these great powers, especially America, from interfering in controversies in China's surrounding regions. As China’s nonintervention ability increases, the middle powers in China’s periphery will increasingly come into conflict with China. At this point, one cannot help but doubt the reliability of America’s support to suppress the impulse of challenging China.
On the other hand, China can use diplomacy with the great powers, in particular a new strategic compromise with America, to reduce the strength of the weaker middle power countries’ bargaining chips. Actually, America is both a crucial country blocking China’s rise to power as well as the key to dealing with relations with regional middle powers. Historically, there are several examples where America and China have made strategic compromises, which in turn improved China’s relationships with regional middle powers.
For example, in the 1970s, America implemented the “containment policy” against
Vietnam. This caused Japan, who was then a middle power, to reconsider its attitude towards China. Specifically, Touei Fumiya, then aide to Japan’s Prime Minister, had to moderate his negative attitude against China. Even though there does not seem to be an opportunity for a strategic compromise at present, in the future China’s comprehensive strength will increase, or perhaps a global or regional catastrophe or crisis will happen that will encourage China and America to cooperate. At that time, it is likely that a Sino-American strategic compromise could be reached.
