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Using SU-30 as a bomber is expensive...
yes, but there is no alternative. Su30 is the largest airplane the airforce has, using for bombing mission I believe. Operating fighter aircraft is not cheap in general.
 
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Using SU-30 as a bomber is expensive...
Only when nothing available around , usually the bombing will be handle by Su22M5 variant , but when dealing with tough targer that require high precison and good mobility plus jamming pod to defend against SAM system , Su 30 with anti ship or anti radiation will be called into action first
Looking good there :v
 

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Only when nothing available around , usually the bombing will be handle by Su22M5 variant , but when dealing with tough targer that require high precison and good mobility plus jamming pod to defend against SAM system , Su 30 with anti ship or anti radiation will be called into action first
Looking good there :v

Su-22's have already being upgraded to Su22M5 variant? I thought they were all version M3 and M4.
 
The China Factor in Russia-Vietnam Security Ties

The China Factor in Russia-Vietnam Security Ties | Foreign Policy Journal

Toward the end of 2015, the Russian Federation made several breakthroughs in its relations with Vietnam, including agreements for mutual cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi on issues such as anti-corruption, defense, and trade.


Russian President Vladimir Putin on a visit to Vietnam in 2006 (Photo: The Kremlin)

While the court of global opinion has largely turned against Russia due to its military actions abroad, in Vietnam, Russia enjoys broad support from the population at large. According to a poll from the Pew Research Center, 75 percent of Vietnamese have a favorable opinion of Russia. At the official level, Vietnam’s foreign minister, Phạm Bình Minh, has recently voiced support for a greater Russian role in global affairs.

According to Maria Zelenkova, a research fellow at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Vietnam’s foreign policy is based upon a desire to develop relations with China, Russia, and the United States in the form of a multi-vector foreign policy. With tensions mounting in the South China Sea, it stands to reason that Hanoi would pursue closer ties to a power besides China and the United States. The pursuit of a multi-vector type of foreign policy is not dissimilar to those of other countries such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia, which must contend with the reality of sharing borders simultaneously with China and Russia.

As tensions rise between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea, Vietnam has concrete reasons to approach Russia seeking a deeper level of partnership. Yet Moscow’s willingness to develop a closer relationship with Hanoi must somehow invariably also serve Russia’s own self interest. This is especially true if Russia risks becoming enmeshed or otherwise involved against its better interests in the South China Sea dispute. Thus the question arises: what benefit is there for Russia in pursuing closer security relations with Vietnam?

In addition to strategic deterrence, one of the most crucial factors and main driving forces in current Russian security policy is the ability to secure itself on its geographic flanks against a plethora of potential adversaries and threats. This is one of the main reasons why Russia has sought to keep countries on its periphery in its geopolitical orbit, in order to create a security belt comprised of friendly states.

Given this facet of Russian security policy, it may seem somewhat illogical that Russia would expend energy to develop security ties with Vietnam. This is particularly given the vast distance between Russia and Vietnam and the fact that no direct threat to Russian security emanates from Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Russia already has several other considerations closer to its peripheral areas, such as the situation in Ukraine and its engagement in Syria (which has larger reverberations for Russia’s security vis-à-vis NATO).

The most important factor driving Russia’s new rapprochement with Vietnam is not peripheral security, but rather to create a hedge against the rise of China. For all of the talk of the growing China-Russia partnership, relations between Beijing and Moscow remain cautious. As Elizabeth Wishnick argues, Russia’s declared ambitions to become a major power in the Asia-Pacific (specifically in East Asia) depend not on its burgeoning partnership with China, but it’s ability to balance China in East Asia.

Indeed, it is only natural that Russia would cooperate with China insofar as doing so would serve Russia’s own national interests. When it becomes contrary to Russian interests to have a partnership with China, however Russia will obviously seek ways to balance Chinese power. As a case in point, Russian energy companies have expanded their cooperation with other countries in the South China Sea region, including Vietnam. In response to this, China has called, without directly stating it, for Russia to refrain from getting involved in the ongoing regional dispute.

In other words, the main driver of Russia’s security policy toward Vietnam isn’t Russia’s own immediate peripheral security but the ability to augment and project its influence in the Asia-Pacific in light of China’s rising star. As part of Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East”, Russian policymakers see a string Russian position, whether diplomatically, economically or militarily, as being essential for Russia’s goal of returning as a great global power.

Indeed, Russia fears becoming a second-rate Asian power subordinate to China, and will heartily welcome alternate partners who can assist Moscow in becoming more active in Asia-Pacific affairs while avoiding subordination to Beijing. Some consider Japan to be a viable partner for Russia as a counterweight to China, yet the Russo-Japanese relationship remains problematic, not least because of the festering dispute over the Kuril Islands. Therefore, Vietnam presents itself to Russia a country of interest in its endeavor to balance China.

Issues of geography (and thus, the attendant issues of logistics and strategic presence) notwithstanding, Russia and Vietnam haveinitiated cooperation in the military sphere. This cooperation has, thus far, been limited to arms sales and technology transfer. Nevertheless, such cooperation will have a role to play in enabling Vietnam to defend itself against growing Chinese power. Vietnam has also recently re-opened the former Soviet base at Cam Ranh to the Russian navy and air force.

Furthermore, both countries have discussed the possibility of deeper collaboration in terms of confidence building measures. Russia has announced that it will participate in a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea in 2016. Russian media have speculated that the drill will take place in May.

For Russia, Vietnam represents an important node in East Asia whereby Russia can actively attempt to balance against Chinese power and thus strengthen its geopolitical and strategic position in East Asia. As Vietnam seeks to diversity its international partnerships, it sees an opening with Russia. In turn, Russia also sees in Vietnam a chance to expand its own Asian influence, and is not wasting the opportunity.
 
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man I hope we needn´t wait too long to see the first destroyers in our Navy.

Thursday, January 07, 2016. Destroyer Bystry, a member of Russia Pacific Fleet, with 315 officers and sailors on board and two accompanied ships paying a visit to Danang. the russians as VN most important strategic partner have free ride, I believe, they can visit and do port call at any time, using VN sea facilities as patrol station, taking fuel, foods, water and other things as well as resting place.

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exotic: defence tie to Mexico

The Mexican Defence Ministry wants to launch cooperation channels in new fields with Vietnam, including facilitating visits to share information and experience. Secretariat Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda (R) and Vietnam Ambassador to Mexico Le Linh Lan.
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securing the western flank: strategically important not to let Cambodia and Laos falling into chinese hands.

Vietnam and Cambodia almost conclude land border demarcation between the two countries. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, right, and Vietnamese PM, Nguyen Tan Dung, inaugurate a new border demarcation post in Ratanakkiri province on Saturday. so a decade old conflict comes to a peaceful end.
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The defence ministries of Vietnam and Laos sign an agreement on their cooperation in 2016.
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not a good sign: since beginning of 2016, as many as 46 flights by chinese airlines ignore giving flight information to Vietnam FIR Ho Chi Minh (green color) in violation of international agreement set by ICAO. the chinese might try to take a piece of VN FIR, the airspace over their occupied islands in the Spratlys.

Hàng chục chuyến bay Trung Quốc xâm phạm vùng kiểm soát của Việt Nam - VnExpress

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I have a different map for the Ho Chi Minh Flight Information Region.

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man I hope we needn´t wait too long to see the first destroyers in our Navy.

Don't hold your breath.

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Great video of Sukhoi fighter jets.

 
Russia-Vietnam: Cooperation in the Arctic?
The two countries look likely to strengthen ties in the energy sector.

By Nadezhda Filimonova
December 11, 2015

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In early April this year, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Vietnam. The trip has been viewed as a continuation of Russia’s policy of deepening ties with Asian countries amid worsening relations with the U.S. and Europe over the Ukrainian crisis. The outcomes of the visit underscore the interest that Russia and Vietnam have in setting up cooperation in a number of areas. In particular, the two countries discussed the possible signing of a free trade agreement between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union by the end of 2015.

Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft and Vietnam’s state-controlled oil and gas company Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam) meanwhile signed a memorandum to extend cooperation in oil and gas production and exploitation on the Russian continental shelf in the Pechora Sea, and agreed on general provisions for Gazprom Neft’s acquisition of a share of the Dung Quat refinery.

Russia’s interest in promoting relations in the energy sector is influenced by the current global political and economic situation. Western sanctions, combined with European attempts to become less dependent on Russian gas, have made a turn to Asia more desirable for Moscow.

Ahead of the visit, Medvedev outlined several possibilities for energy cooperation between the two states. The prime minister said that, “Moscow has prepared a special proposal for companies from Vietnam to participate in hydrocarbon projects in Russia. Vietnam and Russia should consider new, promising forms of cooperation, such as refining rather than extraction alone and the use of various incentives to encourage joint work on the continental shelf of both countries.”

Similar statements were expressed in relation to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in 2014. Russian Deputy Minister of Energy Yuri Senutin proclaimed that “for the first time ever Russia has suggested to the Indian companies participating in projects in development and production of hydrocarbons in Russia, including in the Arctic and in East Siberia.” Such initiatives testify that an idea to involve Asian companies in energy projects has received support not only from the Russian energy companies (Rosneft, Gazprom and Zarubezhneft) but also among Russian political elite.

Additionally, Russian energy companies view the strengthening of cooperation with Vietnamese companies as a way to diversify export markets, find new investors in their energy projects, and expand their presence in energy projects in Vietnam. For its part, the Vietnamese energy company PetroVietnam is keen to stake out a share in Russian oil and gas projects, while assessing the economic costs and benefits, and possible risks.

One of the first opportunities for Vietnam to get access to the Russian shelf dates back to 2012, when the Russian state-controlled oil company Zarubezhneft and PetroVietnam expressed an interest in creating a joint venture for oil and gas exploration in the Barents Sea. In 2011. the acquisition by Zarubezhneft of 100 percent minus one share of Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka, which boasts vast offshore production experience, has created the conditions for the company to meet the legal criteria for offshore production.

In line with the 2008 amendments to the federal law that authorizes a legal entity to operate on a shelf, a company must have five years’ experience in developing deposits on the Russian continental shelf; be established in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation; and have more than 50 percent of its charter capital owned by the government. Since then, Zarubezhneft has tried to apply for licenses on Arctic offshore areas; however, despite debate within the Russian government and strong support from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment the decision to liberalize access to offshore production has yet to be made. One reason is the strong opposition voiced by Rosneft and Gazprom. Opening up access to offshore oil and gas fields would end their existing monopoly over offshore production in the Arctic region.

Like Gazprom and Zarubezhneft, Rosneft has also expressed an interest in developing energy projects together with PetroVietnam. In 2014, the two companies reached an agreement to set up a joint venture to develop two oil field blocks in the Pechora Sea. Although the statements have been made by Rosneft head Igor Sechin concerning the company’s plans to expand cooperation with PetroVietnam, the companies are still negotiating conditions for joint offshore activities.

Given the current geopolitical situation, as well as Russia’s own economic challenges, it is hard to see in the short term at least changes in Russian regulations related to the liberalization of access to offshore production or major increases in offshore activity in the Russian Arctic zone. Rosneft and Gazprom have already requested permission to postpone their offshore projects in the Arctic.

In particular, last month Gazprom Neft announced that it would be postponing until 2031 the Dolginskoye offshore project, which the company plans to develop in partnership with PetroVietnam.

Given the circumstances joint development of onshore projects in the Arctic appears more likely, especially since PetroVietnam is already engaged in oil production in Russia. In 2012, the company established a joint venture in partnership with Zarubezhneft called Rusvietpetro to develop a cluster of oilfields in the Central Khoreyversky uplift in the Nenets Autonomous Area. And in June 2015, the heads of Gazprom and PetroVietnam signed an agreement on major terms and conditions for projects to develop the Nagumanovskoye (Orenburg region) and Severo-Purovskoye (Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area) fields.

Apart from Arctic oil and gas resources, as a major fishing nation Vietnam could also be interested in Arctic fisheries. Since 2015, the five Arctic coastal states (Russia, Canada, U.S., Norway, Denmark) have been holding negotiations on commercial fishing in the central part of the Arctic Ocean beyond the 200 nautical miles of the exclusive economic zones. One of the preliminary results of negotiations was the signing in July 2015 of a declaration on the prevention of unregulated High Seas fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean that put certain limitations on fishing in the area. However, with the opening opportunities for fishing in the central part of the Arctic Ocean interest from non-Arctic states, including Vietnam, is likely, and these states could well become involved in future governance of Arctic fishing. Official representatives from China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland and the EU took part in a meeting in Washington D.C. at the start of this month to discuss policy approaches.

In general, large-scale cooperation between Vietnam and Russia in the development of Arctic energy projects is unlikely in the short term. Over the long term, however, as sanctions are eased it is possible to foresee a partnership between Russian, Vietnamese, European and American energy companies for joint exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the Russian Arctic zone.

Nadezhda Filimonova is head of the World Meteorological Organization Relations Department at the Russian State Hydrometeorological University.

Russia-Vietnam: Cooperation in the Arctic? | The Diplomat
 
we are falling behind of other opponents in the SC Sea. our longest runway is just 550m, not long enough for fighter jet landing and take off. right now, good enough for van tai (transport aircraft) and trinh sat (patrol aircraft).


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max range of aircraft when taking off from an island
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Well it's a EADS CASA C212 produce under licence by Indonesian aerospace. Viet Nam coast guard already operate a few C212 already, Viet Nam just order a new batch?

we are falling behind of other opponents in the SC Sea. our longest runway is just 550m, not long enough for fighter jet landing and take off. right now, good enough for van tai (transport aircraft) and trinh sat (patrol aircraft).


150730-airstrips-1438920906_1200x0.png


max range of aircraft when taking off from an island
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Viet Nam don't really need long runway for jet fighters.Of all the countries, Viet Nam have the closest airbases for Spratly Islands. And I think it just a waste time and money to build runway on those tiny islands, because it will be the easiest and first targets in a start of conflict
 
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Viet Nam have the closest airbases for Spratly Islands. And I think it just a waste time and money to build runway on those tiny islands, because it will be the easiest and first targets in a start of conflict
if war breaks out, any runway is a target, regardless be located either on mainland or island. consider, our fighter jets Su27/30 need about 15 min to reach Spratlys. and that´s sometimes in crisis it is too long, too late. unless we have long runways and hangars on islands for our jets.
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the army shall put heavy anti aircraft defence on islands once runways are constructed.
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