Livefist: GUEST POST | Why The Beast Was Lost
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GUEST POST | Why The Beast Was Lost
-By Aditya Mandrekar
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With news that Iran may have downed one of
the United States' most secret spy-planes -- an
RQ-170 Sentinel built Lockheed-Martin -- the
internet has been abuzz with claims, counter-
claims and outright denials that it could have
happened. Now that Iran has officially released
footage of the UAV in their possession - one that
does resemble the 'Beast of Kandahar' from the
few photos available - speculation has turned to
precisely why the UAV is in Iranian hands.
But first, two things that can be inferred from the
video released:
The UAV may be a blended wing design, but
there are no obvious "stealth" characteristics. A
meshed air intake is not enough to make an
aircraft low-observable and could simply be there
to prevent foreign object damage (FOD). The
control surfaces too do not have any serrated
(jagged) edges that are needed to spread radio
wave reflections; neither do various panels on the
aircraft.
Amusingly, the aircraft is placed on a plinth
instead of its own landing gear. Which means
either the gear stayed retracted or was torn off on
landing, either pointing to signs that it wasn't
made to land in a controlled manner.
So how is the Beast in Iranian hands?
The most exotic claim is of course 'it was hacked'.
This is also the one least likely to be true and
ironically the one explanation that the speculators
seem to long for. The possibility of a spy plane
flying with a datalink continuously active is quite
low. There are many reasons for this, but
security (exposing the communication channel
for long durations) and power consumption (to
power the receiver and, in some cases, a
transmitter for two-way communication) are
chief concerns. UAVs obviously can be fed
course correction updates in real time if sudden
changes are necessary. But these will be brief and
short transmissions that will be irregular and hard
to break into - encryption levels are beyond the
average supercomputer's power to break in
reasonable time, not to mention the possibility of
passcodes changing every mission.
This leaves open a possibility where the Iranians
could have mimicked a remote command - but
then again they would have to have the same
datalink equipment and encryption methods as
the CIA and an ability to transmit it to the exact
spot in the sky they want to, and at the right
time. And even if this is the case, the moment an
operator noticed the UAV going off course, the
CIA would have not hesitated to countermand its
last commands and restore communication, this
time either on different frequencies or with
different codes.
Next, there is speculation that the UAV was
"jammed". The response to this is on two levels:
What was jammed? And, so what?
As mentioned before, the average spy craft will
not always have its receiver running apart from
intelligence gathering purposes. So the probability
that its control could be "jammed" is insignificant.
What is possible, though, is that the GPS receiver
(s) on the Sentinel could be jammed with the
attempt to deny navigational aid. This is unlikely
too because for one, it means flooding the UAV at
its operating altitude with enough radio energy on
ALL channels (including US DoD military GPS
frequencies) from above (since the antennae are
on the upper surface) to attempt to disable
satellite receivers.
And even if GPS data was lost... so what?
Between inertial sensors, magnetic compasses
and radio homing beacons, UAVs are not 100%
reliant on GPS for navigation. In fact,
autonomous flight control software is written
with explicit instructions built-in that unmanned
aircraft facing loss of critical sensors have to head
to a particular location or direction where
recovery can be attempted, either through re-
establishing system integrity or getting it to land
in a controlled location.
Then there is the initial claim by Iran that the
Sentinel was shot down. This seems unlikely to
me; there is no sign of external damage on the
upper body, and more importantly, none on the
leading and trailing edges of the aircraft. This
leads me to believe that there was no contact
between AAA rounds and the drone, let alone a
missile proximity explosion.
The more one looks at it, the simplest answer
seems to fit the data best - equipment failure. As
unglamorous as it sounds, loss of propulsion is
the most likely reason for the loss of the Sentinel.
Whether an engine failure or a fuel leak, it is most
likely that the aircraft lost power and with it, any
hope of making it back. The Iraq-Iran-Afghanistan
region is one of the least forgiving environments
of operation, and it is not hard to imagine dust,
sand and gravel causing lasting damage.
There is also the likelihood that power to the
control surfaces was lost, but it is hard to believe
that the Sentinel does not have at least dual
redundant controls. However, the aircraft is
smaller than previously imagined, so it may be
that the source of electrical power is single. If this
is a battery, it could be simply battery failure. If
the power was delivered from a turbine-driven
alternator, then it is even more evident that loss
of engine power would mean a loss of electrical
power.
