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Fortunately today Russian is smart to choose China as her alliance including military and economy, and it's better to choose a strong and hopeful China as her helper.Russia protect VN in SCS(east sea) against China, who cares if China bow down beg for alliance
Build a nuclear bomb (nuclear reactor ) at the border with China. Any advancement of chinese troops will become an international problem .......
The nuclear power planet (nuclear reactor) is not a nuke, even not a dirty bomb. Nuclear reactor can't explode, just leak nuclear pollutes on VN lands. Who care their nuclear pollutes ???
Bro, the explosion of Japan Fukushima mostly by Hydrogen and Oxygen mixture explosion, not the reactor exploded. The damage to nuclear reactor just lead to nuclear leak and environmental pollution.This will be an issue just like Fukushima and gets world attention. Nuclear reactor is a controlled explosion and it also poses dangers to human kind if safe precautions are not taken.
It seems like We soon can make our own Nuke warhead for our nuke capable missile Shaddock secretly
New Recruit
The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance
Latest ACA Resources
Nuclear Nonproliferation
U.S. Signs Arms Trade Treaty
(October 2013)
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Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107
Updated: March 2013
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. In order for a country to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to a set of nine nonproliferation criteria. The United States has entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with 23 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and Taiwan.[1]
The nine nonproliferation criteria for section 123 agreements are as follows:
Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the country must remain under safeguards in perpetuity.
Non-nuclear-weapon states partners must have full-scope IAEA safeguards, essentially covering all major nuclear facilities.
A guarantee that transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose, except in the case of cooperation with nuclear-weapon states.
In the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers.
U.S. consent is required for any re-transfer of material or classified data.
Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical security.
U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.
Prior U.S. approval is required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained or produced as a result of the agreement. An agreement permitting enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) using U.S. provided material requires separate negotiation.
The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.
Section 123 requires that the Department of State submit a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) explaining how the nuclear cooperation agreement meets these nonproliferation conditions. Congress has a total of 90 days in continuous session to consider the agreement, after which it automatically becomes law unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing it.
The President may exempt a proposed agreement from any of the above criteria upon determination maintaining such a criteria would be “seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense of the United States.” Exempted 123 agreements would then go through a different process than non-exempt agreements, requiring a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement for it to become law. There are no 123 agreements in force that were adopted with such exemptions.
In 2006, Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act which amended the AEA permit nuclear cooperation with India, a country which is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not maintain full-scope safeguards. The Hyde amendment has been criticized for undermining U.S. international counterproliferation efforts.
A 123 agreement alone does not permit countries to enrich or reprocess nuclear material acquired from the United States and permission to do so requires a further negotiated agreement. A debate is currently raging in the nonproliferation community over the “Gold Standard,” named after the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement signed in 2009 whereby the UAE voluntarily renounced pursuing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and capabilities. The UAE agreement stands in stark contrast to the “blanket consent” granted to India, Japan, and EURATOM, who have ENR approval from the U.S. This consent is being sought by other countries as many 123 agreements are up for renewal and renegotiation in 2014, most notably South Korea.
ENR capabilities are controversial because the process transforms raw uranium or spent nuclear fuel into highly-enriched uranium. While these capabilities are generally used for energy purposes, because the same technology can be used for weaponization processes there are concerns of serious proliferation risks when a country obtains the technology. A Gold Standard for 123 agreements would require any country party to a 123 agreement with the United States to renounce ENR activities. The Department of Energy and the U.S. nuclear industry advocate a continuance of the case-by-case approach followed thus far in renewal agreements. A case-by-case approach allows countries to apply for ENR permission, and has been successfully pursued by India and Japan. South Korea is pushing for an agreement to permit reprocessing to develop its own nuclear industry, a major target in its economic development plans.
Thus far Congress has attempted several times to pass measures ensuring that future 123 agreements adhere to the Gold Standard. The most prominent of these bills was H.R. 1280, which among other amendments to the Atomic Energy Act declared that future 123 agreements must include “a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities for such activities, will occur within” the country. The bill also required states considering 123 agreements to be members of many international treaties and conventions promoting non-proliferation. Though reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2011, it was blocked from floor consideration and died with the 112th Congress.
The executive branch has been less clear in its position. The George W. Bush administration coined the term Gold Standard when the U.S.-UAE deal was signed in 2009 and declared it the new standard for nuclear cooperation agreements. The Obama administration has not come out in favor of a Gold Standard, though their have been several interagency reviews soliciting opinions, the most recent during the summer of 2012. A 2011 letter from the Obama administration to Capitol Hill renounced the idea of a uniform approach to 123 agreements and advocated for a case-by-case approach in future negotiations. (See ACT, March 2012).
ENDNOTE:
1. A full list of countries with 123 agreements with the United States can be found at National Nuclear Security Administration, “123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreements
poor paranoid Chinese peasant , Russia bro treat u even worse than a dog, and u still try to lick his bootsFortunately today Russian is smart to choose China as her alliance including military and economy, and it's better to choose a strong and hopeful China as her helper.
Whatever u said, the truth is currently China and Russia were military alliance since S.O.C built, not Vietnam. If VN shoot China, ur Russian bros will punish u with Chinese together, or just stay outside and watch.
problem is u cant check our enrichment process, only VN and US know how many percent do we enrichBro, the explosion of Japan Fukushima mostly by Hydrogen and Oxygen mixture explosion, not the reactor exploded. The damage to nuclear reactor just lead to nuclear leak and environmental pollution.
BTW the nuclear rod used by nuclear power plant only 20% uranium, a real nuclear bomb at least need 15kg 93% uranium. So the nuclear reactor can not reach 'nuclear criticality' to explode like a bomb.
U need to grow up first, "communist" comradeNiceguy, I don't want to condemn you, but you are nationalist extremist. We promised with American not enriching Uranium and they sell us equipments, so we need to keep our promise. We are not Chinese, who lay their own benefits above the promise.
VN moves to ensure nuclear weapon-free ASEANThe Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) or the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, is a nuclear weapons moratorium treaty between 10 Southeast Asian member-states under the auspices of the ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. It was opened for signature at the treaty conference in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 December 1995 and it entered into force on March 28, 1997 and obliges its members not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons.
So can u check our nuclear enrichment process ?? if we dont need to make nuke warhead, then why we demand the right to enrich uranium on our own soil ?? why Japan-Iran are not allowed to do the same ??Don't listen to NiceGuy. He's a Retard.
VN moves to ensure nuclear weapon-free ASEAN
Vietnam is working together with other ASEAN countries to ensure the region is free from nuclear weapons and calls on nuclear weapon states worldwide to recognise the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty.
VN moves to ensure nuclear weapon-free ASEAN -- Vietnam+ (VietnamPlus)
Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-...ilitary-news-discussion-31.html#ixzz2hNuLCL00
From 1976 to 1978, ASEAN's differences with Vietnam were both symbolic and real. ASEAN, for example, proposed establishing Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality and invited Vietnam to support the proposal. Hanoi refused but countered with its own proposal, calling instead for a region of peace, independence, and neutrality. Apparently, the Vietnamese objected to the term freedom because of their vulnerability to criticism on human rights issues. The term Independence, on the other hand, was promoted by the Vietnamese as a concept opposing all foreign military bases in Southeast Asia, an idea that many of the ASEAN nations did not share.
During the Second Indochina War, each ASEAN state pursued its own Vietnam policy. Malaysia and Indonesia maintained strict neutrality, whereas Thailand and the Philippines contributed personnel and materiel to South Vietnam. Perceptions of Vietnam as a possible threat to the region also varied among member nations. Indonesia and Malaysia viewed Vietnam as a buffer against Chinese expansionism, whereas Thailand, wary of possible repetition of historic patterns of confrontation with Vietnam, turned to China for protection following the war's end and the subsequent withdrawal of United States forces from Thailand.
Following the 1978 invasion of Cambodia, however, the ASEAN nations were united in their condemnation of Hanoi. They took the lead in mobilizing international opinion against Vietnam, and, in the UN General Assembly, they annually sponsored resolutions calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and for internationally supervised elections. The ASEAN nations also were instrumental in preventing the Vietnam-sponsored Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh from taking over Cambodia's UN seat. In June 1982, ASEAN was instrumental in persuading three disparate Cambodian resistance elements to merge into a coalition resistance government.
http://countrystudies.us/vietnam/63.htm