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US must convince India to move troops from LoC

The high ratio of troops to militants has definitely helped, but without Pakistani cooperation after 2002, you would likely still be in the same situation that existed in the late 90's.

AM

Its second time you have countered my point with this. I agree it has helped. But the cooperation on its own is insufficient to reduce the number of operatives inside the valley.

thanks
 
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AgNoStIc MuSliM


Pakistan will likely largely control the groups in Kashmir, as it has been since 2002. However, if elements such as Lakhvi are determined to carry out attacks on India, they will obtain the necessary resources elsewhere, and FATA would be open to them.

Yes that is my perception too. That is why in an earlier post I had advocated a clear approach towards the question of terrorism to be adopted by GoP as today groups in FATA and Kashmir are increasingly identifying themselves as being guardians of islam rather than anything else. As such the double standards will be harmful to your interests in the short and long term - both. I have said specifically that if you were to adopt a transparent policy towards such groups even in J&K, you will find a grateful India sitting still while you wipe these buggers out. You are in danger today and if you have no tomorrow, ours will be in danger then. Its as simple as that.


Wait, in your earlier post you argued about the success of maintaining a 'high ratio' of troops to militants, which in Pakistan's case could require an even larger number of troops than India deployed, for an undetermined amount of time given the linkage between the Taliban and the insurgency in Afghanistan.
With massive troop requirements on both fronts - one side or the other will have to be short changed. Its either that or the Civilian government steps into FATA and some of the other agencies with reconstruction and developing effective local LEA's that can take over in areas the military clears and be responsible for COIN.


I understand the submission you have made. IMO the shortage will not be felt too much in Kashmir theater for 2 reasons:

a. There is a generalised Pakistani sympathy in local populance in Kashmir under Pakistani control and as such, PA is unlikely to face major unrest.

b. Even if few militants do cross over LoC, a joint intelligence mechanism can be activated for neutralisation of the same by IA. In such a scenario, there shall be tremendous appreciation of PA and understanding of difficulties being faced by you and understandably you will be given certain leeways for dealing with the threat (meaning even in case of some strike in Idia by terror groups, there shall be no overt/covert moves to threaten your integrity)



With a continuation of the status quo along the LoC and IB, the importance of the FC (its expansion and capacity building) in Pakistan's COIN strategy cannot be minimized, and will be the likely solution going forward.


I think batmannow has given a very workable suggestion in another thread of raising another force dedicated to CI grid (we have RR and AR for example) - something that IMO GoP should look into.


The Kashmiri's are not the issue, since they have largely been controlled since 2002. Nor is it a smart idea to open another front in Pakistan against the Kashmiri groups that command wide support in their freedom struggle. If they decide to go the route of the Taliban and resist, then it really will be a mess.

I agree. I was replying in contention to the post you made about writ of GoP not being there. It does not apply in this theater at all apart from few areas of Gilgit where you do have some problems.
 
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"What he might have alluded to may have been the RAPIDs (Reorganised Augmented Plain Infantry Divisions) which has a higher mechanised component in terms of armour and mechanised infantry being integrated..."

I don't think he was talking about RAPIDs, because they're largely inconsequential in terms of what he was implying. Pakistan has RAPIDs too but they're stationed in their peace time locals, not right next to the border as envisioned by Cold Start.

"Also you are slightly confused about the cold start program.The said program envisions movement of troops for offensive operations within a stipulated time period. Assets for the same were created along IB along the western border at the time of Op. Parakaram as in over the 1 year that IA spent there, deficiencies were noted and changes made. These assets are at static locations now and can be utilised at a short notice..."

I'm not confused about anything, but you are. I'm not wrong when I said the required infrastructure is not yet in place. The report I have says:

"The forward deployment of integrated battle groups and other offensive elements capable of undertaking Cold Start operations requires the construction
of new support infrastructure to house not only the units themselves, but also
the logistical “tail” that supports them. Stationing division-sized forces in the border region will require the expansion of existing facilities and the construction
of new ones. Forward locations close enough to the international border
would be located along a line stretching from Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-
Suratgarh. It is likely that the IBGs would be colocated with existing units
from the pivot corps in their area of operations. Key strategic locations in this
regard include the cantonment at Bathinda, Punjab (the largest cantonment in
India) and the 24th RAPID base at Bikaner.

At this point, there is no indication in open source materials that these required
facilities are being developed. Although hiding some new construction
within existing facilities might be possible, given how closely the Pakistanis
and Indians are watching each other, it is reasonably safe to assume that the
construction of facilities to house nine divisions’ worth of armor, vehicles, and
soldiers along the border would attract attention. By contrast, Pakistan’s
signiªcantly more modest construction of new bunkers and observation towers
on its side of the border adjacent to Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner in
December 2005 attracted Indian attention and press coverage."


Thus my claims are well founded.

"However, the only limiting factor as of yet for this doctrine to be 100% operationalised is - lack of adequate rail routes for transportation..."

Dead wrong.

"An examination of the Indian Army’s progress toward implementing Cold
Start shows that the limited war doctrine remains in the experimental phase. Simulated exercises demonstrate signiªcant progress in networking various units, but much more work is required to achieve proªciency in the execution of Cold Start and the joint operations required by the doctrine. Organizationally, the creation of the South Western Command represents a step forward, but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as the doctrine requires. Interservice and civil-military tensions remain signiªcant barriers to the doctrine’s acceptance. Finally, the execution of Cold Start will require further improvements in the quality of the army’s matériel
and the caliber of its officers. All of this paints a picture of a military organization
struggling with the implications of a new warfighting strategy."


"The Indian Army has developed a new limited war doctrine for responding to
the speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. While this Cold
Start doctrine represents a signiªcant advance in India’s conventional capabilities, it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential consequences."


"At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, much work remains."

I would've love to explain things address the issues and my PoV in greater detail here instead of just quoting a study, but unfortunately I don't have time.

I beg to differ sir.

You have just coalesced two evolving concepts into one. Am unsure if you are active PA/ex-PA or non-combatant.As such, would be grateful if you could give an indication if you are from service background so that it may facilitate easier interaction in accordance. Let me assure you again that you are way off target here right now, what you are referring to by alluding to IBGs is conceptualisation of future doctrine in next decade or so. I shall be happy to share my limited knowledge in extreme broad parameters if so desired.

Thanks
 
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malaymishra


There is not a single plant in this country that makes 155mm gun ammo.

Correction here MM, OFB makes the same.

Indian Ordnance Factories: Ammunition, Explosives, Propellants & Chemicals

155mm, 52 cal ammo.
OFB's dont produce them of adequate quality and not in adequate numbers. Hence even in Kargil, we had to import them on an emergency basis. Thus also, when the contract for the first plant dedicated to producing this munition was awarded to Denel, it got stuck in corruption charges and is lying vacant and partially built.
 
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155mm, 52 cal ammo.
OFB's dont produce them of adequate quality and not in adequate numbers. Hence even in Kargil, we had to import them on an emergency basis. Thus also, when the contract for the first plant dedicated to producing this munition was awarded to Denel, it got stuck in corruption charges and is lying vacant and partially built.

FH-77s Bofors Howitzers are the only 155mm/52 cal weapons at present being operated. And sufficiency in terms of quality and quantity of ammunition to be employed has been achieved.

Kargil was 10 years back. Things have drastically changed. Infact the 300 mm HEAT/HE rockets also the bomblets/mines for use by Smerch is also being fabricated now in India and as such stocks of same in adequate numbers are held by FADs.
 
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