"What he might have alluded to may have been the RAPIDs (Reorganised Augmented Plain Infantry Divisions) which has a higher mechanised component in terms of armour and mechanised infantry being integrated..."
I don't think he was talking about RAPIDs, because they're largely inconsequential in terms of what he was implying. Pakistan has RAPIDs too but they're stationed in their peace time locals, not right next to the border as envisioned by Cold Start.
"Also you are slightly confused about the cold start program.The said program envisions movement of troops for offensive operations within a stipulated time period. Assets for the same were created along IB along the western border at the time of Op. Parakaram as in over the 1 year that IA spent there, deficiencies were noted and changes made. These assets are at static locations now and can be utilised at a short notice..."
I'm not confused about anything, but you are. I'm not wrong when I said the required infrastructure is not yet in place. The report I have says:
"The forward deployment of integrated battle groups and other offensive elements capable of undertaking Cold Start operations requires the construction
of new support infrastructure to house not only the units themselves, but also
the logistical tail that supports them. Stationing division-sized forces in the border region will require the expansion of existing facilities and the construction
of new ones. Forward locations close enough to the international border
would be located along a line stretching from Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-
Suratgarh. It is likely that the IBGs would be colocated with existing units
from the pivot corps in their area of operations. Key strategic locations in this
regard include the cantonment at Bathinda, Punjab (the largest cantonment in
India) and the 24th RAPID base at Bikaner.
At this point, there is no indication in open source materials that these required
facilities are being developed. Although hiding some new construction
within existing facilities might be possible, given how closely the Pakistanis
and Indians are watching each other, it is reasonably safe to assume that the
construction of facilities to house nine divisions worth of armor, vehicles, and
soldiers along the border would attract attention. By contrast, Pakistans
signiªcantly more modest construction of new bunkers and observation towers
on its side of the border adjacent to Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner in
December 2005 attracted Indian attention and press coverage."
Thus my claims are well founded.
"However, the only limiting factor as of yet for this doctrine to be 100% operationalised is - lack of adequate rail routes for transportation..."
Dead wrong.
"An examination of the Indian Armys progress toward implementing Cold
Start shows that the limited war doctrine remains in the experimental phase. Simulated exercises demonstrate signiªcant progress in networking various units, but much more work is required to achieve proªciency in the execution of Cold Start and the joint operations required by the doctrine. Organizationally, the creation of the South Western Command represents a step forward, but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as the doctrine requires. Interservice and civil-military tensions remain signiªcant barriers to the doctrines acceptance. Finally, the execution of Cold Start will require further improvements in the quality of the armys matériel
and the caliber of its officers. All of this paints a picture of a military organization
struggling with the implications of a new warfighting strategy."
"The Indian Army has developed a new limited war doctrine for responding to
the speciªc challenges posed by Pakistans proxy war strategy. While this Cold
Start doctrine represents a signiªcant advance in Indias conventional capabilities, it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of Indias political leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential consequences."
"At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, much work remains."
I would've love to explain things address the issues and my PoV in greater detail here instead of just quoting a study, but unfortunately I don't have time.