Bhairava
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Goyyale, English la thana pesittu irukkom, periya paruppu ivuru, etho kozhi kirukkana maari naalu elutha elutha vaendiyathu. Pocha moodittu english la elutthu da.
Tibet issue
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Goyyale, English la thana pesittu irukkom, periya paruppu ivuru, etho kozhi kirukkana maari naalu elutha elutha vaendiyathu. Pocha moodittu english la elutthu da.
Tiki Tam Tam
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What utter gibberish!
तुम एक बेवकूफ की तरह बात कर रहे हैं बकरी
BigTree.CN
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Is it a fact that "China produces far more food for more people with less farming land than India"?
Brotherhood
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No. Economic or Social factor Unit of measurement China India
1. Total Area (out of which water) millions of sq km 9.60 (2.8%) 3.29 (9.5%)
2. Arable Land millions of sq km 1.48 1.79
3. Irrigated Land millions of sq km 0.53 0.61
4. Railways - length in km '000 71.90 63.23
5. Roadways - paved - length in km '000 1,447 2,411
6. Waterways - length in km '000 123 14.5
7. Natural Gas - Proved Reserves in billion cu m 2,530 854
8. Oil - Proved Reserves billion bbl 18.60 5.70
9. Airports - Total/paved/unpaved numbers 489/389/89 334/239/995
10. Coastline in km 14,500 7,000
11. Steel Production million tons/year 280 45
12. Food grain production million tons/year 418 210
13. Cement Production million tons/year 650 150
14. Crude Oil production million tons/year 180 40
15. Coal Production million tons/year 1,300 300
16. Electricity generated Billions of Kilowatts 2,190 557
17. Transmission & distribution losses as % of total power 6.8 23.4
18. Electricity tariff US$ / 100 KW 4 to 5 8 to 10
19. Cost of commercial borrowing as % interest/ year 6 - 7 8 - 16
20. Telephone lines connected millions 311 67
21. TV sets in households millions 500 85
22. Mobile/cellular phones millions 400 100
23. Internet users millions 111 51
24. Foreign trade (China+HongKong) US$ billions/year 1038+923=1961 260
25. External debt (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 242+416= 658 120
26. Exports (China+HongKong) US$ billions/year 752+286= 1038 120
27. Imports (China + HongKong) US$ billions/year 632+291= 923 138
28. Tourist Arrivals millions/year 87 4
29. TV broadcast stations numbers 3240 562
30. Radio broadcast stations AM/FM/short wave 369/259/49 153/91/68
31. FDI inflow (China + Hong Kong) US$ billions/year 106 8
32. Forex Reserves (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 1017+122= 1,139 175
33. GDP (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 2102+179= 2,281 750
34. GDP Growth (2006) in % rate over last year 9.3 7.9
35. Labour Composition Agriculture %/Industry %/ Services % 49/22/29 60/17/23
36. Population millions 1,314 1,095
37. Population increase per year millions 7.2 15.3
38. Birth rate Numbers per 1000 13 22
39. Per Capita income US$ per year/person 1,498 658
40. Life expectancy Years 74 64
41. Investment % of GDP 44 25
42. Poverty line - numbers %/Numbers in millions 10/131 25/273
43. Inflation Rate % 1.9 4.6
44. Median age Numbar of years 33 25
45. Population Growth Rate % of population 0.59 1.38
46. Infant mortality rate Death Rate per 1,000 23 55
47. GDP (PPP) US$ billions 8,182 3,699
48. GDP (PPP) per person US$ per person/year 6,300 3,400
49. Fertility Rate children born/woman 1.73 2.73
50. Literacy Rate - Definied as age 15 and over can read & write - % of Pop 91 60
51. Death Rate Rate per 1,000 pop 6.97 8.18
52. Public Debt % of GDP 29 82
53. Unemployment rate % of workforce 20 30
54. Labour force in millions 797 496
55. People living with HIV/AIDS '000 (2003) 840 5110
56. Government budget Revenues/Expenditure US$ billions 392/424 111/126
1 billion = 1000 million, 1 million = 10 lacs, 1 crore = 100 lacs = 10 million
**As per official figures
India Watch :: India - China Comparison
1. Total Area (out of which water) millions of sq km 9.60 (2.8%) 3.29 (9.5%)
2. Arable Land millions of sq km 1.48 1.79
3. Irrigated Land millions of sq km 0.53 0.61
4. Railways - length in km '000 71.90 63.23
5. Roadways - paved - length in km '000 1,447 2,411
6. Waterways - length in km '000 123 14.5
7. Natural Gas - Proved Reserves in billion cu m 2,530 854
8. Oil - Proved Reserves billion bbl 18.60 5.70
9. Airports - Total/paved/unpaved numbers 489/389/89 334/239/995
10. Coastline in km 14,500 7,000
11. Steel Production million tons/year 280 45
12. Food grain production million tons/year 418 210
13. Cement Production million tons/year 650 150
14. Crude Oil production million tons/year 180 40
15. Coal Production million tons/year 1,300 300
16. Electricity generated Billions of Kilowatts 2,190 557
17. Transmission & distribution losses as % of total power 6.8 23.4
18. Electricity tariff US$ / 100 KW 4 to 5 8 to 10
19. Cost of commercial borrowing as % interest/ year 6 - 7 8 - 16
20. Telephone lines connected millions 311 67
21. TV sets in households millions 500 85
22. Mobile/cellular phones millions 400 100
23. Internet users millions 111 51
24. Foreign trade (China+HongKong) US$ billions/year 1038+923=1961 260
25. External debt (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 242+416= 658 120
26. Exports (China+HongKong) US$ billions/year 752+286= 1038 120
27. Imports (China + HongKong) US$ billions/year 632+291= 923 138
28. Tourist Arrivals millions/year 87 4
29. TV broadcast stations numbers 3240 562
30. Radio broadcast stations AM/FM/short wave 369/259/49 153/91/68
31. FDI inflow (China + Hong Kong) US$ billions/year 106 8
32. Forex Reserves (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 1017+122= 1,139 175
33. GDP (China+Hong Kong) US$ billions 2102+179= 2,281 750
34. GDP Growth (2006) in % rate over last year 9.3 7.9
35. Labour Composition Agriculture %/Industry %/ Services % 49/22/29 60/17/23
36. Population millions 1,314 1,095
37. Population increase per year millions 7.2 15.3
38. Birth rate Numbers per 1000 13 22
39. Per Capita income US$ per year/person 1,498 658
40. Life expectancy Years 74 64
41. Investment % of GDP 44 25
42. Poverty line - numbers %/Numbers in millions 10/131 25/273
43. Inflation Rate % 1.9 4.6
44. Median age Numbar of years 33 25
45. Population Growth Rate % of population 0.59 1.38
46. Infant mortality rate Death Rate per 1,000 23 55
47. GDP (PPP) US$ billions 8,182 3,699
48. GDP (PPP) per person US$ per person/year 6,300 3,400
49. Fertility Rate children born/woman 1.73 2.73
50. Literacy Rate - Definied as age 15 and over can read & write - % of Pop 91 60
51. Death Rate Rate per 1,000 pop 6.97 8.18
52. Public Debt % of GDP 29 82
53. Unemployment rate % of workforce 20 30
54. Labour force in millions 797 496
55. People living with HIV/AIDS '000 (2003) 840 5110
56. Government budget Revenues/Expenditure US$ billions 392/424 111/126
1 billion = 1000 million, 1 million = 10 lacs, 1 crore = 100 lacs = 10 million
**As per official figures
India Watch :: India - China Comparison
Tiki Tam Tam
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Gounder,
Why blame the poor sod/
A drowning man clutches straws as the saying goes.
Why blame the poor sod/
A drowning man clutches straws as the saying goes.
Tiki Tam Tam
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May like to read:
Autonomy in Xinjiang : Han nationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent
Bovingdon, Gardner
This paper analyzes the sources of Uyghur discontent and ethnonational conflict in Xinjiang since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
It argues that the episodes of unrest in Xinjiang have not been simply contemporary manifestations of an enduring culture of violence. Nor have they been the product of foreign intrigues. Instead, while conflict in the region has had several causes, the system of "regional autonomy" operating in Xinjiang must be seen as a principal source of the unrest.
Instead of resolving a longstanding political dispute between Uyghurs advocating independence and the Chinese government, this system has deepened Uyghur discontent and exacerbated conflict.
To support this thesis, the paper presents both a historical analysis of policy changes over time in Xinjiang and a close study of current policies in the region. Autonomy arrangements around the world have been enacted to protect both states' territorial integrity and the fragile rights of minorities.
But all autonomy regimes privilege territorial integrity over absolute responsiveness to the demands of the autonomous group: they are a compromise between (a) states, which want unabridged sovereignty and homogeneous populations; and (b) peoples that want self-determination, generally meaning independence. Thus we should not be surprised to find both state actors and autonomous groups pressing for renegotiation of their agreements.
Yet there are dramatic differences in the degree to which states have honored their formal commitments and in the amount of pressure for change brought to bear by nominally self-ruling groups. In Xinjiang, the political system has chronically thwarted Uyghurs' exercise of self-rule and thus provoked and exacerbated Uyghur discontent.
One demonstration of the absence of regional autonomy in Xinjiang is that extreme policy swings there tightly followed those in the rest of China and its other autonomous provinces. Relatively tolerant policies in the early 1950s were replaced by strongly repressive and assimilationist ones as the country embarked on the Great Leap Forward in 1958.
A return to moderation in the early 1960s was then reversed again with the advent of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. By the end of that movement in 1976, pressures to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the persecution of religious practices and personnel, and attacks on respected authorities had profoundly alienated most Uyghurs.
Deng Xiaoping's announcement of economic reforms in China in 1978 was soon followed by somewhat more tolerant cultural and economic policies in Xinjiang, though signally without relaxation of political controls. After public demonstrations in Xinjiang in 1988 and 1989 and a violent uprising in 1990, Deng ordered a crackdown in that province.
The political clampdown in Xinjiang was accompanied by new restrictions on culture and religion that have remained in place up to the present. Both long-standing and recent policies by leaders in Beijing and Ürümci have combined to deepen discontent among Uyghurs, and the official refusal to allow open expression of dissatisfaction in the region has only increased that discontent.
Invariably harsh responses to demonstrations have left the field of overt political action to the violent and desperate while failing to address the concerns of the majority. The multifaceted repression of religion—including the closure of mosques, supervision and dismissal of clerics, and the prevention of religious practice by the young—has made Islam in Xinjiang more rather than less political in the Reform era.
And while Beijing has decentralized economic authority during the Reform era, it still wields considerable economic influence in Xinjiang, abetted by the region's disproportionate concentration of state enterprises and dependence on subsidies. The pattern of economic development in Xinjiang has ensured the further stratification of the labor market, a stratification that is often blamed for strengthening oppositional identities and aggravating intergroup friction around the world.
The mining and export of Xinjiang's oil and gas according to Beijing's dictates and by an almost entirely Han Chinese workforce has increased Uyghurs' sense of exploitation.
Heavy Han immigration into the region and the consistent choice of Han officials for the top positions at all levels of Xinjiang's party bureaucracy strike many Uyghurs as colonial practices. Finally, both Han immigration and state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the explicit protections of the constitution.
This pressure has deepened the popular perception of a gulf between Uyghurs and Hans. To suggest that Chinese policies in Xinjiang have been a key source of conflict is to imply that more moderate policies would have provided a better outcome. Historical counterfactuals are notoriously shaky ground for comparison. Furthermore, the frequency of ethnic conflict and violence in Xinjiang during the Republican era might have led us to expect both to continue after 1949. The argument here is not that ideal policies would have eliminated discontent and friction entirely. Instead, this paper contends that, had the CCP hewed more closely to what international legal scholars describe as the minimal principles of autonomy, Xinjiang would have seen less conflict.
It also argues that the particular departures of Chinese practice from that minimal model exacerbated regional conflict in specific ways. There is considerable disagreement on how conflict might be reduced in Xinjiang. Many Uyghurs and foreign observers assert that rigid policies and crackdowns on dissent have precipitated the protests and violent episodes of recent years. In contrast, Chinese officials and scholars claim that the lax PRC policies of the 1980s allowed separatist organizations and Islamic extremists to grow in number in the region and become more influential.
Careful attention to the modern political history of Xinjiang demonstrates that the former view is more plausible. Organized protest and violence emerged in the region long before the 1980s. Furthermore, dissatisfaction since then has not been confined to Islamists and separatists advocating violence; ordinary Uyghurs have expressed profound discontent with Chinese rule in Xinjiang.
Beijing's policies could have been moderated, and they can still be ameliorated now. Sadly however, the September 11 attacks have eliminated Chinese leaders' incentives to enact moderate policies. The announcement of the global "war on terror" appears to have emboldened Beijing to respond to dissent by tightening its grip on the region, and thus to diminish further the small amount of autonomy Uyghurs and others currently exercise. Chinese policy advisors have recommended precisely this recourse. But further reduction in the scope of autonomy in Xinjiang is avoidable and certain to exacerbate discontent.
Autonomy in Xinjiang : Han nationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent
Bovingdon, Gardner
This paper analyzes the sources of Uyghur discontent and ethnonational conflict in Xinjiang since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
It argues that the episodes of unrest in Xinjiang have not been simply contemporary manifestations of an enduring culture of violence. Nor have they been the product of foreign intrigues. Instead, while conflict in the region has had several causes, the system of "regional autonomy" operating in Xinjiang must be seen as a principal source of the unrest.
Instead of resolving a longstanding political dispute between Uyghurs advocating independence and the Chinese government, this system has deepened Uyghur discontent and exacerbated conflict.
To support this thesis, the paper presents both a historical analysis of policy changes over time in Xinjiang and a close study of current policies in the region. Autonomy arrangements around the world have been enacted to protect both states' territorial integrity and the fragile rights of minorities.
But all autonomy regimes privilege territorial integrity over absolute responsiveness to the demands of the autonomous group: they are a compromise between (a) states, which want unabridged sovereignty and homogeneous populations; and (b) peoples that want self-determination, generally meaning independence. Thus we should not be surprised to find both state actors and autonomous groups pressing for renegotiation of their agreements.
Yet there are dramatic differences in the degree to which states have honored their formal commitments and in the amount of pressure for change brought to bear by nominally self-ruling groups. In Xinjiang, the political system has chronically thwarted Uyghurs' exercise of self-rule and thus provoked and exacerbated Uyghur discontent.
One demonstration of the absence of regional autonomy in Xinjiang is that extreme policy swings there tightly followed those in the rest of China and its other autonomous provinces. Relatively tolerant policies in the early 1950s were replaced by strongly repressive and assimilationist ones as the country embarked on the Great Leap Forward in 1958.
A return to moderation in the early 1960s was then reversed again with the advent of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. By the end of that movement in 1976, pressures to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the persecution of religious practices and personnel, and attacks on respected authorities had profoundly alienated most Uyghurs.
Deng Xiaoping's announcement of economic reforms in China in 1978 was soon followed by somewhat more tolerant cultural and economic policies in Xinjiang, though signally without relaxation of political controls. After public demonstrations in Xinjiang in 1988 and 1989 and a violent uprising in 1990, Deng ordered a crackdown in that province.
The political clampdown in Xinjiang was accompanied by new restrictions on culture and religion that have remained in place up to the present. Both long-standing and recent policies by leaders in Beijing and Ürümci have combined to deepen discontent among Uyghurs, and the official refusal to allow open expression of dissatisfaction in the region has only increased that discontent.
Invariably harsh responses to demonstrations have left the field of overt political action to the violent and desperate while failing to address the concerns of the majority. The multifaceted repression of religion—including the closure of mosques, supervision and dismissal of clerics, and the prevention of religious practice by the young—has made Islam in Xinjiang more rather than less political in the Reform era.
And while Beijing has decentralized economic authority during the Reform era, it still wields considerable economic influence in Xinjiang, abetted by the region's disproportionate concentration of state enterprises and dependence on subsidies. The pattern of economic development in Xinjiang has ensured the further stratification of the labor market, a stratification that is often blamed for strengthening oppositional identities and aggravating intergroup friction around the world.
The mining and export of Xinjiang's oil and gas according to Beijing's dictates and by an almost entirely Han Chinese workforce has increased Uyghurs' sense of exploitation.
Heavy Han immigration into the region and the consistent choice of Han officials for the top positions at all levels of Xinjiang's party bureaucracy strike many Uyghurs as colonial practices. Finally, both Han immigration and state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the explicit protections of the constitution.
This pressure has deepened the popular perception of a gulf between Uyghurs and Hans. To suggest that Chinese policies in Xinjiang have been a key source of conflict is to imply that more moderate policies would have provided a better outcome. Historical counterfactuals are notoriously shaky ground for comparison. Furthermore, the frequency of ethnic conflict and violence in Xinjiang during the Republican era might have led us to expect both to continue after 1949. The argument here is not that ideal policies would have eliminated discontent and friction entirely. Instead, this paper contends that, had the CCP hewed more closely to what international legal scholars describe as the minimal principles of autonomy, Xinjiang would have seen less conflict.
It also argues that the particular departures of Chinese practice from that minimal model exacerbated regional conflict in specific ways. There is considerable disagreement on how conflict might be reduced in Xinjiang. Many Uyghurs and foreign observers assert that rigid policies and crackdowns on dissent have precipitated the protests and violent episodes of recent years. In contrast, Chinese officials and scholars claim that the lax PRC policies of the 1980s allowed separatist organizations and Islamic extremists to grow in number in the region and become more influential.
Careful attention to the modern political history of Xinjiang demonstrates that the former view is more plausible. Organized protest and violence emerged in the region long before the 1980s. Furthermore, dissatisfaction since then has not been confined to Islamists and separatists advocating violence; ordinary Uyghurs have expressed profound discontent with Chinese rule in Xinjiang.
Beijing's policies could have been moderated, and they can still be ameliorated now. Sadly however, the September 11 attacks have eliminated Chinese leaders' incentives to enact moderate policies. The announcement of the global "war on terror" appears to have emboldened Beijing to respond to dissent by tightening its grip on the region, and thus to diminish further the small amount of autonomy Uyghurs and others currently exercise. Chinese policy advisors have recommended precisely this recourse. But further reduction in the scope of autonomy in Xinjiang is avoidable and certain to exacerbate discontent.
bandit
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Do you even know how CPI is measuredit's a survey, not a scientific and quantitative measurement of corruption. the criteria of the CPI even changes from year to year.
.
China's version of high IQ at full display here, Statistical survey is not a scientific technique, well well.
You risk yourself being shown in a light of stupidity if you do so, China needs to import almost all of its staples food items to plug shortage in production, India on the other hand does not. So much for "Is it a fact that "China produces far more food for more people with less farming land than India", in bold.
India import statistics for staples:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templa...y_statistics/country_profiles/eng/India_E.pdf
China import statistics for staples:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templa...y_statistics/country_profiles/eng/China_E.pdf
Tiki Tam Tam
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Ethnic Intermarriage in Beijing and Xinjiang, China, 1990*.
by Rizvan Mamet , Cardell K. Jacobson , Tim B. Heaton
Researchers have paid considerable attention to intergroup marriages in western societies, such as the United States and Australia. Few, however, have studied intergroup marriages in nonwestern societies. In this paper we examine ethnic intermarriage patterns in China, a society that many perceive as ethnically homogeneous, but one that recognizes 55 minority nationalities in addition to the dominant Han group. The study of intermarriage in China provides an interesting contrast to Western societies, while contributing to the study of ethnic relations in China.
We use Blau's (1971) macrostructural proposition about group size as a general framework to examine ethnic intermarriage in Beijing and Xinjiang. Blau's (1971) basic proposition, a simple but salient insight, argues that relative group size is an important factor predicting outgroup marriage rates for racial minorities. It suggests that group size is inversely related to the likelihood of intermarriage. Thus, small minorities are more likely than larger groups to be assimilated into the larger culture, and they are more likely than larger groups to intermarry. More recent reformulations of Blau's (1971) proposition have emphasized that mitigating factors and institutional arrangements affect Blau's basic proposition (Kalmijn, 1998; Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Heaton and Jacobson, 2000)
Several mitigating factors operate in China to reduce the rates of intermarriage. These include the history of intergroup conflict, religion, language, culture, normative sanctions, and geographic isolation. Thus, we present a brief history of ethnicity in China.
Ethnicity in China
In the 1990 China Census the minority nationalities numbered 91.2 million composing 8.1 percent of the total population in China. They reside mostly in border areas such as southwest and northwest China, and their settlements constitute about 60 percent of China's total territory (Wu, 1997).
Nationalities in China are designated by the central government. Early in the 20th Century the Sun Yatsen government recognized only five nationalities--Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan and Hui, and all Muslims in China originally were defined as Hui (Gladney, 1996). After the Communist revolution of 1949 China exerted control over Tibet and Xinjiang. The central government expanded the designation of ethnic groups and allowed groups to apply for national minority status. Initially, over 400 ethnic groups claimed minority nationality status, but the central government granted official recognition to only 20. Later, using the criteria of common language, territory, economic life and culture, the government recognized the current 55 groups (Heberer, 1989; Lee, 1997).
Studying Beijing and Xinjiang
Beijing, a municipality and the capital of China is located in the North China and has a total area of 16,800 square kilometers. We elected to study Beijing because of its cosmopolitan character and its diverse ethnic composition. As the center of politics and economics of China, it is one of the most prosperous and fast-developing cosmopolitan areas in China. In 1990, Beijing's total population was 10.5 million, which included members of all 56 ethnic groups in China. The Han accounted for 97 percent of the total population and the 55 minority nationalities constituted the remaining three percent.
Xinjiang Province, one of the five Minority Autonomous Regions in China is located in northwestern China with a total area of 1,626,000 square kilometers (635,000 square miles--about three times the size of France), or about one-sixth of China's total area. In contrast to Beijing, Xinjiang is one of the poorest areas in China. We selected Xinjiang primarily because of its culturally diverse ethnic composition and because it has experienced a dramatic immigration of Han since 1949. In 1990, Xinjiang's population was about 15 million consisting primarily of Uighurs (47.3%) and Han (37.7%) (Hannun and Xie, 1998). The four largest groups, the Uighurs (7.2 million), Han (5.6 million), Kazakhs (1.1 million) and Hui (0.67 million) comprise 97 percent of the total Xinjiang population in 1990 (Anderson and Silver, 1995). Before 1949 the Uighurs constituted more than 80 percent of the Xinjiang population, but the government encouraged Han to migrate into the region, "one of the most dramatic demographic shifts in twentieth-century China" (Benson and Svanberg (1998:22-23). This dramatically reduced the percentage of Uighurs in the population, to less than 50 percent.
The Uighurs, the single largest minority nationality group in Xinjiang, along with the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tatars are Sunni Muslims and are ethnically Turkic. Linguistically and culturally, these groups are closely related to the Turkic groups in the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. The Kazakhs, on the other hand, are nomadic pastoralists who arrived ...
Read this entire Journal Article and more with a FREE trial.
Ethnic Intermarriage In Beijing And Xinjiang, China 1990 - Research and Read Books, Journals, Articles at Questia Online Library
by Rizvan Mamet , Cardell K. Jacobson , Tim B. Heaton
Researchers have paid considerable attention to intergroup marriages in western societies, such as the United States and Australia. Few, however, have studied intergroup marriages in nonwestern societies. In this paper we examine ethnic intermarriage patterns in China, a society that many perceive as ethnically homogeneous, but one that recognizes 55 minority nationalities in addition to the dominant Han group. The study of intermarriage in China provides an interesting contrast to Western societies, while contributing to the study of ethnic relations in China.
We use Blau's (1971) macrostructural proposition about group size as a general framework to examine ethnic intermarriage in Beijing and Xinjiang. Blau's (1971) basic proposition, a simple but salient insight, argues that relative group size is an important factor predicting outgroup marriage rates for racial minorities. It suggests that group size is inversely related to the likelihood of intermarriage. Thus, small minorities are more likely than larger groups to be assimilated into the larger culture, and they are more likely than larger groups to intermarry. More recent reformulations of Blau's (1971) proposition have emphasized that mitigating factors and institutional arrangements affect Blau's basic proposition (Kalmijn, 1998; Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Heaton and Jacobson, 2000)
Several mitigating factors operate in China to reduce the rates of intermarriage. These include the history of intergroup conflict, religion, language, culture, normative sanctions, and geographic isolation. Thus, we present a brief history of ethnicity in China.
Ethnicity in China
In the 1990 China Census the minority nationalities numbered 91.2 million composing 8.1 percent of the total population in China. They reside mostly in border areas such as southwest and northwest China, and their settlements constitute about 60 percent of China's total territory (Wu, 1997).
Nationalities in China are designated by the central government. Early in the 20th Century the Sun Yatsen government recognized only five nationalities--Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan and Hui, and all Muslims in China originally were defined as Hui (Gladney, 1996). After the Communist revolution of 1949 China exerted control over Tibet and Xinjiang. The central government expanded the designation of ethnic groups and allowed groups to apply for national minority status. Initially, over 400 ethnic groups claimed minority nationality status, but the central government granted official recognition to only 20. Later, using the criteria of common language, territory, economic life and culture, the government recognized the current 55 groups (Heberer, 1989; Lee, 1997).
Studying Beijing and Xinjiang
Beijing, a municipality and the capital of China is located in the North China and has a total area of 16,800 square kilometers. We elected to study Beijing because of its cosmopolitan character and its diverse ethnic composition. As the center of politics and economics of China, it is one of the most prosperous and fast-developing cosmopolitan areas in China. In 1990, Beijing's total population was 10.5 million, which included members of all 56 ethnic groups in China. The Han accounted for 97 percent of the total population and the 55 minority nationalities constituted the remaining three percent.
Xinjiang Province, one of the five Minority Autonomous Regions in China is located in northwestern China with a total area of 1,626,000 square kilometers (635,000 square miles--about three times the size of France), or about one-sixth of China's total area. In contrast to Beijing, Xinjiang is one of the poorest areas in China. We selected Xinjiang primarily because of its culturally diverse ethnic composition and because it has experienced a dramatic immigration of Han since 1949. In 1990, Xinjiang's population was about 15 million consisting primarily of Uighurs (47.3%) and Han (37.7%) (Hannun and Xie, 1998). The four largest groups, the Uighurs (7.2 million), Han (5.6 million), Kazakhs (1.1 million) and Hui (0.67 million) comprise 97 percent of the total Xinjiang population in 1990 (Anderson and Silver, 1995). Before 1949 the Uighurs constituted more than 80 percent of the Xinjiang population, but the government encouraged Han to migrate into the region, "one of the most dramatic demographic shifts in twentieth-century China" (Benson and Svanberg (1998:22-23). This dramatically reduced the percentage of Uighurs in the population, to less than 50 percent.
The Uighurs, the single largest minority nationality group in Xinjiang, along with the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tatars are Sunni Muslims and are ethnically Turkic. Linguistically and culturally, these groups are closely related to the Turkic groups in the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. The Kazakhs, on the other hand, are nomadic pastoralists who arrived ...
Read this entire Journal Article and more with a FREE trial.
Ethnic Intermarriage In Beijing And Xinjiang, China 1990 - Research and Read Books, Journals, Articles at Questia Online Library
Tiki Tam Tam
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China's Tibet Policy
http://books.google.co.in/books?hl=...XRVka2Tz5Igw25cq1EzPlxP7Y#v=onepage&q&f=false
http://books.google.co.in/books?hl=...XRVka2Tz5Igw25cq1EzPlxP7Y#v=onepage&q&f=false
Tiki Tam Tam
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The biggest bugbear for the Chinese in trying to Han-ise the population in the olden style where all below the Yellow River was forcibly assimilated and made to accept that they were Hanised and accept Han culture, it is not possible for China to do so for the Tibetan and the Uyghurs so easily.
It is because of globalisation and liberalisation, where people understand their unique identities, language and cultures and hence are not ready to give it up so easily.
Therefore, the Chinese are doing mass demographic changes in this area through mass Han influx as also preventing the Uyghurs and Tibetans are fair share of the Chinese pie by insisting that it is only there for those Uyghurs and Tibetans who learn simplified Chinese and forget their own mother tongues! As also through religious restrictions and diluting the same by making it state controlled and religious issues are made applicable only after clearance by the CCP apparatchiks.
It is because of globalisation and liberalisation, where people understand their unique identities, language and cultures and hence are not ready to give it up so easily.
Therefore, the Chinese are doing mass demographic changes in this area through mass Han influx as also preventing the Uyghurs and Tibetans are fair share of the Chinese pie by insisting that it is only there for those Uyghurs and Tibetans who learn simplified Chinese and forget their own mother tongues! As also through religious restrictions and diluting the same by making it state controlled and religious issues are made applicable only after clearance by the CCP apparatchiks.
ChinaToday
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Hey CD, you know what, i was at sir ray's home court yesterday, boy, it was quiet, damn quiet, so i lost interest for even a good chat, but you know what i found out, "sir ray" now got a new weirdo title as "MENTOR", man no wonder its turn into a troll nest there.
very well said couldnt agreed more with guy like him anything he managed will be completely ruined as expected
BigTree.CN
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China's version of high IQ at full display here, Statistical survey is not a scientific technique, well well.
You risk yourself being shown in a light of stupidity if you do so, China needs to import almost all of its staples food items to plug shortage in production, India on the other hand does not. So much for "Is it a fact that "China produces far more food for more people with less farming land than India", in bold.
India import statistics for staples:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templa...y_statistics/country_profiles/eng/India_E.pdf
China import statistics for staples:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templa...y_statistics/country_profiles/eng/China_E.pdf
Now I am getting to believe the low IQ thing of some Indian.
My original question is "Is it a fact that "China produces far more food for more people with less farming land than India". But you are using the import statistics to answer my question.
What the heck!
Are you trying to tell me just because China imports more food than India, China produces less food than India? Please tell me who taught you that crippled logic.
Let me give you another chance by asking the question again, is it a fact that "China produces far more food for more people with less farming land than India"?
Paan Singh
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Jackdaws
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The Chinese posters here have repeatedly avoided questions relating to Tibet and have conveniently shifted the topic to Indian dietary habits! Fact remains that China has illegally occupied Tibet and the videos of atrocities committed on poor Tibetans are there for the world to see. If the Chinese citizens would prefer to bury their heads in the sand and deny it - it is not dissimilar to the German people during the Nazi regime. It is very disturbing for the civilized world to see.
According to your funny logic, it is those starved to death die of hunger voluntarily because nobody forces them to eat?
Is it because your democracys freedom is free to die and not free to live?
Frankly, I never thought you are so heartless. I dont know how big percent of democratic Indians are as callous as you are. If a large percent of democratic Indians are of your type, your democracy is more disgustingly barbarous than communism, more ferociously inhuman than communism, and more democrazily backward than communism.
BTW, thank you for letting me learn more your f*... please excuse my midwest expression, fcking system!
