Some inaccuracies and strange comments in the article stand out. I couldn't keep them to myself.
For the moment let us forego of other key points that were raised and focus on the key term: State-sponsored terrorism, the Indian side kept repeating the statement over and over again, Pakistan is the worlds epicentre for terrorism. This phenomena of labelling Pakistan as the epicentre of worlds terrorism has an international impact but in my view it is the greatest hurdle for India and Pakistan to progress as states in terms of diplomacy. This issue is even bigger, now, than the Kashmir dispute even though, arguably, Kashmir was its birthplace.
The birthplace was partition. Kashmir joined in a little later and is something which both people cannot do away with locking themselves up in different rooms. At least Pakistan is hell-bent on changing the status-quo.
The Indian side argues that Pakistan directly or indirectly hosts and trains the terrorist activities that take place on its soil(Blank, 2003). There is proof of this claim, certainly, in the nation-state paradigm(Fair, 2004; Riedel, 2008). Many terrorists have claimed to be Pakistanis or supported by Pakistan.
For India this just puts a full stop on the issue, unless and until Pakistan stops harbouring terrorism there can be no talks, there can be no progress.
On the contrary, India attempted talks multiple times in 1998(ruined by Kargil), 2008(ruined by 26/11. Pak foreign minister was actually in India at that time) and now.
It should also be noted that in the 21st century India has repeatedly projected herself as an emerging power and her rows with Pakistan and more importantly her failed attempts to completely restrain Pakistan has been a problem.(Luce, 2010)
Where are the attempts to restrain Pakistan? How much does India focus on Pakistan when it does not come directly to its interests like Kashmir?
Understandably Pakistan has been raised on a defensive position and as such she sees herself as a lighter but meaner boxer. This holds true for all nations in the similar position: adapting an aggressive approach to defend themselves(Dixit, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Kumar, 1992; Philip, 2005).
Understandable.
Firstly, India needs to realise why Pakistan has proxies, it sees itself on a disadvantaged position and India has taken advantage of that, though rightfully or wrongfully, India is hardly a neighbour one would invite over, for Pakistan, at least. The Indian position that it is the stronger party and should be able to have an upper hand causes this dilemma.
India has taken advantage of that once in 1971, but that was after 1965. Pakistan never acted like it was at a disadvantage. If the state narrative of Pakistan is that without Kashmir, Pakistan cannot be, then it is not India's problem.
See, Pakistan has never denied India is the stronger party, it just states that Pakistan too is a party. Pakistan is not playing to win, she is playing to exist! To many Indians this seems to be a hard perception to get. Yet, it has very far reaching consequences for the region.
It is a hard perception to get for Indians because Pakistan never acted like it is playing to exist. Whether in 1965, 1971 or in Kargil. It has always been because they have serious problems assessing their own ability.
The exact situation also exists in the Arab-Israeli conflict, earlier in their history as Isreal was being formed the Israelis realised that the local populace might not be as accepting as they thought, political reasoning aside, the Israelis first line of defence was to ally Arab tribes with them along with Deuez tribes; these were their proxies(Abu-Lughod, 1971). Yet, today, Israel is the target of proxies and here is why: Israel is no more the challenger state.(Paul, 2006)
At the other end of the spectrum, Pakistan remains the challenger state(Huth, 1996; Paul, 2006).
There is no need of explaining so deeply why a weaker rival uses proxies. It is because they cannot stand a face-off head on.
This creates a problem, often Indians see the Pakistani military the direct threat to her stability but historically, the Pakistani military regimes have enjoyed better relations with Indian regimes than their civilian counterparts.(Ziring, 1997)
Isn't that because their word has more weight than anyone else's in Pakistan?
The Pakistani military wants India to allow enough concessions to be able to think that they can exist and it also plays a part in Pakistans politics; historically, people have viewed the civilian governments, with some justification, as incompetent (Nawaz, 2008, Ziring, 1987; 1997) and therefore unable to properly handle diplomacy properly.(Ziring, 1997)
This is pure BS. What they want is J&K and possibly the overthrow of the Indian state as a domino effect. If all they want is to exist, they could just live with the status-quo or better even formalize it. Why throw up $H!t every once in a while? Any Pakistanis agree with this theory that Pakistan is fighting for survival?
For Pakistan the proxies were the ace in the deck and rightfully so, the Indian side, besides their international image, has taken full advantage of Pakistans fissures. It can even be argued that the first real proxies were introduced by India as the Mukti Bahini in 1971 (Groh, 2010) (Grohs definition of proxies). Pakistans infamous Mujahideen were not directly controlled by the military and there was weariness due to their presence, especially in the early years of her inception(Nawaz, 2008).
The author forgets the proxies of 1948 or of 1965. Or is he conveniently using a definition that avoids this label for earlier Pakistani proxies just on the pretext that they are pathetic at organization?
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On a slight detour I would like to explain briefly that the Muslim populace of the world has perceived the various political discriminations and oppressions against them as an in-group threat and due to the mass media there has been considerable projection of the threat which is perceived as a large threat to identity and there rests a responsibility in both the Muslim and International community to address this problem, it is not one sided. The identity formation of various Muslim populations has been fraught with trauma and
no milestones (successful dealing with an identity crisis).
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They actually had milestones back in Nasser's and Mossadegh's era. But all the leaders who advocated a workable identity were either toppled by the USA or by the Wahabi funded agents. Now all the money is bent on one thing: to build an identity based on and solely on Islam. They are not succeeding, that is why it is a nightmare for them. If it succeeds, it would be a nightmare for the rest of the people.
For any society to be able to deal with militancy it should know that it allows for the militancy to exist and must address these problems. For India successful resolution of the discrimination against Muslims and for Pakistan successful development of FATA, political disputed in Balochistan, would ensure an end to militancy regardless of the other states intention and that is not dependent on the other state.
WTF?? I wonder when the author can certify that India has resolved the discrimination against muslims?
For there to be progress India needs to realise that Pakistan has much more to lose and has political justifications to be allowed more concessions from India. India is not under as much pressure as Pakistan and arguing about it does not help, this is a fact. Pakistan is not in a position to allow concessions as it has more to lose in the bargain and needs more to be able to survive whereas India wants to thrive, those two are completely different dimensions and thus India needs to come down on Pakistans point of view. Indian efforts to pressurise Pakistan further, no matter how justified, make things worse.
There should be no reward for false bravado, supremacist narratives, false histories and inflated egos built up by state apparatus among its own people. I believe India should not give any concessions to Pakistan on the points of conflicts. Concessions in trade and other aspects is fine.
How can they? Only yours can. And they do.
