The Pak-US Relationship

[lowe1941]

He's 100% Indian pretending to be Pakistani.

The only enemy is India, not Taliban or Sharia Law.

We had no problem with Taliban before India made its prescence in Afghanistan.

Do you really think If I was Indian I would hesitate to say so,,,, have you ever noticed any time that I dont call it like I see it........why in the world are you so paranoid of India any way......the Taliban are religious fanatics, it was just a matter of time till they tried to expand their power over a backward country like Pakistan, same as they did Afganstan...

You never did say how you would like living under the Taliban, seems like the way things are going you are going to have to get use to the idea,,hopefully we wont have any family or investments in Pakistan by that time...

 

[Jihad]

Do you really think If I was Indian I would hesitate to say so,,,, have you ever noticed any time that I dont call it like I see it........why in the world are you so paranoid of India any way......the Taliban are religious fanatics, it was just a matter of time till they tried to expand their power over a backward country like Pakistan, same as they did Afganstan...

You never did say how you would like living under the Taliban, seems like the way things are going you are going to have to get use to the idea,,hopefully we wont have any family or investments in Pakistan by that time...

Oh shut up.

 

[S-2]

I personally think that this is an immensely important link for Pakistanis here. I'm only now aware of the link and, based on only a cursory examination, have more here than I can ever possibly imagine to read.

I've not yet looked at all the possible areas which reference Pakistan or the formation of U.S. policy with Pakistan. Therein lies the relevancy to you folks. Clearly, though, other opportunities exist to probe U.S. policy, cable traffic, etc. at key junctures of crises elsewhere-such as the middle east.

This should prove very fascinating-

Office Of The Historian Of the U.S. Dept. Of State

 

[Omar1984]

The way a president of Pakistan (at that time Ayub Khan) was greeted in USA in 1961. The president of USA at that time was John F Kennedy.

President John F Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy welcome President Ayub Khan and his daughter

 

[Omar1984]

First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy's trip to Pakistan.

 

[Neo]

The best ally against extremism​

By Paula R Newberg

This is one way the Obama administration’s policies can stem the tide of failure in the region: by ensuring that its own policies are supported in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not just by officers, presidents and technical experts, but by the electorates themselves

Last week, Pakistan turned its political clock back to the year 2007. Its lawyers’ movement forced President Asif Ali Zardari to reinstate judges dismissed by his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf. After many broken promises and nasty personal politics, Pakistanis now confront the same governance problems that dogged them in the waning days of Musharraf’s rule.

This may not seem like progress. But the fact that the courts can now hold government to account is an enormous step for a state engulfed by terror and fear. Just as the United States is ready to unveil a new strategy for the region, Pakistan may finally begin to marshal a democratic response toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda that neither Islamabad nor Kabul could muster until now.

Why should a domestic dispute matter to the US-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda? Politics and a deep need for justice. The Supreme Court can certainly make life uncomfortable for Zardari, whose tenure is coloured by allegations of his corruption and the shadow of Musharraf’s policies. Before the dismissals, the Supreme Court was prepared to take up contentious cases concerning the security and intelligence services, the disappearance of hundreds of Pakistanis swept up in anti-terrorism campaigns and US rendition practices, Musharraf’s abuse of presidential powers to support US policies and state corruption.

Were the court to rule now, these cases could alter the balance of power within Pakistan and the direction of its foreign policy. Each also strikes at the heart of Pakistan’s misled governance. The courts will undoubtedly keep a close eye on diminishing parliamentary prerogatives and rising presidential powers as Pakistan wades into the new depths of the American-led war. This time around, the United States may have to deal with Pakistan, and if it were smart, Afghanistan, on terms set, at least in part, in the region itself.

The most pressing issue is negotiating with insurgents. The Taliban’s strength lies in border regions, but this is not a peripheral problem. Zardari’s decision to reach an agreement with them in the Swat valley — exchanging peace for the imposition of Islamic law — has infuriated Pakistanis who believe it trades constitutional principle for tactical expediency, and land for peace, bringing militancy close to the heartland without regard to public opinion.

The idea that there is a “moderate” Taliban has circulated since the movement’s rise in the 1990s, when the government of Pakistan formally recognised and international organisations engaged with its members in order to secure humanitarian supplies for Afghanistan. Who these moderates are, and how strong they might be, remains hazy.

Then, as now, even limited talks with the Taliban raised fears that talking conferred legitimacy. And then, as now, negotiation was a quick fix without a clear sense of its consequences for the future of either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did little to stop the Taliban, her successor Nawaz Sharif gave them formal sanction, Musharraf and Zardari treated them as bargaining partners — and today the Taliban’s rise has raised anew the question of Sharif’s claim to a close relationship with those the US has spent seven years trying to destroy.

None of these efforts diminished the Taliban’s terror campaign, and attempts to cope with this challenge by acceding to its demands raise serious questions about the country’s future. Some Pakistani terror victims now ask if negotiation with insurgents might turn out to have been the right course. Others worry that such bargains might end Pakistan as they know it. All worry about the government’s alliance with the US, including its tacit permission for pilot-less drone attacks against insurgents inside Pakistan that undercuts its sovereignty and political legitimacy.

These are not questions about military decisions, but about political judgment, and affect the kind of political society that Pakistan can become. While the US debates Zardari’s utility, it’s worth remembering that neither Pakistan’s nor Afghanistan’s president has, or should have, sole authority to decide these questions. In both countries, much-ignored parliaments and courts have constitutional roles that could ease the future of future decisions for the region and foreign powers alike.

Like so many questions about legitimacy in a purportedly democratic state, these turn out to be about popular franchise. One year ago, Pakistanis voted against the parties and politicians who wanted to fight terrorism with authoritarian tools — an implied vote against both the Taliban and military decision-making. Now that Zardari has backed down and restored the authority of the judiciary, many Pakistanis are likely to hope that their government will think much harder about the consequences of handing territory and political power to anti-state insurgents.

The same can be said for Afghanistan, where an election is slated for later this year. Its security environment differs from Pakistan’s even if its enemies appear similar. The country’s history with its own Taliban and the profound weakness of the Afghan state may lead Kabul and Islamabad to take different decisions. The Karzai government allowed talks with the Taliban for several years when the US didn’t want them and continues them now, perhaps with US sanction. Few in Afghanistan have complained.

The primary lesson remains a critical one: Afghans need confidence in their own government, in its decisions about war and, ultimately, peace. Their votes need to be respected within the country and outside — not only when they suit the US and its allies.

Politicians don’t always take the right military decisions; neither do military leaders. The problems that trouble Afghanistan and Pakistan today began politically and remain political. Those politics are not solely national. Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to host transnational groups like Al Qaeda and cross-border movements like the Taliban.

But the region’s travails are both a cause and a consequence of long-standing problems of governance. Terror is not an overlay, but a part of the governance environments of both states, and will not disappear until each state can govern itself fully, representatively and justly. This is not about buying allegiance or manufacturing aid projects to stem extremism — it is about the legitimacy of political leaders and institutions.

The US has difficulty reconciling democracy with foreign policy in this region. It pushed Pakistan to send troops into the tribal areas to fight Al Qaeda, gained permission to fight directly on Pakistani soil and merged anti-insurgency activities across the Durand Line — all without the support of the Pakistani electorate.

In Afghanistan, the US and NATO control a war on the territory of an otherwise sovereign state whose elected leader has virtually no say in its conduct and, when he finally complained publicly, was derided by Washington.

This is one way the Obama administration’s policies can stem the tide of failure in the region: by ensuring that its own policies are supported in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not just by officers, presidents and technical experts, but by the electorates themselves. Only then can both countries can take hard decisions and hold them as their own. It’s called democracy, and deserves a chance. —yaleglobal

Paula R Newberg is the Marshall B Coyne Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University

 

[fatman17]

Challenges lie ahead for US-Pakistani ties

Relations between Washington and Islamabad are becoming strained as Pakistan grapples with increasing instability in the region and conflicting pressures, writes Farhan Bokhari

The decision of US President Barack Obama to send 17,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009 comes as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban - many of whose fighters are based inside Pakistan - are aiming to intensify their attacks on US and NATO forces. Crucially, the US 'surge' - and the Taliban's response to it - could have a significant effect on US ties with Pakistan and on Islamabad's role in the war.

In the week beginning 23 February, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, Pakistan's chief of army staff, began a visit to Washington mainly to discuss US policy in its campaign against terrorism. A week earlier, Pakistani Finance Ministry officials had revealed that the US had withheld about USD1.5 billion in payments to Pakistan's military for its anti-terror operations since May 2008.

Earlier, Obama's appointment of Richard Holbrooke as his envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan underlined Washington's urgent wish to take closer control of US policy in the region. The United States is also working to approve a USD15 billion economic support package for Pakistan for the next 10 years, while the long-term US commitment to military aid is yet to be announced.

The rising conflict in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has turned US attention towards conditions in Pakistan - a country accused by US officials of providing sanctuary to the Taliban.

In recent months, attacks on convoys in Pakistan carrying supplies for US and NATO troops in Afghanistan have prompted Washington to step up its search for alternative supply routes through Central Asia. While Pakistani commentators insist that the country's geographical position makes it indispensable to the US for stabilising Afghanistan, Western defence officials have argued that Pakistan's failure to live up to Washington's expectations, both in terms of providing security for convoys and of combating the Taliban, will inevitably reduce its utility as an ally in the war.

The tone of the relationship naturally governs the US' support for the Pakistani military. Lawmakers in Washington have already raised objections to the support given to Pakistan's F-16 fighter programme, which includes a plan for Pakistan to purchase 18 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft in a deal worth USD498 million. On 24 February a Pakistani defence official said the plan remained unaffected as Pakistan would pay for the aircraft from its own resources, in spite of the financial crisis.

Less clear, however, is the future of mid-life upgrades for up to 71 older F-16A/B aircraft, including 30 already in Pakistan's inventory and 41 that it stands to receive as Excess Defense Articles from the US. Discussions continue over the funding of this upgrade programme, as do negotiations over Pakistan's request for more counter-terrorism equipment, notably new helicopters for operations in the tribal areas.

While the Obama administration has clearly indicated its preference for more civil development assistance to Pakistan, it is unlikely that military assistance will be curtailed. However, more stringent conditions are expected to be attached to such military assistance following revelations two years ago that part of the USD10 billion given to Pakistan between 2001 and 2007 was diverted away from anti-terror efforts.

Also of concern to Islamabad is the US' intention of pursuing closer relations with India. A new element to this relationship may be the emergence of closer co-operation in fighting terrorism in the wake of the attack on Mumbai in November.

This is an area where US-Pakistani relations could come under further stress, especially if, as claimed by Pakistani officials, India tries expanding its interests in Afghanistan through raising its diplomatic and military presence there.

A significant future challenge for US diplomacy in the region could be the fallout from another major terrorist attack in India, which could prompt Delhi to launch limited strikes on suspected terrorist targets in Pakistan. Pakistan is likely to retaliate militarily to such an attack, raising the possibility of a larger conflict. The attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in early March prompted Pakistani officials to voice suspicions of involvement by the Indian intelligence services, further heightening regional tension.

Another continuing controversy is the US policy of using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack suspected militant sites inside Pakistan. At least 30 such strikes were reported in 2008.

The use of UAVs erupted into a bigger controversy in February when the Pakistani press reported that Pakistan had quietly handed over a small Baluchistan airstrip to the US from which to operate the aircraft. At the same time, Pakistani newspapers stoked controversy over the presence of 70 US military trainers on Pakistani soil (although this fact was already well known). In spite of calls from opposition politicians for the Pakistani government to end its support for the US in such areas, Western defence officials say that, given Pakistan's economic and military reliance on the US, such facilities will continue to be extended quietly without either side publicly acknowledging their presence.

An unresolved long-term issue, however, is the relationship between Pakistan's military and Islamic militants - a question of central interest to the US. US officials insist that only a complete detachment of the Pakistani military from Is¡lam¡ic militants will lay the basis for a long-term relationship. Senior military commanders, including Gen Kiyani, have told US officials that such ties are now history. However, a peace agreement signed by the Pakistani government and Islamic militants in Swat in February has revived Western fears that Pakistan's establishment is unwilling to completely destroy militant groups.

The Swat agreement is a litmus test for both sides. If the agreement leads to a long period of calm, it would vindicate Pakistan's position, but if the militants make new inroads into other areas of Pakistan, it will confirm Western suspicions that appeasement is counter-productive.

Pakistan is surrounded by a host of challenges with implications both for external relations and for internal security. The danger for the US-Pakistani relationship comes not just from disagreements between the two sides on policy issues, but also from a growing sense of Pakistan becoming increasingly out of control.

The fundamental challenge ahead is therefore to improve Pakistan's ability to deal with these key concerns that hamper the country's military and economic capacity, while resolving the issues straining US-Pakistani relations.

Farhan Bokhari is a JDW Correspondent, based in Islamabad

© 2009 Jane's Information Group

 

[asq]

I personally think that this is an immensely important link for Pakistanis here. I'm only now aware of the link and, based on only a cursory examination, have more here than I can ever possibly imagine to read.

I've not yet looked at all the possible areas which reference Pakistan or the formation of U.S. policy with Pakistan. Therein lies the relevancy to you folks. Clearly, though, other opportunities exist to probe U.S. policy, cable traffic, etc. at key junctures of crises elsewhere-such as the middle east.

This should prove very fascinating-

Office Of The Historian Of the U.S. Dept. Of State

This indeed is a useful post, but had it also mentioned the facilitator between china and U.S than the deserving Pakistan would have been given the credit it deserved.

It is clear from the actions Pakistan has taken be it Taliban, or catching it killers of American FBI agents or be it Russia walking into Afghanistan or be it Chinese friendship, Pakistan has done more than its fair share, but never gets the thanks, I hope that Washington will see the facts and help its long and time tested ally.

 

[Neo]

US Senate okays $4bn increase in aid to Pakistan​

* Pentagon seeks $3bn in military aid over next five years
* Money will be used to train and equip Pakistan Army​

WASHINGTON: The US Senate voted on Wednesday to boost aid to Pakistan by $4 billion next year.

As the US lawmakers continued work on a $3.5 trillion budget blueprint for the upcoming fiscal year, Senator John Kerry, a Democrat, won adoption of a $4 billion increase next year in aid to Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror.

Earlier, the Associated Press had reported that the Obama administration plans to seek as much as $3 billion over the next five years to train and equip Pakistan’s military and is considering sending 10,000 more troops to battle the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In outlining the spending programme publicly for the first time, defence officials told the Senate Armed Services Committee it is critical to train and equip the Pakistanis so they have the skills and will to fight.

With the administration’s backing, their bill would provide $1.5 billion next year, linked to Pakistan’s counterterror and democracy-building efforts, officials said.

Defence and other administration officials spoke about the spending plans on condition of anonymity because the specific budget requests have not been released.

Also on Wednesday, senators questioned Gen David Petraeus, who heads the US Central Command, and Undersecretary Michele Flournoy over the possible deployment of 10,000 more troops to Afghanistan.

Petraeus said he had forwarded the proposed increase to the Pentagon. That plan could mean stationing almost 80,000 American forces in the country by next year. Currently 38,000 US troops are in Afghanistan.

Lawmakers asked why the extra brigade and headquarters unit requested by Gen David McKiernan had not yet been approved by President Barack Obama.

Flournoy said Obama is aware of the request, but was told he does not have to consider it until late this year because the additional troops will not be needed until next year. agencies

 

[Neo]

US-Pak: Agreeing to disagree​

A joint Pak-US press conference at the Foreign Office in Islamabad has yielded predictable results. The US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen were visiting after a barrage of statements from important sources in the Obama Administration that Pakistan’s ISI was complicit in the terrorism of the Taliban. Their host Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi rejected the charge and was suitably aggressive when he took the opportunity to rebut President Obama’s reference to the blank cheque: “I expect no blank cheques and we will not issue any blank cheques”.

The press conference was clearly a showcasing on the part of Pakistan of the differences that exist between the two sides on how terrorism is to be combated. Islamabad wanted to come clean on the issue of the American drone attacks and put it before the Pakistani public in deference to the “national consensus” against American plans to violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and escalating the alienation of the Pakistani population affected by these attacks. Because of the bad blood created by statements against the ISI, Pakistan reacted by rejecting proposals of further cooperation with the US on Afghanistan, including “joint operations” against the Taliban.

Is this the parting of the ways? No, if you read into Foreign Minister Qureshi’s announcement that discussion of the “differences” will be carried forward in the Afghan-Pak-US talks coming in the first week of May in Washington.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani rallied behind his foreign minister by saying that Pakistan was capable of defeating terrorism, although the world is yet to see the first demonstration of this capacity. There was a promise of retreat from partnership in this as he complained of the non-receipt of the pledged $1.5 billion meant for setting up special industrial zones in the tribal areas.

The two sides are definitely testing each other on their separate needs to remain inside the anti-terror alliance. The US knew that General Musharraf had a covert Afghan policy that partly negated his overt support of the war against terror. He wanted to protect the Afghan Taliban as his proxy in case the Americans decided to leave Pakistan. The Obama Administration, while aware of this strategic game on the Afghan Shura issue, wanted to see whether Pakistan’s Afghan policy had changed after the exit of General Musharraf from the scene. It has found out that it has not, and that Pakistan’s sensitivity to the presence of India in Afghanistan has actually increased.

Pakistan is testing America on its oft-repeated recognition that Pakistan is pivotal to the resolution of the Afghan problem. It has drawn a red line on how much Pakistan will “give” to the roster of demands made on it by Washington, in fact delineating the limit beyond which Pakistan will encash unilaterally on its pivotal importance for Afghanistan. Without articulating it, Pakistan is signalling that it cannot give up on its old policy on Afghanistan based on the use of counterforce to prevent India from using Afghanistan to destabilise its tribal territories inclusive of Balochistan. There is no doubt that the Pakistani government is also under pressure from the “national consensus” emerging in the parliament in Islamabad.

The Pakistani electronic media is also opposed to the drone attacks and keeps the government under pressure with an anti-American message. This message is absorbed not only in the settled areas of Pakistan but also in the tribal areas now under the control of the Taliban. To remove any misperception of our tribal areas, it should be kept in mind that Pakistani TV channels have considerable coverage there. The top tribal agency Bajaur has 60 percent coverage while the lowest coverage at 20 percent is enjoyed by South Waziristan. This means that our TV channels mould attitudes not only in Pakistan but also in the tribal areas where the Taliban too assess the effect of their strategy by interpreting the message of the media.

But that is not to say that Pakistan is ready to forfeit the $7.5 billion aid package it expects to get from the United States over the next five years; nor is it ready to spurn the funds being made available to it through multilateral organisations like the IMF. In fact it expects the US to use its persuasion during the next meeting of the Friends of Pakistan group of countries to give it more money. Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Mr Husain Haqqani, has in fact asked Washington to prepare a Marshall Plan for Pakistan to give it additional $30 billion. But the bottom line is that one can’t ask for this big money while giving nothing in return. *

 

[Neo]

The India factor​

Commentators in Pakistan have their hackles up after Mr Richard Holbrooke, Washington’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said in New Delhi Wednesday: “The US has no plans to mediate between India and Pakistan. We cannot negotiate between the two countries. Our trip was designed to move forward a process in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We stopped here to inform and consult the Indian government”. He and his fellow traveller, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, however, called for cooperation between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US to fight the “common threat” and stabilise the region.

What galls the Pakistani commentators is that, instead of making a tough statement about how India must resolve its Kashmir problem with Pakistan, Mr Holbrooke tried to involve India in Afghanistan: “We cannot settle Afghanistan and many other issues without India’s full involvement.” TV channels poured scorn on the American pronouncements of “friendship” with Pakistan; and some even referred to a joint Indo-US strategy to destabilise and “reduce” Pakistan in order to allow India to establish its hegemony in the region. The deficit of “trust and understanding” between the US and Pakistan evident in Islamabad is thus linked to how India is viewed by Pakistan on the one hand, and the world on the other, including the US.

The US and its western allies now represented in the NATO forces in Afghanistan favour India’s participation in the “nation-building” process in Afghanistan for a number of reasons. They think it is a democracy functioning in the same region of SAARC as Afghanistan with long-standing historic close relations with Kabul. They view with respect India’s investment in Afghanistan — $1 billion as against Pakistan’s $300 million — and do not take seriously Pakistan’s fears that Indians could be doing mischief inside Balochistan from their consular “offices” in Afghanistan. They think Pakistan must seek normalisation of relations with India through a bilateral dialogue to defuse the tensions emanating from India’s presence in Afghanistan.

There are other reasons too for this thinking, apart from the fact that the US doesn’t have the same kind of leverage on India as it does on Pakistan. There is no doubt that the world wants Pakistan to make the needed adjustments in its revisionist nationalism vis-à-vis India in the Indo-Pak normalisation process. It takes a dim view of Pakistan’s misadventure at Kargil in 1999 and an even dimmer view of the Pakistani non-state actors who attacked Mumbai in November 2008. It is fearful of the prospect of Pakistan not punishing the terrorists involved in the Mumbai attacks after owning them up. No neighbour of Pakistan in the region abutting on Afghanistan minds that India is there with big money rebuilding its infrastructure.

On the other hand, for Pakistan, the war in Afghanistan is an extension of the Indo-Pak covert war for an upper hand in Afghanistan. India also remembers the 1999 hijacking of its airliner to Kandahar where the Taliban had pressured India into releasing two terrorists from an Indian jail with close contacts to the ISI. The Pakistan army has always thought of providing against the day when NATO-US forces quit Afghanistan and leave behind a power vacuum that could be filled by India, thus exposing Pakistan to a two-front situation. This of course is a purely military formulation but it has popular acceptance because of Pakistan’s textbook anti-India nationalism made more lethal when linked to Pakistan’s widespread anti-Americanism.

For its Afghan policy to survive and to be able to face up to the challenge of terrorism, Pakistan needs to normalise relations with India quickly. Its nuclear deterrence — and thus its security — is of no use unless it quickly completes the process. We know that the terrorists don’t want this to happen and wish to distract Pakistan with a new Indo-Pak conflict that would lift the pressure from them in the tribal areas. Pakistan has tried to start a low-intensity conflict in the past with the help of non-state actors and has not succeeded. Its “strategic depth” policy against India has failed too. It is because of these background facts that the world wants Pakistan to normalise with India as a means of shoring up its security. The India factor is therefore the most pivotal aspect of the war against terrorism. *

 

[muse]

Serious trouble!! Coming from Ejaz, we can be sure a hard game is going to much much harder.


Rethinking the alliance
Ejaz Haider



Check out the text of the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act of 2009, officially titled HR 1886, introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) on April 2 and currently referred to the committee. (see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1886)

If this bill did not relate to a serious issue in the backdrop of a very grim situation facing Pakistan and this region, one might have dismissed it as a bad joke. While it would be an essential exercise to deconstruct it clause by clause to lay bare its intent, and one hopes the Foreign Office will do exactly that, it is important here to at least point to what is obvious.

First, the bill and some of its clauses, especially those pertaining to India’s interest, are the work of Indian lobbying. That, one should, without any grudge, say is excellent work from India’s perspective. Equally, one might ask what effort, if any, was made by us to thwart India’s designs.

The question, however, is this: should the United States be dealing with Pakistan on the basis of its (US) interests or India’s? The question, at this stage, assumes quite arbitrarily that US interests vis-à-vis Pakistan may be different from India’s. Increasing evidence may even put paid to this assumption but for now we shall not touch upon that.

One may also assume that given the Obama administration’s own rhetoric, the US faces a grave threat in the region, which it cannot tackle without Pakistan’s help. Logically this means that the US should be trying to find points of convergence with Pakistan. Coming up with a bill that does not even purport to hide its India tilt is a strange way of doing that.

Let’s consider Sec 4, Declaration of Principles, Clause 6, sub-clauses (H), (I), (J) and (K), in reverse order.

Sub-clause (J) of the bill requires Pakistan “not to support any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other activities meant to instil fear or terror in India”. This could have been drafted by India. But let’s deconstruct it.

Seems fine; no? The fine-print is a different story. Given terrorist attacks within Pakistan and the degree of difficulty in tackling the menace, how can Pakistan be expected to ensure India will not be attacked and how would it be determined, and by whom, that Pakistan is “allowing” some groups to attack India — New Delhi?

Once again, we are not even getting into the issue of what India might be doing and how might it be funding and supporting not just the Baloch nationalists but also those terrorist groups that are attacking security forces in FATA and elsewhere.

As I wrote in this space last Saturday (“Terrorism and its discontents”; Daily Times, April 4) in relation to our discussion at an India-Pakistan conference in Bangkok, “What is...troublesome...is determining whether blame for a particular terrorist act can be laid at the door of the state of Pakistan. How and who is to trace the spoor; who would determine the intent behind the exercise and what role is [India’s] domestic politics likely to play in such an exercise, as it did during and after Mumbai?”

This conditionality means Pakistan will always be the villain until it proves itself innocent. Do we want the money and this assistance, notwithstanding its apparent generosity, with this conditionality? I don’t know about official Pakistan but as far as I am concerned, no.

Consider sub-clause (K) of the bill. It binds Pakistan “to ensure access of United States investigators to individuals suspected of engaging in worldwide proliferation of nuclear materials, and restrict such individuals from travel or any other activity that could result in further proliferation”.

Well...Dr AQ Khan again! That episode, gentlemen, is over. Dr Khan has been sidelined and punished; Pakistan has taken measures to ensure that no one can do such a thing again; other states whose nationals were involved in the racket have still to come clean on what was going on; proliferation is an area where all nuclear weapon states have some blot on them, and that includes the US; credible reports from US experts have proven proliferation by India and so on, thank you.

And yes, like the US, we like to try our defaulters ourselves.

Sub-clauses (H) and (I) of the bill require Pakistan “not to provide any support, direction, guidance to, or acquiescence in the activities of any person or group that engages in any degree in acts of violence or intimidation against civilians, civilian groups, or governmental entities”; and “to redouble its efforts to prevent the presence of the Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups in Pakistan that support insurgents in Afghanistan”.

Very well. Once again, who will determine that Pakistan is successfully and/or sincerely doing this? Given the complexity of what is happening in this region and the different and differing interests of various players, what benchmarks are to be used by the US to make such a determination?

As I mentioned above, there is much sting in this bill and the FO will have the occasion to go clause by clause to debate that and formulate an appropriate response. But one thing should be clear: the US cannot be trusted as an ally that can act as an honest broker between India and Pakistan. Its tilt towards India is very clear and its policies and approach towards Pakistan are a clear proof of that.

I shall have occasion to get to that in a subsequent piece. But this bill is a piece of legislation that Pakistan must reject categorically and unequivocally. More than that, however, we need to rethink our terms of alliance with the US and for that we need to develop a coherent national response.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[TruthSeeker]

First, the bill and some of its clauses, especially those pertaining to India’s interest, are the work of Indian lobbying. That, one should, without any grudge, say is excellent work from India’s perspective. Equally, one might ask what effort, if any, was made by us to thwart India’s designs.

I think if you study the sponsors of this language you would find that it is Israel doing a favor for India. That is, it is the Congressmen who are strong supporters of Israel who are pushing such conditions into the Pakistani aid bill, not the Obama administration. Unfortunately, the Israeli lobby has found that it can strengthen its relationship with India by loaning some of its "clout" to Indian lobbying objectives. So, the credit for this "success" belongs to the the powerful Israeli lobby in Washington, not to New Delhi.

 

[muse]

Either way, it's a spanner in the works - I would be very, very, very suprised if Pakistan buy into this bill.

So what are it's options ?

Unfortunately, I don't see any -- Ejaz and Brigadier Qadir have suggested that we need to fashion a "national" response -- this is a non-starter -- Nawaz has isued a statement that Pakistan cannot afford any further political confrontation - this is a clear indication of his intent to ensure that exactly this, that is to say political confrontation is exactly what he will produce, while most immediately he is signalling that Zardari sign off on the Nizam E adl legislation, his calculations are in prepartion for destabilization - he must fashion a political environment in which Musharraf's comeback will simply not be possible.

So China's support is no longer a given and the US given this bill, is also a non-starter, though much "negotiations" will ensue - India through Israel American politicians and lobbying will continue to maintain pressure on Pakistan.

So Pakistan gets to limp, bleeding, proud and in the end, unsustainable.

But what if Obama can be made to "feel" more reasonable? what would need to happen for Obama to realize the full import of his statement that Pakistan is central to the kind of solution he seeks which will allow him to evacuate?

That's upping the ante considerably, but I don't see short of Pakistani capitulation, what other choice the pakistani have -- for long they have been brushing aside suggestion of "do or die", "to be or not to be" - and now they have come ot a stage where they don't have any choice in the matter and must play a game they never, at least no sane entity would entertain.

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[TruthSeeker]

Yes, its true that the addition of this language is a real problem. And, if I am correct, the supporting lobbying forces in Congress (combined India and Israel interests) are as powerful as it gets. The only hope is that the State Department and Obama himself will mitigate the language when confronted with the reality of actually helping Pakistan solve what is a very real problem for both Pakistan and the US. I have written my Virginia Senators about supporting the Bill some weeks ago before these "conditions" were introduced by various Jewish legislators. I will write a new letter urging them to not intertwine other issues of the sub-Continent with this much needed aid. I do favor some language that makes it incumbent on Pakistan to use the aid to combat the irhabis, both militarily and in the sense of strengthening the Pakistani State in delivering services to the underserved. My Senator Webb sent me a response noting my support for the aid Bill and telling me that he would let me know his position when the language of the Bill became clear. I think he is receptive to the need to genuinely help Pakistan rather than passing a poison pill Bill that gets us nowhere. Maybe there are more like him.