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Yes independent review of HUD footage proves a lot
im asking this...proof
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ask your diplomt how diffuclt is life after kargill...
need more ?
if you hit us uranimum will process same hit with plutonium.....
(just example dont go nulcear .. as always...)
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch2.pdf
The surprise and alienation felt by members of the Pakistani elite are
confirmed by a reading of Pakistan’s English-language press, which
strongly suggests that at the time of the conflict, editorialists and
other opinion shapers did not know that the incursions around
Kargil were
not
a mujahideen operation. The surprise evinced in
such editorials seems to stem from the writers’ beliefs that Kargil was
not Pakistan’s doing and that Islamabad therefore did not deserve
the opprobrium it received.
In the aftermath of the G-8 communiqué,
3
which Pakistanis read as
laying the blame squarely on Pakistan, several articles spoke out
against what was perceived as an unreasonable and unfair interpre-
tation of events by the international community.
4
One article
poignantly narrates Pakistan’s sense of loss, isolation, and surprise:
We have come a long way indeed from the time when the world lis-
tened to our entreaties on Kashmir with a certain amount of re-
spect. We have come a long way from the time that the OIC
[Organization of Islamic Countries] passed a unanimous resolution
on allowing the Kashmiris the right of self-determination. We have
come a long way indeed from the time that our protector and giver
of all, Amreeka Bahadur, was getting ready to mediate between
India and Pakistan. . . .Whatever happened to us? Why do we stand
at the very edge of the diplomatic precipice today?
5
To illuminate Pakistan’s current standing in the comity of nations,
the author of this article critically examined some of Pakistan’s more
alienating policies, such as its ongoing support for the Taliban.
--
T]he United States has proved to be a fair-weather friend. . . .In-
stead of showing greater understanding of Pakistan’s point of view
and impressing upon India the need to discuss the Kashmir prob-
lem . . ., the US is telling Pakistan to effect a withdrawal of the
Mujahideen (or the infiltrators, as the US prefers to call them) from
Kargil. China does not suffer from the same attitude and its under-
standing of the Pakistani position on all important matters of na-
tional security has always been fair and sympathetic.
6
While such writers persisted optimistically in the days immediately
preceding Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to China,
others sought to dampen any expectation that China would enthusi-
astically support Pakistan.
7
These articles typically reaffirmed the
general contours of Sino-Pakistan relations while vitiating any expec-
tation that China would be totally forthcoming in assistance. A
common strategy employed was to contextualize China’s expected
stance on Kargil vis-à-vis China’s other pressing objectives (e.g., eco-
nomic, social, and military development).
8
Of course, the eventual position taken by China did not live up to any
of Pakistan’s highest expectations. In the days and weeks after the
disappointing visits to China by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and then
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, there was palpable shock at China’s
position and vexation with the Pakistani Foreign Office’s efforts to
spin these visits as fruitful. Abbas Rashid’s opinion piece typifies this
sentiment:
Even China seems to have forsaken its traditional subtlety to get
across the message as plainly as possible that it did not support
Pakistan’s position. . . .Sartaj Aziz dashed off to Beijing and was re-
portedly told by Li Peng . . . that ‘. . . Pakistan should remain cool-
headed and exercise self-control and solve conflicts through peace-
ful means and avoid worsening the situation.’. . .Certainly, this is
----