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The Fight against PKK Terrorism

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To be honest that all preparations happened with knowledge of AKP and the ethnic Kurdish peace coordinator
Prof. BESIR ATALAY as well as some other people working for the CIA e.g. Vamik Volkan

SUR

 
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killed english citizen, they are coming from bokaba aka kobane. So europe what would we do with your terrorists citizens?

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Kobane and Sengal. :tup:

So called Yezide and Kurd massacre was a perfect manipulation and PR in favor for PKK.
The figures can proof it.
 
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I developed my own simple tactic to catch snipers

Illuminating with fake unmanned weapon stations and shooting - Illumination range up to 1000 meter

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Waiting their shot response, recording with acoustic sniper detectors and locating via their integrated GPS

Then one shot one kill, with sniper counter fire or Eryx or Milan GW
 
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Tactical lessons from foreign armies referring to urban warfare :

There are several choices: the 20 lb disposable MPIM/SRAW , the Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, the simple RPG, or the AT-4. In some urban warfare operations, he may dash one block to the rear and return with more rockets.
Perhaps other members of the squad will carry extra rockets or machine gun ammo, which is another reason to have the extra fire team members. Weapons like the MPIM/SRAW can be fired by any infantryman, but a rocker ensures that a well-trained expert is on hand and anxious to fire. Once enemy contact is made, everyone in the squad will eagerly await the "BOOM" of their rocket. Even if nothing is hit, they know the enemy has lost enthusiasm for a fight.
Despite the "Revolution in Military Affairs" US military squads and platoons still rely on light machine guns for serious firepower. Modern squads must carry heavier firepower in the form of heavy caliber rifles and rockets for immediate employment. The US Army platoons with a weapons squad should disband them and organize into three larger and lighter squads as described here. Since key battles in future wars will take place in confined cities, infantry squads must modernize with a variety of weapons with more "BOOM" and fewer "bangs."

http://www.g2mil.com/cities.htm

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GROZNY :

Between January and May 1995, Russian losses in Chechnya were approximately 2,800 killed, 10,000 wounded, and over 500 missing or captured. Chechen casualties were also high, especially among noncombatants.
The Russian forces lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs, and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s in the first three days of fighting. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay out of the fields of fire of the tank and BMP weapons.The Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their infantry weapons. The T-72 tank was unsatisfactory, often called, "dead meat". It was too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, had poor visibility, and poor weapons coverage at close ranges. The Russians removed them from the battle and replaced them with smaller numbers of older tanks and more self-propelled artillery, more ADA weapons, and more BMPs. Precision guided weapons and UAVs were very useful. There was some need for non-lethal weapons, but mostly riot gas and tranquilizer gas, not stuff like sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 Flash flame projector and the MK 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons.

BEIRUT :


  • Beirut.

    • (1) Armor. Tanks were under the command of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Infantry companies. The armor of the Merkava, with an internal troop compartment, proved excellent protection against RPGs, mines, and small arms fire. The IDF felt that tanks were the most useful weapon in Beirut, both in terms of delivering firepower on specific targets and protecting the Infantry. The IDF concluded that the M113 family of armored vehicles was too unreliable, unmaneuverable, and vulnerable.

      (2) Infantry. Clearing buildings presented a major problem for the IDF. In the words of one IDF brigade commander, "Every room is a new battle." Once troops are inside a building, it is impossible for a commander to understand what his troops are confronting, "The battlefield is invisible." In his judgment, the dangers of clearing buildings are so great that they should never be entered unless absolutely necessary: "Avoid cities if you can. If you can't, avoid enemy areas. If you can't do that, avoid entering buildings."

      (3) Artillery. The IDF found the American-made M109 155-mm self-propelled howitzer extremely effective when using high explosives in a direct-fire role. Both sides employed Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, which had tremendous psychological effect on noncombatants. PLO antiaircraft artillery (mostly heavy automatic weapons) was not effective against the Israeli Air Force.

      (4) Munitions. Air-delivered cluster bombs, smart 1000 pound bombs, rockets, missiles and other munitions were precise and effective. Cluster bomb units (CBUs) were highly effective in destroying antiaircraft artillery. However, the CBUs' sub-munitions were responsible for many civilian casualties. Large proportions of the shells used were white phosphorous (WP). The IDF appeared to use WP primarily for the psychological effect it generated, including fear.
As the Israelis discovered in Beirut, simply crushing an adversary no longer guarantees victory—the attacker must also win the international propaganda battle. A well crafted, effective political warfare campaign, being essentially nonviolent in nature, could also contribute to resolving the friendly casualties—collateral damage tension described above.

http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/FM3-06_11H.html


 
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There are some rumors that terorists using drones to gather intelligience.Do we have any detection/jamming capability for drones?
 
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