kalu_miah
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I personally believe China's policy of Non-interference is prioritizing financially benefit of the corrupt CPC elite (most of whom stash wealth abroad) at the expense of vital long term Chinese national geopolitical interest. I open this thread mainly to get opinions and views of Chinese posters who understand the inner workings of CPC elite to validate my above opinion or invalidate, if my view is not correct.
http://ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Analysis_The_End_of_Non_interference_October2013.pdf
About (summary):
The Chinese have long been obsessed with strategic culture, power balances and geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, think tanks, journals and web-based debate are growing in number and quality and give China’s foreign policy breadth and depth.
China Analysis, which is published in both French and English, introduces European audiences to these debates inside China’s expert and think-tank world and helps the European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic and foreign policy issues. While freedom of expression and information remain restricted in China’s media, these published sources and debates provide an important way of understanding emerging trends within China. Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese mainland sources. However, it also monitors content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which occasionally include news and analysis that is not published in the mainland and reflects the diversity of Chinese thinking. The French version of China Analysis can be accessed online at www.centreasia.eu.October 2013
Introduction
by François Godement
According to Qiu Lin, a well-known columnist, China’s non-interference policy is “naïve” and unsuited to protecting its global interests. He says that, caught between international demands for China to take “responsibility” and the need to defend its growing stake in many foreign economies, China has proven hesitant in choosing either course, and may be losing on both counts.
This issue of China Analysis focuses on China’s foreign-policy debate on Iran, Sudan, Syria, North Korea and Burma. Even at a moment when ideological unity is being strongly reasserted, the range of views expressed in this debate is striking. Chinese analysts mention the dangers of China’s high-profile commercial foothold in countries like Iran and Burma. They acknowledge public support for newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani and its reasons – a yearning for reform. A controversial party intellectual, Deng Yuwen, even writes that the ideological gulf between China and North Korea is larger than that between China and the West. There is stark realism on what close partners think of China – for example, some analysts reveal the fear that they have of North Korea one day simply reversing alliances and leaning towards the United States.
However, criticism and doubts mostly go in the other direction. China’s balancing game in the Middle East, where it has strived to keep friendly relations with everyone, is now seen as ineffectual. Instead, and because America is seen as being so keen to attack Iran and to neglect any opening, China is urged to launch an “aid Iran, strike America” policy. The motto is based on one of Mao’s toughest domestic campaigns at the outbreak of the Korean War: Iran is seen as today’s China and Syria is Iran’s North Korea; both are believed to deserve China’s full support.
One of China’s currently most prominent strategy pundits, Yan Xuetong, takes a different and somewhat contradictory approach. He argues that China should merely stand firm with Russia at the United Nations and let the West extricate itself from its impulse for an intervention it can ill afford. By saying no and remaining committed to non-interference, China will actually improve its international standing.
Yan’s attitude, expressed before the Obama administration’s u-turn on Syria, seems prescient. But it also reveals contradictions. After all, Yan was among the first to criticise the principle of non-interference and recommended that China build its own alliances.
Economic security and energy resources clearly play a major role in Chinese foreign policy. Even though our experts acknowledge that the US has actually been encouraging China’s access to oil, there is a nagging fear of the potential for future blackmail. Our Chinese analysts have a strangely detached view on North and South Sudan: the two Sudans are locked in conflict and energy interdependence and America is actually restricting its aid to South Sudan because this also indirectly helps North Sudan. They seem to conclude this is no longer a strategic issue (and do not mention the traditional ideological preference for Khartoum). The clincher is that they estimate that Sudan’s oil resources are on a fast road towards depletion.
Pessimism reigns among Chinese analysts. They fear that the Pentagon is extending its “lily pad” strategy (that is, one based on a network of small bases around the region) to Burma, which has been successfully pressured by the West’s strategy of sanctions rather than by a desire to hedge China. They think that, if Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria fell, it would be replaced by a government that leans towards the West. Were anybody from the West to make such a prediction, it would be seen as wishful thinking.
Non-interference may have hampered Chinese diplomacy by preventing nimble responses and protecting stodgy thinking. Our experts express the same frustrations on widely different issues. But moving to a more committed policy that is not afraid to take sides and favour particular domestic outcomes opens up a gulf of doubts and different answers. It seems China is caught between the risks of being an absentee landlord and the hard choices of exercising imperial power.
.................
4. Has China lost Burma?
Damien Garnier
Sources:
Li Yibo, “Is Burma the US army’s next Asian water lily?”, Shijie Zhishi – World Affairs, 7 December 2012.30
Shi Qingren, “The goal of the United States is to counterbalance China’s influence in Burma”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao – Youth Daily, 4 January 2013.31
Wang Dong, “How should China react to the continuing ‘changes’ in Burma?”, Huanqiu Wang – Global Network, 5 December 2012.32
Xiao Ke, “Reflections on Burma’s revolution and its prospects”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi – Contemporary International Relations, 2012, No. 2.33
Zhou Xinyu, “Comments on the reversal of US policy on Burma”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi – Contemporary International Relations, 2012, No. 10.34
Qiu Lin, “Has China’s ‘ostrich policy’ of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs led to the loss of Burma?”, Fenghuang wang Bobao – Phoenix Online (Blog),
20 June 2013.35
Over the last two years, the United States has changed its perspective on Burma. The US once saw the country as a “rogue state” but now sees it a nation that has introduced democratic reforms that should be encouraged.36 The historic visits made to Burma by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011 and President Barack Obama in December 2012 are evidence of this rapid thaw in relations. However, the relationship between China and Burma is still coloured by the economic and trade sanctions that the US implemented after General Ne Win’s bloody coup in 1988.37 The resulting diplomatic and economic isolation of Burma encouraged the development of privileged relations between Burma and China. China built roads and pipelines for its neighbour and still continues to exploit the country’s natural resources.
The sudden thaw in diplomatic relations between Burma and the US and Europe has upended China’s prospects in Burma. One of the most obvious signs of the shift was Burmese President Thein Sein’s suspension of one of China’s most controversial projects in Burma, the Myitsone Dam.38 Another sign of a change in the balance was the unexplained withdrawal in May 2013 of the Vodafone/ChinaMobile consortium from the tender process for Burma’s first mobile telecoms licence.39
China considers Burma to be important to its security, and Chinese commentators are concerned about the new US interest in the country. They try to explain Burmese and US motivations for closer ties and consider the implications of the new relationship for the future of China-Burma relations.
China’s interest in Burma and Burma’s outreach to the US Burma has considerable strategic importance for China.
Li Yibo says that Burma forms a bridge between China and the Indian Ocean. It provides a geographical linkage that could enable Beijing to free itself of the “Malacca Dilemma” (马六甲困局，maliujia kunju), which the writers agree represents a serious vulnerability for China.40 Beijing is building a pipeline between Yunnan province and Burma’s port city of Kyaukpyu, perhaps in order to facilitate the import of hydrocarbons from Africa and the Middle East. China is also spending a considerable amount of money on upgrading the famous “Burma Road” from Mandalay in Burma to Kunming in China’s Yunnan province, along which US weapons were transported to the Kuomintang during the Second World War. The road could become the main route for China-Burma trade. China is also very interested in gaining more access to Burma’s natural resources, such as oil, copper, and hydropower.
As well as explaining China’s strategic interest in Burma, the writers talk about the historical relations between the two countries. Xiao Ke says that the China-Burma relationship is based on a shared history of Japanese colonialism, common economic interests, and China’s support during Burma’s period of isolation. For these reasons, the writers believe that China and Burma have a special and necessarily close relationship. The relationship is designated by the evocative term paukphaw in Burmese and in Chinese, by a derivation of the Burmese, baobo (胞波). The term signifies an intimate and symbiotic relationship. In both Burmese and Chinese, the term is exclusively used to describe China-Burma relations.
The writers believe that Burma’s outreach to the US was made for pragmatic reasons. Burma wants to escape from the economic sanctions in place since 1988. Zhou Xinyu says that the US “carrot-and-stick” approach gave the Burmese authorities no other choice but to reform the regime in the hope of ending sanctions. Li Yibo cites John Blaxland, an Australian expert on Burmese affairs, who says that Burma does not want to build close ties with the US and is in fact only looking for “more breathing space” (呼吸空间，huxi kongijan). So, Li says, China should not be too worried about the rapprochement.
Shi Qingren is the only writer who suggests that the Burmese government’s positive attitude towards the US could be the result of the rise of China, which has caused its neighbours some concern. He believes that Burma’s rapprochement with the United States cannot be explained solely in economic terms but is also driven by a desire to gain some “strategic room for manoeuvre” (战略回旋余地，zhanlüe huixuanyudi) by increasing its number of external partners.
US motivations for changing track on Burma
Zhou Xinyu says that when the US is in a position of international strength, its foreign policy is determined by arbitrary ideological factors. For example, in the period after the Second World War and the period following the end of the Cold War, he says, ideology strongly influenced American policy. One feature of this ideological approach was the use of what Zhou calls “human rights diplomacy” (人权外交，renquan waijiao). This kind of “unilateralism and interventionism” (单边主义，干涉主义, danbianzhuyi, ganshezhuyi) was the catalyst for the US sanctions on Burma in the late 1980s.
When the international environment is less favourable to the US, as was the case in the late 1970s, it tends to adopt a realist approach to foreign policy, putting human rights on the backburner. The current pragmatic shift in US foreign policy can be explained by the 2008 financial crisis, which has created a more difficult international environment for the US. Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, of which Burma forms a part, exemplifies this new realism. Zhou Xinyu believes the US accepts that its “human rights diplomacy” has failed, having served only to antagonise Burma’s rulers. The US has realised that this failure could turn Burma into a new North Korea, and that sanctions deprived it of its opportunity to capitalise on the significant potential offered by the country. “The United States could not just sit by and watch the influence of China, India, and other powers on the Indochinese peninsula grow,” Zhou says. Now, the US is scrambling to catch up. Zhou Xinyu adds that Obama’s Burma policy is also intended to help Obama at home, by offering him an opportunity to showcase his foreign policy achievements. Xiao Ke says the US only wants to democratise (the term is used here in a pejorative sense) and privatise Burma’s economy. China, on the other hand, wants to settle Burma’s ethnic conflicts and promote the development and economic stability of the country.
The writers agree that the main aim of US policy in Burma is to contain China and prevent it from exerting too much influence in Burma. But Xiao Ke says that Burma is only the final link in the chain of American policy in Southeast Asia. The short-term goal is to make the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the “southern ‘watchdog’ of China” (中国南部的 “守望者”, Zhongguo nanbu de “shouwangzhe”), the role fulfilled by Central Asia in the west of China and the Japan/South Korea pairing in the east. Xiao is speaking to the fear of encirclement that is a major characteristic of Chinese foreign policy.
Li Yibo illustrates this idea using a metaphor of the pond and the water lilies. He compares the “silent” proliferation（消消，xiaoxiao) of military bases in Asia, which possess hi-tech mobile equipment but only a handful of soldiers, to the imperceptible movement of water lilies stretching out across the surface of the pond. Sitting on top of the lilies, the frog can launch himself quickly and from a distance at his prey. Like the lily pond, Li sees a “hidden killing machine” (暗藏杀机, ancang shaji) of bases surrounding China in all directions, from northeast to southeast Asia and even into the Pacific. The missing link in the chain is Burma. Including it in the US sphere of influence would enable the South Asian bases to be linked to ASEAN.41 Ironically, what Li is describing is analogous to the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy.
Shi Qingren thinks US policy in Burma “is exerting pressure on China’s strategic space”（挤压中国的战略空间, jiya Zhongguo de zhanlüe kongjian), of which Burma forms a part. Zhou Xinyu is concerned that US influence has “infiltrated” (渗透，shentou) Burmese society. Li Yibo thinks US influence could in future lead to military links between the two countries. In a possible forerunner to future military cooperation, the Burmese were invited to observe the Golden Cobra military exercises between the US and Thailand in February 2013. Li says that China should be worried about the possibility of a military alliance between Burma and the US, because it would shut down the Burmese alternative to the Malacca dilemma.
China-Burma relations: future prospects
As a possible model for Burma’s future policy direction, Li Yibo points to Vietnam, which has succeeded in getting beyond its historical animosity towards the US. He says that the example proves that 20 years of poor relations between Burma and the US will not necessarily prevent closer ties being forged. Burma will have to choose a strategy from the various models adopted by other countries in Southeast Asia: neutrality, like Thailand; a pro-American policy with the aim of containing China, like Vietnam; alliance with the US, like the Philippines; or an “orientation towards China”, like Cambodia.
Qiu Lin expects Burma to follow the Vietnamese model. He suggests that China may have already lost Burma (中国«丢掉缅甸», zhongguo diudiao miandian).42 Qiu says the Burma-US rapprochement is the direct result of China’s naive foreign policy. China’s guiding principle of non-interference has caused it to bury its head in the sand like an ostrich (驼鸟政策, tuoniao zhengce), leading to the creation of a policy that “lacks strategic vision” (外交缺乏战略眼光, waijiao quefa zhanlüe yanguang). China’s wait-and-see approach stems from its “wishful thinking” (一厢情愿地认为, yixiangqingyuan de renwei) that Burma’s internal affairs, and the internal affairs of China’s neighbouring states more generally, cannot harm China’s interests. But the example of Burma proves that to safeguard its own interests, China needs to get involved in the internal affairs of its neighbours.
Wang Dong thinks China’s Burma diplomacy has been too monolithic. To improve China-Burma relations, China has to build on its soft power in Burma. It should continue to advocate for the lifting of sanctions. It should also support education, micro-credit, and development assistance programmes. Li Yibo agrees China needs to “win hearts and minds in Burma” (赢得缅甸人民的心，yingde miandian renmin dexin). Wang Dong says that China should reach out beyond Burma’s political leaders to ethnic minorities and to Burmese society at large. Wang says that while Chinese investments in Burma benefit the country, Chinese companies must take on “greater social responsibility” (更大的社会责任, gengda de shehui zeren). Wang Dong talks about the social conflicts brought about by two Chinese projects, the construction of the Myitsone Dam and the exploitation of a copper mine in the province of Sagaing.43
This kind of commentary on the shortcomings of Chinese projects is highly unusual for a Chinese media outlet.
Shi Qingren is optimistic about Chinese prospects in Burma. He says that, while the US presence would pose challenges to the China-Burma relationship, China’s relationship with Burma is too firmly entrenched to be completely overturned by the US arrival on the scene. However, he says that China must anticipate the problems ahead and “repair (consolidate) the house before the rainy season” (未雨绸缪, weiyuchoumou). On 19 June, the official publication Huanqiu Shibao published an unedited, albeit partial, translation of an article in the Financial Times that was highly critical of Beijing’s policy on Burma.44 This unusual willingness to critique official policy represents another sign of the media’s impatience with Beijing’s management of a relationship whose future is highly uncertain.
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30 Li Yibo is associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Beijing Institute of Graphic Communications.
31 Shi Qingren is a research fellow in the Defence Policy Research Centre at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao is the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League.
32 Wang Dong is associate professor in the School of International Studies and director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Strategic Studies at Peking University.
33 Xiao Ke is associate professor in the School of Politics and Law at Northeast Normal University. His research focuses on the foundations of political science theory.
34 Zhou Xinyu is a research fellow at the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University. His research interests include American foreign policy, the rise of China, and Chinese public diplomacy.
35 Qiu Lin is a columnist who regularly contributes to China’s leading newspapers.
36 The symbolic beginning of the political transition in Burma was the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010. The dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council and the resignation of General Than Shwe on 30 March 2011 signalled the end of the junta, which gave way to the elected civilian government of President Thein Sein. The new president introduced several reforms aimed at democratising the country, including easing censorship and releasing political prisoners.
37 The United States, the European Union, Australia, and Canada introduced a wide range of sanctions against Burma after 1988. These included a ban on imports, an arms embargo, a freeze in trade relations and investment, a visa ban on certain leaders, whose assets abroad were also frozen. These sanctions have been progressively lifted as democratic reforms have been implemented. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a partial lifting of trade sanctions in September 2012, a decision that was followed in May 2013 by removing the visa ban on Burmese leaders and their close family members.
38 The dam project, suspended on 30 September 2011 by Thein Sein “until the end of his term”, has been very controversial in Burma due to its direct ecological and social consequences (flooding, population displacement, etc.). Besides, most of the electricity produced would have been distributed in China.
39 Gu Shuren, “Has China lost Burma?”, Tianxia, No. 525, 26 June 2013.
40 Eighty percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Straits of Malacca.
41 The American base in South Asia to which Li is referring is probably Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands.
42 Qiu’s entire article is in fact a reaction to the speculation that China has already lost Burma, a theory put forward by journalist Jamil Anderlini in his article “Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong”, Financial Times, 17 June 2013, available at Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong - FT.com
43 The Myitsone Dam project has been suspended since this article was written.
44 “A view from the British media: China must think about the real lessons to be drawn from the case of Burma”, Huanqiu Shibao – Global Times, 19 June 2013. This is a partial translation of British journalist Jamil Anderlini’s article, “Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong”, published in the Financial Times two days earlier. Huanqiu Shibao published this article without making any comment or questioning Anderlini’s extremely critical tone. The article was then taken up by various Chinese media outlets, including news websites and blogs, also without comment, which is most unusual indeed.
http://ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Analysis_The_End_of_Non_interference_October2013.pdf
About (summary):
The Chinese have long been obsessed with strategic culture, power balances and geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, think tanks, journals and web-based debate are growing in number and quality and give China’s foreign policy breadth and depth.
China Analysis, which is published in both French and English, introduces European audiences to these debates inside China’s expert and think-tank world and helps the European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic and foreign policy issues. While freedom of expression and information remain restricted in China’s media, these published sources and debates provide an important way of understanding emerging trends within China. Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese mainland sources. However, it also monitors content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which occasionally include news and analysis that is not published in the mainland and reflects the diversity of Chinese thinking. The French version of China Analysis can be accessed online at www.centreasia.eu.October 2013
Introduction
by François Godement
According to Qiu Lin, a well-known columnist, China’s non-interference policy is “naïve” and unsuited to protecting its global interests. He says that, caught between international demands for China to take “responsibility” and the need to defend its growing stake in many foreign economies, China has proven hesitant in choosing either course, and may be losing on both counts.
This issue of China Analysis focuses on China’s foreign-policy debate on Iran, Sudan, Syria, North Korea and Burma. Even at a moment when ideological unity is being strongly reasserted, the range of views expressed in this debate is striking. Chinese analysts mention the dangers of China’s high-profile commercial foothold in countries like Iran and Burma. They acknowledge public support for newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani and its reasons – a yearning for reform. A controversial party intellectual, Deng Yuwen, even writes that the ideological gulf between China and North Korea is larger than that between China and the West. There is stark realism on what close partners think of China – for example, some analysts reveal the fear that they have of North Korea one day simply reversing alliances and leaning towards the United States.
However, criticism and doubts mostly go in the other direction. China’s balancing game in the Middle East, where it has strived to keep friendly relations with everyone, is now seen as ineffectual. Instead, and because America is seen as being so keen to attack Iran and to neglect any opening, China is urged to launch an “aid Iran, strike America” policy. The motto is based on one of Mao’s toughest domestic campaigns at the outbreak of the Korean War: Iran is seen as today’s China and Syria is Iran’s North Korea; both are believed to deserve China’s full support.
One of China’s currently most prominent strategy pundits, Yan Xuetong, takes a different and somewhat contradictory approach. He argues that China should merely stand firm with Russia at the United Nations and let the West extricate itself from its impulse for an intervention it can ill afford. By saying no and remaining committed to non-interference, China will actually improve its international standing.
Yan’s attitude, expressed before the Obama administration’s u-turn on Syria, seems prescient. But it also reveals contradictions. After all, Yan was among the first to criticise the principle of non-interference and recommended that China build its own alliances.
Economic security and energy resources clearly play a major role in Chinese foreign policy. Even though our experts acknowledge that the US has actually been encouraging China’s access to oil, there is a nagging fear of the potential for future blackmail. Our Chinese analysts have a strangely detached view on North and South Sudan: the two Sudans are locked in conflict and energy interdependence and America is actually restricting its aid to South Sudan because this also indirectly helps North Sudan. They seem to conclude this is no longer a strategic issue (and do not mention the traditional ideological preference for Khartoum). The clincher is that they estimate that Sudan’s oil resources are on a fast road towards depletion.
Pessimism reigns among Chinese analysts. They fear that the Pentagon is extending its “lily pad” strategy (that is, one based on a network of small bases around the region) to Burma, which has been successfully pressured by the West’s strategy of sanctions rather than by a desire to hedge China. They think that, if Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria fell, it would be replaced by a government that leans towards the West. Were anybody from the West to make such a prediction, it would be seen as wishful thinking.
Non-interference may have hampered Chinese diplomacy by preventing nimble responses and protecting stodgy thinking. Our experts express the same frustrations on widely different issues. But moving to a more committed policy that is not afraid to take sides and favour particular domestic outcomes opens up a gulf of doubts and different answers. It seems China is caught between the risks of being an absentee landlord and the hard choices of exercising imperial power.
.................
4. Has China lost Burma?
Damien Garnier
Sources:
Li Yibo, “Is Burma the US army’s next Asian water lily?”, Shijie Zhishi – World Affairs, 7 December 2012.30
Shi Qingren, “The goal of the United States is to counterbalance China’s influence in Burma”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao – Youth Daily, 4 January 2013.31
Wang Dong, “How should China react to the continuing ‘changes’ in Burma?”, Huanqiu Wang – Global Network, 5 December 2012.32
Xiao Ke, “Reflections on Burma’s revolution and its prospects”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi – Contemporary International Relations, 2012, No. 2.33
Zhou Xinyu, “Comments on the reversal of US policy on Burma”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi – Contemporary International Relations, 2012, No. 10.34
Qiu Lin, “Has China’s ‘ostrich policy’ of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs led to the loss of Burma?”, Fenghuang wang Bobao – Phoenix Online (Blog),
20 June 2013.35
Over the last two years, the United States has changed its perspective on Burma. The US once saw the country as a “rogue state” but now sees it a nation that has introduced democratic reforms that should be encouraged.36 The historic visits made to Burma by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011 and President Barack Obama in December 2012 are evidence of this rapid thaw in relations. However, the relationship between China and Burma is still coloured by the economic and trade sanctions that the US implemented after General Ne Win’s bloody coup in 1988.37 The resulting diplomatic and economic isolation of Burma encouraged the development of privileged relations between Burma and China. China built roads and pipelines for its neighbour and still continues to exploit the country’s natural resources.
The sudden thaw in diplomatic relations between Burma and the US and Europe has upended China’s prospects in Burma. One of the most obvious signs of the shift was Burmese President Thein Sein’s suspension of one of China’s most controversial projects in Burma, the Myitsone Dam.38 Another sign of a change in the balance was the unexplained withdrawal in May 2013 of the Vodafone/ChinaMobile consortium from the tender process for Burma’s first mobile telecoms licence.39
China considers Burma to be important to its security, and Chinese commentators are concerned about the new US interest in the country. They try to explain Burmese and US motivations for closer ties and consider the implications of the new relationship for the future of China-Burma relations.
China’s interest in Burma and Burma’s outreach to the US Burma has considerable strategic importance for China.
Li Yibo says that Burma forms a bridge between China and the Indian Ocean. It provides a geographical linkage that could enable Beijing to free itself of the “Malacca Dilemma” (马六甲困局，maliujia kunju), which the writers agree represents a serious vulnerability for China.40 Beijing is building a pipeline between Yunnan province and Burma’s port city of Kyaukpyu, perhaps in order to facilitate the import of hydrocarbons from Africa and the Middle East. China is also spending a considerable amount of money on upgrading the famous “Burma Road” from Mandalay in Burma to Kunming in China’s Yunnan province, along which US weapons were transported to the Kuomintang during the Second World War. The road could become the main route for China-Burma trade. China is also very interested in gaining more access to Burma’s natural resources, such as oil, copper, and hydropower.
As well as explaining China’s strategic interest in Burma, the writers talk about the historical relations between the two countries. Xiao Ke says that the China-Burma relationship is based on a shared history of Japanese colonialism, common economic interests, and China’s support during Burma’s period of isolation. For these reasons, the writers believe that China and Burma have a special and necessarily close relationship. The relationship is designated by the evocative term paukphaw in Burmese and in Chinese, by a derivation of the Burmese, baobo (胞波). The term signifies an intimate and symbiotic relationship. In both Burmese and Chinese, the term is exclusively used to describe China-Burma relations.
The writers believe that Burma’s outreach to the US was made for pragmatic reasons. Burma wants to escape from the economic sanctions in place since 1988. Zhou Xinyu says that the US “carrot-and-stick” approach gave the Burmese authorities no other choice but to reform the regime in the hope of ending sanctions. Li Yibo cites John Blaxland, an Australian expert on Burmese affairs, who says that Burma does not want to build close ties with the US and is in fact only looking for “more breathing space” (呼吸空间，huxi kongijan). So, Li says, China should not be too worried about the rapprochement.
Shi Qingren is the only writer who suggests that the Burmese government’s positive attitude towards the US could be the result of the rise of China, which has caused its neighbours some concern. He believes that Burma’s rapprochement with the United States cannot be explained solely in economic terms but is also driven by a desire to gain some “strategic room for manoeuvre” (战略回旋余地，zhanlüe huixuanyudi) by increasing its number of external partners.
US motivations for changing track on Burma
Zhou Xinyu says that when the US is in a position of international strength, its foreign policy is determined by arbitrary ideological factors. For example, in the period after the Second World War and the period following the end of the Cold War, he says, ideology strongly influenced American policy. One feature of this ideological approach was the use of what Zhou calls “human rights diplomacy” (人权外交，renquan waijiao). This kind of “unilateralism and interventionism” (单边主义，干涉主义, danbianzhuyi, ganshezhuyi) was the catalyst for the US sanctions on Burma in the late 1980s.
When the international environment is less favourable to the US, as was the case in the late 1970s, it tends to adopt a realist approach to foreign policy, putting human rights on the backburner. The current pragmatic shift in US foreign policy can be explained by the 2008 financial crisis, which has created a more difficult international environment for the US. Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, of which Burma forms a part, exemplifies this new realism. Zhou Xinyu believes the US accepts that its “human rights diplomacy” has failed, having served only to antagonise Burma’s rulers. The US has realised that this failure could turn Burma into a new North Korea, and that sanctions deprived it of its opportunity to capitalise on the significant potential offered by the country. “The United States could not just sit by and watch the influence of China, India, and other powers on the Indochinese peninsula grow,” Zhou says. Now, the US is scrambling to catch up. Zhou Xinyu adds that Obama’s Burma policy is also intended to help Obama at home, by offering him an opportunity to showcase his foreign policy achievements. Xiao Ke says the US only wants to democratise (the term is used here in a pejorative sense) and privatise Burma’s economy. China, on the other hand, wants to settle Burma’s ethnic conflicts and promote the development and economic stability of the country.
The writers agree that the main aim of US policy in Burma is to contain China and prevent it from exerting too much influence in Burma. But Xiao Ke says that Burma is only the final link in the chain of American policy in Southeast Asia. The short-term goal is to make the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the “southern ‘watchdog’ of China” (中国南部的 “守望者”, Zhongguo nanbu de “shouwangzhe”), the role fulfilled by Central Asia in the west of China and the Japan/South Korea pairing in the east. Xiao is speaking to the fear of encirclement that is a major characteristic of Chinese foreign policy.
Li Yibo illustrates this idea using a metaphor of the pond and the water lilies. He compares the “silent” proliferation（消消，xiaoxiao) of military bases in Asia, which possess hi-tech mobile equipment but only a handful of soldiers, to the imperceptible movement of water lilies stretching out across the surface of the pond. Sitting on top of the lilies, the frog can launch himself quickly and from a distance at his prey. Like the lily pond, Li sees a “hidden killing machine” (暗藏杀机, ancang shaji) of bases surrounding China in all directions, from northeast to southeast Asia and even into the Pacific. The missing link in the chain is Burma. Including it in the US sphere of influence would enable the South Asian bases to be linked to ASEAN.41 Ironically, what Li is describing is analogous to the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy.
Shi Qingren thinks US policy in Burma “is exerting pressure on China’s strategic space”（挤压中国的战略空间, jiya Zhongguo de zhanlüe kongjian), of which Burma forms a part. Zhou Xinyu is concerned that US influence has “infiltrated” (渗透，shentou) Burmese society. Li Yibo thinks US influence could in future lead to military links between the two countries. In a possible forerunner to future military cooperation, the Burmese were invited to observe the Golden Cobra military exercises between the US and Thailand in February 2013. Li says that China should be worried about the possibility of a military alliance between Burma and the US, because it would shut down the Burmese alternative to the Malacca dilemma.
China-Burma relations: future prospects
As a possible model for Burma’s future policy direction, Li Yibo points to Vietnam, which has succeeded in getting beyond its historical animosity towards the US. He says that the example proves that 20 years of poor relations between Burma and the US will not necessarily prevent closer ties being forged. Burma will have to choose a strategy from the various models adopted by other countries in Southeast Asia: neutrality, like Thailand; a pro-American policy with the aim of containing China, like Vietnam; alliance with the US, like the Philippines; or an “orientation towards China”, like Cambodia.
Qiu Lin expects Burma to follow the Vietnamese model. He suggests that China may have already lost Burma (中国«丢掉缅甸», zhongguo diudiao miandian).42 Qiu says the Burma-US rapprochement is the direct result of China’s naive foreign policy. China’s guiding principle of non-interference has caused it to bury its head in the sand like an ostrich (驼鸟政策, tuoniao zhengce), leading to the creation of a policy that “lacks strategic vision” (外交缺乏战略眼光, waijiao quefa zhanlüe yanguang). China’s wait-and-see approach stems from its “wishful thinking” (一厢情愿地认为, yixiangqingyuan de renwei) that Burma’s internal affairs, and the internal affairs of China’s neighbouring states more generally, cannot harm China’s interests. But the example of Burma proves that to safeguard its own interests, China needs to get involved in the internal affairs of its neighbours.
Wang Dong thinks China’s Burma diplomacy has been too monolithic. To improve China-Burma relations, China has to build on its soft power in Burma. It should continue to advocate for the lifting of sanctions. It should also support education, micro-credit, and development assistance programmes. Li Yibo agrees China needs to “win hearts and minds in Burma” (赢得缅甸人民的心，yingde miandian renmin dexin). Wang Dong says that China should reach out beyond Burma’s political leaders to ethnic minorities and to Burmese society at large. Wang says that while Chinese investments in Burma benefit the country, Chinese companies must take on “greater social responsibility” (更大的社会责任, gengda de shehui zeren). Wang Dong talks about the social conflicts brought about by two Chinese projects, the construction of the Myitsone Dam and the exploitation of a copper mine in the province of Sagaing.43
This kind of commentary on the shortcomings of Chinese projects is highly unusual for a Chinese media outlet.
Shi Qingren is optimistic about Chinese prospects in Burma. He says that, while the US presence would pose challenges to the China-Burma relationship, China’s relationship with Burma is too firmly entrenched to be completely overturned by the US arrival on the scene. However, he says that China must anticipate the problems ahead and “repair (consolidate) the house before the rainy season” (未雨绸缪, weiyuchoumou). On 19 June, the official publication Huanqiu Shibao published an unedited, albeit partial, translation of an article in the Financial Times that was highly critical of Beijing’s policy on Burma.44 This unusual willingness to critique official policy represents another sign of the media’s impatience with Beijing’s management of a relationship whose future is highly uncertain.
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30 Li Yibo is associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Beijing Institute of Graphic Communications.
31 Shi Qingren is a research fellow in the Defence Policy Research Centre at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao is the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League.
32 Wang Dong is associate professor in the School of International Studies and director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Strategic Studies at Peking University.
33 Xiao Ke is associate professor in the School of Politics and Law at Northeast Normal University. His research focuses on the foundations of political science theory.
34 Zhou Xinyu is a research fellow at the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University. His research interests include American foreign policy, the rise of China, and Chinese public diplomacy.
35 Qiu Lin is a columnist who regularly contributes to China’s leading newspapers.
36 The symbolic beginning of the political transition in Burma was the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010. The dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council and the resignation of General Than Shwe on 30 March 2011 signalled the end of the junta, which gave way to the elected civilian government of President Thein Sein. The new president introduced several reforms aimed at democratising the country, including easing censorship and releasing political prisoners.
37 The United States, the European Union, Australia, and Canada introduced a wide range of sanctions against Burma after 1988. These included a ban on imports, an arms embargo, a freeze in trade relations and investment, a visa ban on certain leaders, whose assets abroad were also frozen. These sanctions have been progressively lifted as democratic reforms have been implemented. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a partial lifting of trade sanctions in September 2012, a decision that was followed in May 2013 by removing the visa ban on Burmese leaders and their close family members.
38 The dam project, suspended on 30 September 2011 by Thein Sein “until the end of his term”, has been very controversial in Burma due to its direct ecological and social consequences (flooding, population displacement, etc.). Besides, most of the electricity produced would have been distributed in China.
39 Gu Shuren, “Has China lost Burma?”, Tianxia, No. 525, 26 June 2013.
40 Eighty percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Straits of Malacca.
41 The American base in South Asia to which Li is referring is probably Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands.
42 Qiu’s entire article is in fact a reaction to the speculation that China has already lost Burma, a theory put forward by journalist Jamil Anderlini in his article “Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong”, Financial Times, 17 June 2013, available at Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong - FT.com
43 The Myitsone Dam project has been suspended since this article was written.
44 “A view from the British media: China must think about the real lessons to be drawn from the case of Burma”, Huanqiu Shibao – Global Times, 19 June 2013. This is a partial translation of British journalist Jamil Anderlini’s article, “Myanmar’s old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong”, published in the Financial Times two days earlier. Huanqiu Shibao published this article without making any comment or questioning Anderlini’s extremely critical tone. The article was then taken up by various Chinese media outlets, including news websites and blogs, also without comment, which is most unusual indeed.
