TaimiKhan
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The Chinese way of war
August.24 (China Military News cited from dailytimes.com.pk and written by Shahzad Chaudhry
China currently has the worlds largest dollar reserves at slightly more than two trillion. It funds the US economy by buying into US bonds, securities, and even more importantly the US debt; ten percent of the US public debt is financed by China. If that is not an eternal bind, what else is?
Some weeks ago I wrote in these pages an article captioned The American Way of War, borrowing from Russell Weigley his title of a fine piece of American military history. The article detailed my perception of Americas running strategy in Afghanistan. On a recent visit to China for a conference on strategic stability in Asia, I was exposed to what I have chosen to call The Chinese Way of War.
For two days, delegates at the conference from the neighboring nuclear states of China, India and Pakistan (especially the latter two) traded barbs, reflective of historical mistrust and apprehensions that continue to inform todays insecurity. Every effort to keep in focus the strategic context was blown away by the feuding and yet-to-mature neighbours. Our Chinese hosts watched with helpless amusement.
The strategic environment was indeed addressed, and in no small quantity; the nuclear aspects were debated, and at great length. But the irony of it all was that no one really understood where the sense of strategic equilibrium came from and which has sustained an uneasy truce despite major politico-military challenges. Each wanted the other to give up their arsenal while keeping their own stocks for the same reason that drives everyones insecurity.
The desired end-state may be disarmament, but until that gets actualised, if ever, South Asia would retain this umbrella of dreaded peace theorists call it détente through a balance of terror.
In this huff and puff, and a growing frustration with a singular failure of the two to realise the essence of how the world may have changed in doing its business, including the business of war, the Chinese participants altered the run of play, and left both India and Pakistan stunned with an entirely different perspective. A gem followed; it is both educative and illuminating. We have known it in various descriptions, but never in these words, and never from a greatly respected Chinese academic.
Chatham House rules inhibit me from direct ascription, but, here is the gist of the message: China, assuming its current rate of economic growth for the next five years, will overtake in size and value the Japanese economy and become the second largest in the world. In the same period of five years, Chinas lingering disputes with India will cease to exist and would stand resolved. When China overtakes Japan in economic size, China need not hedge on her nuclear arsenal to subdue or control any arising threat from Japan; in fact, Chinas problems in the South China Sea too will be subsumed by the emerging dynamic of her politico-economic clout.
(For China, her current read of contention on Spratly Islands is of reducing significance since the remaining actors aspiring control over the islands are under a gentle squeeze of Chinas economic hug, and a significantly pervasive presence.)
Let me explain the underlying impulse of such a statement.
Various international sources, including the National Intelligence Council of the United States, concur with the likelihood of China overtaking Japans economy even as they differ on the timeframe, some assuming that this would happen much earlier, possibly in one to two years.
More interesting is the Chinese belief that her politico-economic clout will be enough for the presently competing forces to renege on their confrontational stance on most territorial issues, and submit to the Chinese position under the weight of economic realpolitik. Perhaps China has in mind the accession of both Hong Kong and Macau from competing political forces back to China in a process of what one might call the pressure and grind of Chinas growing global status and the whittling away of the remaining imperialist influence.
The issue: while it may have worked well against Britain and Portugal one a declining power, and the other a relic of its old self how shall it hold against the combined might of both the United States and Japan? What, with North Koreas informal nuclear status, and as a consequence South Koreas reactive awareness to the need to equate with similar acquisition, forcing Japan to begin a debate within to consider changing stance on their national abhorrence to weaponised nuclear capability. Lets shed this ifs-and-buts scenario for the moment, and revert to the remaining portion of the sure-footed remarks by our most valued Chinese academic.
Here goes: China will overtake the US economy, presently the largest in the world by 2025 (international studies have also indicated 2040 as when this might happen so take your pick); and when that happens, Chinas politico-economic clout alone will be enough to obviate reliance on military-nuclear arsenals alone to dominate the global scene.
To interpret that even better, let me add that China could then be so strong as to unilaterally denounce nuclear weapons, and declare disarmament. (Permit me to claim this as my interpretation, for some obvious reasons.) And then, another question: will China, as it supersedes competing economies, arrogate to itself the capacity, and with it the probability, of sanctioning the erstwhile champion economies? And, will that, then, become her unmatchable weapon of imposing a world order that may simply have the traits of dominantly inter-dependent economic linkages leading to an economically competitive world a kind of Chinese century without competitive destructive means? We will see.
Just to put the above in perspective China uses 60 percent of worlds cement currently; with the western economies in recession, the Chinese have reverted to spurring domestic investment, some USD600 billion, building roads and bridges, helping keep the economy moving, along with some smart fiscal and market moves. China produces, however, around 12 percent of global manufactured goods, which must continue to find markets for the production economy to sustain. Just a few years back, global steel prices shot through the roof, and card-board packaging became unavailable yes, the Chinese needed both and the world ran short of both.
China currently has the worlds largest dollar reserves at slightly more than two trillion. It funds the US economy by buying into US bonds, securities, and even more importantly the US debt; ten percent of the US public debt is financed by China. If that is not an eternal bind, what else is?
Strange game this, economy. Consider: in 1997, when Hong Kong acceded to China, Hong Kongs foreign exchange reserves were significantly higher than those of China; in the order of USD200 billion. China has moved in the last decade, and the good Chinese academic may well be right with his predictions.
It may be a bit of trapeze, but let me refer to a recent Fareed Zakaria observation: American consumer spending alone is twice that of the combined value of the Chinese and Indian economies. Given so, and the distance that China needs to cover, she needs to hustle. No surprise then when you see China galloping.
For India and Pakistan, though, the lesson was entirely different: the world has undergone a change, and wars are fought differently the Chinese way. How well was the lesson imbibed? I could not tell; the Chinese academic spoke last and the conference closed.
August.24 (China Military News cited from dailytimes.com.pk and written by Shahzad Chaudhry
China currently has the worlds largest dollar reserves at slightly more than two trillion. It funds the US economy by buying into US bonds, securities, and even more importantly the US debt; ten percent of the US public debt is financed by China. If that is not an eternal bind, what else is?
Some weeks ago I wrote in these pages an article captioned The American Way of War, borrowing from Russell Weigley his title of a fine piece of American military history. The article detailed my perception of Americas running strategy in Afghanistan. On a recent visit to China for a conference on strategic stability in Asia, I was exposed to what I have chosen to call The Chinese Way of War.
For two days, delegates at the conference from the neighboring nuclear states of China, India and Pakistan (especially the latter two) traded barbs, reflective of historical mistrust and apprehensions that continue to inform todays insecurity. Every effort to keep in focus the strategic context was blown away by the feuding and yet-to-mature neighbours. Our Chinese hosts watched with helpless amusement.
The strategic environment was indeed addressed, and in no small quantity; the nuclear aspects were debated, and at great length. But the irony of it all was that no one really understood where the sense of strategic equilibrium came from and which has sustained an uneasy truce despite major politico-military challenges. Each wanted the other to give up their arsenal while keeping their own stocks for the same reason that drives everyones insecurity.
The desired end-state may be disarmament, but until that gets actualised, if ever, South Asia would retain this umbrella of dreaded peace theorists call it détente through a balance of terror.
In this huff and puff, and a growing frustration with a singular failure of the two to realise the essence of how the world may have changed in doing its business, including the business of war, the Chinese participants altered the run of play, and left both India and Pakistan stunned with an entirely different perspective. A gem followed; it is both educative and illuminating. We have known it in various descriptions, but never in these words, and never from a greatly respected Chinese academic.
Chatham House rules inhibit me from direct ascription, but, here is the gist of the message: China, assuming its current rate of economic growth for the next five years, will overtake in size and value the Japanese economy and become the second largest in the world. In the same period of five years, Chinas lingering disputes with India will cease to exist and would stand resolved. When China overtakes Japan in economic size, China need not hedge on her nuclear arsenal to subdue or control any arising threat from Japan; in fact, Chinas problems in the South China Sea too will be subsumed by the emerging dynamic of her politico-economic clout.
(For China, her current read of contention on Spratly Islands is of reducing significance since the remaining actors aspiring control over the islands are under a gentle squeeze of Chinas economic hug, and a significantly pervasive presence.)
Let me explain the underlying impulse of such a statement.
Various international sources, including the National Intelligence Council of the United States, concur with the likelihood of China overtaking Japans economy even as they differ on the timeframe, some assuming that this would happen much earlier, possibly in one to two years.
More interesting is the Chinese belief that her politico-economic clout will be enough for the presently competing forces to renege on their confrontational stance on most territorial issues, and submit to the Chinese position under the weight of economic realpolitik. Perhaps China has in mind the accession of both Hong Kong and Macau from competing political forces back to China in a process of what one might call the pressure and grind of Chinas growing global status and the whittling away of the remaining imperialist influence.
The issue: while it may have worked well against Britain and Portugal one a declining power, and the other a relic of its old self how shall it hold against the combined might of both the United States and Japan? What, with North Koreas informal nuclear status, and as a consequence South Koreas reactive awareness to the need to equate with similar acquisition, forcing Japan to begin a debate within to consider changing stance on their national abhorrence to weaponised nuclear capability. Lets shed this ifs-and-buts scenario for the moment, and revert to the remaining portion of the sure-footed remarks by our most valued Chinese academic.
Here goes: China will overtake the US economy, presently the largest in the world by 2025 (international studies have also indicated 2040 as when this might happen so take your pick); and when that happens, Chinas politico-economic clout alone will be enough to obviate reliance on military-nuclear arsenals alone to dominate the global scene.
To interpret that even better, let me add that China could then be so strong as to unilaterally denounce nuclear weapons, and declare disarmament. (Permit me to claim this as my interpretation, for some obvious reasons.) And then, another question: will China, as it supersedes competing economies, arrogate to itself the capacity, and with it the probability, of sanctioning the erstwhile champion economies? And, will that, then, become her unmatchable weapon of imposing a world order that may simply have the traits of dominantly inter-dependent economic linkages leading to an economically competitive world a kind of Chinese century without competitive destructive means? We will see.
Just to put the above in perspective China uses 60 percent of worlds cement currently; with the western economies in recession, the Chinese have reverted to spurring domestic investment, some USD600 billion, building roads and bridges, helping keep the economy moving, along with some smart fiscal and market moves. China produces, however, around 12 percent of global manufactured goods, which must continue to find markets for the production economy to sustain. Just a few years back, global steel prices shot through the roof, and card-board packaging became unavailable yes, the Chinese needed both and the world ran short of both.
China currently has the worlds largest dollar reserves at slightly more than two trillion. It funds the US economy by buying into US bonds, securities, and even more importantly the US debt; ten percent of the US public debt is financed by China. If that is not an eternal bind, what else is?
Strange game this, economy. Consider: in 1997, when Hong Kong acceded to China, Hong Kongs foreign exchange reserves were significantly higher than those of China; in the order of USD200 billion. China has moved in the last decade, and the good Chinese academic may well be right with his predictions.
It may be a bit of trapeze, but let me refer to a recent Fareed Zakaria observation: American consumer spending alone is twice that of the combined value of the Chinese and Indian economies. Given so, and the distance that China needs to cover, she needs to hustle. No surprise then when you see China galloping.
For India and Pakistan, though, the lesson was entirely different: the world has undergone a change, and wars are fought differently the Chinese way. How well was the lesson imbibed? I could not tell; the Chinese academic spoke last and the conference closed.
