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Redhawk
1.The Battle of Chawinda and the '65 War was well covered by the Australian press. This indeed was the biggest tank battle post-WW II.IA's Chieftains and Centurions against PA's aging Shermans,Chafee light tanks and the modern Patton M-47sandM-48s.
2. IA's Sialkot sector stretching from River Ravi to River Chenab was under Lieut Gen Dunn, Commander 1 Corps.Dunn had set up his HQ at Kaluchak near Jammuon 04 Sep..The task allotted to him was to advance up to the Marala Ravi Link canal bypassing Sialkot built-up area.Thereafter move to the line Daska-Mandhali.Having failed to reach the bar at LHR Gymkhana through a blitzkrieg,obviously IA Chief Choudhury now intended to reach road Gujranwalla-Wazirabad cutting off LHR from RWP.He was given 1 Armd Div under Rajinder Singh, 6 Mtn Div under Korla, 14 Inf Div under Ranjeet Singh and 26 Inf Div under Thapan. Thapan's ops was code named "Nepal".
3. PA had established a Corps HQ, their first, under a valiant officer Lieut Gen Bakhtiar Rana. Rana was a practical down to earth soldier.However, his HQ located at Raiwind was not fully functional. Abrar Husain's 6 Amd Div, 15 Div under Tikka and 8 Div under a shell-shocked ASC Brigadier were facing Dunn. Later 1 Armd Div less a Bde was also moved in this sector pulling out of Khem Karan.
4. Whereas IA's 1 Corps was sloppy in moving to battle locations, Rana's formations were quick to move into defenses anticipating Indian attacks.In a four phased op, 26 Inf Div and 6 Mtn Div crossed the international border at 2300 hrs night 07/08 Sep. This was the northern/right hand advance of Dunn to create imbalance in Rana's defensed.Dunn needed to create a bridgehead across the international boundary to act as the spring board for further ops towards MRL.To meet this northern advance of Dunn, PA could deploy only 6 Bal,newly raised 22 Baloch under Barlas, 13FF (R&S) under Taqseenuddin, and a regt of Chafees and ancient Sherman tanks manned by reservists of a TDU. The right extreme of PA defenses was manned by 2 Bal deployed in their cantt peace location.But the Indian advance was stopped at road Chaprar-Sialkot by intelligent employment of the R&S bn and valiant fighting by 6 Bal.Not only that,the Indians were continuously harassed by sporadic attacks here and there.
5. Dunn's next move was towards the key ground, Chowinda-Philora. International boundary was crossed at first light 08 Sep.However, repeated, regrouped and readjusted assaults from various directions between 08 to 12 Sep failed to achieve any significant gain for Dunn.From13 to 20 Sep he devoted himself in regrouping his forces which had suffered major losses in men and eqpt.Historically Chawinda tank battles took place between 08 to 12 Sep.
6. Having regrouped,Dunn again moved north.He again made desperate efforts to break through between the city and Ravi. In Sialkot at that juncture had collected three amazing artillery officers - Tikka, the Div Arty Comdr whose name I forget unfortunately and Ata commanding 8 Med Regt.Perhaps the last resource that Rana could free was 4 Bal, an old and proud bn with 50% HM and 50% PM. It was withdrawn from Philora defenses and deployed in anti-para drop role on MRL.Actually this was Rana's last proper infantry reserve.Even the Pathan Lashkar tribesmen under Political Agent shad disappeared. Indians had entrenched themselves with bn HQs at Muhadipur and Tilakpur villages making regular forays into are Mile 8 Chaprar-Sialkot Road. Their forward elements were in occupation of a row of villages running north to south.These were Najwal, Panwal,Philora Wadda and Philora Nikki - all on the west of the road axis.
7. Half an hour before last light on 22 Sep, 4 Bal launched a very noisy and open assault on Indian positions held by 1 Madras, 10 Mahar and 5/11 GR. In fact the entire 52 Mtn Bde of 26 Inf Div.The attack looked like highly charged Saracens rushing on the Crusaders yelling the Islamic war cry, Nara e Taqbir/Allah o Akbar.Just before the assault artillery of two Divs and Corps had pounded the objective to shreds. The left attacking Coy reached and took position in Philora Nikki. The right attacking Coy rushed across the road Chaprar-Sialkot and was threatening the Bn HQ of 10 Mahar at Mahadipur when their FOO became a casualty.Infantry signal sets had become dead in the terrible artillery bombardment. There was no way to withdraw own artillery barrage over Mahadipur to carry forward the attack to that location.In fact the forward elements of the attacking companies had rushed forward more than two miles chasing the fleeing enemy.
8.Any study of the Battle of Chawinda must consider the background and particularly the battle plans of both Gen Rana and Gen Dunn.
