Battle of Chawinda 1965
The Grave Yard of Indian Tanks
I8P4Yny3KII[/media] - WORLD'S GREATEST TANK ATTACK ON PAKISTAN
Song sung by Inayat Hussain Bhatti
Great War song and the lyrics are very meaningful!
Defence Journal
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN examines this crucial battle objectively.
Introduction
The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa and Chawinda from 8th to 21 September 1965
were the most decisive battles of the 1965 War .
Initially the Indians were very close to victory while in the last stages the
Pakistan Army was in a relatively better position to launch a counterstroke which could have forced the Indians to abandon all gains made inside the Shakargarh Bulge from 7th September.
The Chawinda Battles also gave birth to many myths as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. Many conflicting claims were made about Military Effectiveness Martial Fervour etc citing the Battles of Chawinda as an example. The
Indian commanders were also criticised for phenomenal incompetence, but somehow they rationalised their failures as a case of
normal failure in
face of technically superior tanks.
Pakistani Dispositions
Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-Chenab Corridor where the battle of Chawinda was fought were as following:-- (ONE)
8 Division consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104 and 115 Brigades) four armoured regiments (20 Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31 & 33 TDU 1) defending Sialkot-Pasrur Sector and Jassar.
The total frontage that this division had to defend was approximately 180,000 yards. 2 But this was only a theoretically awesome figure, because till 1965, keeping in view the force to space ratio in terms of divisions available,
the Indians were not in a position to be effective as a threat all along this frontage. (TWO) 6 Armoured Division in Chenab Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area from any Indian incursion. The 6 Armoured Division was not a full strength division and consisted of a divisional headquarter, three armoured regiments (one of which was in Chamb for Grand Slam) two artillery regiments, two motorised infantry regiments and had no brigade headquarter. Initially it was placed at Gujranwala but later placed at Pasrur4. This Division according to Musa was placed at Pasrur with the express intention of dealing with enemys main attack which was expected on the Jassar-Sialkot approach.5
Indian War Plan
The Main Indian Attack was
aimed at decisively disrupting the Pakistani defensive layout and resultantly forcing Pakistan to commit its main armoured reserves for defence was to be launched by the newly formed Indian 1 Corps comprising the 1st Armoured Division and three infantry divisions (6 Mountain Division 14 Division and 26 Division) in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor from Samba area on the general axis Samba-Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link and eventually secure line Daska-Dhallewali-Mandhali6. In other words the Indian aim as stated by another
Indian military writer was to cut off Sialkot from Lahore.7 As per the wording of the decisions taken at the planning conference of the Indian Chief of Army Staff held on 9th August the object of the 1 Corps attack aimed at Daska was with a view to relieving Jammu.8 This meant that the
Indian Army Chief viewed a Pakistani attack on Jammu with a view to severe the Indian line of communication as most likely. This attack was rightly termed as
Riposte by some Indian authors
.Riposte has been defined as Striking a vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon his attack.
(Moving forward)....
CONCLUSION
The
real heroes of Chawinda were
Colonel Nisar and his unit ∏ whatever their perception or misperception,not knowing what was in front of them , and thankfully so,for this may have reduced their resolution to make a resolute stand, saved
Pakistan on 8th September by their most heroic resistance in Gadgor area. General Ibrar who entered the scene albeit after the really decisive engagement of
Gadgor had been fought played a decisive role in keeping the Pakistani position intact after fiascos like Phillora [
A1Kaid:A Previous Battle] and by prodding Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik not to panic on the fateful 16th of September. The Indians made the Pakistani task easier by pure and unadulterated military incompetence at unit and brigade level ! There is no doubt that nothing could have stopped them from reaching the MRL on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September, had they possessed, an armoured brigade or divisional commander of even a medium calibre!
The Indian failure commenced from division and brigade and not from troop and squadron level. At tank, tank troop and tank squadron level, both sides fought equally level ! It was at brigade and divisiona level that the Indians failed on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September , and thank God there was no brigade headquarter (
Abdul Ali Malik having nothing to do with Gadgor) controlling 25 Cavalry on the Pakistani side.I say this with conviction with what I saw of the Pakistan Army and this is true till 1993 when I left service ! From what I have assessed the Indians are equally illustrious to date at brigade and higher levels ! This mutual incompetence has saved both the countries in all three wars ! Abrar later played a decisive role in saving Pakistan by his most resolute leadership during the highly critical period from 11th to 19th September when the Indians came close to victory on at least three different occasions. During one of the most critical moments of the Battle of Chawinda , on 16th September , Abrar as we discussed earlier dismissed the request of 24 Brigade Commander to abandon Chawinda. This if done would have seriously jeopardised the Pakistani position ! And yet after the war Abrar was superseded and 24 Brigade Commander promoted to general rank finally retiring as a three star general! The third factor in the Pakistani success was 4 Corps Artillery Brigade under the indomitable as well as extremely able leadership of Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry. All three were sidelined. Abrar never went beyond Major Generals rank since Yahya Khan did not like his face, and Abrar was not from Ayubs unit !Chaudhry also suffered on the same count and retired as a brigadier while the much more mediocre gunner Tikka rose to the highest rank!Nisar did become a brigadier but was sidelined even before the 1971 war broke out, since he was not from the infantry, and did not have the right push and pull or patrons in higher positions after 1971!
It was an irony of Pakistani history that Abrar since he was on the wrong side of the army chief was placed on a much lower rung in the heroes of 1965 war than men like Tikka Khan (in whose area of responsibility no major fighting took place) etc.On the other hand
many like Niazi (14 Para Brigade Commander) etc rose to the rank of Lieutenant General by virtue of push and pull based on parochial and personal relations with Ayub being from his unit, while the real heroes were sidelined.
Source:
Battle of Chawinda