Tank Designs

[Persian Achaemenid Empire]

Iranians zulfiqar 3 tank:

 

[Manticore]

T-64BV

T-72AV

T-80BV

 

[Manticore]

altay

 

[Anas Ali]

cooooooool upload 10/10

 

[neolithic]

Tank (probably a T-80) in action video :

Related link(s).

 

[Fsjal]

I personally think Russian and Chinese tanks design is better. Although, Russian is too wide

 

[neolithic]

The future of military tanks | In-depth

 

[Manticore]

 

[Manticore]

Kontakt-5 ERA

Kontakt-5 turret array
The Kontakt-5 EDZ is the explosive reactive armour (ERA) currently installed on Russian MBTs. It is often referred to as 2nd generation, heavy-duty, or integral ERA.

Where the conventional ERAs are only capable of defeating shaped-charge jets, Kontakt-5 can also defeat APFSDS rounds. Because of Kontakt-5, long-rod penetrators can lose over 30% of their penetration potential and the protected vehicle becomes immune to them.

This type of ERA can be easily recognized as it gives the vehicle outfitted with it a distinct 'clam-shell' appearance.

It is believed that while protected by Kontakt-5 ERA, Russian MBTs cannot be penetrated across the frontal arc by the M256 guns firing M829A1 APFSDS ammo.

In addition, thanks to their heavier (15 mm hard steel) front plate, the Kontakt-5 elements are harder to trigger by the precursor charges of tandem warheads, forcing the producers of tandem ATGMs to allocate more mass to precursor charge and, making an MBT more resistant to tandem HEAT warheads, as well.

It is very important to note that while light ERA containers are completely destroyed in the process of detonation, Kontakt-5 sections are not, as their detonation is contained by the outside armor plates. Therefore even after detonation Kontakt-5 sections continue to provide some applique protection.

This armor package is developed by NII Stali (Research Institute of Steel), the leading Russian developer of applique protection packages; Russian Federation pat. No 2064154 from 27.05.92.

Specifications:

Package mass: 3 t

Added protection, RHA rating (as stated by NII Stali):
vs APFSDS: 250 mm
vs HEAT: 600 mm

Kontakt-5 ERA

TShU-1-7 Shtora-1 EOCMDAS
(courtesy of Steven Zaloga and TANKOMASTER)
The Shtora-1 EOCMDAS (electro-optical counter-measures defensive aids suite) is one of the several unique features of Russian MBTs that distinguish them from the rest of the world. It was developed by VNII Transmash in St.Petersburg in cooperation with Elers-Elektron in Moscow, and introduced somewhere around 1988. This system effectively protects an MBT against the two most common ATGW types: wire-guided SACLOS systems (e.g. TOW, HOT) and laser-guided ATGMs (e.g. Hellfire, Copperhead).

Shtora-1 consists of a specialized computer/control panel, two electro-optical interference emitters located on each side of the gun, four laser sensors located on top of the turret, and racks of dedicated anti-laser smoke grenades.

The Shtora has two combat roles. In the first role, it works against IR guided ATGMs, by aligning the turret front to the incoming ATGM and using IR emitters to send false signals which scramble the ATGM guidance system. The principle involved is the following.

Wire-guided missiles such as the American TOW are guided to the target by means of a wire and a flare on the back of the missile. The flare is used to keep a 'reference point' of the missile in relationship to the target lock held by the operator, and the guidance computer tries to put the flare on the reference point. Shtora emitters create a large hotspot, essentially tricking the missile guidance into following the Shtora hotspot instead of the flare hotspot, resulting in faulty course corrections by the ATGW computer. In fact, the computer shall usually believe that no horisontal course correction is necessary since the false flare comes from the same direction as the targeted tank, while vertical corrections shall cause ATGM to either dive into the ground or climb into the sky, depending on whether the operator holds the lock below or above the emitters.

The second part of the system defeats laser guided weapons. When a laser beam is detected the Shtora informs the crew with light and sound; it then launches laser defeating smoke grenades, which enshroud the tank and break or degrade the lock. The tank commander can also press a button that will turn the turret front to the laser to meet incoming ATGM with the best protected section and to engage the laser beam source with the maingun.


Specifications:
System weight: 350 kg

Laser illumination sensors
Quantity: 2x TShU-1-11 precision sensors
2x TShU-1 rough sensors
Field of view (each): -5° .. +25° elevation
90° azimuth
Field of view (total): 360° azimuth

EO interference emitters
Quantity: 2, OTShU-1-7
Operating band: 0.7 .. 2.7 mkm
Protected sector: 4° elevation
20° azimuth
Energy consumption: 1 kW
Light intensity: 20 mcad

Anti-FLIR smoke grenades
Quantity: 12, 81mm 3D17
Obscured band: 0.4 .. 14 mkm
Bloom time: 3 sec
Cloud persistence: 20 sec

http://www.russianarmor.info/Tanks/EQP/shtora.html

DROZD (Thrush) Active Protection System
The 1030M Drozd APS uses small rockets placed in fixed silos to both sides of the turret to defeat incoming ATGMs. The millimeter radar on the rear of a turret tracks the missile and fires the rocket from a silo that points in that direction. The rocket detonates, producing the stream of fragments that destroys the incoming projectile.

The system was installed on marine units' T-55 tanks (designated T-55AD, D signifying Drozd) in 1983.

This system had substantially less capability than the Arena APS in range of protected angles, number of incoming projectiles, and reliability of interception.

The Drozd-2 system that is being marketed today as an upgrade option for T-80U MBT offers several significant improvements over the original version, the most important being the drastically increased range of protected angles, as well as decreased projectile size and increased number of projectiles. This new system may be not inferior to Arena APS.

Specifications:
Designation Drozd Drozd-2
1030M

Layout on each side
of the turret 2 blocks of 5 spread
2 rockets
Protected angle ±40° ±120°

Number of rockets 8 10
Rocket designation 3UOF14
Rocket caliber 107mm

Engagement rate 0.35 sec/threat
Threat speed range 70 .. 700 m/sec
Reload time 15 min

T-55AD with Drozd APS.
1 - Rocket silos; 2 - High frequency radar unit; 3 - Radar control station

T-80U modernization options include Drozd-2 APS.
1 - Radar units; 2 - Rockets.

T-55AD turret detail showing Drozd APS components

http://www.russianarmor.info/Tanks/EQP/drozd.html

 

[Manticore]

ARENA Active Protection System
The Arena tank active protection system belongs to the latest generation of Russian APS, together with Drozd-2 APS.

Arena's direct predecessor was Shatjor APS that was installed on the experimental Obiekt 478M MBT. Both systems have been designed by the Kolomna-based Engineering Design Bureau (KBP) together with other allied enterprises.

Arena is intended to protect tanks from antitank grenades and ATGMs, including some variants of top-attack ATGMs.

The system is described in the Russian patent RU 2102678 C1

The system incorporates the following engineering solutions:

use of a multi-functional millimetre radar with "instant" scanning of all protected sector to detect and track antitank targets;
use of focused instant-effect protective ammunition for aimed destruction of incoming targets;
control equipment, represented by a specialized computer that provides automatic control over radar operation and system as a whole, as well as device for serviceability control of the system and its integrated parts and units.
Protective ammunition is housed in silo sections arranged around the turret. The rack-mounted radar is fixed on the turret roof. All other equipment is housed inside the turret. Connecting cables from the turret run inside the radar rack without affecting the sealing of the fighting compartment.

The system is switched on from the commander's control panel and then operates automatically. On completion of power-on self-test, the system switches to combat mode. All information on the modes of operation and serviceability of the system and its integrated units is displayed on the control panel.

In combat mode, the radar continuously searches for incoming projectiles. Once the threat is detected the radar switches to the target tracking mode, in which the data on the moving target is obtained and entered into the computer, which uses it to select the most appropriate silo and determine the time for its activation. At the determined moment, the computer generates command signals to the selected protective ammunition. The later is launched upwards and detonates, creating a directed stream of destructive elements which destroys any target within this field, eliminating the shaped-charge effect of the threat or reducing it to levels that are not dangerous to the tank.

In emergency the commander (operator) can manually operate and detonate protective ammunition from the control panel.

The number of unused protective ammunition is displayed on the control panel screen.

Each protective ammunition protects a certain azimuth sector, with destruction zones of adjacent ammunitions overlapping each other, thereby intercepting the targets repeatedly approaching the tank from the same direction. The number of mounted protective ammunition is expected to be usually sufficient to defeat all the threats to the tank during a single combat mission without replenishing the protective ammunition.

The system operates in any weather, round the clock, detects and engages targets under all conditions of tank combat employment, including while on the move with a turned turret.

The sector of the MBT protection in azimuth is enough to provide front, side and top protection. It moves together with the turret and overlaps the range of firing angles against tanks during their attack of the enemy's deep echeloned defensive positions.

The circuit-structural design of the radar and methods of radar data processing ensure the high immunity of the system to ECM.

The Arena system does not react to: targets at a range of over 50 meters from the tank; small-size targets (splinters, small caliber projectiles); targets flying away from the tank, including projectiles fired from its own gun; slow flying objects (pieces of earth, birds etc.); shells and projectiles exploding around the tank; projectiles flying over the tank, i.e. not crossing the protected projection of the tank.

All this resulted in radical reduction of false alerts and "unwanted" information entering the computer for analysis and processing and also allows operation only if a dangerous target appears within the system's zone of action and when this target is about to hit the tank.

Considerable attention was paid to the safety problem during the development of the system. There are several safety blocks in the APS launching circuits, which can be only released when the system equipment is in combat mode, the dangerous target is detected and there is a clear indication that this target is about to hit the tank.

There is no danger for the crew members when a protective ammunition operates. The level of pressure and impulse noise at the workstations does not exceed conventional norms when hatches are closed. The system does not operate when the hatches are open.

Owing to the small size of the dangerous zone (20-30 meters around the tank) the system is not hazardous to the accompanying infantry and external tank equipment and the system's units during operation of the protective ammunition. This is ensured by the selected layout and design of the protective ammunition, which forms no lethal splinters during exposition except directed flow of destructive elements that is ejected downwards. The system is also fitted with external warning lights that generate signals to infantry following the tank about the system's acivation.

The APS is protected against bullets and splinters and protective ammunition does not detonate in siloes when fired at by small caliber projectiles.

Provision is made for the complete electromagnetic compatibility of the tank protection system with other tank systems. The Arena system does not restrict the formation of tank groupings in terms of electromagnetic compatibility.

The equipment of tanks with protection systems can ensure their survivability on the battlefield during the offensive operations. In this case losses are reduced 1.5 - 1.7 times. It should be noted here that the Arena system intercepts the most dangerous targets for the tank (ATGMs and antitank grenades) that the tank cannot effectively handle. This occurs when ATGMs are launched from a range of 3-8 km, including ATGMs launched from helicopters and when concealed grenade launchers fire on the tank at short ranges and great variety of aspect angles.

The combat effectiveness of tanks equipped with protection systems can be dramatically increased if the other side is equipped only with light antitank weapons, for example, in local conflicts and during peace-making operations.

Compared to ERA, APS advantages are: destruction of antitank weapons away from the tank's armor; capability to intercept targets with tandem warheads; capability to protect vulnerable spots of the tank (periscopes, joints etc.); more effective azimuth sector of protection with equal weight of protection system.

However, active protection should not be considered an alternative to all conventional types of protection; on the contrary, the problem of increasing tank protection should be solved via a reasonable hybrid of the passive (armor) protection, optronic counter-measures, ERA and active protection. In this case, the tank developer should determine the optimal ratio of such a hybrid to ensure the required level of tank protection, based on "efficiency-cost" criteria.

Specifications:
Package mass: 1100 kg
Reaction time: 0.07 sec
Engagement rate: 0.2 .. 0.4 sec/threat
Threat speed range: 70 .. 700 m/sec
Awareness range: 50 m
Protected angle: ±110°H -6..15°V
Energy consumption: 1kW
Operating power: 27V
Number of protective elements: 22-26

ARENA Active Protection System

 

[Manticore]

Modern Tank Armor index
TTK Ciar's MBT Resources - Modern Tank Armor

 

[Manticore]

Recurring problems of Soviet tank design


In my piece on the T-34 tank I said that postwar Soviet tanks (T-55, T-62, T-72, T-64, T-80) were built on the same principles as the T-34 with unfortunate consequences for the countries that had to use them in combat.

Soviet tanks have performed poorly in WWII, Korea, in the Middle East wars between the Israelis and Arabs and in Gulf War I, in the sense that they have suffered disproportionate losses against tanks that were comparable to them in general characteristics.

It is fascinating to see that the same problems are mentioned in US and Israeli reports separated by decades and referring to different vehicles. From the T-34 in the 1940’s to the T-62 in the Yom Kippur war the same limitations are noted!

Hull size

The T-34 had a huge problem with internal space due to several factors:
1). a large engine that took up roughly half of internal volume

2). its Christie suspension
3). the sloped armor on the sides and back of the vehicle

Postwar tanks did not have these faults but they also suffered from limited internal space since it was a design choice to limit the weight and size of these vehicles.
The result was that all the Soviet tanks were smaller and lighter than their Western contemporaries like the Centurion, M-48 and M-60. This supposedly gave them an advantage in mobility and presented a smaller target at long distances.

However there was a price to pay:
1). The smaller hull affected the performance of the crew and led to fatigue. For example an Israeli evaluation says: ‘As regard to human engineering the best were the Patton tanks (M60/48), then the Centurion and way behind the T-62/55 tanks. The meaning is that the crews of the Patton and Centurion tanks could fight longer periods of time without being exhausted relative to the crews in the T-62/55 tanks.’ [Source: ‘M60 Vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92’, p39]

2). Compared to Western tanks a smaller number of rounds could be carried. For example the T-34/76 carried 77 rounds but the T-34/85 carried only 56 and 16 of these had to be stored in the turret. In comparison the Pz IV had 87 rounds and the Panther 82.
The Centurion, M-48 and M-60 had about 60 rounds compared to about 40 in the T-55, T-62, T-72. The ability to carry more ammo meant that tanks did not have to leave the battle in order to resupply often. This was noted by the Israelis:

‘The amount of gun rounds inside the Patton (M60A1, M60, M48) and the Centurion tanks is remarkably higher (about 60 rounds in each) than in the T-62 and T-55 tanks (less than 40 rounds). The meaning is that on average the T-62 and T-55 tanks should leave their active fight and firing positions for refilling of gun ammunition [more often] than the other tanks, which means that on average the percentage of effective tanks in each moment is smaller in T-62 and T-55 units than in the units of the other tank types.’ [Source: ‘M60 Vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92’, p38]

3). By having ammo and fuel in a small space any penetration of the tank usually led to catastrophic loss of the vehicle and death of the crew. As Zaloga puts it in ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing: Korea 1950’, p23:

‘Armor data provides only part of the picture of a tank's protection. Other factors in assessing the vulnerability of a tank include the internal arrangement of fuel and ammunition. The T-34-85 is a clear example of the trade-off between the benefits and drawbacks of steeply angled protective armor. Although the T-34's sloped sides reduced the likelihood of the tank being penetrated by enemy projectiles, it also led to a decrease in internal hull volume. In the event that the T-34 was penetrated, the projectile was far more likely to produce catastrophic damage among the fuel and ammunition stored in such a small space. The side sponsors of the T-34's fighting compartment in particular contained fuel cells that if penetrated could lead to fire and the destruction of the tank.’

The same problem was identified by the Israelis after the Yom Kippur war. According to ‘M60 Vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92’, p39:
‘Survivability: The silhouette of the T-62 and T-55 tanks is smaller than [that] of the other tanks and the same is true with the silhouette of their turret. One of the most [sic] disadvantages of T-62/55 tanks is their small internal volume. The meaning is that all the internal systems are too close and when one system is hit after penetration, in most cases another system or systems are also damaged or getting out of action. Because of the small internal volume there is in the T-55 tank a fuel tank combined with gun ammunition stowage in the right front corner of the hull (I am not sure if it is the same in the T-62 tank)[it is]. The meaning is absolute destruction and explosion of the tank in case of a penetration. Analysis based up tests and war analysis showed that the improved Centurion and M60A1 were more or less on the same level survivability. Next came the M48 and Tiran 4/5 and finally the Sherman.’

This problem became worse and worse as tank gun calibers grew and more powerful ammo was carried. Zaloga says in ‘M1 Abrams Vs T-72 Ural’, p27 that the T-55 carried 220kg of propellant, the T-62 310kg and the T-72 440 kg.

The result:

Turret size

The T-34/76 had a very cramped turret. An evaluation by US personnel noted:

‘The main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets’

Postwar Soviet tanks had a new hemispherical turret design. This had excellent ballistic protection due to the sloped design but it was very cramped and it seriously affected crew performance and gun depression.

Reload rates
The cramped interior of Soviet tanks limited the speed with which the crew could operate the gun.

The T-34 had a low reload rate of about 4 rounds per minute versus 2-3 times that in German and Western tanks. The same problem was noted in postwar Soviet tanks of the T-55 and T-62 type.

The Soviets tried to solve this problem by installing an autoloader in the T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks. This equipment however has a bad reputation due to many cases of malfunction when it was first introduced.


Gun depression
Soviet tanks from the T-34 onwards had poor gun depression which meant they could not fight in hull down position. Western tanks used this tactic with success especially in the Golan front during the Yom Kippur war. From various Osprey books I collected the following statistics:

An Israeli report noted: ‘The T-62 and T-55 tanks have [limited] depression of their gun, up to about -6 to -7 degrees, whereas all the others have gun depression of about -10 degrees. The meaning is that in many cases the T-62 and the T-55 tanks, while in firing position (behind a fold or a small hill) did not have enough depression and so had to expose themselves more and be more vulnerable to the other side.’ [Source: ‘M60 Vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92’, p38]

Gun performance
Soviet tank guns of WWII developed lower pressure than Western ones with the result that their accuracy and penetration at long ranges suffered. Did the same problem affect postwar vehicles?

The Israelis found the gun of the T-62 to be quite powerful. However a US test of its accuracy showed that after 1km its ability to hit targets was limited. The M-60’s 105mm was significantly more accurate at long ranges. [Source: ‘M60 Vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92’, p50-52]

Suspension
The T-34 had poor stability over rough terrain due to its Christie suspension. Postwar Soviet tanks had torsion bar suspension but the ride continued to be uncomfortable and tiring for the crew.

The dogma of quantity over quality
Why did all the Soviet tanks suffer from the same limitations? The answer is that the Soviet military doctrine emphasized the importance of numbers and the inevitability of heavy casualties. If you expect your tanks to be destroyed quickly then it doesn’t make sense to build expensive ones lavishly equipped with armor and with an emphasis on crew comfort. Instead their goal was to keep weight and size down so they could out produce the West.

The factories of the Eastern bloc churned out thousands of tanks during the cold war and certainly had a big numerical advantage against the West. They also succeeded in building vehicles that were well armed and armored for their time. However their emphasis on production numbers meant that soft flaws (cramped interior, poor gun depression etc) limited their performance in the battlefield.
Western tanks were built on different lines and although they usually had comparable weapons and armor ‘on paper’ in the field of battle they outperformed their Eastern counterparts.

Christos military and intelligence corner: Recurring problems of Soviet tank design

 

[Durrak]

@ANTIBODY how can you remember so many things about Tanks ..... ???

 

[Manticore]

@ANTIBODY how can you remember so many things about Tanks ..... ???

I gradually read up some of the things which I have not read earlier -- I dont remember them by heart lol

My aim is to keep the defence related threads informative

 

[Durrak]

I gradually read up some of the things which I have not read earlier -- I dont remember them by heart lol

Still it's very boring ...... I will kill myself before reading such stuff