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Published here (downloadable PDF):
https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE
Relevant excerpts:
While Russia has a long pedigree of using long-range missiles to keep airborne
or shipborne adversaries out, or hitting targets on land, the recent claims of far-
reaching A2/AD-capabilities are mainly based on three fairly new systems: the
S-400 anti-aircraft system, the Bastion anti-ship system, and the Iskander ballistic
missile system for use against land targets. Most of the rather alarmist accounts
of Russia’s A2/AD-capabilities in recent years have been based on uncritical
acceptance of Russian claims concerning the range and performance of these
systems. Besides uncritically taking Russian data at face value, the three cardinal
sins have been:
(i) confusing the maximal nominal range of missiles with the effective range of
the systems;
(ii) disregarding the inherent problems of seeing and hitting a moving target at a
distance, especially targets below the horizon; and
(iii) underestimating the potential for countermeasures against A2/AD-systems.
The S-400 anti-aircraft system is often said to have a 400-km range and be
capable of intercepting a gamut of targets, from lumbering transport aircraft to
agile fighter jets and cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles. In fact, the
missile with a purported 400-km range, the 40N6, is not yet operational and has
been plagued by problems in development and testing. In its current
configuration, the S-400 system should mainly be considered a threat to large
high-value aircraft such as AWACS or transport aircraft at medium to high
altitudes, out to a range of 200-250 km. In contrast, the effective range against
agile fighter jets and cruise missiles operating at low altitudes can be as little 20-
35 km. Moreover, despite its sophistication, an S-400 battery is dependent on a
single engagement radar and has a limited number of firing platforms. It is thus
vulnerable both to munitions targeting its engagement radar and to saturation
attacks. If and when the 40N6 missile goes online, its 400-km technical range
cannot be effectively exploited against targets below approximately 3000 meters
unless target data can be provided and updated during the missile’s flight by
airborne or forward-deployed radars. Such a capability – often known as
Cooperative Engagement – has only recently been successfully achieved by the
U.S. Navy, and is a highly complex and demanding endeavour that Russia should
not be expected to master within 10-15 years.
=====
However, many of the sensationalist claims about Russia’s A2/AD capabilities –
of bubbles as no-go zones, and on their ripple effects – are clearly overblown and
do not stand up to closer or professional scrutiny. 20 For example, hardly any of
these stories take account of the fact that the Earth is round while radar beams
normally travel in a straight line. This means that the effective range of radar is
usually limited to a “horizon”, much in the same way that the human eye is. This
effect is most pronounced for radars located at ground level searching for objects
at the same level or at low altitude. In such cases, the range is normally 40 km or
less, while the radar horizon widens considerably if either the radar or the target
is airborne and particularly at higher altitude ( see Map 1 below and Appendix 2 ).
(Map 1: Ranges for ground-based radars against targets at different altitudes.)
The S-400 air defence system is often claimed to have a 400-km range, but FOI’s
technical experts estimate that the effective range against maneuvering targets at
low altitude is much less, even down to 20 km for smaller targets hugging the terrain. Russian specialists have estimated the effective range of the S-400
against old and un-stealthy Tomahawk cruise missiles to be 24–36 km in mixed
terrain. At low altitudes, the masking effect of terrain, trees and buildings can
cause a diagram of the effective range to resemble a Rorschach-blot rather than
a neat circle. The S-400 system also has limitations when dealing with a large
number of targets that appear within a short space of time, such as a swarm of
cruise missiles.
=====
The S-400 is a heavy but mobile SAM system, known as Triumf in Russia and
the SA-21 Growler by NATO. 65 It is marketed as being close to omnipotent
against almost all kinds of flying targets, from ballistic missiles and strategic
aircraft, to stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions
(PGMs). In reality, the system is probably optimized for the interception of
ballistic missiles and large high-value aircraft at high altitudes, with an ancillary
function against smaller targets at lower altitudes.
Said to be one of the best air-defence systems currently in production, it entered
service with the Russian Armed Forces in 2007 but did not become operational
in Kaliningrad until 2012 and near St Petersburg until 2016. The S-400 system
is meant to utilize different kinds of missiles, which differ in speed, range and
guidance 68 , much like the US Patriot system can use different missiles for
different targets and purposes:
- A large, very long-range (400 km) high-speed missile with active radar
guidance, known as the 40N6, is intended primarily for use against large
high-value targets. This missile is the basis for the oft-repeated claim
that the S-400 has a range of 400 km, but has repeatedly failed in tests
and is not yet in series production or operational. However, Moscow
has recently claimed that it has now been cleared for production.
- A large, long-range (200–250 km) high-speed missile with semi-active
guidance, known as the 48N6, is probably intended for the same types
of targets. This is a slightly enhanced version of the missile used in the
older S-300 family of systems, known as SA-10 Grumble and SA-20
Gargoyle by NATO.
- A highly agile short- to medium-range (two versions exist, 40 and 120
km) missile with active radar guidance, known as the 9M96 and
9M96DM, is intended for use against tactical aircraft, PGMs and
ballistic missile warheads. This missile is primarily for self-defence of
the S-400 units and any Russian high-value targets close to it.
An S-400 battalion consists of two batteries, each with a command centre, one
surveillance/target acquisition radar, one fire control and engagement radar
(92N6 known as Grave Stone by NATO) and four launch trucks (formally called
transporter-erector-launcher vehicles, TEL) each carrying four large or 16 small
missiles, plus vehicles for auxiliary functions such as reloading and power
supply. Other types of search radars or target acquisition radars can be added,
such as mast-mounted or with alleged capabilities against stealth aircraft. Two
battalions make up a regiment and the battalion is normally connected to
additional sensors and command functions at the regimental level, as well as to
territorial search radars, electronic listening stations and the air defence
command-and-control network. All the main functions are mounted on large
multi-axle trucks. These can be airlifted, but only on very large transport aircraft.
The S-400 is by all accounts a potent air defence system, but is still far from the
400-km range menace to all things flying that it is often made out to be. Since
the most potent long-range missile is still not operational, the currently fielded
system uses the same long-range semi-active missile as the later versions of the
older S-300-system, thus limiting range and performance against all targets but
large aircraft at high altitude. Until the 40N6-missile is actually fielded, the
main new features of the S-400 system is that its more modern radar is able to
handle a greater number of targets simultaneously, and that its agile short- to
medium-range active missiles have capabilities against low-flying and
maneuvering targets and against incoming PGMs.
However, the comparatively short range of these agile missiles, in combination
with the inherent problems of acquiring low-flying objects, limits the effective
range of the S-400 against maneuvering targets at low altitude – such as cruise
missiles or fighter aircraft. Against such targets its effective range may be as little
as 20-35 km, or even less depending on the terrain. This means – at least until
the 40N6 missile becomes operational – that the much-vaunted S-400 far from
establishes a ‘no-go-zone’ over the southern Baltic. It should mainly be seen as
a threat to tankers, transports, and other large aircraft flying at high to medium
altitudes within 200–250 km, and against fighter aircraft or PGMs directly
attacking the S-400 battery or objects in its immediate vicinity.
Moreover, if and when the 40N6 missile becomes operational, in order to fully
exploit its range against targets between 3 000 and 10 000 metres altitude, it will
be necessary to connect the S-400 battery to an external (airborne or forward-
placed) radar that can see the target and provide usable target data for the missile
battery. Using an external and forward-placed sensor to provide target data so
that a “shooter” (launch unit) positioned further back can fire on a target beyond
the horizon is often called a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). When
applied to airborne targets capable of moving in three dimensions at high speed,
this is a demanding task involving a lot of high-tech engineering and integration,
which the US Navy has only recently mastered after decades of effort. Given
the problems in Russia’s defence industries, perhaps particularly defence
electronics, it seems unlikely that Russia will be able to do this anytime soon.
https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE
Relevant excerpts:
While Russia has a long pedigree of using long-range missiles to keep airborne
or shipborne adversaries out, or hitting targets on land, the recent claims of far-
reaching A2/AD-capabilities are mainly based on three fairly new systems: the
S-400 anti-aircraft system, the Bastion anti-ship system, and the Iskander ballistic
missile system for use against land targets. Most of the rather alarmist accounts
of Russia’s A2/AD-capabilities in recent years have been based on uncritical
acceptance of Russian claims concerning the range and performance of these
systems. Besides uncritically taking Russian data at face value, the three cardinal
sins have been:
(i) confusing the maximal nominal range of missiles with the effective range of
the systems;
(ii) disregarding the inherent problems of seeing and hitting a moving target at a
distance, especially targets below the horizon; and
(iii) underestimating the potential for countermeasures against A2/AD-systems.
The S-400 anti-aircraft system is often said to have a 400-km range and be
capable of intercepting a gamut of targets, from lumbering transport aircraft to
agile fighter jets and cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles. In fact, the
missile with a purported 400-km range, the 40N6, is not yet operational and has
been plagued by problems in development and testing. In its current
configuration, the S-400 system should mainly be considered a threat to large
high-value aircraft such as AWACS or transport aircraft at medium to high
altitudes, out to a range of 200-250 km. In contrast, the effective range against
agile fighter jets and cruise missiles operating at low altitudes can be as little 20-
35 km. Moreover, despite its sophistication, an S-400 battery is dependent on a
single engagement radar and has a limited number of firing platforms. It is thus
vulnerable both to munitions targeting its engagement radar and to saturation
attacks. If and when the 40N6 missile goes online, its 400-km technical range
cannot be effectively exploited against targets below approximately 3000 meters
unless target data can be provided and updated during the missile’s flight by
airborne or forward-deployed radars. Such a capability – often known as
Cooperative Engagement – has only recently been successfully achieved by the
U.S. Navy, and is a highly complex and demanding endeavour that Russia should
not be expected to master within 10-15 years.
=====
However, many of the sensationalist claims about Russia’s A2/AD capabilities –
of bubbles as no-go zones, and on their ripple effects – are clearly overblown and
do not stand up to closer or professional scrutiny. 20 For example, hardly any of
these stories take account of the fact that the Earth is round while radar beams
normally travel in a straight line. This means that the effective range of radar is
usually limited to a “horizon”, much in the same way that the human eye is. This
effect is most pronounced for radars located at ground level searching for objects
at the same level or at low altitude. In such cases, the range is normally 40 km or
less, while the radar horizon widens considerably if either the radar or the target
is airborne and particularly at higher altitude ( see Map 1 below and Appendix 2 ).
(Map 1: Ranges for ground-based radars against targets at different altitudes.)
The S-400 air defence system is often claimed to have a 400-km range, but FOI’s
technical experts estimate that the effective range against maneuvering targets at
low altitude is much less, even down to 20 km for smaller targets hugging the terrain. Russian specialists have estimated the effective range of the S-400
against old and un-stealthy Tomahawk cruise missiles to be 24–36 km in mixed
terrain. At low altitudes, the masking effect of terrain, trees and buildings can
cause a diagram of the effective range to resemble a Rorschach-blot rather than
a neat circle. The S-400 system also has limitations when dealing with a large
number of targets that appear within a short space of time, such as a swarm of
cruise missiles.
=====
The S-400 is a heavy but mobile SAM system, known as Triumf in Russia and
the SA-21 Growler by NATO. 65 It is marketed as being close to omnipotent
against almost all kinds of flying targets, from ballistic missiles and strategic
aircraft, to stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions
(PGMs). In reality, the system is probably optimized for the interception of
ballistic missiles and large high-value aircraft at high altitudes, with an ancillary
function against smaller targets at lower altitudes.
Said to be one of the best air-defence systems currently in production, it entered
service with the Russian Armed Forces in 2007 but did not become operational
in Kaliningrad until 2012 and near St Petersburg until 2016. The S-400 system
is meant to utilize different kinds of missiles, which differ in speed, range and
guidance 68 , much like the US Patriot system can use different missiles for
different targets and purposes:
- A large, very long-range (400 km) high-speed missile with active radar
guidance, known as the 40N6, is intended primarily for use against large
high-value targets. This missile is the basis for the oft-repeated claim
that the S-400 has a range of 400 km, but has repeatedly failed in tests
and is not yet in series production or operational. However, Moscow
has recently claimed that it has now been cleared for production.
- A large, long-range (200–250 km) high-speed missile with semi-active
guidance, known as the 48N6, is probably intended for the same types
of targets. This is a slightly enhanced version of the missile used in the
older S-300 family of systems, known as SA-10 Grumble and SA-20
Gargoyle by NATO.
- A highly agile short- to medium-range (two versions exist, 40 and 120
km) missile with active radar guidance, known as the 9M96 and
9M96DM, is intended for use against tactical aircraft, PGMs and
ballistic missile warheads. This missile is primarily for self-defence of
the S-400 units and any Russian high-value targets close to it.
An S-400 battalion consists of two batteries, each with a command centre, one
surveillance/target acquisition radar, one fire control and engagement radar
(92N6 known as Grave Stone by NATO) and four launch trucks (formally called
transporter-erector-launcher vehicles, TEL) each carrying four large or 16 small
missiles, plus vehicles for auxiliary functions such as reloading and power
supply. Other types of search radars or target acquisition radars can be added,
such as mast-mounted or with alleged capabilities against stealth aircraft. Two
battalions make up a regiment and the battalion is normally connected to
additional sensors and command functions at the regimental level, as well as to
territorial search radars, electronic listening stations and the air defence
command-and-control network. All the main functions are mounted on large
multi-axle trucks. These can be airlifted, but only on very large transport aircraft.
The S-400 is by all accounts a potent air defence system, but is still far from the
400-km range menace to all things flying that it is often made out to be. Since
the most potent long-range missile is still not operational, the currently fielded
system uses the same long-range semi-active missile as the later versions of the
older S-300-system, thus limiting range and performance against all targets but
large aircraft at high altitude. Until the 40N6-missile is actually fielded, the
main new features of the S-400 system is that its more modern radar is able to
handle a greater number of targets simultaneously, and that its agile short- to
medium-range active missiles have capabilities against low-flying and
maneuvering targets and against incoming PGMs.
However, the comparatively short range of these agile missiles, in combination
with the inherent problems of acquiring low-flying objects, limits the effective
range of the S-400 against maneuvering targets at low altitude – such as cruise
missiles or fighter aircraft. Against such targets its effective range may be as little
as 20-35 km, or even less depending on the terrain. This means – at least until
the 40N6 missile becomes operational – that the much-vaunted S-400 far from
establishes a ‘no-go-zone’ over the southern Baltic. It should mainly be seen as
a threat to tankers, transports, and other large aircraft flying at high to medium
altitudes within 200–250 km, and against fighter aircraft or PGMs directly
attacking the S-400 battery or objects in its immediate vicinity.
Moreover, if and when the 40N6 missile becomes operational, in order to fully
exploit its range against targets between 3 000 and 10 000 metres altitude, it will
be necessary to connect the S-400 battery to an external (airborne or forward-
placed) radar that can see the target and provide usable target data for the missile
battery. Using an external and forward-placed sensor to provide target data so
that a “shooter” (launch unit) positioned further back can fire on a target beyond
the horizon is often called a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). When
applied to airborne targets capable of moving in three dimensions at high speed,
this is a demanding task involving a lot of high-tech engineering and integration,
which the US Navy has only recently mastered after decades of effort. Given
the problems in Russia’s defence industries, perhaps particularly defence
electronics, it seems unlikely that Russia will be able to do this anytime soon.
