Super MKI crashed some time ago, the actions now...

[Munir]

IAF taking steps to prevent another SU-30MKI crash

Aircraft needs to be better covered to prevent heat soak due to exposure to sun

There are calls for design change including wire-locking the switches in cockpit

BANGALORE: The Indian Air Force is initiating steps aimed at preventing another SU-30MKI crash like the one that occurred near Jaisalmer in April during a routine air exercise, killing the co-pilot and destroying a Rs. 200-crore fighter aircraft.

Highly placed sources in the Ministry of Defence told The Hindu that a joint probe by Indian and Russian Defence and flight engineers zeroed-in on the causes for the crash and suggested remedial action.

While one step will involve better covering of the aircraft when they are parked on the tarmac under to prevent heat soak, the other calls for design change, including wire-locking the switches in the cockpit that control power supply to the aircraft’s flight control computer.

The crash of the long range, high endurance SU-30MKI, the Indian Air Force’s most modern and lethal fighter, sent both the IAF and the aircraft designers, Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau, into a tizzy given the fighter’s exceptional and unrivalled flight safety record. The crash also forced the IAF to ground its entire Sukhoi fleet temporarily, compromising the country’s airpower.

The Court of Inquiry (CoI) that went into the crash found that the pilot, Wing Commander S. V. Munje, inadvertently switched-off the four switches that control the power supply to the computer. Switching-off the power not only cuts off the power supply to the computer, but is also irreversible. Switching them on does not ‘power on’ the all important unit.

The aircraft went into a forward bunt, lost control and crashed, killing Wing Commander P. S. Nara, an officer from the IAF’s Directorate of Air Staff Inspection (DASI).

During the flight, the aircraft is said to have experienced a technical glitch after a round of firing practice. The pilot, who was also under routine inspection by the DASI, is said to have then tried to switch-off the armament master switches, which are located just behind the pilot’s seat and in close proximity to the switches that control power to the flight control computer.

Though the CoI’s conclusion was that the crash occurred due to pilot error, a number of officials are questioning the placing of critical switches that are not to be used during in flight and only for power on when the aircraft is on theground in the cockpit and also, the inadequate in-built safety mechanisms like a wire lock or even a covering flap.

Said a former SU-30MKI pilot: “It is unpardonable and a poor design to have such critical switches, which are not to be used by the pilot in such an accessible manner. The Air Force should insist on design changes.”

The probe also revealed that the ejection seat’s harness had broken, leading to the death of Wing Commander Nara.

The reason for the breaking is being attributed to material failure of the harness due to exposure to the sun. The IAF has taken steps to have the aircraft more adequately covered.

 

[Munir]

Just to remind some that there is a good reason to have a mechanical backup... And that design of the MKI is not that good as we often keep hearing.

 

[Xeric]

The Court of Inquiry (CoI) that went into the crash found that the pilot, Wing Commander S. V. Munje, inadvertently switched-off the four switches that control the power supply to the computer. Switching-off the power not only cuts off the power supply to the computer, but is also irreversible. Switching them on does not ‘power on’ the all important unit.

The aircraft went into a forward bunt, lost control and crashed, killing Wing Commander P. S. Nara, an officer from the IAF’s Directorate of Air Staff Inspection (DASI).

During the flight, the aircraft is said to have experienced a technical glitch after a round of firing practice. The pilot, who was also under routine inspection by the DASI, is said to have then tried to switch-off the armament master switches, which are located just behind the pilot’s seat and in close proximity to the switches that control power to the flight control computer.

Though the CoI’s conclusion was that the crash occurred due to pilot error, a number of officials are questioning the placing of critical switches that are not to be used during in flight and only for power on when the aircraft is on theground in the cockpit and also, the inadequate in-built safety mechanisms like a wire lock or even a covering flap.

Said a former SU-30MKI pilot: “It is unpardonable and a poor design to have such critical switches, which are not to be used by the pilot in such an accessible manner. The Air Force should insist on design changes.”

The probe also revealed that the ejection seat’s harness had broken, leading to the death of Wing Commander Nara.

The reason for the breaking is being attributed to material failure of the harness due to exposure to the sun. The IAF has taken steps to have the aircraft more adequately covered.

So much for the common sense, ergonomics and russian all muscle no brains technology!!

Dude you dont even have the clutch and the accelerator (or for that matter brake and gear paddle) on a fringing motorcycle on the same side of the handle and here we find an air superiority fighter screwing up because of this!!

 

[soldRoMeo1]

Just to remind some that there is a good reason to have a mechanical backup... And that design of the MKI is not that good as we often keep hearing.

The MKI and similar fighters are termed lethal because of their range, radar, maneuverability, weapons etc. No reason to doubt the effectiveness of the plane because of a misplaced switch.

 

[indiatech]

Just to remind some that there is a good reason to have a mechanical backup... And that design of the MKI is not that good as we often keep hearing.

Please share some proof of what you have been hearing. So that we can question our govt about their decision for got for Su-30MKI.

 

[ironman]

Just to remind some that there is a good reason to have a mechanical backup... And that design of the MKI is not that good as we often keep hearing.

Design??? I only read replacement of critical switches from the cockpit.. anyway nice caption for the thread..

 

[blain2]

During the flight, the aircraft is said to have experienced a technical glitch after a round of firing practice. The pilot, who was also under routine inspection by the DASI, is said to have then tried to switch-off the armament master switches, which are located just behind the pilot’s seat and in close proximity to the switches that control power to the flight control computer.

Wow! If the above text is accurate then I must admit that the interior of the MKI is another piece of work by the Russians (who are not famous for ergonomics). For a senior and experienced pilot to reach and turn off switches thinking they are for master weapons control is something very serious. Not sure what the folks at Sukhoi were thinking putting such critical controls on the back side? I also wonder if this would pose issues for less experienced pilots. I am sure IAF will have to re-write some of the procedures about this stuff. Sounds like a clusterF due to the basic layout of the switches and potentially also IAF's in-cockpit procedures around the use of switchology. I am sure some of the legacy Chinese hardware in our use also had a different layout, but a major part of PAF's input on the JF-17 was around the cockpit layout and switchology.

While I am not sure how much more user friendly M2K's cockpit layout is (F-16s definitely have a much better UI inside of the cockpit than most other aircraft), maybe IAF can advise the Russians to move things around a bit as part of the re-design.

 

[Xeric]

Wow! If the above text is accurate then I must admit that the interior of the MKI is another piece of work by the Russians (who are not famous for ergonomics). For a senior and experienced pilot to reach and turn off switches thinking they are for master weapons control is something very serious. Not sure what the folks at Sukhoi were thinking putting such critical controls on the back side? I also wonder if this would pose issues for less experienced pilots. I am sure IAF will have to re-write some of the procedures about this stuff. Sounds like a clusterF due to the basic layout of the switches and potentially also IAF's in-cockpit procedures around the use of switchology. I am sure some of the legacy Chinese hardware in our use also had a different layout, but a major part of PAF's input on the JF-17 was around the cockpit layout and switchology.

While I am not sure how much more user friendly M2K's cockpit layout is (F-16s definitely have a much better UI inside of the cockpit than most other aircraft), maybe IAF can advise the Russians to move things around a bit as part of the re-design.

Oh the other hand if we critically analyze the SOPs in military then i must there are always certain 'strict; dos and donts that are to be followed. Due to military related equipment i would not be telling you the specific info but the simplest example that i can give you is that come what may you dont put your finger on the trigger of any weapons unless you want to fire or when you jump out of plane (para trooping-static line jumps) you dont ever open your legs, now this comes from training, it is made your second nature that you MUST NOT screw up even if you are asleep, as our instructors told us during para training that we will make you practice so much that even if you fell down from your bed while sleeping you'll land on the feet "CLOSED"! Now this is what we cal training...i dont think the IAF has something to this effect if an 'experienced' pilot pull up a wrong string during a simulated exercise. Imagine what they are going to do when they would be at war!

 

[sancho]

The MKI and similar fighters are termed lethal because of their range, radar, maneuverability, weapons etc. No reason to doubt the effectiveness of the plane because of a misplaced switch.

Can't agree more, it's funny how often things will be made up to make that aircrafts look bad. I request to think about that this was the first crash after 12 years in IAF service and like the article says, it was not even a technical problem.

 

[ironman]

Oh the other hand if we critically analyze the SOPs in military then i must there are always certain 'strict; dos and donts that are to be followed. Due to military related equipment i would not be telling you the specific info but the simplest example that i can give you is that come what may you dont put your finger on the trigger of any weapons unless you want to fire or when you jump out of plane (para trooping-static line jumps) you dont ever open your legs, now this comes from training, it is made your second nature that you MUST NOT screw up even if you are asleep, as our instructors told us during para training that we will make you practice so much that even if you fell down from your bed while sleeping you'll land on the feet "CLOSED"! Now this is what we cal training...i dont think the IAF has something to this effect if an 'experienced' pilot pull up a wrong string during a simulated exercise. Imagine what they are going to do when they would be at war!

In Mahabharatha Drona, the guru of Pandava's and Kaurava's asked Bhima after one year of training. How do you feel know ??. Bhima replied "I can defeat 1000 enemies at a time easily". Drona replied " carry on". Another year passed and Drona asked the question again to Bhima. He now replied "I can defeat 500 now". Drona repeated the same question year after another Bhima's answer about number of enemies reduced as same.

20 Years passed.. Drona repeated the question. Now the answer of was different. He said "Now I'm feeling that I can 'defend' one person same as me."

Underestimation of your enemy's strength will become the last mistake you have done in your life.

 

[Xeric]

Underestimation of your enemy's strength will become the last mistake you have done in your life.

Oooohh, that send shivers down my spine!

Sir, unfortunately i was mocking your standard of training which you obviously missed. BTW, the first lesson that guud militaries taught to their men is to give a 100% to your enemy (in every sphere and aspect to include training, equipment, reinforcements etc etc) and then plan on to screw him. So let it not be you telling me how to go about a plan!

We in the military do it well.

 

[blain2]

In Mahabharatha Drona, the guru of Pandava's and Kaurava's asked Bhima after one year of training. How do you feel know ??. Bhima replied "I can defeat 1000 enemies at a time easily". Drona replied " carry on". Another year passed and Drona asked the question again to Bhima. He now replied "I can defeat 500 now". Drona repeated the same question year after another Bhima's answer about number of enemies reduced as same.

20 Years passed.. Drona repeated the question. Now the answer of was different. He said "Now I'm feeling that I can 'defend' one person same as me."

Underestimation of your enemy's strength will become the last mistake you have done in your life.

This is not underestimation. If you take it as underestimation and not worry about it then realize that its to your own detriment. What Xeric is suggesting would in actuality save lives of the IAF pilots if taken the right way.

 

[qsaark]

PAF has also lost its aircrafts, some due to the technical problems, others due to the pilot's mistake. No Air Force is immune to this kind of attrition. As Sancho has mentioned, it is only first loss of a MKI in 12 years. If it was about the ergonomy, or the airplane design, or the training of the pilot, it should have happened in the early days of the MKI's induction in the IAF. Why dragging aircraft design and sarcasm on the training level of the IAF pilots?

 

[soldRoMeo1]

Oooohh, that send shivers down my spine!

Sir, unfortunately i was mocking your standard of training which you obviously missed. BTW, the first lesson that guud militaries taught to their men is to give a 100% to your enemy (in every sphere and aspect to include training, equipment, reinforcements etc etc) and then plan on to screw him. So let it not be you telling me how to go about a plan!

We in the military do it well.

And mocking and undermining enemies seems to be the SOP in the pakistani Army. May be a good moral booster when pepping up your soldiers, unfortunately not so good in combat, you sure remember something like one to ten thingy that was the SOP in the pakistani army some time back, well poor blokes couldn\'t even manage one to one because some stupid general impregnated them with his foolish superiority myth.

Seems some of that stupidity still lurks around...

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

And mocking and undermining enemies seems to be the SOP in the pakistani Army. May be a good moral booster when pepping up your soldiers, unfortunately not so good in combat, you sure remember something like one to ten thingy that was the SOP in the pakistani army some time back, well poor blokes couldn\'t even manage one to one because some stupid general impregnated them with his foolish superiority myth.

Seems some of that stupidity still lurks around...

The 'one to ten thingy' was never 'SOP' in the PA. Rhetoric to pep up the soldiers for battle should not be confused with 'SOP', which is what the Indian commentators generally do.

The fact that Indian commentators are still unable/unwilling to acknowledge that fact is in itself a gross 'underestimation of the enemies capabilities and mindset', and a 'mocking and undermining of the PA'.

I think Xeric was quite clear about how the PA approaches the IA with this statement:

"the first lesson that guud militaries taught to their men is to give a 100% to your enemy (in every sphere and aspect to include training, equipment, reinforcements etc etc) and then plan on to screw him."