Complete shock. That is how friends of retired generals Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel, two members of the Winograd Committee, described the generals' reaction to the Israel Defense Forces' performance during the Second Lebanon War.
Einan, who was charged with drafting the section of the panel's final report that deals with the army, was appalled to discover how badly the ground forces had deteriorated. His conclusions are expected to deal harshly with every level of the army, from the chief of staff to units in the field.
But while the report's harsh conclusions about the army have been widely anticipated, its conclusions about the government, and especially Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, remain a mystery that will be solved only with the document's publication at 6 P.M. on Wednesday night.
A few leaks indicate that Olmert will get off more lightly than he did in the committee's partial report last April. But given the vigorous campaign it has been waging, the Prime Minister's Office is evidently taking no chances - especially since leaks from the partial report seemed to indicate that Olmert would get off lightly in that as well.
The report's hundreds of pages will probably supply both supporters and detractors of the premier with quotes to support their views. But it is also possible that committee chair Eliyahu Winograd will borrow a leaf from Vardi Zeiler, head of another recent inquiry committee, and use Wednesday night's press conference to make harsher statements than can be found in the report.
The report's conclusions about the IDF are not expected to spark much controversy - both because most of those who were senior officers during the war have already resigned, and because the committee is unlikely to leave much room for doubt. Indeed, Nadel was so upset over the army's functioning that in private conversations recently, he reportedly wondered whether it is possible to believe the army's claim that it has learned the war's lessons and corrected the problems. Current senior IDF officers are very worried that the report will further undermine the army's public image.
Though the committee promised the High Court of Justice that its report would not include any personal criticism, two major generals are nevertheless awaiting the document tensely: GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizenkot, who was head of the Operations Directorate during the war, and Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin.
The military section of the report is likely to address several main issues. The first will be the army's single greatest failure during the war - its failure to halt the short-range rocket fire on northern Israel. In contrast, the IDF was relatively successful in taking out Hezbollah's medium- and long-range rockets.
Hesitancy and fear
The failure is attributable to hesitancy at every level of command, from the government down to brigade commanders, and to fear of heavy losses among the troops. In their questions to witnesses, committee members attacked both the delay in launching a major ground operation and the belated call-up of the reserves. The army will be particularly interested in finding out who the panel holds mainly responsible for these failures - the General Staff or Northern Command.
The committee is expected to be particularly critical of the years-long neglect of training, of both regular troops and reservists, and the shortfalls in stocks and equipment. On this issue, fingers will also be pointed at Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, who was chief of staff and then defense minister during the eight years preceding the war, and Moshe Ya'alon, who followed Mofaz as chief of staff.
A related topic is the Home Front Command's failures in helping beleaguered northern residents cope with the rocket attacks. But since the state comptroller has already written a lengthy report on this issue, the Winograd Committee is expected to treat it cursorily.
The committee also promised to devote part of the report to the missile attack on the navy ship Hanit.
The report is unlikely to go into the details of the various land battles, but it is expected to be harshly critical of the army's normative failures: the many cases in which units did not stick to their assigned missions or avoided contact with the enemy.
