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Sensitive Data of Indian Navy’s Scorpene Class Submarines Leaked

@PARIKRAMA why does it give a feeling like some played the french hard for compensation in lieu of other benefits for this and other platform as well. I don't have a solid ground here to prove the point but instinct says, it is like hey lets give them a worry then share the observation then ask for something in return, as them agrees, play the best out of it. I know for the moment, it feels like a conspiracy theory, but things indicates that what on earth would make someone that interesting and credible to share the data which is already, back then, was ordered to be removed/erased and is of no significance but sort of raw material that wouldn't affect the operator strategy and secrets.

As it has been noticed, lightly expressed by French, for the compensation type words and things, I feel like that the leak itself may prove to be a blessing for India for Sub-Upgrades without any additional charges as well as the Rafale discounts however, still my opinion and nothing officials but just a thought.

The Australian obviously cannot do much about more leaks as DCNS has approached right platform and Court is now involved and to the some extent it blinks like, indeed there is something more important that DCNS don't want it to be publicized or shared being sensitive and pushing hard otherwise, would have to bear way more than what earned till now by on-going project in India and possibly loss of Australian contract.

As I said before, it could be a fight between competitors as well that being jealous, made an attempt to damage the reputation of DCNS and regain the market influence though a dirty business and nothing is impossible. Only the up-coming days and any upgrade with respect to current tech in these Sub may prove the worth of leaked data and who knows that data hasn't traveled the world yet as other than countries, there are parties/people that earn money only by such ways/helping the governments. Lets wait and see.
Possible

They then have made the Aussie Guy a good ScapeGoat - if DCNS presses on with Charges and would make an example of him!
 
Possible

They then have made the Aussie Guy a good ScapeGoat - if DCNS presses on with Charges and would make an example of him!

Well hard press by DCNS would also jeopardize many of itself interests so most probably it would be adopt a legal way to make sure B party don't escape and in the mean time make him realize to seize the data and not to escalate the situation further otherwise, the Journo have techniques as well and they know how the handle such situations as it has been their life by revealing the secrets and facing the courts.

I am sure, DCNS is just cooling the situation and don't want further heat as it would already be evaluating the damage and would be preparing for any further demands of its client (s) for different tech to avoid or counter the leak.

If the game is played as I just felt, everyone would have viewed the possibilities of his/her sacrificial so don't expect much here of that example thing. If DCNS press stronger on that guy, the guy spell the beans, the master of conspiracy and this game is revealed and say goodbye to the relations, tech, machines etc so the case would be closed in the best interest of the business and money. Journos knows many ways and tricks that how to escape/avoid such situation.
 
pic1.png


Well This above figure came to my mailbox as part of a presentation. Interestingly its showing somethings which anyone who has followed the scorpene program or even looked in this thread can actually understand ..

@The Eagle - this might support your assertions.


The Indian program capability upgrades were programmed to come from 3rd submarine, now for sure its preponed to second one and first one will see it upgraded during the course of major refits (which will be lot more) or may be an early MLU as it will be used more to test such capability systems.

I always said that DCNS was involved in multiple things . IF we keep churning new subs from DCNS products from the line in MDL (both line 1 and 2) , this will first target
  1. The increase in local proprietary content which stands at 35% atm for the first submarine Kalavari.
  2. Ability to keep building a highly customizable version of the product and much different from original plain vanilla scorpenes operated by other navies
  3. The other line utilsing the second product offering from DCNS can cross leverage and thus bring the capability upgrade faster to 1st line product.
  4. The 2nd line product clearly starts at capability of proprietary content at 35% instead of another shipyard building the whole MIC system from the scratch.
  5. Modular construction keeps the production time limited with parallel construction raising numbers in a decade.
  6. Skill set learned and paid for is not lost by continuously churning improved products from multiple lines with upgrades.
Side note - from 2014 onwards DCNS has been working on a NG -SSBN product (much beyond Terrible from Triomphant class). This is different from the Barracuda tech it has developed so far. Expected that some of the new NG tech will flow into Toruville (third) and majority from Dupetit (fourth one) Barracuda SSN that France is going to build over time.


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Deep dive: Why Scorpene data leak does not compromise security of Project-75.

Sushant Singh spoke to experts and submarine veterans to look at the impact of each of the 10 kinds of data breaches that The Australian newspaper reported last week.
WRITTEN BY SUSHANT SINGH |
Published On:August 29, 2016 1:46 Am

To coordinate next year’s Golden Jubilee celebrations of the induction of the first submarine in the Navy, more than 100 retired officers of the submarine branch started a WhatsApp group last month. This group, which includes three-star officers who have spent decades with submarines, went abuzz at midnight last Tuesday after The Australian newspaper reported that 22,400 pages of documents pertaining to India’s Scorpene submarine programme, called Project-75, had been leaked.
The veterans studied the few leaked pages — with redacted data — put out by the paper, and intense discussions followed in the group for the first three days. In the end, there was near unanimity that while such data being put out publicly was not a good thing, it did not affect Project-75 in any significant way.
Under Project-75, French company DCNS provides design and technology to public sector Mazagon Docks to make six Scorpene submarines, the first of which, INS Kalvari was put out for sea trials earlier this year. The hulls of the other five submarines have been cast, and they are scheduled to be commissioned by 2020.
Captain J S Malik, a retired submariner with 32 years of experience who served as Director of Submarine Operations in Navy Headquarters, said, “Most of this data is generic and belongs to Naval Staff Qualitative Requirements (NSQR) provided by the Navy to the French company, and ‘binding data’ for the product. It does not pertain to any specific submarine, and has limited usage for the adversary.”
But Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Ministry officials have repeatedly asserted that they are “prepared for the worst-case scenario”. What could be the areas of concern for the Navy?

According to Commodore A Jai Singh, a retired submariner who was associated with Project-75 preparations at Navy Headquarters at the turn of the century, “the only thing, which if leaked out from the supplier, that can really compromise the operation of our submarines is the source code of the Fire Control System. It is a top secret thing which the DCNS doesn’t even share with the company providing the weapons. The Australian hasn’t claimed that it is in the possession of the software code, and besides that, everything else is not really going to matter.”
He added, “Just the generic technical specifications are little indication of a submarine’s operational capability. The element of stealth and superiority is how a navy operates its submarines with the equipment on board and therein lie the vital elements of secrecy essential for submarine operations.”
Three top Navy sources have confirmed to The Indian Express that the documents put out so far are not the same as the ones with the Navy. These are dated versions from a period well before the signing of the contract with DCNS in 2005. Navy officials assert that “we are no longer a buyer’s Navy but a builder’s Navy. Only six navies have successfully built ballistic missile submarines, including India. There is no need to be overly concerned as we have the capability of tweaking the design, and the weapon and sensor deployment capability to mitigate any risk from information being compromised.”
The Australian has reported being in possession of 10 types of secret information which compromises the Indian programme. The Indian Express went over each of them with experts to figure out what they mean, and how they could affect the Navy.
Stealth capabilities
Stealth capabilities pertain mainly to the acoustic signature of a submarine, and is a function of many things, including the submarine’s self-noise levels, the propeller configuration, the speed regimes underwater, the noise generated by on-board machinery, and the acoustic damping techniques used both on the hull and within the submarine. The harmonics produced by no two submarines are the same. These spot frequencies, unlike the range given in the documents, are recorded by special equipment after a submarine goes for sea-trials, and kept in the Ship Data Book, a top secret document kept with the captain of the submarine. This data is re-recorded after every major refit, as the harmonics change. In the case of a European design like the Scorpene, there would not be much to choose between contemporary designs of a relatively similar size which would operate in the same frequency ranges.
Frequencies at which submarines gain intelligence
Most modern submarine Electronic Search Measures (ESM) systems operate in a frequency range of 0.2 to 40 GHz, so to learn that Scorpenes operate in a similar frequency band is no compromise. Similarly, submarines are fitted with navigational radars with commercial applications, which operate in a particular frequency range worldwide. A modern submarine rarely, if ever, transmits at sea either from its radars or its sonars, or even its communication sets. A Naval officer who commanded a submarine for six years said that he used an active sonar only thrice in his tenure, that too only to test the equipment and validate the training of his staff.
Noise levels submarines could reach at certain speeds
Noise levels are a function of the submarine speed and the speed of rotation of a propeller, which is recorded during sea trials and noted in the Ship Data Book. The data put out is the NSQR limits given by the Navy to the designers that it should not exceed so many decibels at various speeds.
Diving depths, range and endurance
Range and endurance of all submarines are in the open domain. While specific depths may not be listed in the open specifications, most submarines the world over operate in a more or less similar depth envelope. Endurance of any submarine is dependent on its maximum patrol period, which determines the quantity of fuel carried. It varies between 50 and 60 days in the case of India’s submarines.
Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data
Every submarine is demagnetised after construction and undergoes trials at the underwater ranges at Goa. The data for even the first submarine has not been recorded so far. This data is updated even if a submarine has stayed in a dry dock for a prolonged period. Rarely has a submarine been detected by an MRASW aircraft fitted with a Magnetic Anomaly Detector. Since submarines do not transmit, they are not vulnerable to detection in the e-m spectrum.
Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and combat system
The Navy has not selected the torpedo for the six submarines after the contract for Black Shark torpedoes from the Italian company WASS was cancelled following the VVIP helicopter controversy. Based on the choice of weapons and sensors on board, and the operating philosophy, the combat system would be programmed by the Navy, so there would be very little to be gained from the basic characteristics of the system. The secrecy lies in their programming by the Navy.
Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope
Modern submarines rarely plane to periscope depth except for the minimum time required to charge their batteries. This duration is also a function of the submarine’s mission profile, as well as the tactical exploitation of the platform in the prevailing operational scenario. Knowing the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope actually discloses little or no information about what the submarine is doing or intends to do.
Propeller’s noise specifications
Each propeller generates its own harmonics of noise which is determined after extensive trials, while the data put out is the generic NSQR data. Even a minor chip of 2-3 mm completely changes propeller noise. The propeller generates different noise at different speeds at varying depths and varying hydrological conditions. The submarine is equipped with cavitation meters, to assess the noise level and accordingly vary its speed or depth to find the most suitable depth and speed profile to operate at.
Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces
A submarine is unlikely to surface in an operational deployment, and will do so if required, only in friendly waters. In an emergency, if a submarine has no choice but to surface, its visual presence will be easier to detect than its acoustic signature.
Weapons data
Weapons used in peacetime during training and during war operate on totally different frequencies. The war-shots are launched on frequency hopping mechanism, unlike peacetime firing. A veteran submariner gave the example of the only test war-shot fired by him in 2003 off the coast of Mumbai which could not be recorded by any of the half a dozen Indian ships monitoring the firing, despite knowing the exact timing and the location of the target. Moreover, the Pakistan Navy is also in possession of the same Exocet missile which these Scorpenes will use.

http://indianexpress.com/article/ex...ta-leak-manohar-parrikar-indian-navy-3001106/
 
Malaysian military data secure, says defense chief
The Star/ANN | Kuala Lumpur
Mon, August 29 2016 | 12:21 pm

2016_08_29_10739_1472448066._large.jpg
Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein speaking at a plenary session on "Managing Military Competition in Asia" at the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue at Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, on June 4, 2016.(EPA via The Straits Times/-)
The Malaysian Defense Ministry had already beefed up its cyber defense capabilities as a massive leak of secret data from a French submarine supplier was reported.

Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said proactive measures were put in place last year to prevent any attempt to hack classified military data and information on assets.

“We are working closely with some countries so that confidential information involving our military assets and other information is secured,” he told reporters after opening the Setiawangsa Umno division meeting Sunday.

Last week, The Australian newspaper revealed some sensitive details relating to submarines built by French naval contractor DCNS.

Some 22,400 leaked pages of data, which the daily said it had seen, detailed the combat capability of Scorpene-class submarines designed for the Indian navy, variants of which are used by Malaysia and Chile.

The report detailed the submarine’s sensors and its communications and navigation systems, as well as torpedo launch system.

The Malaysian navy has two Scorpene-class submarines in its fleet – the KD Tunku Abdul Rahman and KD Tun Abdul Razak.

Hishammuddin said there were several unsuccessful attempts to hack the country’s secret military information.

“There were attempts but not many.

“We are definitely taking proactive measures,” he said.


If needed, the cyber defense system can be extended to other ministries with sensitive information, he added.


http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasi...-military-data-secure-says-defense-chief.html
 
The IN is in damage control mode, and the fact remains that regardless of how much was compromised; there was a mole and there may many more.
 
The IN is in damage control mode, and the fact remains that regardless of how much was compromised; there was a mole and there may many more.

It was a disgruntled subcontractor who released docs because he was angry or for financial gain or the subcontractor accidentally released the information after he lost control over it.

Some operational aspects of the data was leaked. The weapons and sensor data were not leaked because even the IN doesn't have it right now.

The stuff in the documents were very generic, like how we say a fighter radar works between 8 and 12GHz, stuff like that. A lot of the data was already open source.
 
It was a disgruntled subcontractor who released docs because he was angry or for financial gain or the subcontractor accidentally released the information after he lost control over it.

Some operational aspects of the data was leaked. The weapons and sensor data were not leaked because even the IN doesn't have it right now.

The stuff in the documents were very generic, like how we say a fighter radar works between 8 and 12GHz, stuff like that. A lot of the data was already open source.
Like I said, damage control.
 
Well you are there was a mole, but he was FRenchman based in Paris and was working for DCNS.
So it's France's fault and their duty to catch him and others
For DCNS it is a loss for business, for the IN it is a national security issue no matter how small.

operational, maintenance and repair instructions
While the Admiral is qualified beyond a doubt to be the authority in this matter. I believe he is sugar coating what is information pertinent to any adversary when it comes to knowing deployment timeframes, maintenance timeframes and the ability of the sub to survive at sea if damaged.

There are not things easily ignored.
 
For DCNS it is a loss for business, for the IN it is a national security issue no matter how small.


While the Admiral is qualified beyond a doubt to be the authority in this matter. I believe he is sugar coating what is information pertinent to any adversary when it comes to knowing deployment timeframes, maintenance timeframes and the ability of the sub to survive at sea if damaged.

There are not things easily ignored.

Ironically it is the Huge delays that have saved us

We will need only a few changes ; upgrades or modifications in the first submarine
to deal with the data leaks

The Other Five are totally safe

This leak is an Eye opener for all of India's current and future deals and contracts

We make complex deals with our suppliers like Offsets ; TOT ; domestic manufacturing

Hence the probability of leaks is more
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@PARIKRAMA

Hello Sir did you read the explanation given by Prasun Sengupta



It seems most are alarmed about the nature of the compromised data that includes propulsion and cavitation data, acoustics at ultra-slow speed, combat system acoustics, drive turbine sound profile, shifting sonar profile during rapid dive, frequencies at snorkling and shallow depth, acoustic dynamics shift between shallow stationary float and snorkeling depth.

In the real world, all such data are programmable, i.e. only after conducting exhaustive hydo-acoustic surveys through 2 rounds of extensive sea-trials can accurate figures be gauged & they in turn are used for deriving 2 types of acoustic signatures through computer modelling: the distinctive signature & the manipulated signature. Only after this does the process of designing customer-specific acoustic rubber tiles begin. This process is known as signature management. Following this, the SSK;s lead boat goes out to sea for sea-trials during which the definitive database of the SSK’s hydro-acoustic data is generated. This then gets programmed into the servers of both the CMS & the integrated platform management system (IPMS).

Thus, based on the above explanation in layman’s terms, it is 100% guaranteed that the specs/performance parameters outlined in the PDF files disclosed by THE AUSTRALIAN newspaper pertain to the CM-2000 SSK MINUS its coating of acoustic rubber tiles & therefore poses no risk or threat to any CM-2000 Scorpene SSK of the IN. In fact, I had a conversation during DEFEXPO 2016 with the Indian OEM that makes such tiles & I was told that the IN will not place orders for such tiles unless & until the structural integrity & hydro-acoustic database of the 1st MDL-built Scorpene has been established/generated through the 1st round of sea-trials.

Only after this will the customisation of Scorpene-specific rubber tiles & installation of additional vibration-isolators will commence & the 2nd round of sea-trials will commence & based on the results obtained, the databases of the CMS & IPMS will be further updated & refined. These final figures will be totally different from what’s today in the public domain.

So, it’s high time all the 'desi’ commentators stoped running amock like headless chicken, & instead they ought to spend more time going into the detail before reaching sound, logical conclusions.
 
For DCNS it is a loss for business, for the IN it is a national security issue no matter how small.


While the Admiral is qualified beyond a doubt to be the authority in this matter. I believe he is sugar coating what is information pertinent to any adversary when it comes to knowing deployment timeframes, maintenance timeframes and the ability of the sub to survive at sea if damaged.

There are not things easily ignored.

I doubt that is unknown to already the adversaries. Every country tries to know what they are buying technically and especially what their opponents have in their arsenal. An adversary via their friends can always get data of RFIs or tenders clandestinely.

Judging by the logic of what you are saying or say downplaying aspect, it holds true bcz Indian media goes bonkers without understanding anything really. But he is not sugar coating much ... India and say for example China both operates kilos.. in essence if what all mass media kept on saying and what say you believe is an effort to downplay then surely kilos are as good as a white elephant to both sides. If I extend the same logic then the new subs Pakistan ordered are also heavily influenced by kilo design. So are they white elephants to anyone?

What we must not forget is the basic processing abilities in the backend has advanced a lot over last 25 years so this enables us to have a far better system in terms of response, detection ability and overall energy management in indian scorpenes as compared to earlier ones made in Chilean Navy ot previous generation agosta sub with major refits. The same will distinguish the new kilos 636 or kilo inspired subs from what is operated by India or with major MLU refit ones.


Ironically it is the Huge delays that have saved us

We will need only a few changes ; upgrades or modifications in the first submarine
to deal with the data leaks

The Other Five are totally safe

This leak is an Eye opener for all of India's current and future deals and contracts

We make complex deals with our suppliers like Offsets ; TOT ; domestic manufacturing

Hence the probability of leaks is more
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@PARIKRAMA

Hello Sir did you read the explanation given by Prasun Sengupta



It seems most are alarmed about the nature of the compromised data that includes propulsion and cavitation data, acoustics at ultra-slow speed, combat system acoustics, drive turbine sound profile, shifting sonar profile during rapid dive, frequencies at snorkling and shallow depth, acoustic dynamics shift between shallow stationary float and snorkeling depth.

In the real world, all such data are programmable, i.e. only after conducting exhaustive hydo-acoustic surveys through 2 rounds of extensive sea-trials can accurate figures be gauged & they in turn are used for deriving 2 types of acoustic signatures through computer modelling: the distinctive signature & the manipulated signature. Only after this does the process of designing customer-specific acoustic rubber tiles begin. This process is known as signature management. Following this, the SSK;s lead boat goes out to sea for sea-trials during which the definitive database of the SSK’s hydro-acoustic data is generated. This then gets programmed into the servers of both the CMS & the integrated platform management system (IPMS).

Thus, based on the above explanation in layman’s terms, it is 100% guaranteed that the specs/performance parameters outlined in the PDF files disclosed by THE AUSTRALIAN newspaper pertain to the CM-2000 SSK MINUS its coating of acoustic rubber tiles & therefore poses no risk or threat to any CM-2000 Scorpene SSK of the IN. In fact, I had a conversation during DEFEXPO 2016 with the Indian OEM that makes such tiles & I was told that the IN will not place orders for such tiles unless & until the structural integrity & hydro-acoustic database of the 1st MDL-built Scorpene has been established/generated through the 1st round of sea-trials.

Only after this will the customisation of Scorpene-specific rubber tiles & installation of additional vibration-isolators will commence & the 2nd round of sea-trials will commence & based on the results obtained, the databases of the CMS & IPMS will be further updated & refined. These final figures will be totally different from what’s today in the public domain.

So, it’s high time all the 'desi’ commentators stoped running amock like headless chicken, & instead they ought to spend more time going into the detail before reaching sound, logical conclusions.

Yes it was posted here. Prasun is half right that data is more like RFI but I certainly believe data pertains to Chilean Navy scorpenes and based on those sub specifics some basic manuals were issued to Indian Navy by DCNS to build their own. There are two crews completely trained for Kalavari and for them the initial training involved French personnel giving training and handbooks of manuals issued from these sets which are now in public domain. They never completely pertain to Indian submarine specifications and in many places it's completely different. For example our front portion hull is modified and much different with addition of sonar elements which helps to integrate more arrays and increases the coverage. There are more such small significant proprietary modification and it started from Hull itself. You can be assured that Malaysian scorpene dived to 350m but Indian one will operate easily at 25% more without compromising or facing any hurdles.

As for acoustic signature it's true atm the trials are underway and acoustic tiles and rubber are yet to be placed. Here again we will use the mix of what we learn via DCNS and what we learned from Akula 2 flowing into ATV project. So the acoustic and rubber tiles led final signature will be different from what we can try to gauge via simulations and algorithms in terms of using reference points from say Agosta and Kilos .

The actual signature to be added to library is definitely more some time away.
 
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