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In Indian Paper:
Did India err in choosing French sub?
Did India go wrong in opting for the French sub, traversing an unknown and untested path? Before the 2002-05 French connection, all Indian Navy submarines were of Soviet/Russian or German origin. Why then did we opt for the French option?
Unlike the country’s air and land forces, the Indian Navy did not have any significant French connection till 2002, when protracted negotiations between New Delhi and Paris ultimately led to the October 6, 2005 contract for the licensed production of six French DCNS submarines at Mumbai’s Mazagon Docks. DCNS was to send technical advisers and provide prefabricated hull elements and combat systems, including command systems, underwater sensors, optronics and communications; while another French company, MBDA, was to supply Exocet SM39 missiles as part of the package. However, the delivery of all six boats, that was to have begun in 2012 and to have been completed in around, is still stuck: not a single one, to date, has been commissioned into the Indian Navy.
How does one then regard the ongoing submarine data leak scandal, and what should India, the affected party, now do? Who is responsible for this “criminal” breach of security and confidentiality, thus jeopardising the very utility of the submarine? India? France? DCNS? Mazagon Docks? The Indian Navy? Retired officers in both Paris and New Delhi? Conmen in Delhi, or middlemen based in exotic islands? The CIA or the ISI? Or Russia, China or Australia? Or someone or some entity that will never be pinned down? A coverup operation to protect those responsible seems almost certain, as the possibility of the involvement of certain interested parties just can’t be ruled out. It is undoubtedly a crisis, the flood of denials from Paris to New Delhi notwithstanding: uncomfortable questions are bound to be raised. Why, how and when did it happen? And who are the gainers?
Some basics, however, seem more than plausible. First, India isn’t yet a high-tech military machine manufacturer, thus its helpless dependence on foreign vendors. Second, India’s traditional scam-oriented procurement process has inevitably made major purchases and acquisitions of arms and military hardware an avoidable victim of time and cost overruns. The Scorpene delay is a good example. Third, no foreign supplier will miss the opportunity for fat profits and will throw in a few morsels in “kickbacks” to “those who matter to fix things”. And finally, rightly or wrongly, there do exist several actors within the Indian system, along with their foreign collaborators, who are capable of going to any extent to make unscrupulous individuals flourish at the expense of the Indian State.
The next question is: why is the Indian Navy constantly in the news since the 1990s for all the wrong reasons? Why not the Army and Air Force? The answer probably lies in the fact that a warship (as a unit) is usually huge, high-tech, with a long gestation period, highly visible and of high value, and is always an attractive asset to milk, in contrast to any single unit of the Army or Air Force gear or hardware. On top of that, and on top of that, only a few nations (US, Russia, Japan, China, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany and India) now have the capability to manufacture fighting ships of at least 5,000 tonnes and above.
One thing must also be remembered here about France. Pakistan traditionally has been the main operator of French submarines in South Asia ever since it inducted the Agosta-70 class boat into its Navy in February 1979 as PNS Hashmat. Pakistan ordered a second batch of three more Agosta-90Bs (which it named Khalid) class boats between 1992 and 1994, and the first ship, built by DCN, Cherbourg, was commissioned on September 6, 1999. The date is significant. September 6 is Pakistan’s Armed Forces Day as India had opened the Lahore-Sialkot front to counter Pakistan’s armour thrust in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector of J&K in 1965.
That is understandable. But why did India begin talks with France on submarines, knowing fully that the company, or its affiliates, was providing similar submarines to Pakistan for long? By and large, the military inventory of India and Pakistan have not been common. When Pakistan used the F-16, Mirage III, Mirage V and F-86 aircraft, India used Ouragon, Mystere, Vampire, Gnat, MiG-21 and AN-12. When the Pakistanis used M-47/M-48 Patton tanks, the Indian arsenal had British and Soviet T-55, PT-76 and a few French AMX-13 light tanks.
Even today, as far as possible, Indian and Pakistani inventories tend to be uncommon. If so, why and how did Indian wisdom change so drastically between 2002 and 2005 to go for a submarine common to both New Delhi and Islamabad? Who in the murky world of the global arms bazaar would resist the temptation of not leaking or selling data for a fortune in the India-Pakistan scenario?
Another disturbing open source nugget, gleaned from the latest edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, is that the French-supplied Pakistani submarine appears “superior” to the Indian Navy’s yet-to-be-commissioned French-origin Scorpene. Only two parameters are mentioned: the speed of the Pakistani boat is “12 knots surfaced”, while that of the Indian vessel is “11 knots surfaced”. Again, while the Pakistani boat’s range is “8500 nautical miles at 9 knots”, that of the Indian one is “6500 nautical miles at 8 knots”. Is this not “Advantage Pakistan”?
The moot point today is quite simple. Did India, wittingly or unwittingly, go wrong in opting for the French sub, traversing an unknown and untested path? Before the 2002-05 French connection, all Indian Navy submarines were of Soviet/Russian or German origin. Why then did we opt for the French option out of the blue? “Experts”, of course, may challenge this view, but it is hard to see logic in going to a country or company that is supplying the same type of submarine to an unfriendly neighbour next door. It appears at first sight to be a crass case of “business opportunity and profit” on the part of the seller and a misguided, misjudged action on the buyer’s part.
A few words on the Navy’s plight would be in order. Too many problems have afflicted the Navy since the 1990s. The succession at the top appears a chronic problem as several chiefs have either performed miserably or were humiliated by the government of the day. The memory of the scandalous “war room” espionage/leak still rankles. Several accidents in static garrisons have spoilt the fleet’s reputation; now comes the “leakage” of submarine data.
Ever since 2005, France is proving to be an erratic and difficult supplier. French fighter Rafale was chosen for the Indian Air Force way back in January 2012. Not a single aircraft has arrived. And now Scorpene. The contract of 2005 should have led to the first boat being commissioned in 2012. That has not happened. The situation now seems so uncertain that the entire onboard instrument/equipment systems of the “leaked boat” might have to be changed. That means cost and time overruns and a colossal loss of India’s public money. Should India then cancel Scorpene and Rafale and urgently revert to the old and dependable supplier from Moscow?
The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College
Did India err in choosing French sub?
Did India go wrong in opting for the French sub, traversing an unknown and untested path? Before the 2002-05 French connection, all Indian Navy submarines were of Soviet/Russian or German origin. Why then did we opt for the French option?
Unlike the country’s air and land forces, the Indian Navy did not have any significant French connection till 2002, when protracted negotiations between New Delhi and Paris ultimately led to the October 6, 2005 contract for the licensed production of six French DCNS submarines at Mumbai’s Mazagon Docks. DCNS was to send technical advisers and provide prefabricated hull elements and combat systems, including command systems, underwater sensors, optronics and communications; while another French company, MBDA, was to supply Exocet SM39 missiles as part of the package. However, the delivery of all six boats, that was to have begun in 2012 and to have been completed in around, is still stuck: not a single one, to date, has been commissioned into the Indian Navy.
How does one then regard the ongoing submarine data leak scandal, and what should India, the affected party, now do? Who is responsible for this “criminal” breach of security and confidentiality, thus jeopardising the very utility of the submarine? India? France? DCNS? Mazagon Docks? The Indian Navy? Retired officers in both Paris and New Delhi? Conmen in Delhi, or middlemen based in exotic islands? The CIA or the ISI? Or Russia, China or Australia? Or someone or some entity that will never be pinned down? A coverup operation to protect those responsible seems almost certain, as the possibility of the involvement of certain interested parties just can’t be ruled out. It is undoubtedly a crisis, the flood of denials from Paris to New Delhi notwithstanding: uncomfortable questions are bound to be raised. Why, how and when did it happen? And who are the gainers?
Some basics, however, seem more than plausible. First, India isn’t yet a high-tech military machine manufacturer, thus its helpless dependence on foreign vendors. Second, India’s traditional scam-oriented procurement process has inevitably made major purchases and acquisitions of arms and military hardware an avoidable victim of time and cost overruns. The Scorpene delay is a good example. Third, no foreign supplier will miss the opportunity for fat profits and will throw in a few morsels in “kickbacks” to “those who matter to fix things”. And finally, rightly or wrongly, there do exist several actors within the Indian system, along with their foreign collaborators, who are capable of going to any extent to make unscrupulous individuals flourish at the expense of the Indian State.
The next question is: why is the Indian Navy constantly in the news since the 1990s for all the wrong reasons? Why not the Army and Air Force? The answer probably lies in the fact that a warship (as a unit) is usually huge, high-tech, with a long gestation period, highly visible and of high value, and is always an attractive asset to milk, in contrast to any single unit of the Army or Air Force gear or hardware. On top of that, and on top of that, only a few nations (US, Russia, Japan, China, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany and India) now have the capability to manufacture fighting ships of at least 5,000 tonnes and above.
One thing must also be remembered here about France. Pakistan traditionally has been the main operator of French submarines in South Asia ever since it inducted the Agosta-70 class boat into its Navy in February 1979 as PNS Hashmat. Pakistan ordered a second batch of three more Agosta-90Bs (which it named Khalid) class boats between 1992 and 1994, and the first ship, built by DCN, Cherbourg, was commissioned on September 6, 1999. The date is significant. September 6 is Pakistan’s Armed Forces Day as India had opened the Lahore-Sialkot front to counter Pakistan’s armour thrust in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector of J&K in 1965.
That is understandable. But why did India begin talks with France on submarines, knowing fully that the company, or its affiliates, was providing similar submarines to Pakistan for long? By and large, the military inventory of India and Pakistan have not been common. When Pakistan used the F-16, Mirage III, Mirage V and F-86 aircraft, India used Ouragon, Mystere, Vampire, Gnat, MiG-21 and AN-12. When the Pakistanis used M-47/M-48 Patton tanks, the Indian arsenal had British and Soviet T-55, PT-76 and a few French AMX-13 light tanks.
Even today, as far as possible, Indian and Pakistani inventories tend to be uncommon. If so, why and how did Indian wisdom change so drastically between 2002 and 2005 to go for a submarine common to both New Delhi and Islamabad? Who in the murky world of the global arms bazaar would resist the temptation of not leaking or selling data for a fortune in the India-Pakistan scenario?
Another disturbing open source nugget, gleaned from the latest edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, is that the French-supplied Pakistani submarine appears “superior” to the Indian Navy’s yet-to-be-commissioned French-origin Scorpene. Only two parameters are mentioned: the speed of the Pakistani boat is “12 knots surfaced”, while that of the Indian vessel is “11 knots surfaced”. Again, while the Pakistani boat’s range is “8500 nautical miles at 9 knots”, that of the Indian one is “6500 nautical miles at 8 knots”. Is this not “Advantage Pakistan”?
The moot point today is quite simple. Did India, wittingly or unwittingly, go wrong in opting for the French sub, traversing an unknown and untested path? Before the 2002-05 French connection, all Indian Navy submarines were of Soviet/Russian or German origin. Why then did we opt for the French option out of the blue? “Experts”, of course, may challenge this view, but it is hard to see logic in going to a country or company that is supplying the same type of submarine to an unfriendly neighbour next door. It appears at first sight to be a crass case of “business opportunity and profit” on the part of the seller and a misguided, misjudged action on the buyer’s part.
A few words on the Navy’s plight would be in order. Too many problems have afflicted the Navy since the 1990s. The succession at the top appears a chronic problem as several chiefs have either performed miserably or were humiliated by the government of the day. The memory of the scandalous “war room” espionage/leak still rankles. Several accidents in static garrisons have spoilt the fleet’s reputation; now comes the “leakage” of submarine data.
Ever since 2005, France is proving to be an erratic and difficult supplier. French fighter Rafale was chosen for the Indian Air Force way back in January 2012. Not a single aircraft has arrived. And now Scorpene. The contract of 2005 should have led to the first boat being commissioned in 2012. That has not happened. The situation now seems so uncertain that the entire onboard instrument/equipment systems of the “leaked boat” might have to be changed. That means cost and time overruns and a colossal loss of India’s public money. Should India then cancel Scorpene and Rafale and urgently revert to the old and dependable supplier from Moscow?
The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College
