Seeds of Indian Proliferation

[Goodperson]

You could do so by countering this report - if not then the argument of India not having a good record on non-proliferation is fair.

It isn't 'me too' - its asking for equal applications of trade and investment conditions in a particular field.

Whatever the requirements, the only ones raised so far by the US has been 'nuclear proliferation', on which count India fails as well, not the ones you raised.

Doesn't "me too" mean the same wrt particular field. Nothing wrong inusing the same. The term has nothing to do with whether you are deficient in that field. It signifies parity.

Regarding proliferations even if Pakistan believes and proves India is a worst Proliferator then what difference does that make? The fact is who matter should be convinced.

 

[Always Neutral]

Dear All,

I am very against anyone getting an NSG waiver without NPT and CTBT but I must warn you of David Albright and his reports. He hates both India and Pakistan equally and ISIS is founded by him and runs on donations. His credentials were exposed by Mr Ritter who was the UN nuclear arms inspector in Iraq - The only person who stated that Iraq had no credible WMD's so I believe Ritter. I am posting excerpts from his article about Pakistan ( Mr Albrights views ), and other things he says about Albright. Incase you wish you can read the whole article at this weblink and make your own judgement.

Regards

Truthdig - Reports - The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was


I am a former U.N. weapons inspector. I started my work with the United Nations in September 1991, and between that date and my resignation in August 1998,


Most recently, Albright could be seen commenting on a report he authored, released by ISIS on June 16, in which he discusses the alleged existence of a computer owned by Swiss-based businessmen who were involved in the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market ring. According to Albright, this computer contained sensitive design drawings of a small, sophisticated nuclear warhead which, he speculates, could fit on a missile delivery system such as that possessed by Iran.


But David Albright has a track record of making half-baked analyses derived from questionable sources seem mainstream. He breathes false legitimacy into these factually challenged stories by cloaking himself in a résumé which is disingenuous in the extreme. Eventually, one must begin to question the motives of Albright and ISIS. No self-respecting think tank would allow itself to be used in such an egregious manner. The fact that ISIS is a creation of Albright himself, and as such operates as a mirror image of its founder and president, only underscores the concerns raised when an individual lacking in any demonstrable foundation of expertise has installed himself into the mainstream media in a manner that corrupts the public discourse and debate by propagating factually incorrect, illogical and misleading information.


On the few occasions when I was able to spend some down time at the U.N. headquarters on Canal Street, I would catch up with the status of the other inspections taking place in Iraq at the same time, including the one Albright was attached to. From all accounts, his lone stint as an inspector was at best unremarkable. He was a dilettante in every sense of the word, a Walter Mitty-like character in a world of genuine U.N. inspectors. There was recognition among most involved that bringing an outsider such as David Albright into the inspection process was a mistake. Not only did he lack any experience in the nuclear weapons field (being an outsider with only secondhand insight into limited aspects of the Iraqi program), he had no credibility with the Iraqi nuclear scientists, and his questions, void of any connectivity with the considerable record of interaction between the IAEA and Iraq, were not taken seriously by either side. Albright left Iraq in June 1996, and was never again invited back.

While not outright fraud, Albright’s self-promoted relationship with the IAEA, and his status as a “former U.N. inspector,” is at best disingenuous, all the more so since he exploits this misleading biographical data in his ongoing effort to insert himself into the public eye as a nuclear weapons expert, a title not supported by anything in his life experience.

can’t say for certain when Albright became “Doctor” Albright. A self-described “physicist,” he allows the term to linger, as he does the title “former U.N. inspector,” in order to create the impression that he possesses a certain gravitas. David Albright holds a master of science degree in physics from Indiana University and a master of science in mathematics from Wright State University. I imagine that this résumé permits him to assign himself the title physicist, but not in the Robert Oppenheimer/Edward Teller sense of the word. Whatever physics work Albright may or may not have done in his life, one thing is certain: He has never worked as a nuclear physicist on any program dedicated to the design and/or manufacture of nuclear weapons. He has never designed nuclear weapons and never conducted mathematical calculations in support of testing nuclear weapons, nor has he ever worked in a facility or with an organization dedicated to either.




I am

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Doesn't "me too" mean the same wrt particular field. Nothing wrong inusing the same. The term has nothing to do with whether you are deficient in that field. It signifies parity.

Regarding proliferations even if Pakistan believes and proves India is a worst Proliferator then what difference does that make? The fact is who matter should be convinced.

Colloquially 'me too' has a derogatory connotation - it implies a whining attitude based solely on the fact that since one entity obtained something, therefore I too deserve the same, irrespective of any requirements or other factors that would translate into me having a need (vs a 'want')for that 'something'.

That is why I pointed out that Pakistan has both the need, has in years prior to the 123 articulated expanding its nuclear power generation capacity, and the existing civilian nuclear program to absorb such trade and investment. This indicates that applying the colloquialism of 'me too' is completely incorrect in the case of Pakistan.

The arguments raised about Indian proliferation are solely to point out the double standards of the West.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Thread merged with the 'Seeds of Indian proliferation' thread.

 

[Goodperson]

Colloquially 'me too' has a derogatory connotation - it implies a whining attitude based solely on the fact that since one entity obtained something, therefore I too deserve the same, irrespective of any requirements or other factors that would translate into me having a need for that 'something'.

That is why I pointed out that Pakistan has both the need, has in years prior to the 123 articulated expanding its nuclear power generation capacity, and the existing civilian nuclear program to absorb such trade and investment. This indicates that applying the colloquialism of 'me too' is completely incorrect in the case of Pakistan.

The arguments raised about Indian proliferation are solely to point out the double standards of the West.

I posted "mee too" with embedded link hence earlier said "apparent", Any ways it is not used for countries.

True Pakistan has legitimate need so it also need nuclear energy. But I wonder why the deal has to be similar to India. Thanks god we have visionary PM "Dr Manmohan Singh".

If you say double standards then that applies to IAEA, NSG and perhaps to US
congress as these are the ones who set the standards.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

True Pakistan has legitimate need so it also need nuclear energy. But I wonder why the deal has to be similar to India. Thanks god we have visionary PM "Dr Manmohan Singh".

I am not sure what you mean by 'similar to India' - the investment and trade benefits being offered are pretty standard, so of course any country that is included after India will have 'similar' concessions.

If you say double standards then that applies to IAEA, NSG and perhaps to US congress as these are the ones who set the standards.

The US congress will vote for whatever puts money in teh US bank, which this deal will.

The IAEA and NSG (US pressure) did indeed apply double standards - and these do for the most part constitute the 'West', so you are really just reiterating my point.

 

[Goodperson]

I am not sure what you mean by 'similar to India' - the investment and trade benefits being offered are pretty standard, so of course any country that is included after India will have 'similar' concessions.



The US congress will vote for whatever puts money in teh US bank, which this deal will.

The IAEA and NSG (US pressure) did indeed apply double standards - and these do for the most part constitute the 'West', so you are really just reiterating my point.

OK , If you believe so.
India should be happy as long it gets Uranium and reprocessing technologies.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

OK , If you believe so.
India should be happy as long it gets Uranium and reprocessing technologies.

I hope she is happy -she pursued the deal didn't she?

I'm merely pointing out the double standards, and how Pakistan has genuine demands which do not fall under the ambit of 'me too'.

 

[dr.umer]

Indian claims of safe nuclear regime exposed​

24 Sep 2008

Jharkhand—The tall Indian claims of being a secured nuclear regime once again fell flat when a container full of radioactive material was seized in India.The startling disclosure was made by no less than a person than Chief Minister of Jharkhand Madhu Khodha himself.

According to Mr. Madhu, the said material was stolen from federal atomic facility at Rajarappa, near Mumbai and smuggled to Iran by sea. He also disclosed that material was not in an ore form but was properly processed “ It had all the capability of causing damage to population due to radiation”, he added.Undeniable sources say the material was deliberately smuggled to Iran as a ploy to tackle Iranian nuclear facilities for the information of the USA.

These sources were also of the view that RAW and other departments under Indian Defence Ministry are collaborating with USA in collection of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear programme and its proliferation. The USA, it may be mentioned here, has the physical presence on Indian land and sea in order to monitor Iran’s nuclear pursuits.

Meanwhile in Shillong, the Meghalaya Police arrested five people forsmuggling some uranium ore. They confiscated the lone packet of unprocessed uranium that was found from them, but it is suspected that the gang could have stolen more uranium stocked up in the same goodown. And this is not for the first time that a packet of uranium found itself in Meghalayan robbers’ pockets.

Earlier in May, five people were arrested in the state for nicking some uranium. —APP

 

[Goodperson]

I think there is difference between Smuggling and Proliferation.

 

[bernard]

dr.umer: USA, it may be mentioned here, has the physical presence on Indian land and sea in order to monitor Iran’s nuclear pursuits.

dr.umer: links please for that claim. i never heard of it

 

[dr.umer]

dr.umer: links please for that claim. i never heard of it

You never heard of it never means it never "happened".

For links you can ask Mr. Madhu, CM or you can request newspaper to provide you contact of their source.

Links

 

[Imran Khan]

VIEW: India and the nuclear black market —Adil Sultan

Although Indian nuclear weapons have depended principally on plutonium, highly enriched uranium is desirable for developing thermonuclear weapons — another benchmark for India to force itself into the league of great powers

As India waits to reap the dividends of its nuclear deal, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has, in a recent report, questioned the adequacy and implementation of India’s export control and nuclear classification procedures. (See David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Indian Nuclear Export Controls and Information Security: Important Questions Remain”, Sept 18.)

The report alleges that India’s illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its un-safeguarded nuclear programme belies its recent commitments to the international community which paved the way for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant India-specific exemption and allowed it to enter into civil nuclear commerce with NSG members-states.

According to the report, India has been procuring Tributyl Phosphate (TBP), a dual-use chemical used in nuclear programmes to separate plutonium from foreign entities. The report also alleges that Indian entities were procuring sensitive centrifuge-related items from the open market for its secret gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.

In a strange coincidence, the day that this report was released, US Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, William J Burns, while pleading India’s case for civil nuclear cooperation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, credited India with a “solid nuclear non-proliferation record”. According to Burns, “India has proven itself a responsible actor with respect to the export of sensitive technologies”. Based on its sound proliferation record and enhanced non-proliferation commitments, it therefore presents a unique case for civil nuclear cooperation.

A unique case, no doubt. It is a country that misused civil nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons, leading to the creation of the NSG in 1975 with the main objective of preventing diversion of dual-use nuclear-related items for military means. Ironically, the NSG has now been coerced into according an India-specific exemption.

India is also unique in that it is the only country in the world that remains outside of any legally binding non-proliferation arrangement, and refuses to accept even the ‘customary’ obligations taken upon by the five major Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under Article 6 of the NPT.

Nevertheless, as a face saving gesture, the NSG in its September 6, 2008 statement, while outlining conditions for allowing the transfer of nuclear technology, made a reference to India’s ‘voluntary commitment’ to institute a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear related material, equipment and technology. In the past, the Indian government had made similar commitments with the US and had provided written assurances to the US that it will not obtain or use licensable items in contravention of the US export control laws and regulations.

Despite such repeated assertions by the Indian government, the revelations made by the ISIS report belie US claims that India has an “exceptional” track record of non-proliferation.

According to the report, India Rare Earths (IRE), a sub-entity of India’s Department of Atomic Energy, procures sensitive materials and technology for a secret gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, codenamed “Rare Materials Project” (RMP), located outside Mysore by using websites and newspapers to solicit interested firms to purchase bid documents for as little as $10. Some of these documents contain detailed drawings and manufacturing instructions, which otherwise are considered classified in supplier countries, for direct use of centrifuge components and other centrifuge-related items.

The evidence provided by ISIS clearly suggests that New Delhi has conducted black market nuclear trading and has exercised poor control over key technology designs. Surprisingly, the Indian Department of Energy (DAE) has acknowledged releasing sensitive gas centrifuge design information during its procurement process but believes that the release of information “does not compromise technology control requirements”. (See second ISIS report dated Sept 19.)

However, European experts do not agree with India’s assertion as the designs of the tubes (with bellows) are for gas centrifuges that should not be publicly available. Whether the Indian DAE is not aware (unlikely) or does not appear to appreciate the sensitivity of the information it releases in its procurement process — either way it is dangerous as the designs could end up in the wrong hands.
ISIS has also alleged that before 2003, India had been procuring large quantities of TBP from China. However, after China enacted new end-user requirements, India’s subsequent attempts to procure TBP from China remained unsuccessful. Subsequently, India utilised an array of Indian trading companies to procure TBP secretly from suppliers in Germany and Russia.

The Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad forwards tenders for buying TBP through Indian trading companies, some of which are acting as liaison companies for other European companies. The TBP procured from Germany and Russia, and possibly other sources, is shipped to Indian trading companies which then turn it over to the NFC.

The Indian DAE did not deny acquisition of TBP from external sources but asserts that the material is not a controlled item in the NSG guideline, which may be true but is contrary to catch-all laws that control the use of such dual-use materials in un-safeguarded nuclear programmes, such as India’s. By using trading companies to procure TBP oversees, India has violated the spirit of the NSG.

The revelation made by ISIS about India’s illicit procurement of sensitive centrifuge components suggests that its centrifuge enrichment activities are moving at a much faster pace with the assistance of the international nuclear black market. Although Indian nuclear weapons have depended principally on plutonium, highly enriched uranium is desirable for developing thermonuclear weapons — another benchmark for India to force itself into the league of great powers.

The author is an Islamabad-based defence analyst pursuing his doctoral studies at Quaid-e Azam University Islamabad. He can be reached at adilsultan66@yahoo.com

 

[Neo]

India and the nuclear black market ​

Adil Sultan

Although Indian nuclear weapons have depended principally on plutonium, highly enriched uranium is desirable for developing thermonuclear weapons — another benchmark for India to force itself into the league of great powers

As India waits to reap the dividends of its nuclear deal, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has, in a recent report, questioned the adequacy and implementation of India’s export control and nuclear classification procedures. (See David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Indian Nuclear Export Controls and Information Security: Important Questions Remain”, Sept 18.)

The report alleges that India’s illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its un-safeguarded nuclear programme belies its recent commitments to the international community which paved the way for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant India-specific exemption and allowed it to enter into civil nuclear commerce with NSG members-states.

According to the report, India has been procuring Tributyl Phosphate (TBP), a dual-use chemical used in nuclear programmes to separate plutonium from foreign entities. The report also alleges that Indian entities were procuring sensitive centrifuge-related items from the open market for its secret gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.

In a strange coincidence, the day that this report was released, US Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, William J Burns, while pleading India’s case for civil nuclear cooperation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, credited India with a “solid nuclear non-proliferation record”. According to Burns, “India has proven itself a responsible actor with respect to the export of sensitive technologies”. Based on its sound proliferation record and enhanced non-proliferation commitments, it therefore presents a unique case for civil nuclear cooperation.

A unique case, no doubt. It is a country that misused civil nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons, leading to the creation of the NSG in 1975 with the main objective of preventing diversion of dual-use nuclear-related items for military means. Ironically, the NSG has now been coerced into according an India-specific exemption.

India is also unique in that it is the only country in the world that remains outside of any legally binding non-proliferation arrangement, and refuses to accept even the ‘customary’ obligations taken upon by the five major Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under Article 6 of the NPT.

Nevertheless, as a face saving gesture, the NSG in its September 6, 2008 statement, while outlining conditions for allowing the transfer of nuclear technology, made a reference to India’s ‘voluntary commitment’ to institute a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear related material, equipment and technology. In the past, the Indian government had made similar commitments with the US and had provided written assurances to the US that it will not obtain or use licensable items in contravention of the US export control laws and regulations.

Despite such repeated assertions by the Indian government, the revelations made by the ISIS report belie US claims that India has an “exceptional” track record of non-proliferation.

According to the report, India Rare Earths (IRE), a sub-entity of India’s Department of Atomic Energy, procures sensitive materials and technology for a secret gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, codenamed “Rare Materials Project” (RMP), located outside Mysore by using websites and newspapers to solicit interested firms to purchase bid documents for as little as $10. Some of these documents contain detailed drawings and manufacturing instructions, which otherwise are considered classified in supplier countries, for direct use of centrifuge components and other centrifuge-related items.

The evidence provided by ISIS clearly suggests that New Delhi has conducted black market nuclear trading and has exercised poor control over key technology designs. Surprisingly, the Indian Department of Energy (DAE) has acknowledged releasing sensitive gas centrifuge design information during its procurement process but believes that the release of information “does not compromise technology control requirements”. (See second ISIS report dated Sept 19.)

However, European experts do not agree with India’s assertion as the designs of the tubes (with bellows) are for gas centrifuges that should not be publicly available. Whether the Indian DAE is not aware (unlikely) or does not appear to appreciate the sensitivity of the information it releases in its procurement process — either way it is dangerous as the designs could end up in the wrong hands.

ISIS has also alleged that before 2003, India had been procuring large quantities of TBP from China. However, after China enacted new end-user requirements, India’s subsequent attempts to procure TBP from China remained unsuccessful. Subsequently, India utilised an array of Indian trading companies to procure TBP secretly from suppliers in Germany and Russia.

The Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad forwards tenders for buying TBP through Indian trading companies, some of which are acting as liaison companies for other European companies. The TBP procured from Germany and Russia, and possibly other sources, is shipped to Indian trading companies which then turn it over to the NFC.

The Indian DAE did not deny acquisition of TBP from external sources but asserts that the material is not a controlled item in the NSG guideline, which may be true but is contrary to catch-all laws that control the use of such dual-use materials in un-safeguarded nuclear programmes, such as India’s. By using trading companies to procure TBP oversees, India has violated the spirit of the NSG.

The revelation made by ISIS about India’s illicit procurement of sensitive centrifuge components suggests that its centrifuge enrichment activities are moving at a much faster pace with the assistance of the international nuclear black market. Although Indian nuclear weapons have depended principally on plutonium, highly enriched uranium is desirable for developing thermonuclear weapons — another benchmark for India to force itself into the league of great powers.

The author is an Islamabad-based defence analyst pursuing his doctoral studies at Quaid-e Azam University Islamabad. He can be reached at adilsultan66@yahoo.com

 

[BATMAN]

India probing radioactive lift button exports
Friday, October 24, 2008

NEW DELHI: India’s atomic safety body said on Thursday that radioactive scrap metal which found its way into buttons installed into lifts in France had been traced back to a western Indian foundry.

At least four Indian firms were involved in the manufacture of the components, an official said, but it was still unclear where the contaminated scrap originated.

“We are tracking back the whole chain,” Satya Pal Agarwal, head of the radiological safety division of India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, told AFP.

“We are taking steps in each place. Exporters have been advised to buy monitors to check their materials before exporting.”

France’s Mafelec firm delivered thousands of lift buttons to Otis, a subsidiary of the US elevator company, which installed them in at least 500 lifts in the country over the summer.

Otis has said it is now in the process of removing the buttons, after France’s Nuclear Safety Authority announced Tuesday that 20 workers who handled the lift buttons had been exposed to excessive levels of radiation.

The French nuclear safety agency has said the lift buttons contained traces of radioactive Cobalt 60.

Swedish officials also said they had found faint traces of radioactivity in steel items imported from India.

The components used by Mafelec were supplied by two Indian firms Bunts and Laxmi Electronics which purchase inputs from SKM Steels which in turn worked with a foundry called Vipras Casting, Agarwal said.

“The foundries must monitor their input material for any radioactive contamination before smelting,” said Agarwal. “Today it happened with Vipras, tomorrow it can happen with someone else.”

But Vipras, which says it has purchased radioactivity detection equipment since the incident came to light, told AFP that in this particular case SKM Steels had provided it the steel scrap to convert into bars.

SKM Steels’ vice president Girish Chaudhary, who deals with exports, denied that.”We are not the source of the scrap,” said Chaudhary. “We have purchased it from Vipras.”

So far, India has not been able to ascertain the source of the contaminated scrap, with hundreds of scrap dealers importing from European countries and the United States, among others.

I wonder if only buttons were made with radioactive scrap!
Radioactive detection equipment will be used only in exports material... What about low cast indians? can they not have luxury to have stuff made of non radioactive scrap?

Caution:
Tourists; refrain from travelling to india.
In your home country use stairs instead of taking elevators made by Otis!
always ask your suppliers to produce the origin certificate of components