A cabal of self-confessed Hindu nationalists, as distinct from Indian nationalists, consistently lauds Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel because it finds in him a soulmate. He is not praised by himself; significantly, he is always pitted against Nehru.
What does the entire record reveal but a man who was rabidly communal in his outlook? The dislike of Muslims hardened over time into antipathy towards them. A hostile Vallabhbhai Patel became an anti-Muslim leader in cahoots with elements who were after their blood, the RSS and the Mahasabha. All this was overlooked and a pocket-version of the Great Patel and Bismark emerged. Simultaneously, the process of denigration of Nehru picked up speed. Nehru foresaw the danger early enough. He told Wavell on July 14, 1945, that “some of the Congress Hindus were anti-Muslim and that the psychological factors were important” ( TOP, Volume 5, pages ). This fitted Patel to perfection. For all his claims to fairness, the communalist in him could never be concealed. As Meredith wrote: Passions spin the plot: /We are betrayed by what is false within. This is truer still of those in the BJP and the RSS who came after him. They have his flaws; none of his gifts.
https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/patels-communalisma-documented-record/article23559347.ece
"The communalism of a majority is apt to be taken for nationalism."
Nehru and Patel
Gandhi showed shrewd judgment when he anointed Nehru rather than Patel as his successor. Nehru was the unequalled idol of the masses at home and the symbol of India’s resurgent nationalism all over the world. Patel, ever parochial, was the party boss with a firm grip on the party machine, which was ensured by his skills as a fund collector. They needed each other. A Congress candidate needed the funds; he also needed popular support, which is what Nehru provided—all over the country.White papers on States
Patel’s achievements have been hugely exaggerated; his grave failures totally overlooked. Historical illiterates who call him India’s Bismarck know little about either. The integration of Indian States into the Union of India was accomplished in two phases; their accession to the Union and their reorganisation and merger as Part B States, only to vanish into a proper uniformity with the other States. Patel’s two White Papers on Indian States (1948 and 1950) record his skilful endeavours in the second phase. The Secretary in his Ministry of States, the brilliant V.P. Menon’s book The Story of Integration of the Indian States records both the processes (Orient Longmans, 1956). His predecessor as Reforms Commissioner and confidant, H.V. Hodson, in his book The Great Divide(Hutchinson, 1969) meticulously records the first based on official records, including Mountbatten’s papers.Odd ideas on States
Quite apart from his integrity, Hodson’s record is too graphic to be dismissed. He went to Bangalore to meet his friend Menon and tape-recorded his testimony. It was Menon’s idea to press into service the draft Instrument of Accession, prepared a decade earlier, as the Government of India Act, 1935, was being enforced. Its federal part proved a non-starter. But Patel had odd ideas. “The Sardar told him [Mountbatten] that he need not bother about the States because after the transfer of power the States peoples would rise, depose their rulers and throw in their lot with the Congress. The Viceroy reminded him that the States had forces, trained and equipped by the British, ranging from a division in Hyderabad to personal bodyguards in small States, which would shoot down the rebels, and that the Princes were preparing themselves, on the advise of the Political Department, against any uprising. A civil war would result, and India would lose far more than she would gain from a peaceful settlement. Sardar Patel asked what he meant. The Viceroy replied that the peaceful settlement he had in mind was to allow the Rulers to retain their titles, extra-territorial rights and personal property or civil List, and in return they would join a Dominion—most of them India, a few, like Bahawalpur, Pakistan—only the three subjects of defence, external affairs and communications being reserved to the Central Government. Patel said he would think it over.Gandhi's assassination
If this “achievement” is magnified, Patel’s grave lapse in the failure to nip in time Savarkar’s conspiracy to murder Gandhi has been completely overlooked. Jayaprakash Narayan was among those who censured him. JP said on February 27, 1948, that he wanted “a man who was free from communalism to be in charge of the Home Department” ( Bombay Chronicle, February 28, 1948).Patel and 'Quit India'
It is historically false to ascribe to Patel achievements which were not his and absolve him of responsibility which indisputably fell on him. Two major events reveal his lack of wisdom. Patel “felt convinced that the allies were going to lose the war” (K.M. Munshi; Pilgrimage to Freedom; Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan; Volume 1, page 75). Gandhi held the same view (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad; India Wins Freedom, 1959; page 4). The Congress Working Committee was split when it met on April 27, 1942, to discuss Gandhi’s draft resolution; a precursor to the Quit India movement launched on August 8, 1942. The minutes were seized and published by the British rulers ( Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances of 1942-43; Manager of Publications, Delhi; pages 42-49 contain the minutes and the rival drafts). Nehru, Azad and a couple of others disagreed but dutifully went along. Patel did not argue but simply said, “I see that there are two distinct opinions in the committee. We have ever since the outbreak of war tried to pull together. But it may not be possible on this occasion. Gandhiji has taken a definite stand…. I have placed myself in the hands of Gandhiji. I feel that he is instinctively right, the lead he gives in all critical occasions.” On June 22, 1941, Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union. On December 7, 1941, Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour. By mid-June 1942 “the limit of Japanese power was reached”. It was sheer madness for the AICC to pass the Quit India resolution on August 8, 1942; especially on Gandhi’s miscalculation that the British would negotiate with him and not arrest him and his colleagues.Against Azad
Once out of prison, the gloves of enforced civility were off. On July 24, 1947, Gandhi asked Nehru to exclude Azad from the first Cabinet of free India. “Sardar is decidedly against his membership in the Cabinet.… It should not be difficult to name another Muslim for the Cabinet” ( The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Volume 9, page 408). Far worse followed. Patel publicly impugned the patriotism of a man who had suffered Jinnah’s insults and his own community’s scorn. Azad convened the Indian Union Muslim Conference in Lucknow on December 27, 1947, at which he pleaded for the dissolution of the Muslim League and urged Muslims to join the Congress. A resolution on these lines was unanimously adopted the next day (Vide the writer’s The Muslims of India: A Documentary Record; Oxford University Press, 2003; page 65 for the full text). Incidentally, the move would have strengthened Nehru.Invitation to RSS
The stick for Muslims was brandished along with the carrot for the RSS and the Mahasabha. “I invite the RSS to join the Congress and not to weaken administration by creating unrest in the country. I realise that they are not actuated by selfish motives but the situation warrants that they should strengthen the hands of the government and assist in maintaining peace. By using violence they cannot render true service to the country….Riots and insensitivity
Communal riots brought out the contrast glaringly. Patel spoke consistently, invariably as a Hindu, all the time spouting the stereotypes of old. The cycle of riots in Calcutta (August 1946), Noakhali (October 1946) and Bihar (October 1946) brought out the old Adam in him. Patel’s complaint to Stafford Cripps is most revealing. “You called the League delegation there (in London along with Nehru and Baldev Singh) at a time when there was some realisation that violence is a game at which both parties can play and the mild Hindu also, when driven to desperation, can retaliate as brutally as a fanatic Muslim. Just when the time for settlement was reached, Jinnah got the invitation, and he was able to convince the Muslims once again that he has been able to get more concession by creating trouble and violence” ( SPC; Volume 3, page 314). So “the time for settlement was reached” when one community had prevailed over the other in killing. A little more bloodshed would have helped the Congress and weakened the Muslim League.The refugee question
Predictably, these emotions surged after Partition. What is little remembered today is that Patel was all for getting the Muslims out of Delhi and for preventing the return to their homes of Muslims who had fled to Pakistan in panic. There was no curb on the traffic between India and Pakistan then. At a meeting of the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet, Patel said that “there was bound to be trouble if as a result of these Muslims not moving out, it proved impossible to accommodate non-Muslim refugees coming from the West” (Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar; The Long Partition; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008; page 39. A work of high quality based on the archives). Nehru was warned on May 4, 1948, that “reports have reached me of considerable discontent both amongst the public in general, and refugees in particular, in regard to our failure to prevent the inflow of Muslims from Pakistan” ( SPC, Volume 6, page 319).Patel and Kashmir
This was Nye’s Tammany Hall boss in full swing. Kashmir and Hyderabad felt the brunt of Patel’s tactics and the full impact of his rabidly communal approach. He chose an appropriate tool, the RSS boss M.S. Golwalkar, who was protected from arrest by Pant, though the Chief Secretary, Rajeshwar Dayal, had seized his papers containing plans for a pogrom of Muslims. One of the best books on the RSS is The Brotherhood in Saffron (Vistaar, 1987) by Walter Anderson, a respected official in the United States State Department who also served in the embassy in New Delhi, and Shridhar Damle. It is based inter aliaon the RSS’ own papers. They wrote: “Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel solicited Golwalkar’s help in an effort to convince the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir to merge his princely state with India. Golwalkar met the Maharaja in October 1947 and urged him to recruit Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs into his militia’’ (page 49).What does the entire record reveal but a man who was rabidly communal in his outlook? The dislike of Muslims hardened over time into antipathy towards them. A hostile Vallabhbhai Patel became an anti-Muslim leader in cahoots with elements who were after their blood, the RSS and the Mahasabha. All this was overlooked and a pocket-version of the Great Patel and Bismark emerged. Simultaneously, the process of denigration of Nehru picked up speed. Nehru foresaw the danger early enough. He told Wavell on July 14, 1945, that “some of the Congress Hindus were anti-Muslim and that the psychological factors were important” ( TOP, Volume 5, pages ). This fitted Patel to perfection. For all his claims to fairness, the communalist in him could never be concealed. As Meredith wrote: Passions spin the plot: /We are betrayed by what is false within. This is truer still of those in the BJP and the RSS who came after him. They have his flaws; none of his gifts.
https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/patels-communalisma-documented-record/article23559347.ece
