gambit
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It is US/NATO label as how the Soviets uses airpower. Imagine Soviet airpower consists mostly of AC-130s with the Soviet Army about 24-48 hrs behind, hence 'Airborne Artillery'. It is a rather limited perspective of airpower.
Soviet jets are known to be less technologically sophisticated than Western jets. Part of that is access to technology and part from doctrine. Being less technologically sophisticated allows the jet to be closer to the front line operating from austere airfields almost close to what helos use, and ease of maintenance by -- shall we say kindly -- less educated/trained troops. When I was active duty, it took a long time for the DoD to declassify some materials gained from our brief examination of the MIG-25 defected by Viktor Belenko, and our squadron had a chance to see some of that material as part of a motivational tour. Our F-15s were using solid state electronics but their MIG-25s had vacuum tubes. The popular defense is that tubes are immune from EMP which our engineers laughed at. Steel is easier to find than composites, so if a MIG-25, and others of that series, is damaged, steel from tanks or APCs can be used to patch up the body and even repair some critical airframe sub-structures, if a competent welder is available.
So if we extrapolate this upward, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets had this limited perspective of its airpower and developed a war time doctrine appropriately. Then forward to today, it seems the VKS deviated little from that perspective and combat doctrine, hence, not much air presence except for where Russian ground troops are fighting, and even then, the VKS is not that impressive compared against the perception that we developed. It seems we continually overestimate the VKS. Maybe it is an intellectual 'better safe than sorry' safety margin on our part.
So if we go by what you are saying on the ground, then no wonder the VKS commander is sitting on his butt. I think the local air commander is doing the best he can, but if the ground commander is unable to accomplish his goals for any reason, from enemy resistance to weather, then the air commander will be equally shorted on what he is allowed to do. The more I look at this, the more it is likely the VKS is staying with Soviet air doctrine. I somewhat feel a little sorry for the guy as I bet he is being pulled three different directions.
If the Russian Army is going to lay siege on the major cities...
The Air Force Has Some Thinking to Do: Airpower and the Future Urban Battlefield - Modern War Institute
The targets . . . just keep getting smaller: individuals, extremists, terrorists, the architects of chaos who disappear in the urban vomit that is the modern city . . . […]
mwi.usma.edu
As can be seen by any Google image search of Raqqa, moreover, the employment of airpower in cities has been accompanied by great destruction.
Regardless of function, role, or mission, the application of airpower in cities for strategic effect is tremendously challenging, even with advanced precision weapons and sensors. The Air Force must move beyond tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to consider broader solutions at the operational and strategic levels because even the best TTPs will not guarantee victory in urban environments.
Currently, airpower in the urban environment combat situation produce only one outcome: great destruction. There is a limit on the angle of approach for any PGM and usually it is greater than 45 deg to vertical. We can use PGM against a building but if the bomb miss it will hit the next building, so in an urban environment, there are very little misses. But the VKS have limited PGM usage so far. There is a caveat to this. Just because you have a lot of PGM does not mean all your pilots are qual-ed to use them and use effectively. Combat is no training environment. The VKS may have a lot of PGM, but if insufficient jets/pilots are qual-ed to use, might as well be no PGM, then we will see even more great destruction to those besieged cities.
What you said about the dilution of power is interesting because it is not applicable to airpower. Simply put, we ain't around all the time. If the tank stopped in front of you, the power of the tank is still there, you are just lucky it is not running or shooting. But with the airplane, I have to leave when I reach bingo fuel. So yes, the Russians should have gone all out on one city, then the next, then the next. Maybe Kyiv should have been the first, but if the VKS cannot replicate Desert Storm, then the air commander should have been allowed to focus his jets on one target at a time.
Now comes the horrific part. Under the concept of 'airborne artillery', the combined effects of artillery shells approach on one side of a target, then bombs delivered by jets on the other side, anyone/anything inside that building will die. We WILL see a humanitarian crisis in each besieged city.
