jhungary
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Not being a pilot, I don't know about Airborne Artillery.I pulled out a Cold War era printed doc from my household goods storage about Soviet battlefield doctrine regarding the use of airpower. Something about the VKS behavior bugged me.
Ref the use of airpower in this war, the Russian air commander seems to have regressed back to his Soviet predecessors: airborne artillery. Basically, for this war, the Russian air commander is operationally, not just organizationally, under the Russian ground commander, whereas with Desert Storm, while Norman Schwarzkopf was the overall commander, Schwarzkopf just inform his air commander Charles Horner what he wanted and let Horner worked out the details. Whoever is the Russian air commander here, he seems to be waiting...and waiting...and waiting...for his orders.
Airborne artillery was the phrase I was looking for. The concept is old and operationally, it is unadaptable or at best limited utility to technological progress. Philosophically, aviation affects time (the actual phrase in this doc) so when the Soviets put the air commander under the ground commander, the entire pace of the war depends on how much knowledge the ground commander have about airpower in general. As such, Soviet airpower tends to attack targets that can affect the battle at best 24 hrs in the future. US airpower doctrine going back to the WW II US Army Air Corps days, attacked oil refineries and ballbearing factories, attacked targets that can affect battles weeks and months in the future, meaning crude oil do not become lubricants and avgas until days or weeks of refinement, then more time transport to the front. This is why USAAC commanders felt they had to be institutionally separated from the Army to develop their own war doctrines. So had there been a war on CONEUR, Soviet airpower doctrine would have the VKS cleared the battlefields before the Soviet Army as Army units, like armor, moves below. Strategic targets would fall under the Soviet Rocket Forces, re ICBMs.
For the Russian military today and here in Ukraine, it seems that while the VKS is apart from the Russian Army on paper, doctrinally, there has been little change since the Cold War yrs. The airborne artillery concept do not, or cannot, compensate for advances like drones, which are essentially airborne guerrilla warfare against advancing ground forces. If armor, for example, is slowed down for any reason, the air force must be proportionally restrained. But what if the Ukrainian Air Force managed to put up a fight? Then until the VKS achieve LOCAL air superiority, meaning maybe a few dozen klicks out front, the Russian Army must be proportionally limited. Currently, the Ukrainian Air Force is too few in numbers. So it seems good fortune for the Russian military that Ukrainian airpower is nothing like US/NATO.
But I can tell you one thing that I know and Gen Marks did not say.
The battleplan have me scratching my head for quite some time. I mean, I get why they attack Kyiv, and why they want to take Mariupol and Odesa, but I cannot figure out why they start a front with Kharkiv? The entire issue with Kharkiv is an outliner to me, the only reason I can think of for them to take it is for its historical significance. But then it would not help the main effort one bit.
Strategically, the breaking down into 2 or 3 routes is a mistake, Russian own the ocean, and troop in Crimea would mean you would have already pin down the Defender inside Mariupol and Odesa, then why attack them? I mean, if you look at it, they did not attack Odesa but they manage to pin the defender in place, but with Mariupol, especially with the ground troop near the separatist region, You really don't need to go toe to toe on them, and now, you don't just pin their troop, you pin down yours too.
That is the reason for me to think, who is actually in charge of the battlefield here, because the decision that was made here does not make sense at all. If you want to take Kyiv, you go heavy on Kyiv, you don't jerk around in other place and dilute your power. I mean, if there is an overall objective, and an overall commander to oversee the overall objective, I don''t think this is going to happen like this.