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Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments PART 2

The EU ninth’s sanctions package coming.

Interesting approach, one package per month.


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https://www.ft.com/content/09424014-da48-44fb-b602-10a55f001fc6

EU to propose sanctions on Russia’s mining industry Bloc aims for ban on investments in one of country’s biggest industries in effort to further cripple economy Russia’s vast mining sector, a global producer of gold, iron ore, uranium and phosphates, accounted for a quarter of foreign investments into the country before the Ukraine war © Bloomberg

if EU and US ARE NOT ACTUALLY BROKE, let them execute this plan! lmao.

they complain about Russian commodities..then buy it via Switzerland (gold) - technology exposes their lies to us.
 
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if you had some brains you would use translate option

View attachment 903799

and im talking about your previous post about polish soldiers that died in ukraine that had pictures from 2013 claiming its from this year


Once again, I don't see any timestamp that shows 2013 and you haven't produced an irrefutable evidence that shows that photo was taken in 2013. Fyi, I shared a tweet, remember.
 
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This study of the early phases of the 2022 war sheds light on Ukraine's strengths and vulnerabilities, and the need for further Western support.

Executive Summary​

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare. Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete.
Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action. As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops. From April, the West became Ukraine’s strategic depth, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) only robbed Russia of the initiative once long-range fires brought Russian logistics under threat.
The tactical competence of the Russian military proved significantly inferior compared with the expectations of many observers based within and outside Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, Russian weapons systems proved largely effective, and those units with a higher level of experience demonstrated that the AFRF have considerable military potential, even if deficiencies in training and the context of how they were employed meant that the Russian military failed to meet that potential. Factoring in the idiosyncrasies of the Russian campaign, there are five key areas that should be monitored to judge whether the Russian military is making progress in resolving its structural and cultural deficiencies. These areas should be used to inform assessments of Russian combat power in the future.
  1. The AFRF currently operate with a hierarchy of jointery in which the priorities of the land component are paramount, and the military as a whole is subordinate to the special services. This creates sub-optimal employment of other branches.
  2. The AFRF force-generation model is flawed. It proposes the creation of amalgamated combined arms formations in wartime but lacks the strength of junior leadership to knit these units together.
  3. There is a culture of reinforcing failure unless orders are changed at higher levels. This appears less evident in the Russian Aerospace Forces than in the Ground Forces and Navy.
  4. The AFRF are culturally vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to rapidly fuse information, are culturally averse to providing those who are executing orders with the context to exercise judgement, and incentivise a dishonest reporting culture.
  5. The AFRF’s capabilities and formations are prone to fratricide. Electronic warfare (EW) systems and other capabilities rarely deconflict, while processes for identifying friend from foe and establishing control measures are inadequate. The result is that capabilities that should magnify one another’s effects must be employed sequentially.

Beyond assessments of the Russian armed forces, there are significant lessons to be drawn from the conflict for the British and other NATO militaries. The foremost of these are:
In due course, it will be possible to extend this study to cover the later phase of the war when Ukraine moved on to offensive operations. As the UAF expend significant ammunition, however, and now depend on their international partners for equipment, it is important that those partners draw the appropriate lessons from the war so far, not least so that they can prepare themselves to deter future threats and to best support Ukraine. Ukraine’s victory is possible, but it requires significant heavy fighting. With appropriate support, Ukraine can prevail.
  • There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Survivability depends on dispersing ammunitions stocks, command and control, maintenance areas and aircraft. Ukraine successfully evaded Russia’s initial wave of strikes by dispersing its arsenals, aircraft and air defences. Conversely, the Russians succeeded in engaging 75% of static defence sites in the first 48 hours of the war. Nor is setting up a headquarters in a civilian building sufficient to make it survivable. The British Army must consider the vulnerability of higher-echelon enablement. The RAF must consider how many deployable spares kits it has to enable dispersion of its fleets.
  • Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity. Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain largescale operations. This must be rectified if deterrence is to be credible and is equally a problem for the RAF and Royal Navy.
  • Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) are essential across all branches and at all echelons. Although critical to competitiveness by providing situational awareness, 90% of UAS employed are lost. For the most part, UAS must be cheap and attritable. For land forces, they must be organic to units for the purposes of both situational awareness and target acquisition. The primary means of CUAS is EW. Another critical tactical requirement is to be alerted to the presence of UAS. For the Royal Navy, CUAS is critical for protecting vessels operating beyond the protection of a task force. For the RAF, the provision of look-down sensing to locate UAS to contribute to air defence is critical. This allows defensive resources to be prioritised on the right axes.
  • The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. Precision weapons, however, are scarce and can be defeated by EW. To enable kill chains to function at the speed of relevance, EW for attack, protection and direction finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations. Sequencing fires to disrupt EW and create windows of opportunity for precision effects is critical and creates training requirements. In modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum is unlikely to be denied, but it is continually disrupted, and forces must endeavour to gain advantage within it.
  • For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.
 
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Fall Yakovlevka in the Russian hands..it is located on a height that gives the Russians a major advantage..
 
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yay he has finally settled it....no more morons here start talking sillyness about Russia using nuclear weapons.

Putin dismisses nuclear weapons concerns, says 'we haven't gone mad,' denies another draft is coming: Live Ukraine updates​


Putin dismissed concerns that he would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, calling them a deterrent. He has said Russia will use “all available means” to protect its territory, including the annexed areas of Ukraine.

“We haven’t gone mad," he said Wednesday. "We are fully aware of what nuclear weapons are."
 
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You believe Chinese are dumb? No, they will not buy everything from Putin they will not fall into the same trap like the Europeans did. Even they want to buy there are lacks of infra, demands.
they prefer to burn coal sovereingly, than depend from Russia.

And for the people who think Russia and China are best friends, I want to remind: Telegram IM app is banned in China :lol:

Anyway future is so long, and all countries will need more energy resources as it decrease world availability.
 
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Russia-Ukraine updates: Putin says threat of nuclear war rising​

Russian President Vladimir Putin

Russian President Vladimir Putin [Sputnik/Sergei Savostyanov/Pool via Reuters]
By Edna Mohamed and Shyema Sajjad
Published On 7 Dec 20227 Dec 2022
Click here to share on social media
This blog is now closed, thanks for joining us. These were the updates on the Russia-Ukraine war for Wednesday, December 7.
Read more


  • 8h ago
    (21:36 GMT)

    US slams ‘loose talk’ on nuclear weapons after Putin comments​

    The US has denounced “loose talk” on nuclear weapons after Putin mused on rising risks of nuclear war but said Moscow would not strike first.
    State Department Spokesman Ned Price said: “We think any loose talk of nuclear weapons is absolutely irresponsible.”
    Price said nuclear powers around the world since the Cold War, including China, India, the United States and Russia itself, have been clear that “a nuclear war is something that must never be fought and can never be won”.
    “We think any other rhetoric – whether it is nuclear sabre-rattling or even raising the spectre of the use of tactical nuclear weapons – is something that is irresponsible,” Price said.
    “It is dangerous and it goes against the spirit of that statement that has been at the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime since the Cold War,” he said.
 
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if EU and US ARE NOT ACTUALLY BROKE, let them execute this plan! lmao.

they complain about Russian commodities..then buy it via Switzerland (gold) - technology exposes their lies to us.
You don’t understand. The sanctions aim to reduce Russia gov revenues. It’s not about not buying everything from Russia. The sanctions will strangulate Russia more and more. Sure, I can go to Swiss and buy Russia gold. Or even here at German banks. Russia gold is cheaper. Putin makes most money from oil selling. That’s now the main target of the newest sanction. At the end of the day, Putin has to choose between bread and butter for his hungry population or rifle and bullets. He can’t have both.
 
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Russia ‘Drains Out’ NASAMS, Hawk, IRIS-T Missile Defense Systems; Ukraine Urges US For Patriot Batteries​



BySakshi Tiwari

December 2, 2022

With Russia’s bombardment continuing unabated, Ukrainian officials have made renewed calls for air defense systems to prevent the country from becoming a black hole.
Speaking to reporters, Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba recently said his country needed “air defense, – IRIS, Hawks, Patriot.”
Russian missile attacks on Ukraine have predominantly targeted its energy infrastructure to curtail its war-fighting capabilities. Even though the West has supplied some advanced air defense systems like the NASAMS, Hawk, and the IRIS-T, Ukraine has maintained that it needs more to fight the Russian barrage of missiles raining down on its cities.
While Ukraine is pleading for more advanced air defense, a US official has said that Russia has resorted to a new ploy to exhaust the air defenses of Ukraine.
A senior US military official said on November 29 that Russia is firing unarmed cruise missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads at Ukraine to deplete Kyiv’s stocks of air defenses, Reuters reported.
The unnamed official was responding to questions regarding a previous British intelligence claim that Russia was likely firing nuclear-capable cruise missiles after removing nuclear warheads.
Ukrainian media reports have also suggested that Russia had fired the Kh-55 cruise missile after unscrewing its nuclear warhead and replacing it with a dummy. Going by these reports, a Kh-55 missile shot down over Kyiv on November 17 contained a “screwed-on” block that acted as a dummy imitator of a nuclear warhead.
Kh-55 Russia missile
Kh-55 Russian Missile
The British defense ministry had assessed that ballast was most likely being used in place of the warheads, a mechanism that would still cause damage due to the missile’s kinetic energy and unspent fuel. This is the first time a US official has commented on the evaluation.
The Pentagon has emphasized that Russia’s escalation in missile strikes in Ukraine partially aims to deplete Kyiv’s air defense supplies and eventually acquire dominance over the country’s skies.

As a result, the United States and its allies have prioritized providing Ukraine with air defense systems. This includes anything from residual Soviet-era systems to more recent Western technologies.
The US is believed to be considering arming Ukraine with its Patriot air defense systems, a Ukrainian request that it has been dithering on.
However, it could be worth considering whether the US and its NATO allies would transfer missile defense systems to Ukraine if Russia used unarmed missiles.
The advanced air defense systems transferred to Ukraine, and those under consideration fire costly missiles. Russia’s use of kamikaze drones has already led experts to believe that the odds were skewed in its favor due to the cost difference.
Some military experts believe that while the British intelligence is not incorrect, it could be a little misplaced and out of context.
HAWK missile
A HAWK missile leaving its launcher

Russia’s Unarmed Missiles Not A New Phenomenon

In a Twitter thread, the UK MoD stated on November 26, 2022, “Russia is likely removing the nuclear warheads from aging nuclear cruise missiles and firing the unarmed munitions at Ukraine.”
After giving some plausible arguments, the thread concluded that “Russia almost certainly hopes such missiles will function as decoys and divert Ukrainian air defenses. Whatever Russia’s intent, this improvisation highlights the depletion in Russia’s stock of long-range missiles.”


The conclusion was also echoed by the Institute for the Study of War, which further stated: “Russian military’s likely use of a more strategic weapon system in the role of a decoy for Ukrainian air defenses corroborates ISW’s previous reporting that the Russian military has significantly depleted its arsenal of high-precision missiles.”
However, military expert and Indian Air Force veteran Squadron Leader Vijainder K Thakur explained that many Kh-55 SM missiles had been withdrawn from their strategic role with the induction of advanced induction of Kh-102 missiles into service.
According to data, Russia began equipping its Kh-55 SM missiles with inert warheads as early as 2015, following the introduction of the Kh-102 long-range, low-observable strategic cruise missile.
X-55 missile, illustrative photo from open sources
Kh-55 in the Ukrainian Air Force Museum (Wikipedia)
The Russian Air Force, for example, stated in 2015 that four MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors had successfully brought down a Kh-55 cruise missile during a test with the assistance of an A-50. Thakur further said that militaries worldwide are attempting to repurpose retired military systems.
Russia is likely using decoy Kh-55 SM missiles with inert warheads to lure Ukrainian air defense systems into lighting up to engage the missile, revealing their positions and exposing them to attack by Su-35S fighters armed with Kh-31 missiles, which, according to the RuMoD, are on patrol 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
That said, Russia continues to rain missiles on Ukrainian cities as the battle enters a very harsh winter. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russian forces were “planning something” in the country’s south and described the situation at the front as complex, with intense fighting in the east, northeast, and south of Ukraine.
The Russian troops caught on a back foot have visibly upped the ante.
 
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It looks like even in Poland, the casualties of the war in Ukraine is piling up. 👇


"The number of wounded is probably three times the number of dead, though that can vary depending on the war's circumstance. It means that in total some 4800 men of the Polish contingent in Ukraine were wounded or killed. Is that one third of the Polish 'mercenary' forces in Ukraine? Is it more? Or less?

We don't know but I expect that quite a lot of regular soldiers of the 16th Pomeranian Mechanised Division in Olsztyn have been 'asked' to take part in the war. The division consists of one armored and two mechanized brigades plus the usual auxiliaries which makes it a 15,000 men strong unit.

The style of Polish graveyards is typical for a Catholic European country. Trees, individual graves, elaborate tombstones, candles and flowers.

polishgrave-s.jpg

source - bigger
It is understandable that people in Poland do not like the plans for an 'American' style military graveyard:


With plans for 1,700 dead Polish soldiers, beyond those 1,200 already buried, the Polish government seems to expect its soldiers to take part in an even more intensified and longer war."

in milions

no idea what is Moon of Alabama but for me sounds like a sect, they don't show any evidence in that anyway ...

i live in poland and im telling you that's how a normal graveyard lookes like in this season ... new tombstones mix with old are a normal thing in poland

and this is how a new grave would look like :
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"he authorities prepared "special honors" for them. Uniform quarters are being built in Olsztyn: There are to be two slab sizes. Larger (meter by meter) are graves for officers, smaller ones (60 cm by 60 cm) are quarters for soldiers. It will not be possible to cover the tombstone with cubes, or to sprinkle pebbles and plant flowers. Only grass is to be spread around the graves. Such an inglorious end awaits the mercenaries who died in Ukraine."

and this is a total bullshit the double size means its for a husband and wife :omghaha: i live near olsztyn man i fk know what im saying.

best part of that article is source of picture :

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2013...

Once again, I don't see any timestamp that shows 2013 and you haven't produced an irrefutable evidence that shows that photo was taken in 2013. Fyi, I shared a tweet, remember.


Here you do mister dum dum sadly for you its to easy :sarcastic::sarcastic::sarcastic::sarcastic:
 
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