Reforming the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

[fatman17]

COMMENT: Tinkering with the military system —Shahzad Chaudhry

The chiefs of the three services in Pakistan end up being both, the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff, defeating the underlying intent and the principle of division of control and power

I have held back this column for a long time now simply because when you have two friends heading the two four-star positions in the army, a chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) and the chief of army staff (COAS), any inference when discussing the military system is bound to impinge on their incumbent positions and their persons. But now that the season for change is on the cards and many have begun to reflect on the various aspects of these changes, it is about time to make a point or two.

The military system is severely lopsided in Pakistan — the predominant position of the army within the national fabric is already manifested in Pakistan’s historical experience. Its overwhelming role within the military system that constitutes the army, air force, the navy and the joint staff headquarters, is excessive and exaggerated. While operational jointness is the only way to fight modern wars, jointness is seen and known only when either of the two smaller services subordinate themselves to the army’s way of operational thinking — many smaller service officers make their careers following this kernel of assured success. There will always be a lead role for the army because our envisaged operations are more likely to be land-based. However, modern capabilities and capacities within the total military system bring to the table the concept of parallel force application that envisage employment of varying capabilities on simultaneous axes within or outside a front with an aim to synergise effects for a more expeditious and efficacious achievement of objectives. Also, such a predominant position of one force practically stifles creative growth in the other two, which remain stagnated in conformity of thought to the army’s direction of war. Hence, institutional intellect never grows. In its current form, jointness within the military system is a direct reflection of the personal rapport, or its crass absence, that defines how the services work together. These are but laments of the inside of a system that needs serious review.

But what should the nation do to propel the military system towards a more professionally focused and nationally balanced disposition? When Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created the joint staff system in 1976, it was essentially aimed at clipping the wings of the all-potent commander-in-chief of the army. The US had followed the same route in 1986 through the famous Goldwater-Nichols Act but the aim was entirely professional — to forge greater jointness in operations between the services, which appeared as a major shortcoming of the Vietnam War. Mr Bhutto’s objectives were entirely political with the benefit of better coordination among the services an incidental picking. Militarily, too, it was not tailored appropriately to Pakistan’s operational environment. In the US system, the chief of staff of any of the services does not hold direct command of troops. They are commanded by commanders-in-chief, such as General Petraeus of CENTCOM, divided geographically on a global scale catering to various theatres of war or likely operations. These commanders-in-chief report directly to their supreme commander, the president of the US. The joint chiefs are the staff of the president and work through the secretary of defence in forging policy, structure, equipment, training and manning of their respective services. To reiterate, they do not hold any troops under them.

In Pakistan, the theatre is only one, the geographical canvas of force employment is limited, and for operational efficacy and efficiency alone must be controlled from one central direction. Hence the chiefs of the three services in Pakistan end up being both, the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff, defeating the underlying intent and the principle of division of control and power that Mr Bhutto had in mind when invoking the joint chiefs system in Pakistan. Why has no one from the military ever voiced concern? Maybe because it offered an additional four-star position to the services where they were happy to ensconce anyone as a favour or recompense. Only, the incumbent CJCSC was aggrieved perpetually for gross under-utilisation.

From a political standpoint, challenges in the military system today manifest along the following lines: as per the original thought divesting army of its ability to periodically intervene in the political system remains paramount, and this must come through an in-built system of checks and division of power within the military structure. Secondly, operational jointness is a compulsion and must be institutionalised. Essentially thus the joint chiefs system must stay but needs to be made more potent. The alternate is the chief of defence staff (CDS) system as in the UK or Australia. The difference is that the CDS then becomes the hierarchical top of the pyramid where the three service chiefs become his immediate subordinates. Unless the position is rotated amongst all, at which suggestion the army is sure to balk, the two smaller services will forever remain stunted in independence and growth. It will be akin to institutionalising the army’s informal pre-eminence amongst the three services.

Other compulsions relate to the existing operational environment in the war against terror. Usually, horses are not changed midway in a war. General Kayani has proved an outstanding army chief in that he has helped the political system through its initial faltering steps and has led winning campaigns in both Swat and Waziristan. These operations are likely to stay and expand further. His equation with international players, particularly the Americans, and with the domestic political leadership is extremely comfortable and he seems committed to stabilising the internal and external dynamics of Pakistan’s stability. Losing him would be a blow to the continuity of a transition in the nation’s institutional rebuilding, while extending his present position will likely not go down well with others in the army waiting to have their chance.

Opportune as it may be, the dilemma could be resolved by moving General Kayani as the chairman joint chiefs, a position which in itself needs to be revamped with some powers of the CDS. These must include, as the primary linkage between the military and the political government on most politico-military matters, responsibility to proceed with ongoing operations through the services. The institution of the NSC is an absolute must for bringing together political, bureaucratic and military inputs on issues of national security, both short and long term. Denial of this imperative is at the nation’s peril. As his additional responsibility, the CJCSC must be consulted for selection of the chiefs of the three services. Promotions to the three-star rank in all three services should be cleared by a board consisting of the three services chiefs and chaired by the CJCSC. This hitherto has remained a discretionary one-man decision that must be checked to render greater transparency and merit in the promotion system at this level. The directorates of the ISI, and the ISPR should be moved directly under the CJCSC. This will help create the necessary balance in the powers of the army chief and the CJCSC, including giving greater comfort to political governments.

General Kayani as the CJCSC with enhanced powers can institutionalise the intended changes during his tenure and bring the credibility of both intent and performance to rationalise the lop-sided nature of the present military system.

We should give it a try.

Shahzad Chaudhry is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador

 

[niaz]

There is little doubt that fighting future wars based on experience of the previous wars in a changing world courts disaster. Nevertheless, a tested and tried system (British) over which Pakistan Army is based will be difficult to get rid off.

In an integrated/digitalized war scenario which relies heavily of modern technology, an army trained to fight a conventional war on WW2 or even Vietnam experience is hardly likely to do well against a technologically advanced enemy.

I am not talking only of Command and Control system that the article is referring to; but the whole concept of war itself. It is certain that Pak Army planners would be looking into the unified command system of the Indian Army including the cold start doctrine and trying to devise ways to combat the situation given the available resources.

IMO, a separate Research cell should be established in the GHQ headed by at least a 2-star general. Main task of this cell should be to theorize all possible permutations and combinations to create an optimum organization required to deal with possible future threats. Organize and train a brigade size task force on these lines and test the performance first in a simulated exercise against a conventional division followed by actual mock combat in a field exercise.

One can argue that this could be waste of men and material but in my view such trial and error research is a must to prepare PA to meet future challenges.

 

[sonicboom]

Reforming the JCSC

Thursday, May 13, 2010
Ikram Sehgal

At my recent talk at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC about the successful counterinsurgency operations by the Pakistani army, renowned defence analyst Stephen Cohen posed a loaded question: whether Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani should get an "extension" when his tenure as COAS expires. My answer was no, that in order to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee the effective institution it was designed to be when it first came into existence in 1975, Gen Kayani should instead head a reformed JCSC.

On extensions my opinion is that once promoted to lieutenant general a three-star must complete his tenure of four years of service (age should not become a bar). But if he has completed his four years of service an extension can be given in extraordinary circumstances. Extension of service for a COAS is an entirely different matter. Primarily, it sets off a chain reaction which ends in promotions in the army being blocked. However loyal and sincere the senior military hierarchy, potential aspirants will feel deprived of their turn at attaining the top slot. Really good prospects down the line will find their careers and ambitions sidelined. All those presently in contention for the COAS job have good professional careers, and for the most part are not tainted by real-estate scandals. "Extension" will mean these officers will retire from service in the next 12-18 months. An extension to the COAS will put a monkey wrench into a natural process.

Promotions during the Kayani incumbency have been deserving ones, and crucial slots (the right man for the right job) have mostly been filled on merit. There will always be a perception of nepotism and favouritism, normal for any organisation or corporate entity. The boss will always tend to prefer those he considers close to him. Rightly or wrongly, a feeling will still prevail that, merit notwithstanding, crucial posts will go to favourites rather than to the man best suited to the job.

The JCSC must become an effective military instrument. Today`s warfare cannot be fought service by service, it has to be a combined, all-service affair. Not a single military analyst believes otherwise, so why is practice different from theory? The present Army-PAF cooperation during counterinsurgency operations has been superb, for while both chiefs are to be commended. Something routine had to depend upon the personal chemistry of the two leaders! This is unacceptable for a modern military machine, the combined potential on which the existence of our nation is dependant.

The JCSC should be the central HQ for all three services, formulating overall war plans incorporating their combined fighting potential, and the mechanism for implementing the war plans. Things basic to the three services must be unified. Some of it is already being done--e.g., medical and engineering services. Why not entities that are common, basic training institutions, workshops, etc.? Specifics cannot be addressed in a short article, but what about standardisation of small arms, vehicles, the myriad types of which defy adequate description? The present incumbent can spend usefully the 150 days he has left by conducting an exercise on how the JCSC can be made effective.

Constructive reforms should include: (1) the JCSC becoming the GHQ for all three services, and the army`s headquarters, the "Army HQ"; (2) the chairman of the JCSC (rename him "Chief of Defence Services," or something similar) presiding over the senior promotions, from one star to two stars and from two stars to three stars in all three services; (3) all postings of three stars taking place with the concurrence of the GHQ; (4) creation of a Joint Operations Chief (JOC), or any such nomenclature, in the GHQ; (5) all military procurement under the GHQ`s aegis; (6) the ISI and the ISPR reporting to the GHQ, etc.

We need services integration, and we need it now. Being 36 years out of date, current and better military minds than mine can work out the modalities of making the JCSC effective. One does not grudge them their task of taking apart and putting out to pasture a 19th-century military mindset having no place in the 21st century, and certainly not after World War II.

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has remade the Pakistani army in many ways more than one: restoring the esteem that in which the army was held by the citizens of the country, and restoring the morale and self-confidence of its rank and file; recalling several hundred army officers "on deputation" in civil services where they had no reason to be; the military`s intelligence services not being allowed to interfere in the 2008 elections.

This set the stage for the army to get out of politics. He oversaw a peaceful transition (with dignity) of Gen Musharraf out of the office of president (and with some difficulty out of the Army House), and stayed neutral in the subsequent process of the election of the new president.

Kayani has focused on soldiers` welfare and a return to professionalism. Counterinsurgency training was carried out indigenously before soldiers were taken into battle. A peacetime outfit was converted into an effective military machine. Observers far and wide have been amazed by the effectiveness of the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign.

Our young men in uniform laid down their lives in Swat and South Waziristan. Their Shahadats amounted to something great. Kayani gently nudged the government into restoring the superior judiciary in the face of the "long march." Kayani`s many successes have not gone to his head. Instead of developing "Napoleonic" tendencies, he remains committed to democracy, even a multi-flawed, inherently corrupt one like ours. His will be a difficult act to follow.

There are many more reasons for Kayani not getting an extension. To quote Air Vice Marshal (r) Shahzad Chaudhry, "losing him would be a blow to the continuity of a transition in the nation`s institutional rebuilding, while extending his present position will likely not go down well with others in the army waiting to have their chance."

With the universal confidence reposed in Kayani, he can supervise the process of making the JCSC reforms effective. Without this, Kayani should opt to retire gracefully, putting the considerable strength of his popularity in ensuring that the best man for the job is selected as the new COAS.



The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com

Reforming the JCSC

 

[Patriot]

I agree with the author - The head of Joint Chief of Staff Committee should be given more power and should be from Air Force to bridge can be built between 3 services.Too many Army Generals are filling this post from last 2 decades.I think only 1 air marshal got this position During BB Tenure.This position should be given to other services officers specially PAF.

 

[blain2]

To add to this discussion, here is AVM Shehzad Chaudhry's article:

Tinkering with the military system —Shahzad Chaudhry

The chiefs of the three services in Pakistan end up being both, the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff, defeating the underlying intent and the principle of division of control and power

I have held back this column for a long time now simply because when you have two friends heading the two four-star positions in the army, a chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) and the chief of army staff (COAS), any inference when discussing the military system is bound to impinge on their incumbent positions and their persons. But now that the season for change is on the cards and many have begun to reflect on the various aspects of these changes, it is about time to make a point or two.

The military system is severely lopsided in Pakistan — the predominant position of the army within the national fabric is already manifested in Pakistan’s historical experience. Its overwhelming role within the military system that constitutes the army, air force, the navy and the joint staff headquarters, is excessive and exaggerated. While operational jointness is the only way to fight modern wars, jointness is seen and known only when either of the two smaller services subordinate themselves to the army’s way of operational thinking — many smaller service officers make their careers following this kernel of assured success. There will always be a lead role for the army because our envisaged operations are more likely to be land-based. However, modern capabilities and capacities within the total military system bring to the table the concept of parallel force application that envisage employment of varying capabilities on simultaneous axes within or outside a front with an aim to synergise effects for a more expeditious and efficacious achievement of objectives. Also, such a predominant position of one force practically stifles creative growth in the other two, which remain stagnated in conformity of thought to the army’s direction of war. Hence, institutional intellect never grows. In its current form, jointness within the military system is a direct reflection of the personal rapport, or its crass absence, that defines how the services work together. These are but laments of the inside of a system that needs serious review.

But what should the nation do to propel the military system towards a more professionally focused and nationally balanced disposition? When Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created the joint staff system in 1976, it was essentially aimed at clipping the wings of the all-potent commander-in-chief of the army. The US had followed the same route in 1986 through the famous Goldwater-Nichols Act but the aim was entirely professional — to forge greater jointness in operations between the services, which appeared as a major shortcoming of the Vietnam War. Mr Bhutto’s objectives were entirely political with the benefit of better coordination among the services an incidental picking. Militarily, too, it was not tailored appropriately to Pakistan’s operational environment. In the US system, the chief of staff of any of the services does not hold direct command of troops. They are commanded by commanders-in-chief, such as General Petraeus of CENTCOM, divided geographically on a global scale catering to various theatres of war or likely operations. These commanders-in-chief report directly to their supreme commander, the president of the US. The joint chiefs are the staff of the president and work through the secretary of defence in forging policy, structure, equipment, training and manning of their respective services. To reiterate, they do not hold any troops under them.

In Pakistan, the theatre is only one, the geographical canvas of force employment is limited, and for operational efficacy and efficiency alone must be controlled from one central direction. Hence the chiefs of the three services in Pakistan end up being both, the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff, defeating the underlying intent and the principle of division of control and power that Mr Bhutto had in mind when invoking the joint chiefs system in Pakistan. Why has no one from the military ever voiced concern? Maybe because it offered an additional four-star position to the services where they were happy to ensconce anyone as a favour or recompense. Only, the incumbent CJCSC was aggrieved perpetually for gross under-utilisation.

From a political standpoint, challenges in the military system today manifest along the following lines: as per the original thought divesting army of its ability to periodically intervene in the political system remains paramount, and this must come through an in-built system of checks and division of power within the military structure. Secondly, operational jointness is a compulsion and must be institutionalised. Essentially thus the joint chiefs system must stay but needs to be made more potent. The alternate is the chief of defence staff (CDS) system as in the UK or Australia. The difference is that the CDS then becomes the hierarchical top of the pyramid where the three service chiefs become his immediate subordinates. Unless the position is rotated amongst all, at which suggestion the army is sure to balk, the two smaller services will forever remain stunted in independence and growth. It will be akin to institutionalising the army’s informal pre-eminence amongst the three services.

Other compulsions relate to the existing operational environment in the war against terror. Usually, horses are not changed midway in a war. General Kayani has proved an outstanding army chief in that he has helped the political system through its initial faltering steps and has led winning campaigns in both Swat and Waziristan. These operations are likely to stay and expand further. His equation with international players, particularly the Americans, and with the domestic political leadership is extremely comfortable and he seems committed to stabilising the internal and external dynamics of Pakistan’s stability. Losing him would be a blow to the continuity of a transition in the nation’s institutional rebuilding, while extending his present position will likely not go down well with others in the army waiting to have their chance.

Opportune as it may be, the dilemma could be resolved by moving General Kayani as the chairman joint chiefs, a position which in itself needs to be revamped with some powers of the CDS. These must include, as the primary linkage between the military and the political government on most politico-military matters, responsibility to proceed with ongoing operations through the services. The institution of the NSC is an absolute must for bringing together political, bureaucratic and military inputs on issues of national security, both short and long term. Denial of this imperative is at the nation’s peril. As his additional responsibility, the CJCSC must be consulted for selection of the chiefs of the three services. Promotions to the three-star rank in all three services should be cleared by a board consisting of the three services chiefs and chaired by the CJCSC. This hitherto has remained a discretionary one-man decision that must be checked to render greater transparency and merit in the promotion system at this level. The directorates of the ISI, and the ISPR should be moved directly under the CJCSC. This will help create the necessary balance in the powers of the army chief and the CJCSC, including giving greater comfort to political governments.

General Kayani as the CJCSC with enhanced powers can institutionalise the intended changes during his tenure and bring the credibility of both intent and performance to rationalise the lop-sided nature of the present military system.

We should give it a try.

Shahzad Chaudhry is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador

 

[fatman17]

mods pls merge as already posted

 

[fatman17]

I agree with the author - The head of Joint Chief of Staff Committee should be given more power and should be from Air Force to bridge can be built between 3 services.Too many Army Generals are filling this post from last 2 decades.I think only 1 air marshal got this position During BB Tenure.This position should be given to other services officers specially PAF.

according to the rules, it is a 'rotating system' where senior-most AP,PAF and PN general officers are given the post but yes i agree due to army 'over-bearence' it gets the post the majority of the times.

last PN officer was Adm Sirohey and last PAF officer was AVM Feroze Khan (i think)

 

[blain2]

It was ACM Farooq Feroze Khan ;-) You have to be a 4 star to be considered for the slot. Somewhere in the late 90s, early 2000s, it was decided that for JCS to work, the post has to go to the Army because of, and as alluded to by you, the domination of the service over the other two.

 

[fatman17]

Comment: The days ahead —Zafar Hilaly

One hears that the government is currently pondering the amount of extra time General Kayani should be given as head of the army. Should it be one, two or three years?

If life were fair, the prime minister, a gaddi-nashin, would have been making a living interceding with God on behalf of devotees. Nevertheless, Mr Gilani will need his special nexus with God to get the government out of the deep hole in which it finds itself as the seemingly inevitable clash with the judiciary draws nearer. To be fair to Mr Gilani, he would prefer not to be a part of the fracas, it being entirely a matter concerning Mr Zardari, but he has no option. As he said some time ago, “We swim or sink together.”

The Swiss cases are not the only cause of friction between the government and the judiciary. If, or rather, when the Supreme Court finds out about the amount of commission, the extent of advance payment and other details of the rental power projects (RPPs), of which it has taken suo motu notice, there will be hell to pay. The ethos of the Supreme Court is very different from that of Mr Zardari. Actually, there is a vast divergence between them on just about every issue, including their respective takes on right and wrong and what is permissible or reasonable and what is not. In brief, their perspectives are antithetical and a rupture, therefore, appears very likely.

Another development, which could impact negatively on the conduct of the war against the Taliban, is the question of General Kayani’s extension. That he should be given one is generally agreed by all, especially many of those who serve with him in the army. Ordinarily, extensions are considered unnecessary because no one is indispensable. However, that cliché has proved wrong by the absence of Benazir Bhutto and the presence of Mr Zardari in her stead.

One cogent reason for Kayani to remain is that, having been tasked to draw up the military’s response to the threat posed by the Taliban and India and to such Indian doctrines as ‘Cold Start’ and ‘Two-Front Wars’, it is only logical that he stays on to implement it. Thus far, Kayani’s operational plans have been successful far beyond expectations, although success against the Taliban has been marred by collateral damage to civilian property and lives, lack of a determined effort to resettle the displaced population and an inability to provide assured security to the inhabitants of the areas supposedly cleansed of the enemy. And although all that, the military says, is not its job, frankly no one buys such nice distinctions. There is no use clearing a field of weeds if nothing is made to grow on it. Whether the military feels aggrieved or not, it had better address these issues lest Kayani be equated with the victorious Protestant general whose troops caused such desolation and suffering that when he was removed many rejoiced.

One hears that the government is currently pondering the amount of extra time General Kayani should be given as head of the army. Should it be one, two or three years? And that will probably depend on who else the government has in mind. And also whether it prefers to serve out its own term with Kayani or would also like to appoint his successor.

Given the proclivity of the current regime to keep its options open, which is another way of not having to deal with the issue immediately, one suspects that it may opt to grant him only another year. That would be a pity for a number of reasons in addition to the importance of continuity of command: the excellent rapport that Kayani has forged with allied generals; the trust that he has engendered among them and with his own troops; the strategy that he enunciated and recently sold to NATO in Brussels; and, of course, the likelihood of another operation in North Waziristan. However, to my mind, Kayani needs to stay most of all because removing a commander in the midst of a war sends the wrong message to friend and foe alike and, more importantly, because he appears uniquely suited for the job at this juncture of our troubled history in view of his personality, temperament, ability, aptitude and experience.

These plusses easily outweigh the heart burning his extension may cause among his peers. They also outweigh fears that he may grow too big for his boots. In any case, that is misreading the man. And, as this is the near universal view about him, not everyone can be wrong. The snag is that General Kayani will not personally raise the issue nor, rumour has it, will he accept an extension unless it is long enough to allow him to implement his plans for the army.

The selection of an army chief, or the question of his extension, is nearly always in Pakistan the subject of intense controversy. What should be and is elsewhere a relatively routine matter dictated by need, and not wish or favour, is not so here. Mr Gilani (or is it Mr Zardari?) has the opportunity to lay such speculation to rest by being forthcoming on the issue and acting quickly to quell the uncertainty. And, hopefully, they will, because one recalls with no pleasure the antics of politicians when it came to choosing General Waheed’s successor after he refused an extension; and earlier after General Asif Nawaz’s untimely death. In the case of the former, it was virtually the only subject of discussion at every Islamabad gathering for weeks and, in the case of the latter, one recalls being offered celebratory sweets by supporters of a general who eventually did not make it. Things should not be allowed to reach such a pass. It is hardly an unforeseen event.

In many respects, therefore, 2010 is a crucial year. It will probably determine Mr Zardari’s fate and, if things do not go well in the war, also Pakistan’s future. Should one be downhearted? No!

The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at charles123it@hotmail.com