RAW News & Discussions

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Bush is legally doing it.

China has gagged it.

All others are secretly at it!

Everyone knows of RAW. They have bungled too many things to remain unknown!

 

[akzaman]

India's Kaoboys: In the shadow of history

Claude Arpi

August 06, 2007

In the sixties, one heard about the Kaulboys, a few generals
gravitating around Lieutenant General B M Kaul who took over as
chief of the general staff at army headquarters with Jawaharlal
Nehru's blessings.

They quickly became great China policy experts with the tragic
consequences of October 1962. Henderson-Brooks is said to have
pointed out that from the beginning of 1961 'crucial professional
military practice was abandoned. From this stemmed the
unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces.'

Today we are introduced to the Kaoboys. While the Kaulboys were
flamboyant, rash and braggart, the Kaoboys were discreet, efficient,
often grey but professional to the tips of their fingers.

Unfortunately so far they have remained in the shadow of history.
Thanks to B Raman, who worked for 26 years for the Research and
Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, we know
more about Rameshwar Nath Kao and his boys today.

Raman's book The Kaoboys of the R&AW, Down Memory Lane (published by
Lancer Publishers) is not the first book written by an intelligence
officer. B N Mullick, who served for 16 years as the director of the
Intelligence Bureau, wrote My Years with Nehru, his memoirs in three
volumes. But this was before the bifurcation of the Intelligence
Bureau into two separate agencies: one looking after internal
intelligence (IB) and the other after the external (R&AW).

Raman's work is exceptional because for the first time we get an
insider's analysis of the success and failures of the secretive
Indian external intelligence agency. The book covers the history of
R&AW since its inception in September 1968 till Raman retired from
service in August 1994.

In many ways, Kao was a remarkable officer. Alexandre de Marenches,
the legendary French external intelligence Chief, is supposed to
have said about Kao: 'What a fascinating mix of physical and mental
elegance! What accomplishments! What friendships! And yet so shy of
talking about himself, his accomplishments and his friends!'

Through the book, one notices Indira Gandhi's absolute confidence in
her external intelligence chief and this for one reason: his
professional competence. Kao was responsible for setting up R&AW
practically from scratch.

Raman remembers some of his qualities: 'He gave credit to his
colleagues and subordinates when things went well and took the blame
when things went wrong. He was liked by the high and the mighty not
only in India, but also in many countries, but throughout his life
never once did he drop or use their names.'

It seems that the name Kaoboys stuck to Kao and his team when George
Bush Sr was the CIA chief in the 1970s. He was told by his chief of
station in Delhi about the Kaoboys of R&AW (the name may have
originally been given by the diplomat Apa Pant). When Kao visited
the CIA HQ in Washington DC, Bush Sr presented him a small bronze
statue of a cowboy.

But Kao's team were no cowboys, their work was silent, no question
of showing off, no tall claims ('tall claims have a nasty way of
coming back home to haunt you'), no weekly appearances on television
panels commenting on every topic under the sky! However, under Kao's
leadership, the 'boys' managed, amongst other feats, to free
Bangladesh from Pakistan's yoke.

It was R&AW's hour of glory, though Kao's name was hardly known.
Raman recounts an incident which occurred in 1996. Celebrations were
held in Delhi to mark the 25th anniversary of the liberation of
Bangladesh. While politicians were speaking, a Bangladeshi
gentleman 'noticed a tall, handsome and elegant man sitting
inconspicuously at the back of the audience. The Bengali went and
told the man (Kao): 'Sir, you should have been sitting at the centre
of the dais. You are the man who made 1971 possible.'

Kao replied: 'I did nothing. They (resumably the boys) deserve all
praise.' Embarrassed to have been recognised, Kao left. Through the
290 pages of the Kaoboys, Raman goes into some details on the
Bangladesh war and several other operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan
or Sri Lanka as well as his postings in Paris and Geneva.

There are two ways to go about reviewing a book like the Kaoboys.
One is to pick up a few 'scoopy' details and highlight them. This
has been done by many reviewers. However, as Raman himself pointed
out in one of his Rediff columns, the 'breaking the news' type of
commentators are often illiterate and what they perceive as the
scoop is simply due to their appalling ignorance.

For example, headlines about 'French intelligence penetrating the
PMO' became recurring. What was known as the Coomar Narain case in
the early eighties remained in the press for several weeks at the
time of its discovery. French intelligence officers used to visit
the prime minister's office on Sundays and other holidays, select
thousands of documents and take photocopies of whatever files
interested them, of course on the PMO's machine.

What Raman does not mention is that when it was discovered, the
French ambassador was declared persona non grata and given 48 hours
to leave the country. He was later promoted to director general of
the French ministry of external affairs (equivalent to foreign
secretary) for his 'good work'.

Dr P C Alexander, Indira Gandhi's principal secretary whose office
was looted, was not rewarded, but only 'kicked up' as high
commissioner in London. The operation is analysed by Raman as the
greatest failure in counter-intelligence.

Many of such stories found in Raman's book have been reported in the
Indian press. I would therefore prefer to highlight some more
important aspects of Raman's memoirs which are the only available
views by an insider, not 'a bird of passage', on the functioning of
the R&AW (Mullick's books were more a personal justification for the
IB's failure in the fifties to envisage and anticipate the Chinese
threat).

One quality of Raman which probably helped him in his career as a
spy is his honesty. He often records his personal or his
organisation's mistakes or failures. Just to cite one, when in 1969,
the Naga threat was a serious issue in the Northeast, the IB and
R&AW had assessed that 2,100 Nagas had managed to go to Yunnan to be
trained by the Chinese.

Sam Manekshaw, the then army commander, contended that they were not
more than 450. A year later, after arresting and interrogating a
Naga leader they found out that the army was right.

Raman readily acknowledges it. Of course there were far more serious
failures, particularly the intelligence 'black hole' before the
Mumbai blasts after the Babri Masjid demolition or the Sri Lankan
messy story. All are honestly analysed. To be able to assess its
failure is certainly one of the most indispensable qualities of an
intelligence analyst. Raman admits 'like all living organisations,
(R&AW) has had the best times and it has had the worst of times.'

From the prologue of the book till the last chapter, one issue comes
again and again: The non-cooperation (to say the least) of the
United States to help India handle its security threats. This is not
something new, though Raman gives several shocking factual examples.

On the day of his retirement in 1994, a man known for his poker
face, 'who showed no emotions or passion' shouted 'bastards' as he
entered his flat in Chennai. It was the anger and bitterness that he
had kept suppressed during 26 years of service. It was not directly
addressed to R&AW's US counterpart, the CIA, but rather at the State
Department.

The reader will have the occasion to go through scores of examples
of US 'un-cooperation,' whether it was in the support to the
Khalistani movement or the insurgency in J&K, all instigated by the
ISI and directly sponsored by the United States which only
discovered the meaning of terrorism in September 2001.

It is unfortunate that tragedies have been necessary to open the
eyes of the West to the difficulties faced by India (for example,
Canada started collaborated when its nationals were killed in the
Kanishka bombing).

The only time the US agencies collaborated with India was when they
needed India's help to counter the advances of Communist China. Once
after R&AW was given some equipment to spy on China, the then
director of the US Intelligence told Kao: 'Ramji, we all cheat in
this profession. I know that the R&AW will cheat and use the
equipment given by us for the collection of TECHINT (Technical
Intelligence) about Pakistan. Make sure that our State Department
does not come to know of it.'

Paradoxically, it is when the CIA was ferocious in its PSYWAR
campaign against Indira Gandhi that the agency was 'cordially'
collaborating with R&AW for controlling China.

Extremely useful insights are given by Raman on the relations
between R&AW and the IB which never really 'digested' the
bifurcation of 1968. Cooperation, for example during the Sri Lankan
episode, has often been lacking. A similar rivalry existed (and
probably still exists) between the intelligence officers posted
abroad and Indian diplomats who often blamed R&AW to just
prepare 'copy and paste' reports from open sources and were probably
jealous of the lack of parliamentary and public oversight on R&AW's
work and their easier access to head of governments.

Fascinating is Raman's sharp analysis of the relations of successive
R&AW chiefs with the different Indian prime ministers. Indira
Gandhi, Rajiv and Chandra Shekhar seem to have been the favourites
and Morarji Desai who ordered a strict budget reduction, left less
of an impression on Raman, except for the nuts he was eating while
others were lavishly banqueting in Paris one day.

One sad confirmation is R&AW's weakness in accessing China. A large
percentage of the agency's officers have specialised either in
Pakistan, Afghanistan or Arab countries but very few in China.
During its nearly 40 years of history, only one of R&AW's chiefs has
been a 'China hand'. This is probably due to the fact that Enemy No
1 has always been Pakistan and not China. One can hope that it will
be rectified in the years to come.

One can, of course, regret that Raman did not speak more about the
some of the agency's covert operations, for example the role of
Tibetan troops under Kao during the 1971 operations, the role of the
Aviation Research Centre or covert actions 'to bleed' Pakistan.

Raman's book, apart from being full of juicy stories will remain a
textbook for those interested to study and understand the first
years of India's external intelligence agency. The nuggets and
the 'scoops' will soon be forgotten, because India is 'a nation
without memory' as Raman wrote, but this will remain.

One last regret. Raman says that the Historical Division at R&AW is
no more. Can we hope that the government will take the timely
decision to reopen it, so that our children can one day read the
equivalent to the 'family jewels' (about CIA covert operations)
recently released by the CIA?

 

[akzaman]

The Spy Master and his Kaoboys

Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

After working for 28 years in Military Intelligence, I realised that MI was like a mistress to be coveted and courted in privacy and ignored in public by the commanders. But after reading B Raman's 'The Kaoboys of the R&AW' - an absorbing walk down the memory lane of his 27-year journey in the Research and Analysis Wing - I came to the conclusion that civil intelligence agencies are no better. But unlike the MI they are not mistresses but royal concubines. Their influence is great, but they have to stand in for the queen to take the flak when the royalty fails.

According to Raman, the name Kaoboys was originally used by Ambassador Apa Pant. It stuck to RN Kao, the visionary chief of R&AW and his team when George Bush Sr was the CIA chief in the 1970s. When Kao visited the CIA HQ in Washington DC, Bush presented him a small bronze statue of a cowboy. And Raman as one of the original Kaoboys, shares his memories of working under the great spymaster.

Three things make this book remarkable candour and honesty, fair judgement, and moral courage. The self-effacing personality Raman has not prevented him from calling a spade a spade whether it is about his mentor and Guru RN Kao, or his organisation. I found Raman's book refreshing after reviewing General Musharraf's autobiography glorifying himself in the first person singular. Unlike the General, Raman does not drum up his achievements loudly in every chapter. These are tucked in here and there in low key, often credited to his guru or his organisation.

As a nation our historical sense rarely goes beyond Ramayana and Mahabharata. Thus we have been missing out on first hand accounts those who participated in events that shaped national decision making process. There are a few memoirs of politicians and bureaucrats from the former Vice President Dr MC Chagla to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to Dr PC Alexander which do fill the void. But unlike many of them written in dry as dust 'South Block English', Raman has adopted a modern, reader-friendly style. So the book is interesting and a few anecdotes thrown in between makes it absorbing. Books on Indian intelligence, that too on R&AW, are too few. So Raman's honest book is a welcome addition to understand Indian history in the making from an intelligence perspective. Raman's writing highlights areas of strengths and weaknesses not only in intelligence but also in our national policy making process and governance. This enhances the value of this book.

There are two broad streams of analytical thought running through the book: national leadership's role in the performance of R&AW, and issues relating to R&AW's structuring and operational management. This article shall touch upon some of these aspects rather than the juicy stories, some of which have already been reproduced in the media.

National leadership and the performance of R&AW

The performance of R&AW under prime ministers like Mrs Indira Gandhi and PV Narasimha Rao, who had clarity of thought, was far superior to others like Morarji Desai or VP Singh whose prejudices overrode their faith in professional competence of intelligence agencies.

Intelligence assets take time to build; unfortunately lack of continuity in policy decisions on intelligence can cost the nation dearly. When this is combined with populist decision making by the rulers, it can become a disaster. The author has cited a number of such instances. For instance the soft handling of terrorism in Kashmir by VP Singh kindled the spread of terror threat. Stung by this in a fire fighting measure, his government went to the other extreme of asking the R&AW to give arms training to RSS cadres of Jammu to fight the terrorists! Though nothing came of it as the Babri Masjid issue took precedence, it showed the extreme swings which government policy could take. The dismantling of covert action assets painstakingly created in Pakistan when IK Gujral came to power is yet another such instance that affected India's national interest.

Among the prime ministers with whom Raman had interacted, Mrs Indira Gandhi comes alive as a powerful personality. Raman's vivid picture of Indira Gandhi's paranoia in chapter 5 is succinctly summed up in the statement 'benevolence and malevolence go side by side.' She recognised the value of giving enough space to RN Kao to build the R&AW as an effective organisation. Actually, RA&W under Kao proved itself within eight years of its arrival during the Bangladesh war in 1971. But somewhere down the line, R&AW lost its grip with Bangladesh thereafter and came a cropper with Mujibur Rahman's assassination. The Bangladesh War was a glorious chapter in Indian intelligence, when the army, the BSF, the IB and the R&AW worked to a cogent plan without trampling upon each others toes. Unfortunately, that spirit was perhaps never recovered in any other national crisis or war ever after, whether it was Khalistani revolt, Mumbai blast or Kargil War.

Chapter 7 dealing with the period of Emergency is interesting. The questionable use of R&AW during the Emergency, like the induction of two officers in I&B Ministry, reflected the leadership failure of both the prime minister and the organisation. Though the misuse was probably exaggerated in public perception, it coincided with the period of R&AW's rapid expansion. More than that, the Emergency set a bad precedence in the successive governments misusing intelligence agencies for political purposes. Raman's frank analysis of Kao's role during this period as advisor to Mrs Gandhi has no frills attached.

The Rajiv Gandhi period was a troublesome one for the nation, with Punjab in the melting pot of insurgency aided and abetted by the ISI, in the midst of the young leader's attempt to establish himself on his own terms. Perhaps this is the best chapter in the whole book. The faltering steps taken by Rajiv Gandhi with the help of R&AW to handle Pakistan is explained in some detail by Raman. But Rajiv had the sense to maintain continuity with earlier policies and kept an open mind unlike his successors. Thus timely technology inputs to the R&AW were acquired in this period.

Most of the intelligence community will concur with Rajiv's belief and Raman's observation about the Pakistani mindset as an enduring phenomenon that bugs Pak perceptions and policies towards India. Of course there were some quirks in Rajiv's performance: training of the first batch of the SPG in Italy, Rajiv Gandhi directly getting involved in a campaign to 'get back' at VP Singh and the intelligence agencies joining his bandwagon, his inexperienced handling of the Sri Lanka intervention etc. Raman has objectively discussed these issues.

External threats to intelligence

Raman has cited a number of instances of penetration of the IB, PMO including the NSCS, and the R&AW by the CIA, French and German intelligence etc. For instance the CIA had a mole in R&AW in Chennai during 1987 and the French had infiltrated the PMO in Delhi in this period and sensitive information was leaking like a sieve in this period. His suggestion for setting up a watchdog body to monitor the performance of IB and R&AW is an important one. In the US, such a body reports directly to the Congressional Oversight Committees. However in our country, where some of the ministers continue to be in the cabinet even as serious criminal cases are pending against them, the usefulness of such a parliamentary oversight committee appears doubtful.

The CIA has probably four decades of relationship with Indian intelligence. Yet it has persisted successfully in penetrating Indian intelligence agencies more than once. Raman has documented a few such cases of CIA moles in R&AW (an unnamed IPS officer and Major Rabinder Singh). Despite this, his contempt is focused on the State Department as the biggest road block to Indian interests. The State Department had all along known the ISI's involvement in terrorism in India and had consistently refused to recognize it. During the Narasimha Rao days it had the temerity to put India on notice if the R&AW did not desist from covert action in Pakistan! For those who want better relations with the US, Raman gives a timely reminder in this piece.

R&AW and Iinternational relations

Many may not know the nature of relationship that exists between intelligence agencies of many countries. Raman recounts the relationship built between the R&AW and the CIA, French SDECE, Khad of Afghanistan, the SAVAK of Shah's Iran, MOSSAD, the MI5 and MI6, and even the Ministry of State Security of China at various points. Of course, these relations had two sides: they helped each other wherever it was possible but that did not prevent them from spying on each other. While CIA helped R&AW as far as China was concerned, it constantly tried to penetrate the top echelons of Indian administration and the R&AW.

Raman cites his own experience of working under cover appointments in Indian missions in Paris (operating with the full knowledge of the French to gather intelligence on third countries without using French nationals) and Geneva. These two accounts on the sidelines are full of interesting anecdotes of visits of VIPs from India and the internal politics of Indian missions.

Many may not know the R&AW had an important role in building bridges with African nations and Israel. Similarly it had a hand in opening up India's relations with China during Rajiv Gandhi's regime.

Conclusion

The book is a tribute to RN Kao, described by Raman as one who "gave credit to his colleagues and subordinates when things went well and took the blame when things went wrong. He was liked by the high and the mighty not only in India, but also in many countries, but throughout his life never once did he drop or use their names."

But it is much more than that. It is a mirror of how we excelled and faltered as a nation and the role played by the R&AW in it. And it is worth reading for this single reason.

As an old MI hand I share Raman's concern at the pedestrian response in the government machinery to take action upon receiving vital information. He cites the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is one instance he cites. I know this to be true first hand because MI handed over to the IB in Chennai an intercepted LTTE transmission where the cadre spoke of finishing off Rajiv when he came to Tamilnadu. The IB boss laughed it off. "Why should the LTTE kill him?" was his reaction. Perhaps the LTTE did not hear him; after a few months they killed Rajiv Gandhi. Now we see this kind of inaction time and again, the latest being the Hyderabad blasts where there was advance notice of the explosions. Who is accountable for such lapses? Unless, we become a nation with accountability for our actions or inaction more innocent lives will be blasted to bits.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, is an intelligence analyst. E.-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )
The Spy Master and his Kaoboys

 

[Marathaman]

What is all this remote viewing crap? Since when did the intelligence agencies start appointing mind-reading kooks?

 

[bhangra12345]

What is all this remote viewing crap? Since when did the intelligence agencies start appointing mind-reading kooks?

The author must have got a brain wave after seeing minority report and so is sprouting those.

Minority Report (2002)

Those are his musings of what will happen when they actually do it and slam he take his most (non)favorite agency and then assigns it to that.

 

[BATMAN]

R.A.W.: An Instrument of Indian Imperialism - Worldpress.org
R.A.W.: An Instrument of Indian Imperialism
Isha Khan, Dhaka, Bangladesh, September 12, 2007

India's intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R.A.W.), created in 1968, has assumed a significant status in the formulation of the country's domestic and foreign policies, particularly the latter. Working directly under the prime minister, it has over the years become an effective instrument of India's national power. In consonance with Kautilya's precepts, R.A.W.'s espionage doctrine is based on the principle of waging a continuous series of battles of intrigues and secret wars. (Kautilya, or more popularly, Chânakya, was an ancient Indian political theorist.)

Since its creation, R.A.W. has been a vital, though unobtrusive, actor in the Indian policy-making apparatus. But it is the massive international dimensions of R.A.W. operations that merit a closer examination. To the credit of this organization, it has in a very short span of time mastered the art of spy warfare. Credit must go to Indira Gandhi who in the late 1970's gave it a changed and much more dynamic role. To suit her much publicized Indira Doctrine (India Doctrine), Gandhi specifically asked R.A.W. to create a powerful organ within the organization that could undertake covert operations in neighboring countries. It is this capability that makes R.A.W. a more fearsome agency than the superior K.G.B., C.I.A., M.I.6, B.N.D., or Mossad.

Its internal role is confined only to monitoring events that have a bearing on the external threat. R.A.W.'s boss works directly under the prime minister. An Additional secretary to the government of India, under the director of R.A.W., is responsible for the Office of Special Operations, intelligence collected from different countries, internal security (under the director general of security), the electronic/technical section, and general administration. The additional secretary as well as the director general of security is also under the director of R.A.W. The director of security has two important sections: the Aviation Research Center and the Special Services Bureau. The joint director has specified desks with different regional divisions/areas (countries): area one, Pakistan; area two, China and Southeast Asia; area three, the Middle East and Africa; and area four, other countries.

The Aviation Research Center (A.R.C.) is responsible for interception, monitoring and jamming of a target country's communication systems. It has the most sophisticated electronic equipment and also a substantial number of aircraft equipped with state-of-the-art eavesdropping devices. A.R.C. was strengthened in mid-1987 by the addition of three new aircraft, all Gulf Stream-3s. These aircraft can reportedly fly at an altitude of 52,000 feet and have an operating range of 5,000 kilometers. A.R.C. also controls a number of radar stations located close to India's borders. Its aircraft also carry out oblique reconnaissance, along the border with Bangladesh, China, Nepal, and Pakistan.

Having been given virtual carte blanche to conduct destabilization operations in neighboring countries inimical to India, R.A.W. seriously undertook restructuring of its organization accordingly. R.A.W. was given a list of seven countries—Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Maldives—that India considered its principal regional protagonists. It very soon systematically and brilliantly crafted covert operations in all these countries to coerce, destabilize, and subvert them in consonance with the foreign policy objectives of the Indian government.

R.A.W.'s operations against the regional countries were conducted with great professional skill and expertise. Central to the operations was the establishment of a huge network inside the target countries. It used and targeted political dissent, ethnic divisions, economic backwardness, and criminal elements within these states to foment subversion, terrorism, and sabotage. Having thus created conducive environments, R.A.W. stage-managed future events in these countries in such a way that military intervention appears a natural concomitant of the events. In most cases, R.A.W.'s hand remained hidden, but more often than not target countries soon began unearthing this "hidden hand." A brief expose of R.A.W.'s operations in neighboring countries, "Open Secrets: India's Intelligence Unveiled " by M. K. Dhar (Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2005), revealed the full expanse of its regional ambitions to suit the India Doctrine.

Bangladesh
Indian intelligence agencies were involved in erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, beginning in the early 1960's. Its operatives were in touch with Sheikh Mujib for quite some time. Sheikh Mujib went to Agartala in 1965. The famous Agartala case was unearthed in 1967. In fact, the main purpose of raising R.A.W. in 1968 was to organize covert operations in Bangladesh. As early as 1968, R.A.W. was given a green light to begin mobilizing all its resources for the impending surgical intervention in erstwhile East Pakistan. When in July 1971 General Manekshaw told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the army would not be ready until December to intervene in Bangladesh, she quickly turned to R.A.W. for help. R.A.W. was ready. Its officers used Bengali refugees to set up the guerilla force Mukti Bahini. Using this outfit as a cover, the Indian military sneaked deep into Bangladesh. The story of Mukti Bahini and R.A.W.'s role in its creation and training is now well known. R.A.W. never concealed its Bangladesh operations. (See Asoka Raina's "Inside R.A.W.: the story of India's Secret Service, Vikas Publishing House of New Delhi.)

The creation of Bangladesh was masterminded by R.A.W. in complicity with the K.G.B. under the covert clauses of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (adopted as the 25-Year Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972).

R.A.W. retained a keen interest in Bangladesh even after its independence. Subramaniam Swamy, Janata Dal member of Parliament, a close associate of Morarji Desai, said that Rameswar Nath Kao, former chief of R.A.W., and Shankaran Nair were upset about Sheikh Mujib's assassination and chalked a plot to kill Gen. Ziaur Rahman. However, when Desai came to power in 1977 he was indignant at R.A.W.'s role in Bangladesh and ordered operations in Bangladesh to be called off; but by then R.A.W. had already gone too far. General Zia continued in power for quite some time but was assassinated after Indira Gandhi returned to power, though she denied involvement in his assassination (Weekly Sunday, Calcutta, Sept. 18, 1988).

R.A.W. was involved in training of Chakma tribes and Shanti Bahini, who carried out subversive activities in Bangladesh. It also unleashed a well-organized plan of psychological warfare, created polarization among the armed forces, propagated false allegations of the use of Bangladesh territory by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, created dissension among the political parties and religious sects, controlled the media, denied the use of river waters, and propped up a host of disputes in order to keep Bangladesh under constant political and socio-economic pressure (See "R.A.W. and Bangladesh" by Mohammad Zainal Abedin, November 1995, and "R.A.W. in Bangladesh: Portrait of an Aggressive Intelligence," written and published by Abu Rushd, Dhaka).

Sikkim and Bhutan
Sikkim was the easiest and most docile prey for R.A.W. Indira Gandhi annexed the Kingdom of Sikkim in the mid-1970's. The deposed King Chogyal Tenzig Wangehuck was closely followed by R.A.W.'s agents until his death in 1992.

Bhutan, like Nepal and Sikkim, is a land-locked country totally dependent on India. R.A.W. developed links with members of the royal family as well as top bureaucrats to implements its policies. It cultivated agents from among Nepalese settlers and put itself in a position to create difficulties for the government of Bhutan. In fact, the king of Bhutan has been reduced to the position of merely acquiescing to New Delhi's decisions and goes by its dictates in the international arena.

Sri Lanka
Post-independence Sri Lanka, despite having a multi-sectoral population, was a peaceful country until 1971 and was following an independent foreign policy. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, despite heavy pressure from India, Sri Lanka allowed Pakistan's civil and military aircraft and ships to stage through its air and seaports with unhindered refueling facilities. It had also permitted Israel to establish a nominal intelligence presence and permitted the installation of a high-powered transmitter by Voice of America, which was resented by India.

It was because of these "irritants" that Indira Gandhi planned to bring Sri Lanka into the fold of the so-called Indira Doctrine (India Doctrine). Kao was told by Gandhi to repeat their Bangladesh success. R.A.W. went looking for militants it could train to destabilize the regime. Camps were set up in Tamil Nadu and old R.A.W. guerrilla trainers were dug out of retirement. R.A.W. began arming the Tamil Tigers and training them at centers such as Gunda and Gorakhpur. As a sequel to this ploy, Sri Lanka was forced into the Indian power web when the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 was singed and the Indian Peacekeeping Force landed in Sri Lanka.

The Ministry of External Affairs was upset at R.A.W.'s role in Sri Lanka as they felt that R.A.W. was continuing negotiations with Tamil Tiger leader Parabhakaran in contravention to the Indian government's foreign policy. According to R. Swaminathan, (former special secretary of R.A.W.) it was this outfit that was used as the intermediary between Rajib Gandhi and Tamil leader Parabhakaran. Former Indian high commissioner in Sri Lanka J. N. Dixit even accused R.A.W. of having given 10 million rupees to the L.T.T.E. (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). At a later stage, R.A.W. built up the E.P.R.L.F. (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front) and E.N.D.L.F. (Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front) to fight against the L.T.T.E., which made the situation in Sri Lanka highly volatile and uncertain later on.

Maldives
Under a well-orchestrated R.A.W. plan, on Nov. 30, 1988, a 300- to 400-strong well-trained force of mercenaries armed with automatic weapons, initially said to be of unknown origin, infiltrated in boats and stormed the capital of Maldives. They resorted to indiscriminate shooting and took high-level government officials hostage. At the Presidential Palace, the small contingent of loyal national guards offered stiff resistance, which enabled President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom to move to a safe place where he issued urgent appeals for help from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Britain, and the United States.

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reacted promptly and about 1,600 combat troops belonging to the 50th Independent Para-Brigade in conjunction with Indian naval units landed at Male, the capital of Maldives, under the code name Operation Cactus. A number of Indian air force transport aircraft, escorted by fighters, were used for landing personnel, heavy equipment, and supplies. Within hours of landing, Indian troops flushed out the attackers from the streets and hideouts. Some of them surrendered to Indian troops, and many were captured by Indian naval units while trying to escape with their hostages in a Maldivian ship, Progress Light. Most of the 30 hostages, including Ahmed Majtaba, Maldives' minister of transport, were released. The Indian government announced the success of Operation Cactus and complimented the armed forces for a good job done.

The Indian defense minister, while addressing air force personnel at Bangalore, claimed that the country's prestige had been raised because of the peace-keeping role played by Indian forces in Maldives. The international community in general and South Asian states in particular, however, viewed with suspicion the over-all concept and motives of the operation. The Western media described it as a display by India of its newly acquired military muscle and its growing role as a regional police force. Although the apparent identification of two Maldivian nationals among the mercenaries, at face value, link it with previous such attempts, other converging factors indicative of external involvement could hardly be ignored. That the mercenaries sailed from Manar and Kankasanturai in Sri Lanka, which were in complete control of the Indian Peacekeeping Force, and the timing and speed of India's intervention proved its involvement beyond any doubt.

Nepal
Since the partition of the subcontinent, India has openly meddled in Nepal's internal affairs by contriving internal strife and conflicts through R.A.W. to destabilize the successive legitimate governments and prop up puppet regimes that would be more amenable to Indian machinations. Armed insurrections were sponsored and abetted by R.A.W. and later requests for military assistance to control these conflicts were managed through pro-India leaders. India has been aiding and inciting the Nepalese dissidents to collaborate with the Nepali Congress. For this they were supplied arms whenever the king or the Nepalese government appeared to be drifting away from India's dictates and impinging on India's hegemonic designs in the region. In fact, under the garb of the so-called democratization measures, the Maoists were actively encouraged to collect arms and resort to open rebellion against the legitimate Nepalese governments. The contrived rebellions provided India an opportunity to intervene militarily in Nepal, ostensibly to control the insurrections, which were masterminded by R.A.W. itself. It was an active replay of the Indian performance in Sri Lanka and Maldives a few years earlier. R.A.W. is particularly aiding the people of Indian origin and has been providing them with arms and ammunition. R.A.W. has also infiltrated the ethnic Nepali refugees who have been extradited by Bhutan and taken refuge in eastern Nepal. R.A.W. can exploit its links with these refugees whenever either country goes against Indian interests. Besides, the Nepalese economy is totally controlled by Indian moneylenders, financiers, and business mafia. (See "R.A.W.'s Machinations in South Asia" by Shastra Dutta Pant, Kathmandu, 2003.)

Afghanistan
Since December 1979, throughout the Afghan War, the K.G.B., K.H.A.D. (W.A.D.) (a former Afghan intelligence outfit), and R.A.W. stepped up their efforts to concentrate on influencing and covertly exploiting the tribes on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. There was intimate coordination between the three intelligence agencies not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, where destabilization was sought through a subversion and sabotage plan related to Afghan refugees and mujahideen in the tribal belt and inside Pakistan. They jointly organized spotting and recruitment of hostile tribesmen and trained them in guerrilla warfare, infiltration, subversion, sabotage, and the establishment of saboteur forces/terrorist organizations in the pro-Afghan tribes of Pakistan in order to carry out bombings in Afghan refugee camps in the Northwest Frontier province (NWFP) and Baluchistan to threaten and pressure them to return to Afghanistan. They also carried out bomb blasts in populated areas deep inside Pakistan to create panic and hatred in the minds of locals against Afghan refugee mujahideen to pressure Pakistan to change its policies on Afghanistan.

Pakistan
Pakistan's size, strength, and potential have always overawed India. It has always considered Pakistan to be the main opponent to its expansionist doctrine. India's animosity toward Pakistan is psychologically and ideologically deep-rooted and unassailable. India's 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan over Kashmir, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, are just two examples.

R.A.W. considers Sindh province to be Pakistan's soft underbelly. It has made it the prime target for sabotage and subversion. R.A.W. has enrolled an extensive network of agents and antigovernment elements and is convinced that with a little push restless Sindh will revolt. Taking full advantage of the agitation in Sindh in 1983, and the periodic ethnic riots, which have continued to today, R.A.W. has deeply penetrated Sindh and cultivated dissidents and secessionists, thereby creating hard-liners unlikely to allow peace to return to Sindh. R.A.W. is also similarly involved in Baluchistan.

R.A.W. is also being blamed for confusing the ground situation is Kashmir so as to keep the world's attention away from the gross human rights violations in Indian-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (I.S.I.), being almost 20 years older than R.A.W. and having acquired a much higher standard of efficiency in its functioning, has become the prime target of R.A.W.'s designs. The I.S.I. is considered to be a stumbling block in R.A.W.'s operations and has been made a target of massive misinformation and propaganda campaigns. The tirade against I.S.I. continues unabated. The idea is to keep I.S.I. on the defensive by alleging that it has had a hand in supporting the Kashmiri mujahideen and the Sikhs in Punjab. R.A.W.'s fixation on I.S.I. has taken the shape of I.S.I.-phobia, as in India everyone traces the origin of all happenings and shortcomings to the I.S.I. Whenever and wherever there is a kidnapping, a bank robbery, a financial scandal, a bomb blast, or what have you, the I.S.I. is deemed to have had a hand in it. (See "R.A.W.: Global and Regional Ambitions" edited by Rashid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Saleem, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Asia Printers, Islamabad, 2005).

In summary, R.A.W. over the years has admirably fulfilled its tasks of destabilizing target states through the unbridled export of terrorism. The Indira Doctrine spelt out a difficult and onerous role for R.A.W. It goes to its credit that it has accomplished its assigned objectives due to the endemic weakness in the state apparatus of these nations and the failures of their leaders.

 

[haviZsultan]

Nice information Batman! An-eye opener to the world!

 

[mustang]

Most of us would know about these following institutions.
1.CIA
2.KGB
3.MI5-(BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGENCY)
4.ISI-(pakistani intelligence agency)

Whats China's intelligence agency called ???

 

[ejaz007]

Another link that sheds some light on RAW. Hope it has not been pasted earlier in the thread. This sheds some light into the activities of peace loving India.
Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] - India Intelligence Agencies

 

[IceCold]

India cannot let peace prevail in the region thats something for sure whether its Pakistan, BD, Srilanka. The thing is what are we doing to counter RAW. The political unstability in pakistan, the opposition leaders specially the kind we have here has just contributed in RAW's efforts to destabilize pakistan. The pathetic opposition isnt allowing the government to focus its attentions on more important matters such as this. After elections are done, we would see some political stability in the country after which hopefully we can focus our attention on elements that are casuing the instability within pakistan and counter it. Also the region countries affected with this should join hands pakistan, BD, Srilanka to counter this terrorism sponspered by India and a true mechanism should be built to stop India from bullying her smaller neighbours.

 

[Bull]

India cannot let peace prevail in the region thats something for sure whether its Pakistan, BD, Srilanka. The thing is what are we doing to counter RAW. The political unstability in pakistan, the opposition leaders specially the kind we have here has just contributed in RAW's efforts to destabilize pakistan. .

Any country would luv to have peacefull neighbours. Well blame has been flying around but then why is nobody saying what India gain's by all these.

The pathetic opposition isnt allowing the government to focus its attentions on more important matters such as this..

Show me an opposition party anywhere in the world that allows to.

After elections are done, we would see some political stability in the country after which hopefully we can focus our attention on elements that are casuing the instability within pakistan and counter it.

How? After elections there wont be any opposition party at all!!!

Also the region countries affected with this should join hands pakistan, BD, Srilanka to counter this terrorism sponspered by India and a true mechanism should be built to stop India from bullying her smaller neighbours.

Oh yeah encircling India!!!

 

[IceCold]

Any country would luv to have peacefull neighbours. Well blame has been flying around but then why is nobody saying what India gain's by all these.

India's gains: To achieve unchallenge supermacy in the region.

Show me an opposition party anywhere in the world that allows to.

Well they do specially when the matter is related to national security unlike here where people go to US for assurance to get elected.

How? After elections there wont be any opposition party at all!!!

No but there big mouths will be shut for another five years as they could see the clear rejection of them in elections by the people of pakistan for whom they call them selves the so called representives of the people.

Oh yeah encircling India!!!

Exactly but not encircling but to counter. Why do you think we have started to develop defence ties with these countries.

 

[Bull]

India's gains: To achieve unchallenge supermacy in the region.

India is unchallenged in this region. Pakistan being an exeption.

No but there big mouths will be shut for another five years as they could see the clear rejection of them in elections by the people of pakistan for whom they call them selves the so called representives of the people.

You have no idea about democracy!!!

 

[IceCold]

India is unchallenged in this region. Pakistan being an exeption.

So do you get now why india wants to destabilize pakistan.

You have no idea about democracy!!!

Really!!! I didnt expect you to come to a conclusion about me so soon. Trust me i know pakistan's democracy much more then you can imagine but what i mentioned earlier is ture and that is the very reason democracy doesnt have much success in the country. Dont try to compare it with India.

 

[Bull]

So do you get now why india wants to destabilize pakistan.

What made you think i didnt.

Really!!! I didnt expect you to come to a conclusion about me so soon. Trust me i know pakistan's democracy much more then you can imagine but what i mentioned earlier is ture and that is the very reason democracy doesnt have much success in the country. Dont try to compare it with India.

Democracy works the same way everywhere. Ruling party complaining abt coalation parties blockinh all developments are also usual.