Effing bullshit. The IAF pilot who was shot down cannot even speak publicly and they got twisted theories into stupid articles. A BVR engagement becoming a dogfight....
Evidence 5: ‘Evidence tampering’ by DG ISPR
On 5 April, DG ISPR Ghafoor came out with a supposedly new piece of ‘evidence’ to support the claim that Abhinandan NEVER launched his R-73 missile. This happened after the recovery of the MiG-21 debris from the crash site — a photo of which clearly shows a burnt-out R-73 on its launcher rail, with its seeker head a few feet ahead, lying near the nose of the MiG-21. Interestingly, the ‘second’ R-73 is NOT visible anywhere in the debris.
Debris of Abhinandan’s MiG-21 aircraft in Azad Kashmir | Photo: By special arrangement
That caught Ghafoor’s goat and he, with support from the Pakistan Army’s dirty tricks department and some resourceful ‘jugaad’ — tweeted a picture of the so called air-to-air missiles recovered from the MiG-21 crash site, insinuating that — no missile was fired by the MiG-21 — with all being recovered at the site of the wreckage.
Now, herein lies a story — a story of a lie, deceit and misdirection. Ghafoor posted a ‘grainy’ low resolution photograph of 4 missiles — 2 x R-77 and 2 x R-73. The R-73 missile seen burnt on its launcher, is very much there with its seeker head lying loose on extreme right. But what is a modern-day miracle is the recovery of a near intact Vympel R-73 from the crash site.
Ghafoor opportunistically timed this tweet with the release of the Foreign Policy media piece by Lara Seligman, who claimed in her post that US government sources had confirmed to her that NO F-16s had been lost by the PAF. The article created a furore in Indian circles, wherein the US Government denied that any such count had taken place at all. But Ghafoor was looking for one such opportunity to slip past his misdirection effort, which beyond making him the most ‘liked’ Pakistani General on Twitter — unfortunately exposes his ‘evidence tampering’ lie to a great extent!
A very thoughtful tweet on the above does full justice to Ghafoor’s protracted effort to keep up the disinformation campaign against India.
Yes, Ghafoor and his ilk — picked up a R-73 from the black market or from one of Pakistan’s allies or e-bay or from wherever it came, and tagged it as a near intact R-73 — to support that NO R-73 launch took place on that fateful day. In fact Ghafoor may just find ‘ball tampering’ in an international cricket match to be a far more worthwhile preposition.
The ‘tampered evidence’ presented by Ghafoor is exposed by these three pertinent questions:
Ghafoor’s doctored evidence is proof that ISPR desperately wants to bury the PAF aircraft shoot down theory.
- Why the grainy image, especially since it’s of no help to a serious observer wanting to examine same for authenticity?
- Why NO observers allowed to check on these missiles — up-close and personal?
- Why NO serial number of the recovered R-73 provided, not even a partial one?
Because the ISPR boss knows that he and his army of bots, can control the narrative only so much — knowing well that in spite of the Pakistan Army’s best effort to cover the crashed debris of the PAF asset, social media is a far larger and sordid entity — beyond the control of any single nation — and one day — an image of the ‘second plane’ crashing in Azad Kashmir will pop out from some abyss of the very medium which the likes of him exploit to generate misinformation, to come and haunt the Pakistani armed forces at large.
8 pieces of clinching evidence that show how IAF’s Abhinandan shot down a Pakistani F-16
https://theprint.in/defence/8-piece...abhinandan-shot-down-a-pakistani-f-16/278752/
The time and energy they spent on claiming fake F16 kill it was better spend to train Abhinandan more. Such a bunch of fools can't believe it
So what really happened that day?
The subsequent sequence of events gives a ‘blow by blow’ account of the final aerial engagement till the last fall of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir.
The Consolidated Air Situation Map based on OSINT & Shared data (Not to Scale)
Refer the above consolidated air situation map for events taking place, sequentially marked from 1 to 10 from 1020 to 1040 hours in the following paragraphs.
Event No. 1: 1022 hours — launch of an IAF R-73 AAM against a PAF F-16
Event No. 2: 1022 hours — PAF targeting Abhi’s No. 2
- Abhinandan launched a R-73 missile on a heading of 280–290 degrees at 20,000 feet after the missile head locked onto a target in frontal quarters. Since the radar was in close combat (CC) search mode at that time, the aircraft being tracked by the R-73 would not have got any Lock ON chirp on its radar warning receiver (RWR). Neither does the R-73 missile give any approach warning while using passive guidance. The PAF aircraft, targeted by the IAF MiG-21, was NOT aware that a R-73 missile had been fired against it.
- The R-73 seeker could have locked on to two PAF jets, one at north edge and the other at the bottom edge of the Mangla reservoir. The blip at the north edge, which subsequently vanished from the scope was flying at Mach 1+ at 32,000 feet.
Image: By special arrangement
The IAF’s ELINT data suggests that an F-16 was on the bearing where PAF’s Alpha-3 was noticed — hence in all probability, the blip which vanished was an F-16.
- This F-16 was identified to have a the callsign — ‘Alpha-3’ (IAF radio intercept).
We know for sure now that the PAF fired an AMRAAM on Abhi’s No. 2. The AMRAAM missed Abhinandan’s No. 2, who had gone COLD by then.
- The PAF’s F-16, north over the Mangla reservoir, Call sign Alpha -3 was vectored eastwards to intercept Abhinandan’s No. 2, who by now was back across the LoC in J&K, heading north east in the Rajouri sector.
- According to reconstruction of the situation, the F-16 (Alpha-3) was at 32,000 feet and assisted by ‘Vigil’ (AEW&C) picked up the MiG-21 (Abhi’s No. 2) on his airborne interception (AI) radar at 60–70 km at 18,000 feet. The F-16 did a fast descending turn to a lower altitude to build up speed and achieve his firing solution sooner, as well as carrying out a rapid change of height to break any fire control lock with all aware that MiGs had crossed the LoC. For info, at Mach 1.5 the AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM receives a bump up of 10–15% in max range (standard USAF AMRAAM firing tactics).
- He would have fired his AMRAAM at IAF’s Alpha-2 between Dmax 1-2. This missile is seen in the Thanamandi video. We can also hear the sound of the Indian MiG-21, indicating it was close.
Event No. 3: 1023 hours — The ‘puff’
This object which divides itself later on into two segments, is the elusive aircraft — which has moved on from the ‘puff’ position when captured by the observer on his phone.
- This describes the ‘puff’ point, when the R-73 missile fired by the MiG-21 reached the vicinity of the F-16 and activated its proximity fuse. The ‘puff’ happened at the cross-section of the observer to the ‘puff’ lines from Khuiratta and Charhoi.
- From Abhi’s last plotted position to the calculated position of the ‘puff’ is a distance of 20 km. The R-73 would have covered this distance + distance required during the proportional navigation ‘lead pursuit’ trajectory. Assuming max 2–3 km deviation for this trajectory from point to point navigation with a non-manoeuvring, supersonic speed F-16 in the R-73’s frontal quarters, passing left to right and descending. So, the R-73 covered approx 22 km to the ‘puff’ location. The F-16’s trajectory actually benefits the R-73 in adjusting a steady (greater) lead ahead and bleeds lesser energy. Reverse calculating, we get time of flight of R-73 to ‘puff’ location at an average speed of 612 m/s at 35 seconds.
Advantage of ‘Lead pursuit’ over ‘pure pursuit’ guidance- Flying at Mach 1 (conservative estimate), descending from 32,000 to 25,000 feet, the F-16 would have covered a ground distance of around 375 meters every second (subsonic to supersonic at an average altitude of 28,000 feet at -39 to 40 deg centigrade for that day). Assuming it turned for 3-5 seconds before it proceeded for the intercept (IAF radar picture showed this F-16 in a slight descending turn to left and assuming 20 deg/ sec rate of turn), in 35–5 = 30 seconds — it would cover 11,250 m or 11.25 km — which is close to the estimated distance of 12 km from the F-16s initial position north of Mangla reservoir to the ‘puff’.
- An R-73 missile can intercept a 12G manoeuvring target at 0.3–30 km. The F-16 was placed around 22 km (trajectory inclusive) from the missile. The F-16 was well within the kinematic performance range available to the R-73 missile to shoot down the F-16.
- How are we sure that it was this aircraft which fired the AMRAAM at Abhi’s No. 2 across the LoC? We are sure because we observe only two missiles fired by the PAF inside Azad Kashmir that day. This was the first event, the second was fired to shoot down Abhinandan seconds later from south of the Mangla reservoir and Mirpur town.
- So why no explosion at the ‘puff’? For this we need to understand that the R-73 would have exploded at a near beam (3 o’ Clock) aspect to the F-16 based on our investigation. In my earlier assessment of April 19, I had assumed that the missile hit the F-16 in its frontal quarters. However, I did not have the IAF radar picture and the newer video evidence. The R-73’s proximity fuse activating the 7.4 kg continuous rod warhead in that aspect.
The R-73 missile engineering drawing
Let’s understand how the R-73 warhead would have exploded — The R-73 has a continuous rod warhead weighing 7.4 kg — which is activated by a proximity fuse when it senses an aircraft in close quarters. When detonated, the high explosive imparts momentum to the rods, thrusting them outward in an expanding circle. The pressure wave from the explosive acts evenly on the rods over their length. The rods are sufficiently soft to allow the expansion without breaking the rods or the welded joints, and the detonation velocity is limited to approx. 1000 m/s, allowing the rods to bend at these locations instead.
At some intermediate point the ring will have a zig-zag (alternating direction) appearance within a cylindrical envelope — Upon ultimate expansion the ring is circular and contained within a plane.This rapidly expanding ring, when hitting the aircraft, is more effective than an equivalent fragmentation warhead — for the science inclined, the ring’s effectiveness decreasing as 1/R, rather than 1/R2 for fragments.
Portions of the aircraft intercepted by the expanding ring of the continuous rod warhead — will receive a continuous cut through the skin, light structure, underlying cables, hydraulic lines, and other plumbing if present — This may cause a structural failure, or, if not, can be sufficient for defeating the redundancy of aircraft systems. The effect is only pronounced as long as the ring is unbroken, so multiple layers of rods are employed in practical weapons to increase the effective radius.
Expansion of a continuous rod warhead explained
Analysing the effect of the R-73 warhead hitting at right beam quarter to the F-16- On the basis of the above, we identify two zones of damage on the F-16. Travelling at a supersonic speed, the nose and the cockpit area of the F-16 would have sustained limited damage due to shrapnel. This may however be enough to critically injure the pilot/s. The brunt of the continuous rod warhead would have been borne by the middle to rear portion. What the ‘puff’ indicates is that the damage was mostly due to the shrapnel’s kinetic effect, not a violent incendiary explosion of any manner. The supersonic state of the aircraft is the most probable reason for the F-16 not catching fire due to the expanding ring of the warhead.Continuous rod warheads generally tend to induce damage, which can slice open an aircraft as can be seen in the case of Abhinandan’s MiG-21, which was hit from the rear. So, while no explosion is visible, there would have been internal damage in the rear portion, as well as a new direction vector — mix of aircraft forward speed and the impact from the right due to the warhead explosion, would have veered the damaged aircraft to the left.
- So what was the damage on the aircraft after the hit at the ‘puff’ stage. For this, we get a very brief idea in the Charhoi video. After the puff, the videographer briefly records the state of another ‘puff’ like object, which is however moving towards the right, which is identified by the effort of the person to maintain this smoke blob in the centre of the field of view of the phone. We know that this is not the puff, because the Sun position for this is different. Interestingly in a short glimpse around the 21 second run of the video, we see this object dividing itself in two parts.
The R-73 hit the F-16 at supersonic speeds around 25,000 feet at the ‘puff’ location. After which it veers to the left as a result, and a few seconds later broke into two distinct parts due to damage by the R-73 warhead.
Event No. 4: 1023 hours — The ‘Parachute’
#The PAF’s F-16 ACES ejection seat resembles an Indian flag with its colours.
- In the Khuiratta video, we see a distinct object with a low rate of descent. While we are unable to identify the same adequately from the close up, the rate of descent indicates that this is a parachute.
The puff, the parachute and the debris in the Khuiratta video- So, after the ‘puff’ event at 25,000 feet, the aircraft’s direction veered to the left on a north-westerly course, which was the resultant direction of its initial supersonic speed and the impact of the R-73 warhead from the right.Let’s assume at the point of impact at the ‘puff’ location, the speed of the aircraft was Mach 1 (375 m/s). Post impact by the R-73 with a velocity of at least 500m/s — the resultant velocity in the left turn would be approx 250 m/s for same AUW. This is effectively 990 kmph or 535 knots.
- Now we notice, that from the ‘puff’ to the parachute/debris, the altitude of the aircraft hasn’t changed more than 1,000 odd feet. This indicates that the engine was partially still processing power output.
Reference the 25k feet line from the puff- The puff to the tadpole distance shown on the 25,000 feet AMSL line in the above image is about 10 km. So, the aircraft, from the puff point, travelled 10 km before converting into the tadpole shape. At what average speed will the aircraft be able to cover 10 km from the puff point?The average speed = 650 kmph, achieved by partial engine run till at least 35–50 sec after impact at the ‘puff’ point.
- The F-16 was at 25,000 feet AMSL. From the observer at Khuiratta, the puff will be at a ground distance of 11 km.
- Since the videographer reacted basis the twin claps at the puff to film the scene, we take a 10 second reaction time. Sound travels from puff to Khuiratta in 37 seconds. So, he would have filmed at 37 + 10 seconds = 47 seconds. when he started filming, 47 seconds had elapsed since the ‘puff’, the parachute deployed and the debris falling. In those 47 seconds, the aircraft would have travelled 8.4 km. In 37 seconds, the aircraft would have covered approx 6 km.
- The parachute position will be 6 km from the Khuiratta observer to the puff line, on 25,000 feet puff to Tadpole line.
- Deploying all seen elements on the 25k line from the puff, we get approx positions of all objects seen in the air that day.
- At 6 km from the puff the pilot of the F-16 ejected out of the stricken aircraft either before or after the separation of the debris, a good 36 seconds post the missile impact. What we analysed a bit earlier becomes relevant now, with the separation of the debris from the main aircraft body around 5-6 km from the puff, about the time the pilot ejected out. This is also the time where I believe the partial working engine would have stopped. After this the aircraft would have coasted another 4-odd km, before becoming the tadpole.
- Back to the parachute. The ROD of the parachute is lower than the debris, but cannot be calculated as not enough frames are available on the parachute, the observer focussing on the falling debris.
- So why did the pilot delay the ejection till 36 odd seconds after the missile hit? The most plausible answer is either the pilot was injured in the missile strike or was still assessing the state of the aircraft with engine running partially, although with the aircraft breaking in at least two pieces after 36 seconds, the pilot would have got signs inside the cockpit a good 15-20 seconds before. Hence the latter may not be plausible. A delayed ejection by the PAF pilot indicates that the pilot may have been stunned and injured in the R-73 hit.
- The approximate location of the landed pilot after ejection would be on the Khuiratta — parachute line, which is displaced by 6 km from the ‘puff’ to parachute line.
- After landing it is highly possible that the pilot was either mobbed by Azad Kashmir residents or would have been in an unconscious state due to injuries sustained.
- It is quite possible he would have been mistaken for an IAF pilot due the following reasons:
# Most probably, there would be no outward indication on his flying coverall of any PAF affiliation. The fact that IAF and PAF belong to the same subcontinental stock would have made any meaningful resemblance easier for a case of mistaken identity.
#The larger piece of the aircraft had landed a good 4–5 km from the pilot’s position, hence there was no means to know by the smaller debris that it was a PAF jet. The Doosra Banda mentioned by DG ISPR had landed north-west of Charhoi around 1025 hours. An information blackout was enforced in the area by Pakistan immediately after the crash, hence no close-up video is available of the parachute and the debris landing on ground.
Event No. 5: 1023 hours — The ‘Debris’
The debris was a smaller part of the aircraft, most probably its tail portion, given that the R-73 would have inflicted most of the damage in the middle — rear section of the F-16.
Event No. 6: 1024 to 1028 hours — The Tadpole
- It was spotted by the Khuiratta observer falling at a high ROD. Its rate of descent has been calculated at 180 m/s.
- The piece of debris would have fallen on the Khuiratta to debris line and would be 6–7 km from the puff to debris line (25k line).
- That there is no news ever heard on the debris indicates that the Pakistan Army was able to quickly move in and clamp down on the evidence.
The Tadpole was formed a further 4 km ahead of the parachute/ debris line, the momentum of the aircraft taking it beyond, until, post the debris separation the aircraft, the remaining airframe finally caught fire, with thousands of gallons of fuel converting into millions of permeable and condensed droplets, taking a smokey cloud like appearance, resembling a tadpole.
The formation and end have been explained in the evidences section.
Is it a coincidence that the Pakistan Army issued an advisory in the Kotli area immediately after the tadpole crash — about use of across-LoC rockets by the Indian Army?
- The Tadpole was seen in decent fidelity from the Charhoi and Thanamandi videos.
- It is proven beyond doubt to be a man-made object.
- Behind the smokey cloud of high temperature and fuel, the main airframe caught fire and burnt to a great extent.
- The only debris left from the airframe would be smaller sized unburnt articles and semi-molten/molten pieces, which probably would have rained down below the overhang of the Tadpole.
- The smaller pieces of debris would have ensured that no one would be wiser to the fact that a PAF asset had been shot down. This was one of the major reasons why the Pakistan Army was able to ensure a complete blackout of information in the Kotli and Charhoi zones. However, the leftover/critical pieces of debris may have been collected over a period of time.
By special arrangement
It was claimed that the Pakistan Army destroyed a couple of Indian rockets in air. This would be the perfect alibi to cover up for the far strewn small debris/ molten elements from the crash of the PAF jet.
Tadpole — is the most conclusive VISUAL proof of the crash of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir that day.
Event No. 7: 1022 hours — The AMRAAM launch at the MiG-21
This event is characterised by a large-scale tactical failure by the PAF BARCAP, which allowed the IAF MiG-21 to penetrate 10-odd km into Azad Kashmir, before any tactical action was taken against him.
The AMRAAM was fired by Wing Commander Noman Ali Khan of 29 Sqn, embedded with the Combat Commander’s School (CCS) at Sargodha. Noman reached south of Mirpur, with a steady AI Lock on his APG-68 V9 radar, launching at least one AMRAAM against Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft. A video link to the AMRAAM fired by him against Abhinandan on an approximate course is available here.
AMRAAM launch by PAF against Abhinandan
Fired from an altitude of 30,000 feet the AMRAAM covered the 20-odd km within its NEZ quickly and hit the IAF MiG-21 in the rear. Abhinandan ejected out successfully.
The IAF MiG-21 was shot down by a PAF AMRAAM and not a surface-to-air missile.
Events No. 8, 9, 10: 1023–1034 hours — The crash of the IAF MiG-21
50 seconds after Abhinandan Varthaman fired a R-73 against a PAF jet, he was hit by an AMRAAM. the MiG-21 crash is very well documented.
Event 8 indicates the missile hit point.
MiG-21 crash recorded near Horan Kotla in a clear video
Event 9 indicates the parachute landing point near Horan Kotla village. Event 10 indicates the area where the unburnt debris fell down.
Debris of Abhinandan’s MiG-21 aircraft in Azad Kashmir | Photo : By special arrangement
Abhinandan, post ejection had a harrowing escape, when he was manhandled severely by an irate mob, saved by the arrival of the Pakistan Army in the nick of time. And yes, my Pakistani readers, the cup of tea is appreciated and will indeed be reciprocated!
He was made a pawn in a heightened disinformation war with India by the ISPR and after some deft diplomacy by the Indian government, was repatriated after 3 days in Pakistani custody.
Event No. 11: 1040 hours — A Pakistan Army search & rescue (SAR) helicopter
The last piece of the puzzle which supports that a PAF jet was shot down on 27 February is provided by an innocuous looking Pakistan Army light communication helicopter, a Bell Jet Ranger. Utilised routinely for communication duties, the helicopter would not have caught our eye, except that it is featured in the Charhoi video flying at ultra-low level, after the Tadpole event.
After plotting its path, we see it make a left turn in front of the Charhoi videographer, heading for…surprise, surprise…the location of the downed PAF pilot’s parachute landing zone.
A Pakistan Army Jet Ranger seen flying in front of the Charhoi observer
A major aerial engagement had taken just a few minutes back, with the perpetual loss of situational awareness (LOSA) still hanging over the battlefield, what business did a Pakistan Army communication/SAR helicopter have flying around without a highly urgent task at hand?
Or maybe the heli did have an urgent task.
Notice the path of the SAR helicopter plotted at 1040 hours towards the PAF Pilot’s landing zone
The Bell Jet Ranger, was airborne minutes after the aerial engagement to locate and pick up the crashed PAF pilot.
Yes we have klingon cloaking technology.
We want evidence, not your crappy logics. We gave the world evidence with 2 R-73 and R-77 intact. Tell me if he did it, Pakistan would have denied aninondones existence? There was nothing that can stop Pakistan denying him? Above all if you are so confident with your Migs then why did not you counterattack?
They are bunch of liers and pussies who got reality check.
1. Su30 didn't fire get firing solution had got to do with short legged R77 BVR onboard.
You are wrong. They are retarded.
Because that's been written by former IAF fighter pilot..
Please rebut his points and technical justifications..
So why even after all these days, PAF and government hiding that proof of SU30 MKI
Thats why Pakistan is good in begging and India need not..
