R-73 available in E-Bay

[Suriya]

Event No. 4: 1023 hours — The ‘Parachute’

1. In the Khuiratta video, we see a distinct object with a low rate of descent. While we are unable to identify the same adequately from the close up, the rate of descent indicates that this is a parachute.
   
   
   
   The puff, the parachute and the debris in the Khuiratta video
2. So, after the ‘puff’ event at 25,000 feet, the aircraft’s direction veered to the left on a north-westerly course, which was the resultant direction of its initial supersonic speed and the impact of the R-73 warhead from the right.Let’s assume at the point of impact at the ‘puff’ location, the speed of the aircraft was Mach 1 (375 m/s). Post impact by the R-73 with a velocity of at least 500m/s — the resultant velocity in the left turn would be approx 250 m/s for same AUW. This is effectively 990 kmph or 535 knots.
3. Now we notice, that from the ‘puff’ to the parachute/debris, the altitude of the aircraft hasn’t changed more than 1,000 odd feet. This indicates that the engine was partially still processing power output.
   
   
   
   Reference the 25k feet line from the puff
4. The puff to the tadpole distance shown on the 25,000 feet AMSL line in the above image is about 10 km. So, the aircraft, from the puff point, travelled 10 km before converting into the tadpole shape. At what average speed will the aircraft be able to cover 10 km from the puff point?The average speed = 650 kmph, achieved by partial engine run till at least 35–50 sec after impact at the ‘puff’ point.
   
5. The F-16 was at 25,000 feet AMSL. From the observer at Khuiratta, the puff will be at a ground distance of 11 km.
6. Since the videographer reacted basis the twin claps at the puff to film the scene, we take a 10 second reaction time. Sound travels from puff to Khuiratta in 37 seconds. So, he would have filmed at 37 + 10 seconds = 47 seconds. when he started filming, 47 seconds had elapsed since the ‘puff’, the parachute deployed and the debris falling. In those 47 seconds, the aircraft would have travelled 8.4 km. In 37 seconds, the aircraft would have covered approx 6 km.
7. The parachute position will be 6 km from the Khuiratta observer to the puff line, on 25,000 feet puff to Tadpole line.
8. Deploying all seen elements on the 25k line from the puff, we get approx positions of all objects seen in the air that day.
   
9. At 6 km from the puff the pilot of the F-16 ejected out of the stricken aircraft either before or after the separation of the debris, a good 36 seconds post the missile impact. What we analysed a bit earlier becomes relevant now, with the separation of the debris from the main aircraft body around 5-6 km from the puff, about the time the pilot ejected out. This is also the time where I believe the partial working engine would have stopped. After this the aircraft would have coasted another 4-odd km, before becoming the tadpole.
   
10. Back to the parachute. The ROD of the parachute is lower than the debris, but cannot be calculated as not enough frames are available on the parachute, the observer focussing on the falling debris.
11. So why did the pilot delay the ejection till 36 odd seconds after the missile hit? The most plausible answer is either the pilot was injured in the missile strike or was still assessing the state of the aircraft with engine running partially, although with the aircraft breaking in at least two pieces after 36 seconds, the pilot would have got signs inside the cockpit a good 15-20 seconds before. Hence the latter may not be plausible. A delayed ejection by the PAF pilot indicates that the pilot may have been stunned and injured in the R-73 hit.
12. The approximate location of the landed pilot after ejection would be on the Khuiratta — parachute line, which is displaced by 6 km from the ‘puff’ to parachute line.
13. After landing it is highly possible that the pilot was either mobbed by Azad Kashmir residents or would have been in an unconscious state due to injuries sustained.
14. It is quite possible he would have been mistaken for an IAF pilot due the following reasons:

#The PAF’s F-16 ACES ejection seat resembles an Indian flag with its colours.

# Most probably, there would be no outward indication on his flying coverall of any PAF affiliation. The fact that IAF and PAF belong to the same subcontinental stock would have made any meaningful resemblance easier for a case of mistaken identity.

#The larger piece of the aircraft had landed a good 4–5 km from the pilot’s position, hence there was no means to know by the smaller debris that it was a PAF jet. The Doosra Banda mentioned by DG ISPR had landed north-west of Charhoi around 1025 hours. An information blackout was enforced in the area by Pakistan immediately after the crash, hence no close-up video is available of the parachute and the debris landing on ground.

Event No. 5: 1023 hours — The ‘Debris’
The debris was a smaller part of the aircraft, most probably its tail portion, given that the R-73 would have inflicted most of the damage in the middle — rear section of the F-16.

1. It was spotted by the Khuiratta observer falling at a high ROD. Its rate of descent has been calculated at 180 m/s.
2. The piece of debris would have fallen on the Khuiratta to debris line and would be 6–7 km from the puff to debris line (25k line).
3. That there is no news ever heard on the debris indicates that the Pakistan Army was able to quickly move in and clamp down on the evidence.
   

Event No. 6: 1024 to 1028 hours — The Tadpole
The Tadpole was formed a further 4 km ahead of the parachute/ debris line, the momentum of the aircraft taking it beyond, until, post the debris separation the aircraft, the remaining airframe finally caught fire, with thousands of gallons of fuel converting into millions of permeable and condensed droplets, taking a smokey cloud like appearance, resembling a tadpole.

The formation and end have been explained in the evidences section.

1. The Tadpole was seen in decent fidelity from the Charhoi and Thanamandi videos.
2. It is proven beyond doubt to be a man-made object.
3. Behind the smokey cloud of high temperature and fuel, the main airframe caught fire and burnt to a great extent.
4. The only debris left from the airframe would be smaller sized unburnt articles and semi-molten/molten pieces, which probably would have rained down below the overhang of the Tadpole.
5. The smaller pieces of debris would have ensured that no one would be wiser to the fact that a PAF asset had been shot down. This was one of the major reasons why the Pakistan Army was able to ensure a complete blackout of information in the Kotli and Charhoi zones. However, the leftover/critical pieces of debris may have been collected over a period of time.
   
   
   
   By special arrangement

Is it a coincidence that the Pakistan Army issued an advisory in the Kotli area immediately after the tadpole crash — about use of across-LoC rockets by the Indian Army?

It was claimed that the Pakistan Army destroyed a couple of Indian rockets in air. This would be the perfect alibi to cover up for the far strewn small debris/ molten elements from the crash of the PAF jet.

Tadpole — is the most conclusive VISUAL proof of the crash of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir that day.

Event No. 7: 1022 hours — The AMRAAM launch at the MiG-21
This event is characterised by a large-scale tactical failure by the PAF BARCAP, which allowed the IAF MiG-21 to penetrate 10-odd km into Azad Kashmir, before any tactical action was taken against him.

The AMRAAM was fired by Wing Commander Noman Ali Khan of 29 Sqn, embedded with the Combat Commander’s School (CCS) at Sargodha. Noman reached south of Mirpur, with a steady AI Lock on his APG-68 V9 radar, launching at least one AMRAAM against Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft. A video link to the AMRAAM fired by him against Abhinandan on an approximate course is available here.

AMRAAM launch by PAF against Abhinandan
Fired from an altitude of 30,000 feet the AMRAAM covered the 20-odd km within its NEZ quickly and hit the IAF MiG-21 in the rear. Abhinandan ejected out successfully.

The IAF MiG-21 was shot down by a PAF AMRAAM and not a surface-to-air missile.

Events No. 8, 9, 10: 1023–1034 hours — The crash of the IAF MiG-21
50 seconds after Abhinandan Varthaman fired a R-73 against a PAF jet, he was hit by an AMRAAM. the MiG-21 crash is very well documented.

Event 8 indicates the missile hit point.

MiG-21 crash recorded near Horan Kotla in a clear video
Event 9 indicates the parachute landing point near Horan Kotla village. Event 10 indicates the area where the unburnt debris fell down.

Debris of Abhinandan’s MiG-21 aircraft in Azad Kashmir | Photo : By special arrangement
Abhinandan, post ejection had a harrowing escape, when he was manhandled severely by an irate mob, saved by the arrival of the Pakistan Army in the nick of time. And yes, my Pakistani readers, the cup of tea is appreciated and will indeed be reciprocated!

He was made a pawn in a heightened disinformation war with India by the ISPR and after some deft diplomacy by the Indian government, was repatriated after 3 days in Pakistani custody.

Event No. 11: 1040 hours — A Pakistan Army search & rescue (SAR) helicopter
The last piece of the puzzle which supports that a PAF jet was shot down on 27 February is provided by an innocuous looking Pakistan Army light communication helicopter, a Bell Jet Ranger. Utilised routinely for communication duties, the helicopter would not have caught our eye, except that it is featured in the Charhoi video flying at ultra-low level, after the Tadpole event.

After plotting its path, we see it make a left turn in front of the Charhoi videographer, heading for…surprise, surprise…the location of the downed PAF pilot’s parachute landing zone.

A Pakistan Army Jet Ranger seen flying in front of the Charhoi observer
A major aerial engagement had taken just a few minutes back, with the perpetual loss of situational awareness (LOSA) still hanging over the battlefield, what business did a Pakistan Army communication/SAR helicopter have flying around without a highly urgent task at hand?

Or maybe the heli did have an urgent task.

Notice the path of the SAR helicopter plotted at 1040 hours towards the PAF Pilot’s landing zone
The Bell Jet Ranger, was airborne minutes after the aerial engagement to locate and pick up the crashed PAF pilot.

 

[ColonelSanders]

It's long but with full of reasoning. Good read for mystery of 27Th Feb and #doosara banda.

Can i order some R-73 from ebay? I need a few for decoration.



What an idiot....

 

[Sulemanms202]

what an absolute time waster

 

[Jango]

Evidence 6: The ‘Tadpole’

The ‘Tadpole’ is mathematically calculated to be at a distance of between 37–40 km from, and 8,000 feet higher than the observer, which makes it 4,800+8,000 feet=12,800 feet or 13,000 feet AMSL.

How is this mathematically calculated? Please, I would love to know.

Goddamn this was better than a Tom Clancey novel.

 

[Asimzranger]

@Suriya you and your countrymen love sasta nasha next time show proper evidence not Bollywood CID logic.

 

[ebrahym]

wow you must be really really desperate for Abhinandan
@Suriya
pass the joint let us all see what you have been smoking

 

[SSG_Commando]

I have some basic questions to ballywood infested minds of Indians:

- Why dont you ask Abinandone if he shot an aircraft or not?
- If he would have really done it, dont you think his existence will be wiped out just like the second pilot you claiming like parrots?

Your Airforce chief is claiming that with 44 old aircraft what do you expect?
Have some insanity and brains ........

 

[Suriya]

I have some basic questions to ballywood infested minds of Indians:

- Why dont you ask Abinandone if he shot an aircraft or not?
- If he would have really done it, dont you think his existence will be wiped out just like the second pilot you claiming like parrots?

Your Airforce chief is claiming that with 44 old aircraft what do you expect?
Have some insanity and brains ........

Abinandone was got Vir Charka for shoting down a pak F-16 , u want more confirmation from him.

Beside 44 old aircraft mig21 , we got 272 Su30s too. They are enough for Pakistan , we need latest tech for China.

How is this mathematically calculated? Please, I would love to know.

Goddamn this was better than a Tom Clancey novel.

Contact on twitter https://twitter.com/joe_sameer and this bunch

However, the way you perceive yourself is what enables, or disables, you. And this has been the cheekiest of them motivations, which has helped me and my colleagues — @bennedose @bishwa55900127 @sayareakd @anshumig and @Vakil_Raghu get to the bottom of this affair.

 

[Hex0maniac]

Event No. 4: 1023 hours — The ‘Parachute’

1. In the Khuiratta video, we see a distinct object with a low rate of descent. While we are unable to identify the same adequately from the close up, the rate of descent indicates that this is a parachute.
   
   
   
   The puff, the parachute and the debris in the Khuiratta video
2. So, after the ‘puff’ event at 25,000 feet, the aircraft’s direction veered to the left on a north-westerly course, which was the resultant direction of its initial supersonic speed and the impact of the R-73 warhead from the right.Let’s assume at the point of impact at the ‘puff’ location, the speed of the aircraft was Mach 1 (375 m/s). Post impact by the R-73 with a velocity of at least 500m/s — the resultant velocity in the left turn would be approx 250 m/s for same AUW. This is effectively 990 kmph or 535 knots.
3. Now we notice, that from the ‘puff’ to the parachute/debris, the altitude of the aircraft hasn’t changed more than 1,000 odd feet. This indicates that the engine was partially still processing power output.
   
   
   
   Reference the 25k feet line from the puff
4. The puff to the tadpole distance shown on the 25,000 feet AMSL line in the above image is about 10 km. So, the aircraft, from the puff point, travelled 10 km before converting into the tadpole shape. At what average speed will the aircraft be able to cover 10 km from the puff point?The average speed = 650 kmph, achieved by partial engine run till at least 35–50 sec after impact at the ‘puff’ point.
   
5. The F-16 was at 25,000 feet AMSL. From the observer at Khuiratta, the puff will be at a ground distance of 11 km.
6. Since the videographer reacted basis the twin claps at the puff to film the scene, we take a 10 second reaction time. Sound travels from puff to Khuiratta in 37 seconds. So, he would have filmed at 37 + 10 seconds = 47 seconds. when he started filming, 47 seconds had elapsed since the ‘puff’, the parachute deployed and the debris falling. In those 47 seconds, the aircraft would have travelled 8.4 km. In 37 seconds, the aircraft would have covered approx 6 km.
7. The parachute position will be 6 km from the Khuiratta observer to the puff line, on 25,000 feet puff to Tadpole line.
8. Deploying all seen elements on the 25k line from the puff, we get approx positions of all objects seen in the air that day.
   
9. At 6 km from the puff the pilot of the F-16 ejected out of the stricken aircraft either before or after the separation of the debris, a good 36 seconds post the missile impact. What we analysed a bit earlier becomes relevant now, with the separation of the debris from the main aircraft body around 5-6 km from the puff, about the time the pilot ejected out. This is also the time where I believe the partial working engine would have stopped. After this the aircraft would have coasted another 4-odd km, before becoming the tadpole.
   
10. Back to the parachute. The ROD of the parachute is lower than the debris, but cannot be calculated as not enough frames are available on the parachute, the observer focussing on the falling debris.
11. So why did the pilot delay the ejection till 36 odd seconds after the missile hit? The most plausible answer is either the pilot was injured in the missile strike or was still assessing the state of the aircraft with engine running partially, although with the aircraft breaking in at least two pieces after 36 seconds, the pilot would have got signs inside the cockpit a good 15-20 seconds before. Hence the latter may not be plausible. A delayed ejection by the PAF pilot indicates that the pilot may have been stunned and injured in the R-73 hit.
12. The approximate location of the landed pilot after ejection would be on the Khuiratta — parachute line, which is displaced by 6 km from the ‘puff’ to parachute line.
13. After landing it is highly possible that the pilot was either mobbed by Azad Kashmir residents or would have been in an unconscious state due to injuries sustained.
14. It is quite possible he would have been mistaken for an IAF pilot due the following reasons:

#The PAF’s F-16 ACES ejection seat resembles an Indian flag with its colours.

# Most probably, there would be no outward indication on his flying coverall of any PAF affiliation. The fact that IAF and PAF belong to the same subcontinental stock would have made any meaningful resemblance easier for a case of mistaken identity.

#The larger piece of the aircraft had landed a good 4–5 km from the pilot’s position, hence there was no means to know by the smaller debris that it was a PAF jet. The Doosra Banda mentioned by DG ISPR had landed north-west of Charhoi around 1025 hours. An information blackout was enforced in the area by Pakistan immediately after the crash, hence no close-up video is available of the parachute and the debris landing on ground.

Event No. 5: 1023 hours — The ‘Debris’
The debris was a smaller part of the aircraft, most probably its tail portion, given that the R-73 would have inflicted most of the damage in the middle — rear section of the F-16.

1. It was spotted by the Khuiratta observer falling at a high ROD. Its rate of descent has been calculated at 180 m/s.
2. The piece of debris would have fallen on the Khuiratta to debris line and would be 6–7 km from the puff to debris line (25k line).
3. That there is no news ever heard on the debris indicates that the Pakistan Army was able to quickly move in and clamp down on the evidence.
   

Event No. 6: 1024 to 1028 hours — The Tadpole
The Tadpole was formed a further 4 km ahead of the parachute/ debris line, the momentum of the aircraft taking it beyond, until, post the debris separation the aircraft, the remaining airframe finally caught fire, with thousands of gallons of fuel converting into millions of permeable and condensed droplets, taking a smokey cloud like appearance, resembling a tadpole.

The formation and end have been explained in the evidences section.

1. The Tadpole was seen in decent fidelity from the Charhoi and Thanamandi videos.
2. It is proven beyond doubt to be a man-made object.
3. Behind the smokey cloud of high temperature and fuel, the main airframe caught fire and burnt to a great extent.
4. The only debris left from the airframe would be smaller sized unburnt articles and semi-molten/molten pieces, which probably would have rained down below the overhang of the Tadpole.
5. The smaller pieces of debris would have ensured that no one would be wiser to the fact that a PAF asset had been shot down. This was one of the major reasons why the Pakistan Army was able to ensure a complete blackout of information in the Kotli and Charhoi zones. However, the leftover/critical pieces of debris may have been collected over a period of time.
   
   
   
   By special arrangement

Is it a coincidence that the Pakistan Army issued an advisory in the Kotli area immediately after the tadpole crash — about use of across-LoC rockets by the Indian Army?

It was claimed that the Pakistan Army destroyed a couple of Indian rockets in air. This would be the perfect alibi to cover up for the far strewn small debris/ molten elements from the crash of the PAF jet.

Tadpole — is the most conclusive VISUAL proof of the crash of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir that day.

Event No. 7: 1022 hours — The AMRAAM launch at the MiG-21
This event is characterised by a large-scale tactical failure by the PAF BARCAP, which allowed the IAF MiG-21 to penetrate 10-odd km into Azad Kashmir, before any tactical action was taken against him.

The AMRAAM was fired by Wing Commander Noman Ali Khan of 29 Sqn, embedded with the Combat Commander’s School (CCS) at Sargodha. Noman reached south of Mirpur, with a steady AI Lock on his APG-68 V9 radar, launching at least one AMRAAM against Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft. A video link to the AMRAAM fired by him against Abhinandan on an approximate course is available here.

AMRAAM launch by PAF against Abhinandan
Fired from an altitude of 30,000 feet the AMRAAM covered the 20-odd km within its NEZ quickly and hit the IAF MiG-21 in the rear. Abhinandan ejected out successfully.

The IAF MiG-21 was shot down by a PAF AMRAAM and not a surface-to-air missile.

Events No. 8, 9, 10: 1023–1034 hours — The crash of the IAF MiG-21
50 seconds after Abhinandan Varthaman fired a R-73 against a PAF jet, he was hit by an AMRAAM. the MiG-21 crash is very well documented.

Event 8 indicates the missile hit point.

MiG-21 crash recorded near Horan Kotla in a clear video
Event 9 indicates the parachute landing point near Horan Kotla village. Event 10 indicates the area where the unburnt debris fell down.

Debris of Abhinandan’s MiG-21 aircraft in Azad Kashmir | Photo : By special arrangement
Abhinandan, post ejection had a harrowing escape, when he was manhandled severely by an irate mob, saved by the arrival of the Pakistan Army in the nick of time. And yes, my Pakistani readers, the cup of tea is appreciated and will indeed be reciprocated!

He was made a pawn in a heightened disinformation war with India by the ISPR and after some deft diplomacy by the Indian government, was repatriated after 3 days in Pakistani custody.

Event No. 11: 1040 hours — A Pakistan Army search & rescue (SAR) helicopter
The last piece of the puzzle which supports that a PAF jet was shot down on 27 February is provided by an innocuous looking Pakistan Army light communication helicopter, a Bell Jet Ranger. Utilised routinely for communication duties, the helicopter would not have caught our eye, except that it is featured in the Charhoi video flying at ultra-low level, after the Tadpole event.

After plotting its path, we see it make a left turn in front of the Charhoi videographer, heading for…surprise, surprise…the location of the downed PAF pilot’s parachute landing zone.

A Pakistan Army Jet Ranger seen flying in front of the Charhoi observer
A major aerial engagement had taken just a few minutes back, with the perpetual loss of situational awareness (LOSA) still hanging over the battlefield, what business did a Pakistan Army communication/SAR helicopter have flying around without a highly urgent task at hand?

Or maybe the heli did have an urgent task.

Notice the path of the SAR helicopter plotted at 1040 hours towards the PAF Pilot’s landing zone
The Bell Jet Ranger, was airborne minutes after the aerial engagement to locate and pick up the crashed PAF pilot.

love the pictures btw. total bs but very detailed I must say.
I guess you did your job well, you gave your alleged and circumstantial evidence but still PAF didn't gave any. I suggest you to sit tight. because what ever we have isn't some cropped pics its will be solid trust me.

 

[messiach]

Ok.

Event No. 4: 1023 hours — The ‘Parachute’

1. In the Khuiratta video, we see a distinct object with a low rate of descent. While we are unable to identify the same adequately from the close up, the rate of descent indicates that this is a parachute.
   
   
   
   The puff, the parachute and the debris in the Khuiratta video
2. So, after the ‘puff’ event at 25,000 feet, the aircraft’s direction veered to the left on a north-westerly course, which was the resultant direction of its initial supersonic speed and the impact of the R-73 warhead from the right.Let’s assume at the point of impact at the ‘puff’ location, the speed of the aircraft was Mach 1 (375 m/s). Post impact by the R-73 with a velocity of at least 500m/s — the resultant velocity in the left turn would be approx 250 m/s for same AUW. This is effectively 990 kmph or 535 knots.
3. Now we notice, that from the ‘puff’ to the parachute/debris, the altitude of the aircraft hasn’t changed more than 1,000 odd feet. This indicates that the engine was partially still processing power output.
   
   
   
   Reference the 25k feet line from the puff
4. The puff to the tadpole distance shown on the 25,000 feet AMSL line in the above image is about 10 km. So, the aircraft, from the puff point, travelled 10 km before converting into the tadpole shape. At what average speed will the aircraft be able to cover 10 km from the puff point?The average speed = 650 kmph, achieved by partial engine run till at least 35–50 sec after impact at the ‘puff’ point.
   
5. The F-16 was at 25,000 feet AMSL. From the observer at Khuiratta, the puff will be at a ground distance of 11 km.
6. Since the videographer reacted basis the twin claps at the puff to film the scene, we take a 10 second reaction time. Sound travels from puff to Khuiratta in 37 seconds. So, he would have filmed at 37 + 10 seconds = 47 seconds. when he started filming, 47 seconds had elapsed since the ‘puff’, the parachute deployed and the debris falling. In those 47 seconds, the aircraft would have travelled 8.4 km. In 37 seconds, the aircraft would have covered approx 6 km.
7. The parachute position will be 6 km from the Khuiratta observer to the puff line, on 25,000 feet puff to Tadpole line.
8. Deploying all seen elements on the 25k line from the puff, we get approx positions of all objects seen in the air that day.
   
9. At 6 km from the puff the pilot of the F-16 ejected out of the stricken aircraft either before or after the separation of the debris, a good 36 seconds post the missile impact. What we analysed a bit earlier becomes relevant now, with the separation of the debris from the main aircraft body around 5-6 km from the puff, about the time the pilot ejected out. This is also the time where I believe the partial working engine would have stopped. After this the aircraft would have coasted another 4-odd km, before becoming the tadpole.
   
10. Back to the parachute. The ROD of the parachute is lower than the debris, but cannot be calculated as not enough frames are available on the parachute, the observer focussing on the falling debris.
11. So why did the pilot delay the ejection till 36 odd seconds after the missile hit? The most plausible answer is either the pilot was injured in the missile strike or was still assessing the state of the aircraft with engine running partially, although with the aircraft breaking in at least two pieces after 36 seconds, the pilot would have got signs inside the cockpit a good 15-20 seconds before. Hence the latter may not be plausible. A delayed ejection by the PAF pilot indicates that the pilot may have been stunned and injured in the R-73 hit.
12. The approximate location of the landed pilot after ejection would be on the Khuiratta — parachute line, which is displaced by 6 km from the ‘puff’ to parachute line.
13. After landing it is highly possible that the pilot was either mobbed by Azad Kashmir residents or would have been in an unconscious state due to injuries sustained.
14. It is quite possible he would have been mistaken for an IAF pilot due the following reasons:

#The PAF’s F-16 ACES ejection seat resembles an Indian flag with its colours.

# Most probably, there would be no outward indication on his flying coverall of any PAF affiliation. The fact that IAF and PAF belong to the same subcontinental stock would have made any meaningful resemblance easier for a case of mistaken identity.

#The larger piece of the aircraft had landed a good 4–5 km from the pilot’s position, hence there was no means to know by the smaller debris that it was a PAF jet. The Doosra Banda mentioned by DG ISPR had landed north-west of Charhoi around 1025 hours. An information blackout was enforced in the area by Pakistan immediately after the crash, hence no close-up video is available of the parachute and the debris landing on ground.

Event No. 5: 1023 hours — The ‘Debris’
The debris was a smaller part of the aircraft, most probably its tail portion, given that the R-73 would have inflicted most of the damage in the middle — rear section of the F-16.

1. It was spotted by the Khuiratta observer falling at a high ROD. Its rate of descent has been calculated at 180 m/s.
2. The piece of debris would have fallen on the Khuiratta to debris line and would be 6–7 km from the puff to debris line (25k line).
3. That there is no news ever heard on the debris indicates that the Pakistan Army was able to quickly move in and clamp down on the evidence.
   

Event No. 6: 1024 to 1028 hours — The Tadpole
The Tadpole was formed a further 4 km ahead of the parachute/ debris line, the momentum of the aircraft taking it beyond, until, post the debris separation the aircraft, the remaining airframe finally caught fire, with thousands of gallons of fuel converting into millions of permeable and condensed droplets, taking a smokey cloud like appearance, resembling a tadpole.

The formation and end have been explained in the evidences section.

1. The Tadpole was seen in decent fidelity from the Charhoi and Thanamandi videos.
2. It is proven beyond doubt to be a man-made object.
3. Behind the smokey cloud of high temperature and fuel, the main airframe caught fire and burnt to a great extent.
4. The only debris left from the airframe would be smaller sized unburnt articles and semi-molten/molten pieces, which probably would have rained down below the overhang of the Tadpole.
5. The smaller pieces of debris would have ensured that no one would be wiser to the fact that a PAF asset had been shot down. This was one of the major reasons why the Pakistan Army was able to ensure a complete blackout of information in the Kotli and Charhoi zones. However, the leftover/critical pieces of debris may have been collected over a period of time.
   
   
   
   By special arrangement

Is it a coincidence that the Pakistan Army issued an advisory in the Kotli area immediately after the tadpole crash — about use of across-LoC rockets by the Indian Army?

It was claimed that the Pakistan Army destroyed a couple of Indian rockets in air. This would be the perfect alibi to cover up for the far strewn small debris/ molten elements from the crash of the PAF jet.

Tadpole — is the most conclusive VISUAL proof of the crash of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir that day.

Event No. 7: 1022 hours — The AMRAAM launch at the MiG-21
This event is characterised by a large-scale tactical failure by the PAF BARCAP, which allowed the IAF MiG-21 to penetrate 10-odd km into Azad Kashmir, before any tactical action was taken against him.

The AMRAAM was fired by Wing Commander Noman Ali Khan of 29 Sqn, embedded with the Combat Commander’s School (CCS) at Sargodha. Noman reached south of Mirpur, with a steady AI Lock on his APG-68 V9 radar, launching at least one AMRAAM against Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft. A video link to the AMRAAM fired by him against Abhinandan on an approximate course is available here.

AMRAAM launch by PAF against Abhinandan
Fired from an altitude of 30,000 feet the AMRAAM covered the 20-odd km within its NEZ quickly and hit the IAF MiG-21 in the rear. Abhinandan ejected out successfully.

The IAF MiG-21 was shot down by a PAF AMRAAM and not a surface-to-air missile.

Events No. 8, 9, 10: 1023–1034 hours — The crash of the IAF MiG-21
50 seconds after Abhinandan Varthaman fired a R-73 against a PAF jet, he was hit by an AMRAAM. the MiG-21 crash is very well documented.

Event 8 indicates the missile hit point.

MiG-21 crash recorded near Horan Kotla in a clear video
Event 9 indicates the parachute landing point near Horan Kotla village. Event 10 indicates the area where the unburnt debris fell down.

Debris of Abhinandan’s MiG-21 aircraft in Azad Kashmir | Photo : By special arrangement
Abhinandan, post ejection had a harrowing escape, when he was manhandled severely by an irate mob, saved by the arrival of the Pakistan Army in the nick of time. And yes, my Pakistani readers, the cup of tea is appreciated and will indeed be reciprocated!

He was made a pawn in a heightened disinformation war with India by the ISPR and after some deft diplomacy by the Indian government, was repatriated after 3 days in Pakistani custody.

Event No. 11: 1040 hours — A Pakistan Army search & rescue (SAR) helicopter
The last piece of the puzzle which supports that a PAF jet was shot down on 27 February is provided by an innocuous looking Pakistan Army light communication helicopter, a Bell Jet Ranger. Utilised routinely for communication duties, the helicopter would not have caught our eye, except that it is featured in the Charhoi video flying at ultra-low level, after the Tadpole event.

After plotting its path, we see it make a left turn in front of the Charhoi videographer, heading for…surprise, surprise…the location of the downed PAF pilot’s parachute landing zone.

A Pakistan Army Jet Ranger seen flying in front of the Charhoi observer
A major aerial engagement had taken just a few minutes back, with the perpetual loss of situational awareness (LOSA) still hanging over the battlefield, what business did a Pakistan Army communication/SAR helicopter have flying around without a highly urgent task at hand?

Or maybe the heli did have an urgent task.

Notice the path of the SAR helicopter plotted at 1040 hours towards the PAF Pilot’s landing zone
The Bell Jet Ranger, was airborne minutes after the aerial engagement to locate and pick up the crashed PAF pilot.

 

[Jango]

Abinandone was got Vir Charka for shoting down a pak F-16 , u want more confirmation from him.

Beside 44 old aircraft mig21 , we got 272 Su30s too. They are enough for Pakistan , we need latest tech for China.


Contact on twitter https://twitter.com/joe_sameer and this bunch

Sorry mate, ain't gonna specially make a twitter account to ask a question from someone as deluded as this guy. Who can't even differentiate between 2 different guys and makes them out to be the the same.

 

[Vapnope]

So an Indian mig 21 shoots down an advanced F16 however,

- India wanted to launch a ground and naval attack after 27th feb
- Modi said if we had Rafale, outcome would have been different
- Ajit Doval called Pakistani counterpart and threatened to launch Brahmos against Pakistan
- Ajit Doval goes to John Bolton to show that Pakistan has used F16s
- Dhanoa recently said "No one drives that vintage cars like Mig21"
- India wanted Israeli BVR missiles while according to them an r73 was able to take down an F16
- India said, SU30s dodged AMRAAMs (I don't know why no indian asked IAF that why didn't they attack back and decimated PAF, why they chose to run away)

Do anything India did after 27th Feb makes anyone think that they had an upper hand that day?

 

[Reichsmarschall]

Joe if you're reading this let me know.

 

[Jango]

Event No. 4: 1023 hours — The ‘Parachute’

1. In the Khuiratta video, we see a distinct object wit

Nice to know that an F-16 crashed near my village.

I just have a question.

When is this novel going to be published and hit the stores?

 

[Ultima Thule]

8 pieces of clinching evidence that show how IAF’s Abhinandan shot down a Pakistani F-16

Ok, what next, @Suriya