Pakistan's War - Documentaries

[S-2]

"...it hurts him when the western community thanklessly overlooks the efforts of his Men and Pakistan Army. Clearly he knows what he's talking about."

He shouldn't be so sensitive. In general, it's a soldier's lot in life. Specifically, he shouldn't feel singled out as a Pakistani warrior. The western community "thanklessly overlooks the efforts" of our men and western armies daily as well.

Join the crowd.

Those whom are professionals know the story. There are grave issues in the Pakistani army but motivation by the soldiers at the sharp end isn't any issue of consequence. Tactics and training, equipment, more troops, more aviation, armor, engineers, more civil aid, medics, community liaisons- sure, lots of problems there.

Higher up, though, remain the real questions-

1. How did Bajour, specifically Loe Sam, become so fortified and when?

2. Who should have known and when? ISI? Tribal Agents?

3. How did the Army NOT KNOW until they literally stumbled on militias in Loe Sam. This despite the F.C. unit being nearly wiped out only recently?

4. Now that the P.A. does know, do they intend to occupy and HOLD the ground. To do so will require more, not less forces. To not do so means that the land remains contested.

5. Any clue on Mohmand and the Waziristans? More of the same fortifications? If so, when attack, if ever? Each passing day suggests that the tunnels only become longer and deeper.

6. Is the P.A., instead, intending to turn Bajaur into a Potemkin village while it tries to play off Mehsud, Nazir, and Bahadur against one another further south?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

6. Is the P.A., instead, intending to turn Bajaur into a Potemkin village while it tries to play off Mehsud, Nazir, and Bahadur against one another further south?

I believe most reports on the impact of the Pakistani operation in adjacent areas in Afghanistan leave no room for 'Potemkin village' arguments.

Mehsud, Nazir and Bahadur are already being played against one another in that the TTP is being denied room there. Given Tribal dynamics, I highly doubt the Wazirs would be interested in attacking the Mehsud tribe on Pakistan's behalf without a significant escalation from Mehsud against them.

Even in a situation where the Taliban have directly attacked the Tribal power structure and authority figures (the Salarzai tribe in Bajaur) the resultant Lashkar, raised in support of the PA/FC against the Taliban, remained strictly confined to the Salarzai area.

I would expect the same in Nazir and Gul Bahdur's tribes, so the PA/FC will have to go it alone against Mehsud.

Likely future expansion into Khyber, Mohmand and Orakzai in my opinion, with Khyber already seeing low level ops. to secure NATO supply routes.

 

[RedBaron]

4. Now that the P.A. does know, do they intend to occupy and HOLD the ground. To do so will require more, not less forces. To not do so means that the land remains contested.

S2: great observations, mate.
When I saw the documentary and the challenges PA/FC face in Bajaur, I could not help but compare it to the "whack the mole" situations that coalition forces face in Afghanistan. I was also struck by the sight of tanks retreating from the Taliban counter-attack on one occasion. How did the Taliban manage to build up such a lethal arsenal and operating environment without anyone raising a red flag? I have the same questions as you have.

On a personal note, it was moving to watch the bravery of the injured colonel and his family.

 

[S-2]

The tanks are powerful and useful- but not perfectly so. The main gun and machine guns are valuable in this fight and should dominate but need targets to do so. For that they need infantry. They also need infantry to provide immediate protection.

Those vehicles were 1950s-60s era armor. They also didn't possess reactive armor. They would be vulnerable to shaped charge anti-armor weapons like 107mm recoil rifle fire as well as RPG-7s. Numerous instances we saw a disabled T-54 near Loe Sam town. As you will recall, the tanks initially appeared in front of everybody, to include their own infantry before withdrawing. There may have been good reason. There may also have been good reason for the journalist to leave. I'm less certain about why the infantry broke contact and retreated. I'm also actually unsure whether any of them were IN contact at the time.

Generally, infantry move toward the sound of guns- not away.

That was disturbing.

 

[S-2]

"I believe most reports on the impact of the Pakistani operation in adjacent areas in Afghanistan leave no room for 'Potemkin village' arguments."

The operations there are indeed encouraging relative to the recent past. There's little doubt that Bajaur is having a real impact in Konar.

The destruction in Loe Sam is real enough. Those troops there are certainly playing war for real. My point is more to whether it will be limited as such. You've answered my questions nicely.

More operations at some point for Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Tribal nice-nice further south and see if the enemy of my enemy is really my friend.

 

[RedBaron]

...
Those vehicles were 1950s-60s era armor. They also didn't possess reactive armor. They would be vulnerable to shaped charge anti-armor weapons like 107mm recoil rifle fire as well as RPG-7s.
...
I'm less certain about why the infantry broke contact and retreated. I'm also actually unsure whether any of them were IN contact at the time.

Generally, infantry move toward the sound of guns- not away.

That was disturbing.

Re: tanks, are coalition forces using them in Afghanistan at all? If so are they faring better due to better armour/newer tanks? I know terrain is not really tank country, but maybe PA can learn from coalition experience with mechanized infantry/armor in Afghanistan.
Drones could be useful here to site targets for tanks.
Regarding infantry, in that one instance, I assume they realized they were outnumbered and outgunned, so decided to return to base and return with reinforcements.

 

[Beskar]

The tanks are powerful and useful- but not perfectly so. The main gun and machine guns are valuable in this fight and should dominate but need targets to do so. For that they need infantry. They also need infantry to provide immediate protection.

Those vehicles were 1950s-60s era armor. They also didn't possess reactive armor. They would be vulnerable to shaped charge anti-armor weapons like 107mm recoil rifle fire as well as RPG-7s. Numerous instances we saw a disabled T-54 near Loe Sam town. As you will recall, the tanks initially appeared in front of everybody, to include their own infantry before withdrawing. There may have been good reason. There may also have been good reason for the journalist to leave. I'm less certain about why the infantry broke contact and retreated. I'm also actually unsure whether any of them were IN contact at the time.

Generally, infantry move toward the sound of guns- not away.

That was disturbing.

Earlier in the documentary, when the Colonel is showing the journalist the Insurgents "Weapons Manual" you can see that they talk about rocket-launchers and you even see a couple of them in pictures. So basically, you can realize the sheer number of weapons and rocket launchers they possess. Which are deadly against the T-59's. Not to mention the IED's and booby-traps spread around the obvious entrance routes.

Secondly, when you're operating in a terrain which is favourable for guerilla insurgents, it's really hard to gather Intel on their whereabouts and numbers. Just like how they showed the underground tunnel systems. The "Retreat" basically was a measure to minimize OBVIOUS casualties. If the enemy pops up from every other corner armed with rocket launchers and Heavy machine guns, you don't stand there and prepare to get massacred. You retreat while making a defensive parameter.

Now that they know the REAL strength of the enemy in that particular strong hold, they'll prepare a counter offensive and take it back JUST like how they took VARIOUS Taliban strong holds near Kunar district, which were once CRAWLING with Taliban.

 

[S-2]

"Secondly, when you're operating in a terrain which is favourable for guerilla insurgents, it's really hard to gather Intel on their whereabouts and numbers."

This is Pakistan. It's your terrain. There should be nothing favorable to the enemy about it. Your national intelligence has failed you that an enemy militia could seal this region and fortify it from their supposed prying eyes.

Get this counter-insurgent, guerrilla hocus-pocus out of your system. This fight is nothing like the fight in the Konar. There are no civilians here. It's a battlefield and a very conventional one at that. Clear tunnels with purpose and then seal them. There are proven methods for doing so. Isolate the battlefield. If after two to four months in this highly defined and small battlespace you've no clue to the infil and exfil routes, then your battlefield reconnaissance is not doing it's job. If you do have a clue, then your infantry commanders aren't doing theirs.

Finally, are there enough troops to do the job? They must find, fix, fight, and finish the enemy. Then they must stay to secure the peace such that re-construction can commence. Until then, Loe Sam is a wasteland and you lose.

"JUST like how they took VARIOUS Taliban strong holds near Kunar district, which were once CRAWLING with Taliban."

Loe Sam is a taliban strong-hold near Kunar. Am I missing something? Please provide some links to these battles, if you don't mind. I'll look forward to reading them.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

After observing the incidence on live tv, I was very concerned at the lack of understanding of the pakistani govt , the politicians etc at what happened at RED MOSQUE. The issues of the red mosque were not addressed and dealt with properly. Seemingly, the pakistani govt didnot understand or comprhensd the stuation or didnot know how to stand upto it.

The first and foremost thing to confront was, that the red mosque students were mentally brainwashed by their the teachers and made emotionally captive---by the principal and their cohorts. The parents of those kids, boys and girls had sent their children to get an education----the parents didnot send their childern to be recruited into a children's army of maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi. Ghazi used the kids to meet his personal agenda and the agenda of al qaeda----he trained them instead, to fight his personal wars. He filled their innocent minds with hatred for the society and anybody else who didnot think like them. He collected weapons and stored them in the seminary to fight the govt forces. He had prepared a fighting force out the young innocent students who came to study at the school.For that reason he committed treason against the state.

The government should have fought tooth and nail in the media to get this message across to the masses of the country---this issue should have been pounded over and over again and again. But before we had gotten to that position----the red mosque issue should have been brought to notice and an ending, a lot sooner. The result showed the casual approach taken and lack of understanding by Gen Musharraf and his colleagues about this major issue. We had fools at our dispoasl aka Ijaz Ul Haque---Ch Shujaat etc etc---these guys were making deals with known terrorists and were trying to get them safe passage---. Ch Shujaat is a known blabbering idiot who has never stepped up and taken the bull by the horns----he would rather use his weak kneed diplomacy against the very people who wanted to hijack the ideology of the nation.

To top it all off---the govt let the media run out of control in every which way---every tv anchor suddenly became a MASTER HOSTAGE NEGOTIATOR, gave all kind of live tv coverage to the scenario at hand----the situation ran totally out of control.

Truthfully---pakistan had wished that this monster of radicalism will disappear somehow or the other----america will get tired and leave----and we will be doing things that we had been doing through all these years.

There is something fundamentally wrong here---pak army has taken too long to neutralize the issue at stake. The cardinal rule of command is to neutralize the insurgency in the shortest period of time and do not stop once the enmy is on the run to sign for peace. Pakistan army generals had been made a fool many atimes over, by the taliban and the jirga. Somebody needs to tell them what the real problem is and how things need to be dealt with.

Pak army needs a better propaganda manager in the FATA. The propaganda should be in the form of radio bulletins, on public losdspeaker systems in village, towns and city squares, by leaflet drops over all territory continuosly---by declaring the taliban as enemies of the state, the muslims and islam----suicide bombers as enemies of ALLAH, his beloved prophet, the holy Quraan and the teachings of the holy prophet Mohammad. This media campaign should be continuous and relentless.

I really am surprised that why the media savy americans have not done so already---why has this information not been used and enforced in pakistan. This is the only way pakistan can control the minds of the people-----a massive media campaign 24/7----with a religious background but condemning the acts of the taliban.

 

[S-2]

"Re: tanks, are coalition forces using them in Afghanistan at all?"

Both the Canadians and the Danes are operating Leopard II there now. The Danes just played a big part in an op with the Brits northwest of Lashkar Gal. Plenty of tank ground in the south.

We're seeing Pakistani armor because the battle is literally along a line-of-communication in Loe Sam and resides along the valley floor- not the foothills or mountains. It's mixed density terrain- farms, villages/towns, open fields. No large patches of dense forest but sparse shrub woodlands.

The enemy unfortunately posesses an advantage of intimacy with the battlefield. It didn't need and shouldn't have been that way. There's nothing, however, about the terrain that's imposing restrictions on the mobility of the forces involved that I can see.

"...maybe PA can learn from coalition experience with mechanized infantry/armor in Afghanistan."

There's plenty of open source stuff out there for those who want to learn. Experiences from Iraq too. Not only armor ops but convoy operations, cordon and searches, etc. A whole gamut of newly-mined professional literature very accessible.

We work hard to build relationships and procedures between our armor, artillery, and infantry officers. It's not easy and I imagine that the Pakistanis have plenty of experience there that's valuable. The fundamentals don't change much.

 

[Neo]

"Secondly, when you're operating in a terrain which is favourable for guerilla insurgents, it's really hard to gather Intel on their whereabouts and numbers."

This is Pakistan. It's your terrain. There should be nothing favorable to the enemy about it. Your national intelligence has failed you that an enemy militia could seal this region and fortify it from their supposed prying eyes.

Sir,

This is indeed our terrain but I don't think its fair to blame our intelligence for the failures, your side is as much responsible as ours.
As a military proffessional you'll agree that it started as your war and we had little choice than to support you or see tomahawks flying all over the country hitting our strategic assetts.

US/Nato forces should have sealed or atleast guarded Pak-Afghan border before the carpet bombings were launched on Tora Bora and other parts of the region driving those militants into Pakistan. They were already heavily armed when they entered the country and PA wasn't there to counter them due constitutional restriction.

Were you not aware of the ethnic dynamics of the region? How can you miscalculate the local sympathy and support for those militants who're considered "brothers in arms" and therefor offered shelters?

We were incapable of stopping them due constitutional restrictions, lack of funds, weapons and support of local jigra's at that time (2002-03) but you could have done so much more. And now we're paying heavily for your mistakes and still have to take the blame for "not doing enough"

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

This is indeed our terrain but I don't think its fair to blame our intelligence for the failures, your side is as much responsible as ours.

NATO/US has the edge in electronic and aerial surveillance, by far, and from what I understand this information was being shared, or should have been shared, prior to the launch of a coordinated operation in an area that had a significant impact on the situation in Afghanistan.

In terms of humint, it has always been assumed the PA/ISI had the better assets in FATA. The lack of awareness of structures, defences, numbers, tactics etc. points to a pretty comprehensive failure from the intelligence standpoint, on both sides.

 

[RedBaron]

NATO/US has the edge in electronic and aerial surveillance, by far, and from what I understand this information was being shared, or should have been shared, prior to the launch of a coordinated operation in an area that had a significant impact on the situation in Afghanistan.

In terms of humint, it has always been assumed the PA/ISI had the better assets in FATA. The lack of awareness of structures, defences, numbers, tactics etc. points to a pretty comprehensive failure from the intelligence standpoint, on both sides.

On the elint issue, as per today's WSJ, this is now apparently in place and PA now has access to Predator drone video feeds in FATA.

Pakistan and U.S. Rebuild Strained Military Ties - WSJ.com

On the humint factor, I disagree there was intel failure on ISI's part. After all, it had (until very recently at least) significant ties with the Taliban and may have looked the other way when the Taliban entered FATA and setup bases due to US pressure in Afghanistan.

Overall, looks like the Bajaur ops have resulted in valuable gains to US forces in Kunar as per the WSJ report. Extract below:
"Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan, said the number of insurgents crossing into Afghanistan from Pakistan has begun to decrease, reducing a major cause of instability in Afghanistan. Gen. Schloesser said U.S. and Afghan forces, which were hit by up to 20 rockets a day over the summer, are now hit by two or three.
U.S. officials attributed the declines to American missile strikes on insurgent targets inside Pakistan and the coordinated military campaign known as Operation Lionheart, which involves U.S. moves against militants in the Kunar region of Afghanistan and a large Pakistani campaign in the extremist stronghold of Bajaur."

 

[S-2]

"As a military proffessional you'll agree that it started as your war and we had little choice than to support you or see tomahawks flying all over the country hitting our strategic assetts."

This has little to do with how the Rehman boys, upon getting their AZZES handed to them in the Korengal in the fall of 2007 pulled back into Bajaur and unhinged Loe Sam to personal advantage over the next ten months.

Your comment disturbs me as presented. What it really says to me is, "If we didn't think you were entirely capable and willing to kick our ***** to oblivion, we'd tell you to piss off."

Fair enough. That said, America should harbor no illusion under your premise that you constitute a willing and trusted ally. All that follows shouldn't be a surprise if that's the case. That might, btw, include the sharing of relevant operational intelligence. It might reveal sources and methods and get somebody killed by an ally who's only commitment is to avoid a whooping and who might actually have allegiance to our enemy in Afghanistan.

"US/Nato forces should have sealed or atleast guarded Pak-Afghan border before the carpet bombings were launched on Tora Bora and other parts of the region driving those militants into Pakistan."

Who knows what NATO/US should have done. The war unfolded fast but it wasn't like Pakistan didn't know on Sept. 12 that we were coming. A more forthcoming effort by Pakistan may have found your divisions racing up to FATAland for extensive "training exercises" with your F.C. and conducting "joint" training patrols, etc.

BTW, "constitutional restrictions"????

Foreign combatants of a neighboring army enter Pakistan and you are "constitutionally restricted" from engaging them? Really? Better think that one through again, Neo.

"How can you miscalculate the local sympathy and support for those militants who're considered "brothers in arms" and therefor offered shelters?"

That's your miscalculation- not ours. That's your turf- not ours. Those were your tribal citizens offering sanctuary- not ours. You want us to do your thinking for you now? You're the local experts. If you knew this, where was your army to repel these foreign soldiers from the afghan taliban army and A.Q.? Isn't that what an army does?

Maybe all of your "local" knowledge has made you go "native"? A bit of "Stockholm Syndrome" were you've more sympathy for the perpetrators than the victims?

"...you could have done so much more."

Yup. No doubt about it in retrospect. You've highlighted for myself all that we could have done to ameliorate the need to do so for itself by Pakistan. Clearly that's what should have happened given the results- Attack the enemy AND be certain to guard the neighbor's borders for them in the process. Heaven forbid that they do so for themselves with war right on their own border.

Oh well, you live and learn.

 

[S-2]

"NATO/US has the edge in electronic and aerial surveillance, by far, and from what I understand this information was being shared, or should have been shared, prior to the launch of a coordinated operation in an area that had a significant impact on the situation in Afghanistan."

Ummm...look, we're talking about guys digging out basements and tunneling under streets at night. This is a shovel and pickaxe fortification exercise where lots of sweaty guys with weapons who are always real dirty and scare the living bejeezus out of the neighbors have just moved into the home next door. They have other bad, armed sweaty guys who visit them at weird hours and when they leave they're always real dirty too.

And noisy!? Banging and clanging and strange sounds at all hours...da-da-da. Now if Rehman, et al are known to have pulled back from Kunar, do you start looking in Bajaur or do you wait for the mythical but omnipresent signal intercept?

I'm not buying. Your army should have clearly known the nature of the forces awaiting them in Loe Sam and the extent of their fortifications. As it was, it was all a complete surprise.

Blame us should you wish but it's your army on your soil that's living/dying with the consequences.