Pakistan's Taliban Offensive Will Fall Short

[khujliwal]

Pakistan's military is in the midst of an assault on Taliban and allied Islamist fighters in the rugged mountains of North Waziristan -- an offensive that the U.S. government has been urging it to undertake for at least a decade. The conventional wisdom in Washington has been that a North Waziristan sweep would clean out the last and strongest bastion of armed Islamic militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre -- most critically, the so-called Haqqani network of guerrillas fighting the U.S.-led forces in neighboring Afghanistan.

But even though this offensive seems likely to be the most ambitious Pakistani attempt in the past decade to control North Waziristan, it will, at best, fall far short of what Washington and Islamabad hope for.

One reason is that Pakistan still lacks any national strategy in which the government and armed forces together fight Islamist militancy and terrorism. In North Waziristan, the army is re-using the blunt force approach it has used before: clear out the local population, then use air strikes, artillery, and ground forces to clean out any insurgents that remain. This tactical, rather than strategic, approach means that the North Waziristan battle will not be definitive, but rather just another fight in Pakistan's inconclusive long war.

To build a national strategy, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government needs to bring the military out of what has been a long silence to share with the Pakistani public its vision of what will work. The government must then include the military's view in a way it has not so far. In February, for example, Sharif's administration released an embryonicNational Internal Security Policy that had been prepared with no visible participation by the military and that has already hit snags in its implementation.

In North Waziristan, both the army and the government have been telegraphing their intentions, reducing hopes that the offensive might decapitate the Taliban leadership. Chances are that the leaders have already fled to Afghanistan or elsewhere in Pakistan. Cities such as Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Islamabad offer safe haven against U.S. drone surveillance and strikes. If the Taliban and their affiliates follow previous patterns, they will have left North Waziristan to be defended by Uzbeks, Chechens, and others who cannot blend in to Pakistani populations.

While the army says its commander, Gen. Raheel Sharif (no relation to the prime minister), has directed "that all terrorists along with their sanctuaries must be eliminated without any discrimination," it has not specified the targets of the assault. The Haqqani group, long a source of U.S.-Pakistani tension because of its attacks in Afghanistan from bases in North Waziristan, was not mentioned. (It is unclear whether Pakistan may have asked the Haqqanis to evacuate the area, or whether it will leave them untouched by the offensive.) Given the interlocking franchise arrangements among the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Punjabi militants, it is hard to imagine a successful operation that leaves any of these groups untargeted.

Regardless, the current operation could prompt some serious thinking on Pakistan's need for a unified, civil and military campaign beyond North Waziristan. The heartland of Punjab province, Karachi in Sindh province, and the southwestern province of Balochistan remain hotbeds of militant activity, and are often given the blind eye by officialdom for political reasons. Sectarian and ethnic violencepermeate Pakistan's polity, too. Prime Minister Sharif should make a clear, concise statement to his people on the broad strategy of this long war, rather than leaving it to a restricted military operation in North Waziristan that may produce instant gratification, but that avoids Pakistan's larger internal security problems. If he deals in reality rather than rhetoric, the people of Pakistan may surprise him with their support. Most of them are fed up with the steady deterioration of their lives and the economy, as well as the apathy of the ruling class in dealing with insecurity.

A Pakistan that shows a willingness to fight a truly national campaign against militancy will need help from the United States and other friends to better track down terrorist networks, and to cut off their domestic and external sources of financial support. One of the least used domestic resources in that regard is the ability of the State Bank of Pakistan to track financial flows and to quarantine suspicious activities. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran could also help in curtailing the flows of funding from their countries that feed a proxy war between Shia and Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan.

In the end, Pakistani society must decide if it will hide its head in the sand or recognize the existential dangers of militancy and terrorism within its borders. The counterfactual to this is a steady decline that will make nuclear-armed Pakistan an even more dangerous place.

Shuja Nawaz is the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.
Pakistan's Taliban Offensive Will Fall Short

 

[Capt.Popeye]

The title of Shuja Nawaz's piece above is (IMO) alarmist, premature and unnecessarily speculative in nature. At this (early) stage of the campaign; that cannot be an advisable approach to take.

That being said; Shuja does make some telling points about how the plan seems to have taken off.
Firstly; there is still not any great clarity on how much congruence the GHQ (PA) and GoP have on the methods and objectives. That is important, even critical for the plan of action to succeed. And for the general public in Pakistan to lend their unstinting and unequivocal support to the campaign. Which is critical to achieve lasting results.

The second point that Shuja Nawaz makes is imbued with some degree of validity: which is that the approach is still 'tactical' with deficient attention being addressed to the 'strategic' aspects. This point of view deserves more thought.

But will that still justify attaching the title, that has been?

@Icarus: Sir, your views?

 

[hkdas]

Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster


Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch
IssueCourtesy: CLAWS| Date : 02 Jul , 2014


On Sunday, 15 June 2014, a press release from Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relation (ISPR), announced the launch of “Operation Zarb-e-Azb”, to clear North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of militants belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups such as the Haqqani network, who had made the dense mountainous terrain of that Agency into a sanctuary.1 The terrorist attack on Karachi airport a week earlier was the trigger that finally removed any ambivalence on the issue.

Over 10 people being killed every day denotes a phenomenal quantity of violence.

The operation was long in the offing. Three years earlier, General Petraeus, while leaving command of US-ISAF troops in Afghanistan, referred to Pakistan Army’s long-overdue operation in Kurram and the trans-border movement by Afghan militants and their TTP affiliates as ‘North Waziristan in reverse’.

The statement implied that the Pakistan military would also have to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in NWA, more specifically the presence of an al Qaeda-inspired militant conglomerate, presumably protected by the Haqqani network. Pakistan understandably resisted US pressure, partly because it viewed the Haqqani network as its strategic assets, but also because of the sheer difficulties involved in pursuing an offensive line in the difficult and treacherous mountain terrain of NWA.

While the Pakistani establishment did attempt to deal with the surrounding regions of Kurram, Bajaur and Dir, NWA was left largely alone, though the areas around the mountains that separate North and South Waziristan, in the Shawal and Makeen valleys, where the TTP held sway saw limited activity. The TTP had moved into this region when the Pakistan army dislocated them from the Mehsud regions of Laddha, Makeen and Sararogha in October/November 2009.2

Though a national consensus exists on launching Zarb-e-Azb, the military operations are fraught with risks. NWA adjoins the entire greater Paktia region, home to the Haqqani’s Zadran tribe. An assault on the Haqqani’s and affiliates in NWA means stoking a beehive of all those who are already filled with a sense of betrayal by the erstwhile security institutions. A reaction can be expected in mainland Pakistan, wherein cities such as Peshawar, Mardan, some southern districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa such as DI Khan and Kohat, as well as Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi would remain on the terrorist’s radar as legitimate targets for attack. The blowback suffered in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation in 2007 is a pointer. The present operations could well herald a more brutal phase of terrorist reprisal attacks, leading to uncertainty and instability across the country. Needless to say, the peace accord, signed on February 17, 2008, stands nullified in NWA, with adverse consequences for the military.

In all probability, civilians are withstanding the worst of state brutality, and civilian deaths are being counted as terrorists killed in operations.

About 40,000 troops are taking part in the operation, which began with aerial strikes and artillery bombardment. This facet of the operation continues and the ground assault with tanks and infantry is yet to commence. An ISPR press release of June 27 however indicated that a ground offensive could commence shortly. The bombardment actually started on 23 May, a full three weeks before the ISPR named the operation as Zarb-e-Azb3.

The ISPR has claimed hundreds of terrorists killed in the bombardment, but such claims appear to be more a propaganda ploy to buttress internal support and maintain morale. High-speed fighter aircraft are unsuitable for taking on mobile groups of foot fighters and any casualties caused to the militants will at best be incidental. The same goes for artillery fire, which in the absence of direct observation against specific targets through forward observers is largely ineffective. In all probability, civilians are withstanding the worst of state brutality, and civilian deaths are being counted as terrorists killed in operations. Very few militants remain in the area, having moved to adjoining areas before the start of the operation as reported by the stream of refugees leaving North Waziristan to safer abodes in Bannu and other places. This movement started on May 22 when Pakistani F16 jets pounded suspected targets. The human tragedy is on an epic scale and would be hard to describe.

The population of North Waziristan as per the 1998 census data, extrapolated from the earlier census report, stood at 3,61,246. In the absence of census data, it could be presumed that the population has increased to five to six lakh people since then. Of this, about 450,000 have fled their homes4, leaving the area bereft of its population base. Only a small segment of the population remains, perhaps to guard what little is left of their home and hearths.

From a humanitarian perspective, the operation has severe consequences. The cost of looking after half a million internally displaced persons is colossal, even if a large number choose to live with relatives and friends. The social cost of displacement in terms of lack of access to healthcare and education added to the economic cost of displacement and conflict is worrisome. However, all this could perhaps be acceptable if there was reasonable prognosis of success in operations. That, in the present case, appears unlikely. An analogy with respect to India is pertinent.

FATA covers an area of 27,200 sq km. In comparison, the Kashmir division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with an area of 15,948 sq km is just over half that size. In a broader sense, the insurgency affected areas of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, when insurgency was at its peak, could be considered as a rough equivalent of FATA.

Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border, even if it desires to do so.

The Indian Army’s operations in J&K were troop intensive, with the Army deployed in a grid pattern all across the disturbed areas of the state. The Indian Army was in for the long haul, with operations being conducted with minimum use of force. As a result, there was no displacement of the local population. In Pakistan, military operations follow the war model, with emphasis on the use of maximum force. This has its own drawbacks in terms of alienation of the population and flies against the very principle of restoring peace and tranquillity in an area. India had the capacity and the will to maintain a long-term deployment of troops in J&K, to ensure that the various terrorist outfits could not hold the state to ransom. Pakistan’s capacity in this respect if suspect.

A fundamental negative in Pakistan’s case is its inability to isolate the area of operations. The porous border permits free movement on either side of the Durand Line. Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border, even if it desires to do so. Militants thus have safe sanctuaries to retreat to when pressured by the Pakistan military and return when the pressure eases. Defeating the militants in such a scenario is extremely difficult. In addition, for Pakistan to maintain its hold over NWA and other parts of FATA, the area will have to be physically held. This poses a fresh set of challenges.

While the Pakistan military will be able to overrun NWA, holding on to the area is fraught with serious consequences. The terrain is extremely inhospitable and communication infrastructure is minimal. The mountains, as is well known, eat up troops and the Pakistan army perforce will have to concentrate on holding built up areas, covering their lines of communications and attempting to dominate the mountainside with patrols and aerial reconnaissance. This opens them to guerrilla action from militants, who will continue to hound the security forces through ambushes and improvised explosive devices. In the absence of a political settlement, the battle is unwinnable. The aerial bombardment has already alienated the locals who, even if they do return to their homes after the Pakistan army has ceased their operations, will be distrustful of the security forces. Lack of public support will further impinge on the ability of the state to neutralise the militants.

Lack of public support will further impinge on the ability of the state to neutralise the militants.

If these were the only challenges faced by Pakistan, then perhaps they could still manage to contain the situation. But the country is also beset with a raging ethnic insurgency in Baluchistan, inspired by a deep seated desire to secede from the state. Karachi, the financial capital of the state is seething with ethnic, sectarian and terrorist violence. Violence levels in Southern Punjab are increasing and even Rawalpindi and Islamabad face the threat of suicide attacks. In the one-year period from 5 June 2013 to 15 June 2014, 4113 persons including security force personnel have been killed in terrorist violence perpetrated by the TTP and its affiliates.5

Over 10 people being killed every day denotes a phenomenal quantity of violence. In addition, externally, Pakistan still views India as its primary threat and deploys a large number of troops on its Eastern border.

In such a scenario, Pakistan lacks the capacity for a sustained deployment of troops in NWA and other parts of FATA, which is essential to restore the credibility and will of the state. As defeating the TTP and other groups is unlikely and sustained deployment to maintain peace is not feasible, Pakistan will at some point have to go back to the peace table and hold talks with the militant outfits. What sort of arrangement that may emerge is to be seen, but the TTPs insistence on Sharia as the form of government in the areas they control will perhaps have to be acceded to. In a sense, this will effectively divide the state and lead to the creation of a larger Pashtun identity, on either side of the Durand Line. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by the end of this year will only hasten this process.

India is not a player in the destiny of Pakistan and can do precious little to rein in the radical forces nurtured by Pakistan for over three decades through a virulent state sponsored education system. Pakistan is looking at a long-term socio-political disaster. The antidote for the conglomerate of religiously driven militants is a conclusive official campaign, free of fear or favour. But perhaps the tipping point has been reached and even such a campaign is unlikely to succeed. In a paraphrasing of the well-known nursery rhyme, “All the Kings Horses and all the Kings Men, could not put Pakistan together again”. Will that be the fate of Pakistan? Time will tell.

Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster » Indian Defence Review

 

[FaujHistorian]

Good articles.

Very intellectual discussion.

Very good knit picking
Very short of "how can we help".

So in the end. Just empty talk.

 

[Donatello]

Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster


Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch
IssueCourtesy: CLAWS| Date : 02 Jul , 2014


On Sunday, 15 June 2014, a press release from Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relation (ISPR), announced the launch of “Operation Zarb-e-Azb”, to clear North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of militants belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups such as the Haqqani network, who had made the dense mountainous terrain of that Agency into a sanctuary.1 The terrorist attack on Karachi airport a week earlier was the trigger that finally removed any ambivalence on the issue.

Over 10 people being killed every day denotes a phenomenal quantity of violence.

The operation was long in the offing. Three years earlier, General Petraeus, while leaving command of US-ISAF troops in Afghanistan, referred to Pakistan Army’s long-overdue operation in Kurram and the trans-border movement by Afghan militants and their TTP affiliates as ‘North Waziristan in reverse’.

The statement implied that the Pakistan military would also have to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in NWA, more specifically the presence of an al Qaeda-inspired militant conglomerate, presumably protected by the Haqqani network. Pakistan understandably resisted US pressure, partly because it viewed the Haqqani network as its strategic assets, but also because of the sheer difficulties involved in pursuing an offensive line in the difficult and treacherous mountain terrain of NWA.

While the Pakistani establishment did attempt to deal with the surrounding regions of Kurram, Bajaur and Dir, NWA was left largely alone, though the areas around the mountains that separate North and South Waziristan, in the Shawal and Makeen valleys, where the TTP held sway saw limited activity. The TTP had moved into this region when the Pakistan army dislocated them from the Mehsud regions of Laddha, Makeen and Sararogha in October/November 2009.2

Though a national consensus exists on launching Zarb-e-Azb, the military operations are fraught with risks. NWA adjoins the entire greater Paktia region, home to the Haqqani’s Zadran tribe. An assault on the Haqqani’s and affiliates in NWA means stoking a beehive of all those who are already filled with a sense of betrayal by the erstwhile security institutions. A reaction can be expected in mainland Pakistan, wherein cities such as Peshawar, Mardan, some southern districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa such as DI Khan and Kohat, as well as Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi would remain on the terrorist’s radar as legitimate targets for attack. The blowback suffered in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation in 2007 is a pointer. The present operations could well herald a more brutal phase of terrorist reprisal attacks, leading to uncertainty and instability across the country. Needless to say, the peace accord, signed on February 17, 2008, stands nullified in NWA, with adverse consequences for the military.

In all probability, civilians are withstanding the worst of state brutality, and civilian deaths are being counted as terrorists killed in operations.

About 40,000 troops are taking part in the operation, which began with aerial strikes and artillery bombardment. This facet of the operation continues and the ground assault with tanks and infantry is yet to commence. An ISPR press release of June 27 however indicated that a ground offensive could commence shortly. The bombardment actually started on 23 May, a full three weeks before the ISPR named the operation as Zarb-e-Azb3.

The ISPR has claimed hundreds of terrorists killed in the bombardment, but such claims appear to be more a propaganda ploy to buttress internal support and maintain morale. High-speed fighter aircraft are unsuitable for taking on mobile groups of foot fighters and any casualties caused to the militants will at best be incidental. The same goes for artillery fire, which in the absence of direct observation against specific targets through forward observers is largely ineffective. In all probability, civilians are withstanding the worst of state brutality, and civilian deaths are being counted as terrorists killed in operations. Very few militants remain in the area, having moved to adjoining areas before the start of the operation as reported by the stream of refugees leaving North Waziristan to safer abodes in Bannu and other places. This movement started on May 22 when Pakistani F16 jets pounded suspected targets. The human tragedy is on an epic scale and would be hard to describe.

The population of North Waziristan as per the 1998 census data, extrapolated from the earlier census report, stood at 3,61,246. In the absence of census data, it could be presumed that the population has increased to five to six lakh people since then. Of this, about 450,000 have fled their homes4, leaving the area bereft of its population base. Only a small segment of the population remains, perhaps to guard what little is left of their home and hearths.

From a humanitarian perspective, the operation has severe consequences. The cost of looking after half a million internally displaced persons is colossal, even if a large number choose to live with relatives and friends. The social cost of displacement in terms of lack of access to healthcare and education added to the economic cost of displacement and conflict is worrisome. However, all this could perhaps be acceptable if there was reasonable prognosis of success in operations. That, in the present case, appears unlikely. An analogy with respect to India is pertinent.

FATA covers an area of 27,200 sq km. In comparison, the Kashmir division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with an area of 15,948 sq km is just over half that size. In a broader sense, the insurgency affected areas of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, when insurgency was at its peak, could be considered as a rough equivalent of FATA.

Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border, even if it desires to do so.

The Indian Army’s operations in J&K were troop intensive, with the Army deployed in a grid pattern all across the disturbed areas of the state. The Indian Army was in for the long haul, with operations being conducted with minimum use of force. As a result, there was no displacement of the local population. In Pakistan, military operations follow the war model, with emphasis on the use of maximum force. This has its own drawbacks in terms of alienation of the population and flies against the very principle of restoring peace and tranquillity in an area. India had the capacity and the will to maintain a long-term deployment of troops in J&K, to ensure that the various terrorist outfits could not hold the state to ransom. Pakistan’s capacity in this respect if suspect.

A fundamental negative in Pakistan’s case is its inability to isolate the area of operations. The porous border permits free movement on either side of the Durand Line. Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border, even if it desires to do so. Militants thus have safe sanctuaries to retreat to when pressured by the Pakistan military and return when the pressure eases. Defeating the militants in such a scenario is extremely difficult. In addition, for Pakistan to maintain its hold over NWA and other parts of FATA, the area will have to be physically held. This poses a fresh set of challenges.

While the Pakistan military will be able to overrun NWA, holding on to the area is fraught with serious consequences. The terrain is extremely inhospitable and communication infrastructure is minimal. The mountains, as is well known, eat up troops and the Pakistan army perforce will have to concentrate on holding built up areas, covering their lines of communications and attempting to dominate the mountainside with patrols and aerial reconnaissance. This opens them to guerrilla action from militants, who will continue to hound the security forces through ambushes and improvised explosive devices. In the absence of a political settlement, the battle is unwinnable. The aerial bombardment has already alienated the locals who, even if they do return to their homes after the Pakistan army has ceased their operations, will be distrustful of the security forces. Lack of public support will further impinge on the ability of the state to neutralise the militants.

Lack of public support will further impinge on the ability of the state to neutralise the militants.

If these were the only challenges faced by Pakistan, then perhaps they could still manage to contain the situation. But the country is also beset with a raging ethnic insurgency in Baluchistan, inspired by a deep seated desire to secede from the state. Karachi, the financial capital of the state is seething with ethnic, sectarian and terrorist violence. Violence levels in Southern Punjab are increasing and even Rawalpindi and Islamabad face the threat of suicide attacks. In the one-year period from 5 June 2013 to 15 June 2014, 4113 persons including security force personnel have been killed in terrorist violence perpetrated by the TTP and its affiliates.5

Over 10 people being killed every day denotes a phenomenal quantity of violence. In addition, externally, Pakistan still views India as its primary threat and deploys a large number of troops on its Eastern border.

In such a scenario, Pakistan lacks the capacity for a sustained deployment of troops in NWA and other parts of FATA, which is essential to restore the credibility and will of the state. As defeating the TTP and other groups is unlikely and sustained deployment to maintain peace is not feasible, Pakistan will at some point have to go back to the peace table and hold talks with the militant outfits. What sort of arrangement that may emerge is to be seen, but the TTPs insistence on Sharia as the form of government in the areas they control will perhaps have to be acceded to. In a sense, this will effectively divide the state and lead to the creation of a larger Pashtun identity, on either side of the Durand Line. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by the end of this year will only hasten this process.

India is not a player in the destiny of Pakistan and can do precious little to rein in the radical forces nurtured by Pakistan for over three decades through a virulent state sponsored education system. Pakistan is looking at a long-term socio-political disaster. The antidote for the conglomerate of religiously driven militants is a conclusive official campaign, free of fear or favour. But perhaps the tipping point has been reached and even such a campaign is unlikely to succeed. In a paraphrasing of the well-known nursery rhyme, “All the Kings Horses and all the Kings Men, could not put Pakistan together again”. Will that be the fate of Pakistan? Time will tell.

Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster » Indian Defence Review

Do we care what Indians think? Nope.

I mean, how low and woefully ignorant one has to be to write up and read in Indian Defence Review?

 

[khujliwal]

Good articles.

Very intellectual discussion.

Very good knit picking
Very short of "how can we help".

So in the end. Just empty talk.

Bro it's not like that, the discussion is, how this operation is different from the previous ones, inputs from Pakistani members will help.

 

[Icarus]

The title of Shuja Nawaz's piece above is (IMO) alarmist, premature and unnecessarily speculative in nature. At this (early) stage of the campaign; that cannot be an advisable approach to take.

That being said; Shuja does make some telling points about how the plan seems to have taken off.
Firstly; there is still not any great clarity on how much congruence the GHQ (PA) and GoP have on the methods and objectives. That is important, even critical for the plan of action to succeed. And for the general public in Pakistan to lend their unstinting and unequivocal support to the campaign. Which is critical to achieve lasting results.

The second point that Shuja Nawaz makes is imbued with some degree of validity: which is that the approach is still 'tactical' with deficient attention being addressed to the 'strategic' aspects. This point of view deserves more thought.

But will that still justify attaching the title, that has been?

@Icarus: Sir, your views?

Indeed, the title is misleading and has been attached with the sole purpose of grabbing attention, the material of the article hardly even denotes any relevance to the title. The article itself addresses a different matter entirely. There is still a void to be filled as far as counter-terrorism policy goes and until the nation has a government that seems committed to tackling the terrorism menace, the matter will not subside. The perception and projection of the government and its relationships with the armed forces requires some changes in order to make the psychological impact of these operations more effective.
As for the second point, I believe that tactical and strategic motives of the operations are intertwined, clearing the areas and dismantling terrorist command structures is a tactical objective and when it has been achieved, the strategic objectives of holding the areas and refraining the terrorists from taking over will take precedence. However, the real result will be achieved when the civilian government works to consolidate the Army's gains by providing infrastructure and administrative support to the locals which has so far, unfortunately, remained a non-starter. The Army clears the area, rebuilds and reestablishes the political machinery, which leads people to see the Army and TTP as the sole stakeholders in the conflict and the GoP is ignored entirely, resultantly, when the Army leaves those areas, the people don't really respond to the government machinery the same way. That is a matter which I believe needs to be addressed.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Good articles.

Very intellectual discussion.

Very good knit picking
Very short of "how can we help".

So in the end. Just empty talk.

Whatever??!!
Neither did your post throw in any specific or worth-while point of view.........or even attempt to either support or counter any views that have been offered so far!

So are you also just attempting to add to "the empty talk"?

 

[Icarus]

Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster


Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch
IssueCourtesy: CLAWS| Date : 02 Jul , 2014


Pakistan is looking at a long-term disaster » Indian Defence Review

Typical and stereotypical, two words I can best use to describe this article.

 

[FaujHistorian]

......
FATA covers an area of 27,200 sq km. In comparison, the Kashmir division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with an area of 15,948 sq km is just over half that size. In a broader sense, the insurgency affected areas of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, when insurgency was at its peak, could be considered as a rough equivalent of FATA.

Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border, even if it desires to do so.

....
A fundamental negative in Pakistan’s case is its inability to isolate the area of operations. The porous border permits free movement on either side of the Durand Line. Pakistan lacks the capacity to seal this border,....

In such a scenario, Pakistan lacks the capacity for a sustained deployment of troops in NWA and other parts of FATA, which is essential to restore the credibility and will of the state. As defeating the TTP and other groups is unlikely and sustained deployment to maintain peace is not feasible, Pakistan will at some point have to go back to the peace table and hold talks with the militant outfits. What sort of arrangement that may emerge is to be seen, but the TTPs insistence on Sharia as the form of government in the areas they control will perhaps have to be acceded to. In a sense, this will effectively divide the state and lead to the creation of a larger Pashtun identity, on either side of the Durand Line. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by the end of this year will only hasten this process.

India is not a player in the destiny of Pakistan and can do precious little

OK this is what I see from this good general from India.


Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity
Pakistan lacks the capacity


He may be right.
He may be utterly wrong


only time will tell.

Positive news.

Swat ops have severely hampered TTP there.
NWA ops will do the same.

There will be a permanent cantonment in Swat
There will be a permanent cantonment in NWA

Life will be bed of roses in the area. NO
But there is no other option.

you capture and hold and do so for 100s of years

This is how countries survive.

Will there be negotiations at some point. Sure

PA is there to stay in NWA.

So Indian gernal Sahib

use your think tank to adivse NaMo Sahib about the resolve of PA to bring peace in the region.
otherwise
all your bombastic statements in Kashmir will be flushed down the drain.


hope you all get it.

 

[Jango]

However, the real result will be achieved when the civilian government works to consolidate the Army's gains by providing infrastructure and administrative support to the locals which has so far, unfortunately, remained a non-starter. The Army clears the area, rebuilds and reestablishes the political machinery, which leads people to see the Army and TTP as the sole stakeholders in the conflict and the GoP is ignored entirely, resultantly, when the Army leaves those areas, the people don't really respond to the government machinery the same way. That is a matter which I believe needs to be addressed.

Haven't we all been waiting for this day to come!

 

[FaujHistorian]

Whatever??!!
Neither did your post throw in any specific or worth-while point of view.........or even attempt to either support or counter any views that have been offered so far!

So are you also just attempting to add to "the empty talk"?

see my later post.

Will add more as time permits.


Happy Ramzan

 

[hkdas]

Do we care what Indians think? Nope.

I mean, how low and woefully ignorant one has to be to write up and read in Indian Defence Review?

well, your(Pakistani's) woefully ignorant nature and lack of strategic thinking lead your county to become a unstable and volatile nation. the author of that article is an army officer with very good experience in counter insurgency operations.

 

[Icarus]

well, your(Pakistani's) woefully ignorant nature and lack of strategic thinking lead your county to become a unstable and volatile nation. the author of that article is an army officer with very good experience in counter insurgency operations.

Yes, but the General's credentials are not being questioned, what's being questioned is the fact that he put in the effort to write this article which at the end of the day makes a lot of assumptions, repeats India's stance on Pakistan and then goes on to finish on the note of 'we'll see what happens when it actually happens'.

 

[FaujHistorian]

well, your(Pakistani's) woefully ignorant nature and lack of strategic thinking lead your county to become a unstable and volatile nation. the author of that article is an army officer with very good experience in counter insurgency operations.

Easy to say for an Indian.

So sad to see Indians totally failing to realize that areas now called Pakistan have been a great wall of India protecting it for 200+ years from centuries old concept of Afghan hoards.

Give and take 1814-2014, Afghan hoards had been pushed across Khyber
Still the area we see now as Wazirastan has remained trouble spot since 1814 (if not before that time, but you see why I am capping this at 1814 to provide an approximate start time)

Instead of working with Pakistan to strengthen the protection wall of India,

Ignorant fools have been trying to pull it down
while colluding with some of the same old Afghan hoards.


Did Pakistan use some of the hoards in Kashmir back in 80s and 90s? you betcha

But from then on, the same Pakistan has stopped them as well.


So you want to live in present while learning from the past?

or you just want to live in the past.

Choice is yours.



I say this is all discussion of the net warriors.

I mean no personal disrespect. I hope you realize

Happy ramzan.