The recoil on the Bren is insane.
This has bothered me for years. I don't see any real benefit to the level of fragmentation we see in our regional paramilitary forces. Not only should paramilitaries merge under a central entity, say National Guard, but it makes sense to give them the role of disaster relief or any internal security issue. And having a central organisation under GHQ would bring vast improvements to their capabilities. But knowing how things work in Pakistan, it would take a calamity for us to even think of this otherwise sensible reorganisation.
P.S. This picture is forever etched in my mind. You cannot thank Lt Gen Tariq Khan (R) enough for rescuing FC.
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We are romancing the Russians hence the expense.
Yep. The concept of "levies" is antiquated.
Today, 'internal security' is a beast with its own distinct challenges, so it needs specific aptitudes and -- not least -- types of people in charge. You have to deal with local sensitivities, low-intensity warfare, and a host of other issues that you shouldn't burden the regular Army with (especially over the long-run).
As I see it, the job of the Pakistan Army is to defeat the army of an enemy country. It needs to be tuned to 'go for the kill' as swiftly as possible, so its training, weapons, and deployments should reflect that goal.
The job of a potential 'National Guard' is to protect the integrity of our country against natural disasters, or asymmetrical threats, or even popular unrest. This is the force that has the capacity for COIN, intelligence, emergency policing, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, field hospitals, etc.
Finally, placing a National Guard under GHQ helps the Army standardize equipment (e.g., USAF and ANG).
So, if they order 60 attack helicopters, they can add another 15 for the National Guard. It would not be an opportunity cost because in a state v. state war, the National Guard will operate under the Army -- so it'd be 75 attack helicopters in war.
Likewise for MRAPs. Yes, the MRAPs have a special use-case in COIN, but in a regular war, they can revert to a 4x4 APC. So again, if they order 1,000 MRAPs, they can make sure the design is suitable for use in COIN/CT as well as an APC.
It can work the other way around too. The National Guard may require a new assault rifle with sights, and given that the order is large (e.g., 100,000), GHQ can align it to a future rifle need. GHQ may not equip the regular Army with the new rifles right away, but it can prepare for that by front-loading the investment for the Guard.
Ironically, the presence of a National Guard might even help us get foreign financial support. With a non-India focus from the onset, the US might love the idea and open all sorts of aid (e.g., subsidize MRAPs, rifles, etc). If Congress inquires about the aid, the DoD or Dept of State will say, "this aid goes to the Pakistani National Guard, they have a single mandate, to fight terrorism."