CriticalThought
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The recent deal between Russia and India for the S-400 air defence system has raised a lot of concerns within Pakistani defence circles. In this article, we analyse the threat to Pakistan and possible measures to counter the threat.
India has been consistently increasing its air defence prowess over the past many years. This capability ranges from Anti-aircraft guns for close range, to legacy SA-6 and Tunguska for short range, and S-125 for medium range. There are unconfirmed rumors of S-300 being deployed in some form. Some of these legacy Russian systems are being replaced gradually with newer systems produced in cooperation with Israel. These include Akaash, and Barak. Finally, active R&D is taking place on the AAD and PAD ballistic missile defence systems.
Without going into the details and capabilities of each of these systems, it should be obvious that Indian defence strategists have been alert to developments in the region, and have made considerable efforts to orchestrate a credible response. Given the extensive nature of this air defence capability, the prospects of any deep strikes by Pakistani aircraft into Indian territory have been questionable at best. Up till now, a Pakistani response to any Indian aggression would have come in the form of stand-off weapons launched in a saturation attack style to soften up air defences. But with the S-400, this game has taken a dangerous turn for Pakistan.
The emergent threat to Pakistani air assets is that of force denial. Indian planners want to neutralize Pakistani aircraft from the comfort of their own borders, without putting any Indian aircraft at risk. Although the PAF has the capability to counter any Indian SAM threat, including the S-400 system, it is the combined threat of Indian planning that causes extreme concern.
Consider a scenario where India launches a salvo of supersonic Brahmos missiles at Pakistani forward bases and air defence installations. This infrastructure costs hundreds of millions of dollars, and significant damage would set back Pakistan both financially and militarily. Currently, Pakistan lacks any air defence capability that can counter the threat of Brahmos missile. Our best defence is an effective offence. Unfortunately, in the presence of Indian air defence whose reach extends to well within Pakistan's borders, the Pakistani response will be necessarily delayed and degraded. Even disregarding the fact that India can absorb much more damage because of its financial and military muscle, Pakistan would be unable to give an equal response in a quick timeframe. Any Pakistani counter-attack would have to first neutralize the Indian air defences.
So what should be an appropriate Pakistani response? This author feels that Pakistan's response should be three pronged. First and foremost, Pakistan needs a solid air defence system. Such a system should take into account threats from both the East and the West. Second, Pakistan needs to upgrade its EW capabilities. And last but not least, we need a kinetic response that will make most Indian air defence redundant.
At this point, a reciprocal purchase of S-400 by Pakistan seems implausible. What is needed is a credible response to the Brahmos missile to protect land and sea based assets. Pakistan should look at both indigenous development and a quick foreign purchase. In the long term, indigenous capability is the only sustainable way to counter the increasing Indian threat. But in the short term, deployment of HQ-9 should be given a priority.
Indigenous capability development is a long term option and has many sub-components. This includes indigenous development of tracking and targeting radars, surface to air missiles, sonic and laser based weapons.
Electronic warfare incorporates subterfuge, sabotage, and espionage. Pakistani intelligence needs to gain knowledge of Indian air defence capabilities and any weak spots. This can include making inroads to Indian defence suppliers to find out about weaknesses and loopholes. It can also mean infiltrating Indian defence organizations such as DRDO.
Lastly, Pakistan needs to upgrade its cruise missile program to target the hypersonic range. Thankfully, much of the R&D in Babur will be relevant because terrain recognition, waypoint navigation, target identification can all be utilized. A credible hypersonic missile will make most Indian air defence, and restore the balance where a saturation strike from Pakistan would be a credible threat to Indian infrastructure.
India has been consistently increasing its air defence prowess over the past many years. This capability ranges from Anti-aircraft guns for close range, to legacy SA-6 and Tunguska for short range, and S-125 for medium range. There are unconfirmed rumors of S-300 being deployed in some form. Some of these legacy Russian systems are being replaced gradually with newer systems produced in cooperation with Israel. These include Akaash, and Barak. Finally, active R&D is taking place on the AAD and PAD ballistic missile defence systems.
Without going into the details and capabilities of each of these systems, it should be obvious that Indian defence strategists have been alert to developments in the region, and have made considerable efforts to orchestrate a credible response. Given the extensive nature of this air defence capability, the prospects of any deep strikes by Pakistani aircraft into Indian territory have been questionable at best. Up till now, a Pakistani response to any Indian aggression would have come in the form of stand-off weapons launched in a saturation attack style to soften up air defences. But with the S-400, this game has taken a dangerous turn for Pakistan.
The emergent threat to Pakistani air assets is that of force denial. Indian planners want to neutralize Pakistani aircraft from the comfort of their own borders, without putting any Indian aircraft at risk. Although the PAF has the capability to counter any Indian SAM threat, including the S-400 system, it is the combined threat of Indian planning that causes extreme concern.
Consider a scenario where India launches a salvo of supersonic Brahmos missiles at Pakistani forward bases and air defence installations. This infrastructure costs hundreds of millions of dollars, and significant damage would set back Pakistan both financially and militarily. Currently, Pakistan lacks any air defence capability that can counter the threat of Brahmos missile. Our best defence is an effective offence. Unfortunately, in the presence of Indian air defence whose reach extends to well within Pakistan's borders, the Pakistani response will be necessarily delayed and degraded. Even disregarding the fact that India can absorb much more damage because of its financial and military muscle, Pakistan would be unable to give an equal response in a quick timeframe. Any Pakistani counter-attack would have to first neutralize the Indian air defences.
So what should be an appropriate Pakistani response? This author feels that Pakistan's response should be three pronged. First and foremost, Pakistan needs a solid air defence system. Such a system should take into account threats from both the East and the West. Second, Pakistan needs to upgrade its EW capabilities. And last but not least, we need a kinetic response that will make most Indian air defence redundant.
At this point, a reciprocal purchase of S-400 by Pakistan seems implausible. What is needed is a credible response to the Brahmos missile to protect land and sea based assets. Pakistan should look at both indigenous development and a quick foreign purchase. In the long term, indigenous capability is the only sustainable way to counter the increasing Indian threat. But in the short term, deployment of HQ-9 should be given a priority.
Indigenous capability development is a long term option and has many sub-components. This includes indigenous development of tracking and targeting radars, surface to air missiles, sonic and laser based weapons.
Electronic warfare incorporates subterfuge, sabotage, and espionage. Pakistani intelligence needs to gain knowledge of Indian air defence capabilities and any weak spots. This can include making inroads to Indian defence suppliers to find out about weaknesses and loopholes. It can also mean infiltrating Indian defence organizations such as DRDO.
Lastly, Pakistan needs to upgrade its cruise missile program to target the hypersonic range. Thankfully, much of the R&D in Babur will be relevant because terrain recognition, waypoint navigation, target identification can all be utilized. A credible hypersonic missile will make most Indian air defence, and restore the balance where a saturation strike from Pakistan would be a credible threat to Indian infrastructure.
