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Pakistan has decided that it will have tactical nuclear weapons at sea, where a ship or submarine commander may be authorised to launch a nuclear strike against an Indian Task Force in international waters
These are difficult times for India. To counter the growing blue water capability of the Indian Navy, China has transferred designs and expertise to enable the Pakistan Navy to introduce tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) at sea.
On November 5, 2013, the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Forces Command fired two quadruple salvos (i.e. eight missiles) of the NASR short-range (60 kilometre) battlefield ballistic missile capable of carrying a “new miniaturised” 200 kg plutonium warhead, (under development since 2011, but essentially a copy of a Chinese TNW tested in 1992 by China), thus introducing TNWs on land.
These NASR missile batteries with TNWs would be placed under local battlefield commanders (unlike strategic nuclear weapons which are under the National Command Authority, headed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister), who may use them at their discretion to blunt a conventional Indian attack (in response to a terror attack on India like 26/11).
Thus it will initiate a nuclear war, as India would respond with a massive nuclear strike in keeping with its nuclear doctrine. It is apparent from Pakistan’s posture and Chinese border incursions that these two allies do not believe that India will follow its nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation.
Pakistani NASR is a copy of the Chinese WS-2 rocket. Since the miniaturised TNWs (one to five kilotonnes or KTs) were reportedly tested by China in 1992, Pakistan does not have to test them.
Such TNWs would have a yield of about two KT each (the Hiroshima Uranium bomb was 14 KT, and Nagasaki plutonium bomb was 22 KT) and a damage radius (a combination of blast, heat, pressure and radiation) of below one km, depending on the height of bomb explosion.
The plutonium for the TNWs would come from the four Khusab nuclear plants gifted by China, which will enable Pakistan to make four to five plutonium TNWs annually, in addition to 10 uranium atom bombs (yield about 14 KT each) it produces annually.
Added to this is the known capability of the Pakistan Air Forces’ Strategic Forces Command to deliver airborne nuclear weapons by fighter aircrafts using free fall nuclear bombs or the 350-km range (450 kg nuclear warhead) Ra’ad air launched cruise missile (also of Chinese design, and this Ra’ad will be carried by the Chinese supplied JF-17 Fighter aircraft).
On December 30, 2013, the media reported that arrested Indian Mujahideen terrorist Yasin Bhatkal had confessed to the police that he was “assured” by his Pakistani handlers that a “dirty nuclear bomb” could be made available to be dropped on Surat. The dirty nuclear bomb is a simple radiological “weapon of mass disruption” (not to be confused with an atom or hydrogen bomb, both of which are “weapons of mass destruction”), which combines available radioactive materials (including those used in medical industry or research) with conventional explosives to cause mass panic and terror against civilian populations.
It contaminates the affected area with radioactive material. This has economic consequences as it leads to industrial and tourist shutdown. And thus arises the need for expensive decontamination equipment to cleanse the contaminated area by highly trained nuclear emergency response and support teams.
This dirty bomb threat (transported by sea in a repeat 26/11 type attack) is real and is merely an extension of the present Pakistani policy of using conventional terror.
In such an alarming scenario, Pakistan would be hoping that its nuclear weapons (including ready to use TNWs) would deter an Indian response.
This article also deals with the new threat posed by Pakistan Navy, which plans to take TNWs to sea for possible use against Indian coastal cities like Mumbai, or the major oil terminal at Vadinar (Gujarat) or the Mumbai high offshore oil rigs or against the new task forces of the Indian Navy, which would be centred around the newly acquired 44,500-tonne aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the under construction 37,000-tonne indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant (expected to join the Navy by 2018).
In April 2011, Pakistan signed a contract with China for delivery of six Qing-class conventional submarines. Few Indians analysed the implications of this event.
These Qing subs, maybe delivered between 2017 and 2022. Each one of them would have the capability to launch the 700-km range, nuclear-tipped Babur land attack cruise missile that was produced in Pakistan but was, yet again, based on a Chinese design.
In 2012, the Pakistan Navy announced the creation of a new “Strategic Naval Command” to be headed by a vice-admiral. On December 19, 2012 and December 21, 2012, the media reports indicated that the Pakistan Navy had successfully test-fired a new land attack, nuclear tipped variant of the Chinese designed C-802 anti-ship missile with 120-km range or the 700-km range Babur nuclear capable land attack cruise missile from PNS Zulfiquar (one of four Chinese designed F-22 frigates with the Pakistan Navy).
The news further stated that the Pakistani Navy Chief Admiral Mohammad Asif Sandila was present during the test firings and this would give the Pakistani Navy a “counter value” (i.e. targeting civilian population) deterrence capability against Indian coastal cities with TNWs.
India does not have TNWs. Indeed the experience of the Cold War showed that TNWs were inherently destabilising, as their inadvertent use by a battlefield commander (on land or sea) could trigger of a nuclear holocaust.
Hence both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation gave up TNWs and relied on large, centrally controlled nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence.
Pakistan obviously has decided that it will have TNWs at sea, where a ship or submarine commander may be authorised to launch a nuclear strike against an Indian Task Force in international waters, on the false assumption that it will not trigger a massive Indian nuclear retaliation.
Even more dangerous is the prospect of a “rogue” jihadi Pakistan’s naval ship or submarine commander launching an unauthorised nuclear strike against a crowded city like Mumbai, thereby killing thousands in a “nuclear 26/11”.
Given that China poses an additional nuclear threat to India and that Pakistan is China’s nuclear-armed proxy in South Asia, what are the options for India?
Post-2014, the next government should take a fresh look at India’s nuclear doctrine of no-first use and also expedite operational induction of ballistic and cruise missile defence systems.
Our response mechanism to a dirty nuclear bomb or TNW or a strategic nuclear bomb needs to be exercised regularly with nuclear emergency response and support teams being tested and audited. Dedicated hospitals in each major city need to be earmarked and outfitted to provide medical assistance to victims of a nuclear attack.
The Indian Navy needs to factor in the new sea based nuclear threat emanating from Pakistan Navy and Pakistan-based sea terrorists, while maintaining a technological edge over deployable Chinese Navy units operating in the Indian Ocean region.
This means that the Indian Navy would need a capability to sanitise a belt of 350 miles around our coasts with a combination of intelligence, satellites, aircraft and warships, and simultaneously have enough nuclear tactical submarines to detect and destroy Pakistan Navy’s nuclear armed units as they leave Pakistan.
While strategic nuclear weapons are here to stay in the South Asia triangle comprising India, China and Pakistan, peace is not possible till TNWs and dirty nuclear bombs are abolished and dismantled under international supervision.
The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
Pakistan’s dirty bomb threat | The Asian Age
These are difficult times for India. To counter the growing blue water capability of the Indian Navy, China has transferred designs and expertise to enable the Pakistan Navy to introduce tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) at sea.
On November 5, 2013, the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Forces Command fired two quadruple salvos (i.e. eight missiles) of the NASR short-range (60 kilometre) battlefield ballistic missile capable of carrying a “new miniaturised” 200 kg plutonium warhead, (under development since 2011, but essentially a copy of a Chinese TNW tested in 1992 by China), thus introducing TNWs on land.
These NASR missile batteries with TNWs would be placed under local battlefield commanders (unlike strategic nuclear weapons which are under the National Command Authority, headed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister), who may use them at their discretion to blunt a conventional Indian attack (in response to a terror attack on India like 26/11).
Thus it will initiate a nuclear war, as India would respond with a massive nuclear strike in keeping with its nuclear doctrine. It is apparent from Pakistan’s posture and Chinese border incursions that these two allies do not believe that India will follow its nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation.
Pakistani NASR is a copy of the Chinese WS-2 rocket. Since the miniaturised TNWs (one to five kilotonnes or KTs) were reportedly tested by China in 1992, Pakistan does not have to test them.
Such TNWs would have a yield of about two KT each (the Hiroshima Uranium bomb was 14 KT, and Nagasaki plutonium bomb was 22 KT) and a damage radius (a combination of blast, heat, pressure and radiation) of below one km, depending on the height of bomb explosion.
The plutonium for the TNWs would come from the four Khusab nuclear plants gifted by China, which will enable Pakistan to make four to five plutonium TNWs annually, in addition to 10 uranium atom bombs (yield about 14 KT each) it produces annually.
Added to this is the known capability of the Pakistan Air Forces’ Strategic Forces Command to deliver airborne nuclear weapons by fighter aircrafts using free fall nuclear bombs or the 350-km range (450 kg nuclear warhead) Ra’ad air launched cruise missile (also of Chinese design, and this Ra’ad will be carried by the Chinese supplied JF-17 Fighter aircraft).
On December 30, 2013, the media reported that arrested Indian Mujahideen terrorist Yasin Bhatkal had confessed to the police that he was “assured” by his Pakistani handlers that a “dirty nuclear bomb” could be made available to be dropped on Surat. The dirty nuclear bomb is a simple radiological “weapon of mass disruption” (not to be confused with an atom or hydrogen bomb, both of which are “weapons of mass destruction”), which combines available radioactive materials (including those used in medical industry or research) with conventional explosives to cause mass panic and terror against civilian populations.
It contaminates the affected area with radioactive material. This has economic consequences as it leads to industrial and tourist shutdown. And thus arises the need for expensive decontamination equipment to cleanse the contaminated area by highly trained nuclear emergency response and support teams.
This dirty bomb threat (transported by sea in a repeat 26/11 type attack) is real and is merely an extension of the present Pakistani policy of using conventional terror.
In such an alarming scenario, Pakistan would be hoping that its nuclear weapons (including ready to use TNWs) would deter an Indian response.
This article also deals with the new threat posed by Pakistan Navy, which plans to take TNWs to sea for possible use against Indian coastal cities like Mumbai, or the major oil terminal at Vadinar (Gujarat) or the Mumbai high offshore oil rigs or against the new task forces of the Indian Navy, which would be centred around the newly acquired 44,500-tonne aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the under construction 37,000-tonne indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant (expected to join the Navy by 2018).
In April 2011, Pakistan signed a contract with China for delivery of six Qing-class conventional submarines. Few Indians analysed the implications of this event.
These Qing subs, maybe delivered between 2017 and 2022. Each one of them would have the capability to launch the 700-km range, nuclear-tipped Babur land attack cruise missile that was produced in Pakistan but was, yet again, based on a Chinese design.
In 2012, the Pakistan Navy announced the creation of a new “Strategic Naval Command” to be headed by a vice-admiral. On December 19, 2012 and December 21, 2012, the media reports indicated that the Pakistan Navy had successfully test-fired a new land attack, nuclear tipped variant of the Chinese designed C-802 anti-ship missile with 120-km range or the 700-km range Babur nuclear capable land attack cruise missile from PNS Zulfiquar (one of four Chinese designed F-22 frigates with the Pakistan Navy).
The news further stated that the Pakistani Navy Chief Admiral Mohammad Asif Sandila was present during the test firings and this would give the Pakistani Navy a “counter value” (i.e. targeting civilian population) deterrence capability against Indian coastal cities with TNWs.
India does not have TNWs. Indeed the experience of the Cold War showed that TNWs were inherently destabilising, as their inadvertent use by a battlefield commander (on land or sea) could trigger of a nuclear holocaust.
Hence both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation gave up TNWs and relied on large, centrally controlled nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence.
Pakistan obviously has decided that it will have TNWs at sea, where a ship or submarine commander may be authorised to launch a nuclear strike against an Indian Task Force in international waters, on the false assumption that it will not trigger a massive Indian nuclear retaliation.
Even more dangerous is the prospect of a “rogue” jihadi Pakistan’s naval ship or submarine commander launching an unauthorised nuclear strike against a crowded city like Mumbai, thereby killing thousands in a “nuclear 26/11”.
Given that China poses an additional nuclear threat to India and that Pakistan is China’s nuclear-armed proxy in South Asia, what are the options for India?
Post-2014, the next government should take a fresh look at India’s nuclear doctrine of no-first use and also expedite operational induction of ballistic and cruise missile defence systems.
Our response mechanism to a dirty nuclear bomb or TNW or a strategic nuclear bomb needs to be exercised regularly with nuclear emergency response and support teams being tested and audited. Dedicated hospitals in each major city need to be earmarked and outfitted to provide medical assistance to victims of a nuclear attack.
The Indian Navy needs to factor in the new sea based nuclear threat emanating from Pakistan Navy and Pakistan-based sea terrorists, while maintaining a technological edge over deployable Chinese Navy units operating in the Indian Ocean region.
This means that the Indian Navy would need a capability to sanitise a belt of 350 miles around our coasts with a combination of intelligence, satellites, aircraft and warships, and simultaneously have enough nuclear tactical submarines to detect and destroy Pakistan Navy’s nuclear armed units as they leave Pakistan.
While strategic nuclear weapons are here to stay in the South Asia triangle comprising India, China and Pakistan, peace is not possible till TNWs and dirty nuclear bombs are abolished and dismantled under international supervision.
The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
Pakistan’s dirty bomb threat | The Asian Age