Thursday, August 09, 2012
VIEW : Swat operation and the role of the army — Amna Syed
In a state of vulnerability, it was the Taliban who extended a hand of sympathy, promising both worldly success and triumph in the hereafter
It was on the eve of May 16, 2009, that Pakistani forces advanced towards the Swat valley, which had become the hub of terrorism in the northwest of Pakistan. Once known for its serene beauty, the Swat valley had fallen prey to terrorist activities when the TTP active in Swat attacked the city of Buner, not honouring the pact they had signed with the Pakistani government. This operation known as Operation Rah-e-Nijat was not the first of its kind.
In the US’s War against Terror the Pakistan army had previously been part of several such endeavours including a few in Swat like the Operation Rah-e-Rast and Operation Rah-e-Haq, yet this particular operation superseded all others in importance, for this was a battle of survival for Pakistanis.
Early in the summer of 2009, the provincial government signed a pact with the militants in Swat. According to this the militants would give up arms and Swat valley would be under the rule of Shariah and hence under heavy influence of these militants. The signing of the Nizam-e-Adl Ordinance was being viewed with much suspicion not only locally but internationally as well. These fears were confirmed with the attack on the city of Buner. Hence, the idea of the Pakistani state’s writ being compromised in Swat began to evolve all around.
The militants first began their activities in the year 2001 shortly before the attack on the World Trade Centre. As Swat was one of the areas with a large youth population, it held great importance for the Taliban leadership who believed that this very youth could be easily trained and equipped to fight their war. The increasing unemployment rate in the region and lack of financial support programmes by government had made the Taliban hopeful of control of this area. Mounting economic worries had left parents with little choice but to send their children to madrassas run by these militants. When such a child completed schooling, he found that there were very few or no jobs at all which he could look towards in hope of supporting his family. In such a state of vulnerability, it was the Taliban who extended a hand of sympathy, promising both worldly success and triumph in the hereafter. They were making an offer that could not be refused.
The insurgents adopted a policy of both convincing and terrorising the population in coming to terms with the Taliban. While many schools were torched and razed to the ground, a key militant leader, Maulana Fazlullah, would air his anti-westernisation sermons urging people to stop sending their girls to school as he called for a total ban on female education. In 2004 alone, there were 200 dropouts in Government High School for Girls, Charbagh. The names of these students were aired on radio, hailing them for defying western culture and escaping the fire of hell that otherwise awaited them. Swat clearly had become a Taliban stronghold. There were reports of dead bodies being found on trees, usually beheaded, and bodies lying on pavements; hence any feeble local resistance to the rule of the insurgents was brutally dealt with. In such a situation, government and military had to plan their next move very carefully.
When the country’s leadership decided the course of action that was to be adopted, there were many questions raised as to the success of such a plan. However, all parties including the military leadership deemed an operation of this kind necessary because of the advancing tide of the terrorists towards the Capital. The leader of JUI, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, was reported to have said that the Taliban were just behind the Margalla hills. The threat was real and there were very few options government could play around with. This, coupled with the US pressure for such an operation, left Pakistan with no other choice.
The Pakistan army struck with full force, crippling the militants’ defences and surprised the international community with the success of the attacks. The efforts of the Pakistan army were internationally recognised. In 2009, The New York Times reported that the US joint chiefs of staff commended the efforts of the Pakistani army.
The Swat operation was very intricate in many respects. The complexity of this operation came from the fact that it was carried out in an urban area where the militants could easily take refuge in the densely populated region. Moreover, the treacherous terrain of the land made the operation more difficult. Coming into a valley where the militants already had a stronghold and then defeating them in battle was not an easy task. However, because of great stories of heroism that will be remembered for times to come, the Pakistan army not only recaptured but cleared the area of insurgents. Many important leaders of the TTP and TNSM were captured or killed.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the operation was the displacement of the IDPs; this was a source of major concern to the Pakistani authorities. According to UN reports, some 1.9 million people had been compelled to leave their homes, while some shifted in with host families. An approximate 260,000 had taken refuge in camps set up by the government.
In a seemingly impossible task, the local authorities, with the help of the Pakistan army, were able to successfully return all these displaced people back to the safety of their homes. At the time when they were leaving their houses, international media had described the idea of their returning home an unrealistic dream because the parallel for such could not been found in history. The UN reports had quite openly claimed that if such a return were ever possible, it would not be before three to four years. However, the reservations of the international community were put to rest with the return of these people.
With war in Swat over and peace restored, we now look towards the causes and consequences of the Taliban control of the area. Analyses very clearly point in the direction of a weak education system and lack of employment opportunities for the people. The task of rehabilitation, which lies ahead of us, is if not more, then as equally important as was the elimination of the Taliban initially. People who have returned to their homes do not return to the Swat they once called home, the place that had been the Mecca for tourists in Pakistan. They return to a war-ravaged Swat. Children have come home to find their schools in rubble. While many government and non-governmental organisations are working to rebuild schools, the progress is very slow. A report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in the year 2010 showed that out of 175 schools that had been destroyed, only six were reconstructed. Furthermore, lack of economic activities in the region provides a difficult situation for people. According to the fact-finding analysis of the conflict later, a majority of people believed that it was unemployment that had initially pushed the population towards ‘Talibanisation’.
Swat today remains a vulnerable area and government should take all precautionary measures to ensure a safe and prospering northwestern Pakistan. In this, not only the health and education sector has to be catered for, adequate economic opportunities have to be generated.
While the efforts of the local authorities and army have been widely acclaimed, for obvious reasons the duty that awaits us cannot be ignored.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at
ayeshamazher@yahoo.com
